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The USSR in the Great Patriotic War: Tragedy of 1941.



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On June 22, 1941 the Soviet Union underwent unexpected, without declaration of war, to attack of Germany. The Great Patriotic War of owls etsyugo the people, become with a stavny part of W Aura of world war began.

First of all it is necessary to give a periodization of the described events. It agrees settled in a modern domestic historiography with a hema the next periods are allocated.

The first period: June, 1941 - November, 1942

The second period: November, 1942 - December, 1943

The third period: December, 1943 - May, 1945

War of the USSR against Japan is considered as the independent and final period of its participation in World War II. In

about to a snov of this periodization put the course of fight for a strategic initiative. During the first period a strategic initiative in general the German army possessed, its command defined the direction and time of drawing the main blows, the Red Army had to conduct large-scale defensive battles, receding in depth of the Soviet territory.

Within the first period also initial stage of war is allocated: from June 22 to July 10. The concept "initial stage" is widespread in a military historiography, it is time from the beginning of military operations before completion of mobilization when bo evy actions are conducted by army of peace time. The attempt of the Soviet command to seize strategic initiative during offensive operations in the winter - spring of 1942 was not successful, and the Wehrmacht began large-scale approach on the southern flank of east front again. To break the course of war and to take an initiative of its maintaining command of the Red Army managed only during the second period of war, and since December, 1943 up to the end of war the strategic initiative already was in hands of the Soviet armed forces.

Statement of a problem. In relation to events of the beginning of war it is represented to the most productive from the informative point of view to consider accident of 1941 as syuy rsd the moment of truth which gave the answer on vopro with about that how adequate were ideas of ruling elite of the USSR of the approaching war and how effective was a preparation for it. At the same time events of the first period showed degree of efficiency of activity of the Soviet system in extreme conditions of transition from peaceful life to war. During this period the system began to realize the mobilizing potential that in a surrealism future allowed to create prerequisites for fundamental change in war.

In this regard it is also expedient to specify statement of a problem, having focused attention on the following key questions. What was the valid ratio of forces of the parties by the beginning of fighting? What role in defeats of the Red Army was played by factors of an objective and subjective order? How reasonable and adequate effect Soviet ru kovodstvo were had? How did they affect the course of events on the Soviet-German front? How during an initial stage of war features of the Soviet military-political system were shown? How did the condition of the Soviet society on the eve of war affect succession of events during its initial stage? How mobilization of capacity of the country for the benefit of warfare was carried out?

Justification of a problem In a domestic historiography strongly took roots opinion that the beginning of war was absolutely unexpected for soviet leadership and its action in the first days were dictated by this surprise and the fact of sharply conscious incompleteness of preparation of army for war. Admitting the unconditional fact unexpected and belief of lomny attack of fascist Germany on the Soviet Union, it is necessary to pay nevertheless attention that the management of the Third Reich only in next, not the first, time repeated the favourite scheme of attack (without declaration of war and in every way at once), and, so, the surprise was very relative. Besides the analysis of degree of adequacy of the very first actions of I.V. Stalin and his environment after receiving news of attack of Germany pozyulyat to give a bit different interpretation of the reasons of defeats of the Red Army in the first days of war.

Preparation for war became a basis and, in fact, backbone function of the Soviet mode, and the mode was most adapted for needs of warfare. However at its beginning the Soviet system appeared incapable to develop the most effective solutions for aggression reflection. Accident of 1941 became a result of activity of the Soviet military-political system in pre-war years and at the very beginning of war.


Battles on border (on June 22 - on July 10, 1941)

On the night of June 22 the main attack of the German army of invasion was put on troops of three border military districts (fronts) - Northwest, Western and Southwest. A bit later also troops of the Southern front (former Odessa military district) underwent blows. Against them three groups of the German armies - Sever, Centre and Yug respectively acted. In general, on one of the directions the German troops had no overwhelming superiority, and in a strip of actions of the Southwest front the considerable advantage was on the party of the Red Army.

Table 1. A ratio of forces of the parties for June 22, 1941 1

Forces and means Staff (thousand people) Tanks Planes Tools and mortars

Western front 678 2,189 1,539 10,296

Group of Centre armies 634.9 8 yu 1,677 12,500

Northwest front 379.5 1,274 1,078 4938

Group of Sever armies 655 1,389 1,070 7673

Southwest front 957 4,783 1,759 12,604

Group of Yug armies 730 799 772 9700

All as a part of border fronts of the Red Army 2,014.5 8,246 4,376 27838

All as a part of the German army on the Soviet border 2,019.9 2,998 3,519 29,873

Directive No. 1 was still transferred from headquarters of districts to headquarters of armies and cases when in 3 hours 15 min. the German artillery opened fire at all line of the Soviet-German border. At the same time hundreds of planes struck blows to military and civilian facilities. Also many cities, among them - Murmansk, Riga, Minsk, Smolensk and Kiev underwent bombing. In 3 hours 17 min. in the General Staff was on luchen the first report from Sevastopol on a raid of the German aircraft.

From memoirs of the marshal G.K. Zhukov:

"The people's commissar ordered me to call I.V. Stalin. I call. Nobody answers phone. I call continuously. At last I hear a sleepy voice of the general Vlasik (head of department of protection).

>- Sgo speaks?

>- Chief of the General Staff Zhukov. I ask to connect me to companion Stalin urgently.

>- What? Now?! - the security officer was surprised. - Companion Stalin sleeps.

>- You awake immediately: Germans bomb our cities, war began.

Several moments last silence. At last in a tube deafly


>- Wait.

In about three minutes I.V. Stalin approached an apparag. I reported a situation and asked for permission to begin reciprocal fighting. I.V. Stalin is silent. I hear only its heavy breath.

>- Did you understand me? - Again silence.

>- Whether there will be instructions? - I insist.

At last as though having regained consciousness, I.V. Stalin asked:

>- Where people's commissar?

>- Speaks on VCh with the Kiev district.

>- Come with Tymoshenko to the Kremlin. Tell Poskrebyshev that he called all members of the Politburo...

At 4 hours 30 minutes mornings we with S.K. Tymoshenko arrived to the Kremlin. All called members of the Politburo were already assembled. I and the people's commissar was invited in an office.

I.V. Stalin was pale and sat at a table, holding the tube which is not filled by tobacco in hand.

We reported a situation. I.V. Stalin nedoumevayushche told:

>- Whether it is provocation of the German generals?

>- Germans bomb our cities in Ukraine, in Belarus and the Baltics. What is provocation... - answered S.K. Tymoshenko.

>- If it is necessary to organize provocation, - I.V. Stalin told, - that the German generals bomb also the cities... - And, psdumav it is a little, continued: - Hitler for certain does not know about it".

(G.K. Zhukov. Memoirs and reflections. T. 2. M, 1990. Page 8-9.)

News of the beginning of war was a bolt from the blue for soviet leadership and caused confusion. And it is quite clear: all policy of Stalin of two pre-war years proceeded from impossibility of similar turn of events, and all actions of the power, often absurd and not reasonable, were directed to provoking this attack. And everything was vain.

But if after all to recognize that all Stalin policy was dictated by conviction in unavailability of the country to war and desire to delay its beginning at any cost, then Stalin's reaction has to there was be absolutely other. If it really so

considered, that news of attack had to cause even not confusion, but the real shock already during the first hours. And all subsequent actions had to be absolutely others, directed to localization of damage and, the most important, time prize for reduction of the country and army in readiness for warfare. The best way for this purpose - tough defense at in advance prepared boundaries, in case of need - retreat with the purpose to keep efficient parts and to again win time.

However Stalin's actions were absolutely others. Soon after the official announcement Germany wars transferred by the ambassador in Moskve von Shulenburg when all doubts disappeared, Stalin without any fluctuations approved the offered Tymoshenko and Zhukov directive No. 2: to troops it was ordered "in every way and means to fall upon enemy forces and to destroy them in areas where they broke the Soviet border". But there passed all not how many hours, and directive No. 3 was sent to troops. Its contents was even more resolute: joint actions of Northwest, Western and Southwest fronts to crush shock groups of Wehrmacht and to move fighting to the territory Ger of a mania. Despite objections and fluctuations of command of fronts, Moscow very strictly insisted on its immediate execution.

These actions of Stalin will not be coordinated with his belief in unavailability of army to war in any way. Rather it resembled rage of the deceived and deceived person, besides the person confident in the forces: "Ah, time so, we will show you now!" In general, the first steps of Stalin and the high military command once again confirmed: the soviet leadership had no adequate idea of truly m a condition of the Red Army and its real it is possible styakh. And this circumstance played the most fatal role in the result of border battle.

By the time of obtaining directive No. 3 of army to a Torah x fronts fell into the hardest state: being overtaken unawares, they were exposed to massive attacks of aircraft, artillery and tank groups of the opponent. The German troops managed to achieve suddenness on all directions of blows.

Especially brightly it showed s in a strip of actions of the Western front. When at dawn on June 22 parts of the 28th rifle corps came under powerful fire of the German artillery, commanders just did not believe in such opportunity and a signal "" tried signals of rockets dag, but it led only to firing strengthening. Commanders of many other parts, having come under fire and raids of aircraft, just preferred not to take any actions, being afraid "to give in on provocation".

The first attacks of Wehrmacht put out of action communication lines and control centers troops. Tyazhleyshy consequences were caused by blow of Luftwaffe to the Soviet airfields in the morning on June 22 in which hsda over 800 planes were destroyed. Together with losses during air fights only the Air Force of the Western front lost 40% of the structure. In the first day of war the German aircraft strongly took gospodstyu in air that was crucial for the result of battles of all initial stage of war. Continuous and effective air reconnaissance allowed the German command "to glance in cards" the opponent, in due time opening his plans. Assault blows of the German bombers broke transfer re zerv and promotion of the Soviet striking powers to areas from a sredotocheniye, destroyed communication centers and command posts, breaking managements of troops. Luftwaffe managed to develop the real "air umbrella" over the shock tank groups which were breaking through the Soviet defense, having provided them investigation, cover and clearing of ways of break. Gain domination in air became the first and necessary condition of the next blitzkrieg of Wehrmacht.

Loss of communication with higher headquarters led

to the fact that divisions and regiments of the Red Army were forced to make independent decisions. And here all shortcomings of command structure of RKKA affected. Fear of responsibility, inability to adoption of independent decisions kept commanders waiting for orders from above. But orders were not... The front headquarters which lost touch with headquarters of the armies tried to restore it, directing "delegates of communication" there. But numerous groups of the German saboteurs whose task included destruction of wire communication and interception on exiled already acted in the back. There was still a radio communication, but it and remained not mastered: in troops it is effective were not able to use it yet. As were not able to code and protect negotiations still. Specialists of the German radio services without effort took the bearings of work of the Soviet radio of transmitters, determining by them me hundred-position of headquarters, and nayudit on them aircraft. As a result the Soviet headquarters very reluctantly used a radio communication.

Having used effect of suddenness and confusion of the Soviet command the German troops occupied practically all bridges across the boundary Dvina Rivers, Dubissa and Bug. Capture intact mo st of St is scarlet a commonplace for in ermakht and: Germans managed it repeatedly that suggests an idea of some kind of regularity. These facts were explained by the same fear of responsibility of the Soviet commanders. Having appeared in a situation of need of the emergency adoption of the independent decision and not having an opportunity to contact the higher administration, they, as usual, preferred to wait, believing that the inaction nevertheless is less dangerous to them personally, than unauthorized action (blasting bridges).

Occupation of bridges across these rivers which could become a serye a zny obstacle allowed the German command to a descent to throw the shock tank and mechanized parts into approach. By the end of day on June 22 depth of advance of the German troops was from 20 to 70 km. Practically on all line of frontier to the German troops it is daring s to break through defense of the Red Army and to destroy a control system of troops. At this particular time to headquarters of fronts and on the directive of the people's commissar of defense No. 3 stepped.

In a situation when command of fronts did not regain control yet, and investigation yet not in hid structure and dislocation of the German army groups and, the most important, the directions of the blows struck by the opponent, was senseless to take the offensive not about hundred, but is criminal. Besides on preparation of operation of such scale not less than 30 - 40 days were required.

From memoirs of the marshal G.K. Zhukov:

"... The general N.F. Vatutin told, as. V. Stalin approved the draft of directive No. 3 of the people's commissar and ordered to append my signature.

>- What the directive is? - I asked.

>- The directive provides transition of our troops to kontrnas-tupagelny actions with a problem of defeat of the opponent on the major directions, besides with an exit to the territory of the opponent.

>- But we do not know for sure yet where and with what forces the opponent strikes the blows, - I objected. - Whether it is better to understand till the morning what occurs at the front, and then to make the necessary decision.

>- I share your point of view, but case this solved.

>- Well. - I told, - append my signature".

(G.K. Zhukov. Memoirs and reflections. T. 2. M, 1990. Page 14.)

Control questions: What dictated the edition of directive No. 3? As far as did it appear to the adequate developed situation?

But in the evening on June 22 of a yuysk started implementation of the directive. As envisioned by her originators it was planned, using the mechanized cases which were in a reserve of front command, to attack flanks of the German shock groups which broke in depth of the Soviet defense, to surround them and to destroy. In fact, it was than other as retaliation across Agra a quarrel that in precisely st met pre-war expectations of the beginning of war: "The plane will depart, zastrochit a machine gun, / iron tanks Will roar, / Both battle ships will go, and the infantry will go, / And dashing carts will rush off!"

Carrying out the directive, command of three fronts threw into approach the main reserve - the mechanized cases, those "armored fists" on which it laid s so many hopes. In a quantitative sense this was enormous tank armada. Two mekhkorpus of the Northwest front involved in counterstroke had 950 tanks against 600 German. The western front sent to the flank the opponent two mekhkorpus which had 1,265 tanks. The most powerful shock group was used by command of the South Western front - 5 mekhkorpus as a part of which there were in the general difficult st 2,803 tanks (already during battle one more joined them mekhkorpus, having about 1,070 tanks) against 4 German tank divisions which had only 585 tanks (one more tank division - 143 tanks was involved in battle). It would seem, the Soviet tank avalanche had to simply crush the German troops. But all three fronts suffered the most severe defeat in which thrown into counterattack of a mekhkorpus just ceased to exist.

Why and as it occurred, it is possible to understand on the example of actions

the 8th mechanized corps of the general D.I. Ryabyshev. The case was a part of the Southwest front and by the beginning of battle had 899 tanks. At the time of obtaining the order on counterstroke of its division made already the second march, carrying out the order of the headquarters of the front. Zamys ate counterstroke forced it to change once again the direction of the movement and to start a re-deployment over again, then everything repeated once again. As a result of all this staff confusion of a division of the case by the time of the introduction in battle there passed 480 - 500 km while fighting manuals provided commission of marches to the place of fight no more than 40 - 50 km. As the building did not receive any hour for necessary maintenance, it was necessary to leave a set of fighting vehicles on roads. Marches of the case were organized extremely ineptly: instead of seven routes of the movement put to the case, it was allocated only two that led to numerous jams on roads. The German aviation intelligence found promotion of the case at once, and up to the area from a sredotocheniye it was exposed to the continuous attacks from air. About any suddenness of its blow there could not be also a speech. As a result to the area of concentration of the 8th mekhkorpus left, having only a half of the tanks.

From memoirs of the general N.K. Popel:

". Ryabyshev turned back, lifted a peak-cap from the earth, straightened out overalls and a little solemn step moved towards to the head car. It left the low chernousy military. Ryabyshev was extended:

>- Companion member of the Council of War of the front...

That whom the komkor addressed did not begin to listen to the official report, did not bring a palm to a temple. It went, crushing the polished boots a bush, directly for Ryabyshev. The Koshcha came nearer, looked from below up in a wrinkled broad face of the commander of the case and by the voice squeezed from yaro st asked:

>- For how many was on sale, Judas?

Ryabyshev faced in a string the member of the Council of War, taken aback, not finding what to tell and all of us in embarrassment looked at the low all right cut-out case commissioner.

Dmitry Ivanovich started talking the first:

>- You would listen, the companion of case...

>- You, the traitor, the field court will listen. Here, under a pine, we will listen and at a pine we will shoot...

I did not sustain and acted forward:

>- You can accuse us of anything. However work before to listen.

>- And, it you, the regular lawyer at the traitor... - Now the stream of curses fell upon me.

All knew that the member of the Council of War does not take out when it is killed. But I had nothing to lose. I used its weapon. That there was no conscious reception. The anger prompted.

>- Still it is unknown by what soobrazhniya those who the order force to give to the enemy by force the taken territory are guided.

Case the commissioner stopped. To face to me, he should not raise the head. We one growth. Before my eyes accurate black polosk and at owls, the right e an eyelid nervously twitches. Almost inaudible confusion is in good voice the member of the Council of War:

>- Who ordered to give you the territory? What do you grind? The general Ryabyshev, report.

Dmitry Ivanovich reports. The member of the Council of War paces before us, having stuffed up hands for a back.

Case the commissioner understands what left not absolutely all right. But is not given. He looks at the watch and orders to Dmitry Ivanovich:

>- In twenty minutes report to me about syu I eat the decision...

Case the commissioner did not give time neither for investigation, nor for a regrouping of divisions. Than to come?

Ryabyshev gets up and goes to the case commissioner pacing alone.

>- The case smozht to finish a regrouping only by tomorrow's morning.

The member of the Council of War from indignation speaks nearly in a whisper:

>- In twenty minutes the decision - and forward.

>- Than "forward"?

>- I order to begin approach immediately. You will not begin, I will discharge of a position, I will prosecute...

The mobile group as a part of Vasilyev's division, Volkov's regiment and a motorcycle regiment is created. The main forces will finish a regrouping and tomorrow will engage.

>- Long ago so, - the member of the Council of War lours at Dmitry Ivanovich. - The Koshch is wanted to be brought poll to the Homeland, find a way...

Ryabyshev is silent. Hands on seams. Eyes are directed over the head of the case commissioner somewhere.

The member of the Council of War lays a narrow white hand to a peak-cap.

>- Carry out. And Popel will order mobile group.

Case the commissioner turns to me:

>- You will occupy Dubno by the evening, receive an award. You will not borrow - we will expel from party and we will shoot..."

(N.K. Popel. During a heavy time. M, 2001. Page 137-140.)

Because of full inability to provide actions of such mass of the equipment even the operations of some cases and divisions successful first came to an end with nothing. the 6th mekhyurpus the Western front, one of the few completely uyumplektovanny, had 1,022 tanks and also participated in counterstroke. However its actions were paralyzed by the German aircraft as the case had no cover about a skid spirit at all. The shortage of fuel and ammunition which did not manage to bring logistics forced tankmen to destroy the cars and to recede. By the result of battle in the case there were only 50 cars.

The headquarters of the Western front lost control of troops. Front commander general D.G Pavlov about put the command post and went to troops, communication with it was not, it was not possible to find it.

As a result the retaliation conceived in Moscow led to accident. Only armies of the Southwest front in a hsda of this counterstroke lost 2,648 tanks, and the front practically lost the tank reserves. The assistant to the commander of a yuyskama of the Southwest front on tank yuyska general V.T Volsky reported to the chief Av-tobronetanyuyugo management of RKKA to the general Ya.N. Fedorenko: ". For August 1 the Southwest front does not incorporate the mechanized connections as the fighting hammered together units..." The same fate on a stigl and a mekhkorpus of two other fronts.

15 July the high command of the Red Army summed up the sad result of "retaliation": about a statka of the mechanized cases were

are disbanded, their tanyuvy divisions were transferred to army command. The result of "tank slaughter" on border showed that the soviet leadership, having managed to create "the striking sword" with huge work of RKKA - the grandiose tank armada serving within long years as decoration of military parades simply was not able to use it.

From memoirs of the member of the Politburo of TsKVKP (b) A.I. Mikoyan:

"For the seventh day of war the fascist troops occupied with

Minsk. On June 29, in the evening, at Stalin Molotov, Malenkov, I and Beria gathered in the Kremlin. Detailed data on situation in Belarus then did not arrive yet. It was known only that there is no communication with troops of the Belarusian front. Stalin called Narkomat Tymoshenko's defenses, but that could tell nothing acceptable on the western direction about situation. Disturbed by such progress of the case, Stalin suggested all of us to go to Narkomat defenses and to understand a situation on the ground.

In a narcomat there were Tymoshenko, Zhukov and Vatutin. Zhukov reported that touch is lost, told that sent people, but what is the time it will be required for communication establishment - nobody knows. About half an hour was told quite quietly. Then Stalin exploded: "What for the General Staff? What for the chief of staff who in the first day of war became puzzled has no communication with troops, represents nobody and orders nobody?"

Zhukov, of course, not less Stalin experienced the state of affairs, and such hail of Stalin was for it offensive. And this courageous person literally burst out crying and ran out to other room. Molotov followed him. All of us were in the depressed state. Minutes through 5-10 Hammers brought externally quiet Zhukov, but he had wet eyes".

(A.I. Mikoyan. So was. M, 1999. Page 389-390.)

For correction of a situation the real "marshall landing" as a part of G.I. Kulik, B.M. Shaposhnikov and K.E. Voroshilov supported in several days with S.K. - Tymoshenko and S.M. Budenny and also the chief of the Head political department of the Red Army L.Z. Mekhlis - especially authorized representative of Stalin was directed to the Western front. As a result on the Western front there were all) (!) marshals of the Soviet Union. But also it did not save the front from defeat. Tanyuvy pincers of Wehrmacht were closed in Minsk: On June 28 towards each other there were divisions 3rd tanyuyuy groups of the general G. Gotha and the 2nd tank group of the general Mr. Guderian, two armies of the Western front - the 3rd and 10th - together with nesyulky divisions of the 13th army (only 26 divisions) got to an environment. The sandpiper got to an environment together with parts of the 10th army. Only the insignificant number of soldiers and officers could escape from an environment. According to the German data, 116 thousand soldiers and officers were taken prisoner, as trophies 1,964 tanks, 1,505 tools and 327 planes were seized. On June 29 Pavlov was detached from go-mando a vaniye, replaced him Tymoshenko.

Soon also command of the North Western front was likewise replaced, but also here on a lozheniye did not change for the better. Having reflected counterstroke of mekhyurpus, the mister mansky a yuyska began quickly e advance deep into of the Soviet territory. And already on June 26 tanks of one of divisions by means of disguised saboteurs took mo sta through Western to Dvin. As a result it was not succeeded to detain Germans on it e a stestvenny boundary, and on July 8 the opponent approached Pskov.

After capture of Minsk the German troops continued the movement on the East. Now Smolensk became their purpose. The Soviet command tried to detain them, using natural barriers - the rivers to Zine and Zapadnaya Dvin's Vera. But the main way of defense remained the same: towards the opponent the commands of the front going into the disposal reserves went one by one, but it only gave the chance to the coming German troops to destroy them one by one.

As a result of July 9 of a division of the 2nd tank group of Guderian on the western direction left to Dnieper. Troops of the Southwest front, having lost 60% of the tanks during counterstroke, also began withdrawal to frontier of 1939, trying to avoid an environment from the tank divisions of group of the general E. Kleist which broke in depth of the Soviet defense. The fact that Germans obviously lacked one more tank group for effective operations for an environment helped out them.

By July 11 the German troops came to approaches to Kiev where they managed to be stopped.

Results and conclusions. In general, the scheme of battles of an initial stage of war was following. The sudden blow of the German troops which destroyed a control system of the western districts led to the fact that parts of the Red Army entered battles unorganized, often separately and almost blindly as front and army reconnaissance could not carry out the tasks. Command of fronts, without having managed to understand a situation and thoughtlessly following directives from Moscow, threw into counterstroke the tank reserves separately, without appropriate preparation and providing. The German troops, almost without losing the rate of the approach, one by one beat Soviet a mekhkorpus and in two weeks left to old frontier of the USSR.

The initial stage of war by the Red Army was lost. But in the strategic relation its results were also that Germany did not manage to realize the first part of the plan Barbarossa - to destroy a kernel of the Red Army in border battles. Defeat was inflicted only over the Western front. To troops the Northwest the leg and Southwest fronts was succeeded to avoid defeat and to depart to the line of old frontier. Besides in the depth of the Soviet defense on the western direction the German troops unexpectedly for themselves met the second strategic echelon of the Red Army.

As a result the opponent promoted deep into the Soviet Union on 300

>- 600 km, having occupied the territory with the population of 23 million people - all Latvia, Lithuania, almost all Belarus, a considerable part of Estonia, Ukraine, Moldova. The Red Army suffered huge losses: from 170 divisions, in stretivshy on border attack of the enemy, 28 were destroyed completely, 70 lost more than a half of the structure. The general total losses of three Soviet fronts in border battles were 747,870 soldiers and officers, at the same time two thirds from them came s to irrevocable losses (dead and prisoners) - 588598 people. The Red Army lost about 3,985 planes, 11,703 tanks, 18,794 tools and mortars. Losses of Wehrmacht for togas the period were 77,313 people, 950 planes, 1,500 tanks and 1060 tools. (As the battlefield about stavat s for beliefs makhty, a considerable part of padded German tanks, unlike Soviet, was repaired subsequently and returned to a system.)

Also losses of material stocks of the Red Army, mostly with sredotochenny in border districts were enormous. At retreat the army lost about 200 fuel, ammunition and equipment warehouses. Only one Western front lost 4,216 cars of ammunition, troops of the Southwest front at retreat destroyed 1,933 cars of ammunition and 38047 t of fuel. These losses for a long time caused the shortage of ammunition and arms which was tested by parts of the Red Army until the end of 1941 And the German army for the tenth day of war began to cover one third of the needs for fuel at the expense of trophies. Among the German high command euphoria reigned. On July 4 Hitler said in svo I eat to a circle: "I try to put myself in position of the opponent all the time. Practically he already lost war".

So what causes of this accident were?

The most widespread explanation of so catastrophic beginning of war - suddenness of the German attack. The foundation for it was laid by Stalin in the performance on November 6, 1941. But the appeal to the facts pozyulyat to call into question this traditional explanation.

In fact for many headquarters and bodies the fact of attack was not unexpected. So, troops of the Baltic military district received still on June 18 the order on reduction in combat readiness and a performance to new areas of concentration. The order ordered "to alert parts according to plans of a raising for fighting alarm, but not to announce the alarm. Having the put norms of wearable and mobile stocks of food, fuels and lubricants, ammunition... with brag only necessary for life and fight; to fill up with staff each division. To recall immediately staff from business trips and to remove being at various works. To make marches only at night. In areas of concentration carefully to mask and organize circular protection and observation. To disperse troops to a company; to establish trouble-free and high-speed connection with the subordinated parts in areas of concentration". (But even these events held in time changed nothing during fight in a strip of the Northwest front: and its divisions suffered cruel defeat in the first days of war.) In the same way there was no suddenness of attack for troops of the Southern and Leningrad fronts where active fighting began only in July, and likewise were for them extremely unsuccessful.

Sudden for the Soviet troops was not a fact of attack (eventually, the military person is obliged to be ready to surprises) - absolutely unexpected, even shocking, there was a scale of blows. After Bugs recognized: "Sudden transition to approach in such scales, besides at once by all forces which are available and in advance developed on the major strategic directions, that is the nature of the blow, in all volume us was not assumed. Neither the people's commissar, nor I, nor my predecessors B.M. Shaposhnikov, K.A. Meretskov and leadership team of the General Staff expected that the opponent will concentrate such mass of the armored and motorized troops and will throw them in the first day powerful compact groups on all strategic directions for the purpose of drawing the crushing cutting blows". The Soviet generals did not allow and think that the opponent can take the offensive in every way srat. As the chief of staff of the 4th army general L.M. Sandalov, "commanders of cases and divisions remembered... assumed that... the opponent will not risk to intrude by big forces and will direct only separate gangs to our territory".

The blows struck by the German army were very powerful, at once in every way, and very exact. The mobility of the German troops allowed nano to sit these blows very quickly, choosing the weakest sites of defense of the Red Army, focusing on these sites

repeatedly superior forces, and in case of need quickly changing the direction of blows. Noting this feature of actions of Wehrmacht, M. Blok who was involved in fighting of the French army in the spring - summer of 1940, swept aside: "Germans conducted this war under the sign of "high-speed technologies"... Germans came much quicker than what we waited from them for, and that ordered rules. And so was during all war".

But e fir-trees for the French army the similar actions of Wehrmacht really were absolutely unexpected and shocking, for the Red Army it should not have become something new in any way. Participants of meetings of command structure in December, 1940 paid attention to these features in actions of Wehrmacht. But analyzing experience of the German blitzkrieg in Europe, the Soviet military leaders drew a paradoxical conclusion (apparently, imposed to them "from above"

>- party ru kovodstvo): the Wehrmacht not on dares to apply strategy and tactics of blitzkrieg in war against "the country with the advanced social and political system". Proceeding from this situation no measures against tactics of the German army were taken, as predetermined its amazing efficiency in June, 1941

Most of all the interaction of diverse forces of the opponent brought to automatism - aircraft, tanks, artillery, infantry struck both command, and officers, and ordinary Red Army men. It seemed, not people, and accurately debugged car struck one by one crushing blow. The perfection of this car suppressed.

This superiority of Wehrmacht caused that shock which was noted by many participants of an initial stage of war. K.K. Rokossovsky who met war by the commander of the 9th mekhyurpus of the South Western front repeatedly observed manifestations of this shock. "The unexpected blow struck with the enemy with huge forces and its rapid advance in depth of the territory for some time was stunned... our troops. They underwent shock... Cases when even the whole parts which got under sudden flank blow of small group of enemy tanks and aircraft were exposed to panic were observed... Fear okruzh?

Emily Simmons
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