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Protection of the back of the Red Army in the conditions of a state of siege of Moscow during the Great Patriotic War



nisin A.A.

PROTECTION of the BACK of the RED ARMY in the conditions of the STATE OF SIEGE of MOSCOW during the GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR

The battle of Moscow (on September 30, 1941 - on April 20, 1942) became one of the main military events of World War II. It is necessary to remind that A.G the itler considered capture of the capital of the USSR as one of the chief military and political goals of implementation of the plan Barbarossa [13, page 25-26]. Planning capture of Moscow, the military-political leadership of fascist Germany staked not only on blows of connections of Wehrmacht, but also on subversive activities of the agency. Its zabroska in a zone of the Moscow strategic direction began long before the German troops came to distant approaches to the capital of the USSR.

The main forces and means of prospecting device G of an ermaniya acted on the Soviet-German front. Their task was in paralyzing work of the back of the Red Army, its supply with arms, ammunition, fuel and food, providing with replenishment and also receiving intelligence information and information data. The most part of this agency had to get into Moscow for commission of acts of sabotage at the plants, factories and other important objects, for the organization of blastings bridges, failure of organized evacuation of the industrial enterprises, institutions and the population, creation of a situation of confusion and chaos, distribution of false rumors. Their purpose was - to spread panic, to cause disorders and to disorganize defense of the city [4, page 246-249]. In addition to it the German bodies of promotion planes with hundreds of thousands of anti-Soviet leaflets which were dumped on the settlements of Moscow area and to Moscow almost daily were equipped and went to the back of the Soviet troops.

The soviet military authorities already repeatedly faced the solution of a similar problem during military operations [7, page 40]. For fight against the German agency in the operational back of field army troops of protection of the back of field army were created. So, on June 25, 1941 the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR adopted the resolution on assignment of tasks of protection of the back I act -

Russian cabbage soup of the Red Army on the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (PCIA) [2, page 253-254]. On the basis of this document the management of a narcomat made the decision according to which the troops of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (boundary, internal, on protection of especially important enterprises of the industry, on protection of railway constructions, convoy) which appeared in the combat zone were involved in protection of the back of field army.

They were faced by the following tasks:

>- identification and detention of an agency of the opponent thrown in the back of the front, traitors and the German proteges in the areas freed from the German occupation;

>- elimination of the small groups and groups of the opponent which broke or thrown to the back of the operating Red Army (submachine gunners; parachutists, saboteurs and so forth) for failure of normal work of the back;

>- any suppression of anti-Soviet performances; manifestations of antisovietism in the back of the operating Red Army and detention of organizers and participants of these performances;

>- fight against desertion and marauding;

>- carrying out together with the Councils of War of fronts and local authorities of actions for the organization of the front-line mode (resettlement, cleaning, etc.);

>- protection of communications on certain sites in a strip of the back of the front according to decisions of the Councils of War of fronts;

>- protection of army places of acceptance of prisoners of war [2, page 271-273].

Troops of protection of the back carried out also military and administrative work. With

this purpose in the cities, in a front-line strip for maintenance of an order, ensuring strict observance of the rules dictated wartime both the military personnel, and the civilian population, created commandant's offices. Military commandants were allocated with special powers, quite often performed administrative functions in the settlements freed from aggressors. Chiefs of troops of protection of the back were appointed military commandants of the cities, as a rule.

In October days of the first year of the Great Patriotic War of an event developed promptly. 13 - On October 14, 1941 the German troops intruded in borders of the Moscow region and occupied 17 areas completely and 10 partially [13, page 57]. By the time of pronouncement of the resolution State Komi -

a theta of Defense (state treasury bills) about introduction in Moscow of a state of siege of October 19, 1941 the situation on fronts, on approaches to Moscow, became complicated. With the opponent's exit to the Mozhaisk line of defense the direct threat to the capital of the Soviet state was created.

Before the political country leaders there was a priority to evacuate most the enterprises of large-scale industry and the population of the city from Moscow. The state Committee of Defense decided to accelerate mass evacuation of the enterprises, institutions and the population from Moscow and Moscow area to the deep back. On October 15, 1941 state treasury bills adopted the resolution "About Evacuation of the Capital of the USSR of Moscow" [5, page 115-116].

Though evacuation assumed the strict and accurate organization, however, as confirm documents of the Central state archive of social movements of Moscow, it was not succeeded to prevent panic in the city. Actions of heads of the state and narcomats, the Moscow party committee and the Moscow Council not always were thought over, did not conform to requirements of a situation [15, page 35-36]. Situation was aggravated by the German leaflets scattered during night and day bombings of the city. In them Hitlerites urged Muscovites to leave urgently the capital not to be destroyed. Unforeseen situations resulted. For example, on October 16 and 17 the German agency, leaning on criminal elements, managed to break the movement on the main route connecting Moscow with the back - on Entuziastov Highway. Forces military division and militia succeeded to restore order. Here and there and in other places, but in smaller scales, an agency of the opponent it was succeeded to carry out the plans [9, page 550].

The made mistakes and miscalculations to a limit complicated already heavy situation. According to the incomplete data of Management of the commandant of the city of Moscow which are stored in the Central archive of the Ministry of Defence from 438 enterprises, institutions and the organizations of the capital 779 executives ran away. As a result of it material values were stolen, the state property is squandered. For example, the running executives during the period from October 16 to October 18 were stolen by cash of 1,484,000 rubles, it is plundered values and property for the sum of 1,051,000 rubles and 100 automobile and cargo cars are hijacked [8, page 213]. The human masses incited by various rumors began to smash grocery stores, the markets, to self-willedally occupy apartments of evacuated, to plunder things and values from warehouses and

enterprises. In many respects thanks to efforts of Moscow criminal investigation department and the 2nd special division of expeditious appointment of troops of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs the order in the city quickly managed to be restored [12, page 78-79].

The emergence of direct threat of break of defense of Moscow, existence of diversionary activity and provocations of an agency of the opponent which overflowed the capital of a wave of marauding, robberies, alarmism demanded from the country leaders of acceptance of urgent and drastic measures on toughening the being in place legal regime. On October 19 state treasury bills adopted the resolution on introduction since October 20 in the city of Moscow and adjacent regions of a state of siege [11, l. 167168]. It was at the same time decided to appoint the military commandant of Moscow the major general K.R. of the Sinilova1 withdrawn month earlier from the Karelian front and which received a position of the commander of the 2nd ODON of troops of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. This choice was made quite reasonably.

The resolution state treasury bills established measures for the most strict protection of public order within the city and the next suburbs and assigned to the military commandant of Moscow tasks of maintenance in the city of the mode of a state of siege, having at the same time given to him special powers: to make responsible with transfer of a military court to court, and the provokers, spies and other agents of the enemy urging for violation of an order - to shoot on the place. Thereof Management of the military commandant was transferred to the state obsidional polozheniya2.

K.R. Sinilov managed to reconstruct all commandant's service in the shortest possible time, having created 25 regional military commandant's offices in Moscow, 9 more - in its suburbs. Besides, military commandant's offices began to function in Podolsk,

1 K.R. Sinilov got enormous experience of counteraction to the spies and saboteurs transferred by the Japanese intelligence on the territory of the USSR, ordering Nerchinsk, Shilkinsky and Daursky boundary groups. In 1939 he became the head of department of border troops of the Murmansk district of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. Interacting with the 14th army and with the Northern Navy, successfully coped with a task of protection of frontier and the back of troops. In the fall of the 1939th and in the winter of the 1940th the parts entrusted to it were involved in fighting during the Soviet-Finnish campaign. In the summer of 1941 it constrained forces of the subordinated troops the opponent acting on the Murmansk direction before approach of parts of the 14th army [6, page 4]. - A.N.

The number of Management of the military commandant of Moscow on the new state was 249 servicemen, 31 people of civilian structure and 35 units of the automotor-equipment. The special task force which was on the purpose the working device of the military commandant on the organization of the mode of a state of siege was taken on staff. This group also conducted investigations on the facts of the most serious violations and crimes [1, page 17-19]. - A.N.

Kolomna, Serpukhov, Ramenskoye, Noginsk, Nut Zuev, Zagorsk [14, l. 130]. Total number of Management together with staff of regional commandant's offices, military and transit and 5 military and food points was 1,213 people Besides, according to the decision of state treasury bills for a state of siege, in the order of the military commandant the 2, 3, 19, 30, 73 detached local rifle battalions and the 15, 16, 45 and 61 separate local rifle companies with a total number of 3,119 people were given; the 2nd separate division of expeditious purpose of VV People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs; militia of Moscow and suburbs and also working groups [3, page 75-76].

The commandant came into close contacts with bodies of state security - Management of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs across Moscow and the Moscow region, special department of the Moscow Military District (further MVO).

Management of the commandant actively participated in the organization and carrying out evacuation from Moscow of a considerable part of the civilian population. It concerned certain categories of Muscovites which according to the decision of the government of the country had to be taken out from the capital in order to avoid the victims at raids of enemy aircraft, - first of all children, old men, women, disabled people, etc. For this purpose in the city at regional councils evacuation points were created. Their work was taken under control by military commandants of areas on the basis of the corresponding order of the commandant of the city. For evacuation of the corresponding categories of the population to the commandant of the city echelons were made available. In very short time from Moscow 270,624 people, including evacuated and refugees from the territories occupied by Hitlerites were taken out to the back [9, page 552].

The priority directions in activity of Management of the commandant in the period of a state of siege were guard duty, security service of public order (patrol) and service of an obstacle. For osushche - stvleniye of guard duty 600 servicemen were daily allocated. They were a part of 26 garrison guard exposed on the most important military facilities.

the Patrol service was carried out under the leadership of the commandant of Moscow by forces of the 2nd separate division of special function of troops of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and militia. For execution of patrol service in Moscow and the next suburbs it was daily allocated 1,600 persons. Special attention was paid to night patrol [10, page 42].

A flood of Moscow an agency of the enemy and the systematic zasylka of spies and saboteurs, penetration of the persons who did not have the right for residence in Moscow and almost free penetration into the capital, both civilians, and the military personnel demanded to organize service of an obstacle. Outposts on all railway, highway and water lines conducting to Moscow and at railway stations were exposed. In total 25 outposts of an obstacle were created. From 35 to 50 people headed by officers entered everyone. Besides, behind city boundaries 35 posts and 50 routes of patrol acted on highways. Thus, possible ways of illegal penetration into the capital, first of all the opponent's agencies were blocked. For service on outposts and posts army dresses from the 2nd separate division of special function of troops of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and separate local shooting parts [14, l were allocated. 1-30].

Only during a state of siege (from the moment of its announcement till July 1, 1942) in Moscow and suburbs were detained 830,060 persons. Among them: spies and saboteurs - 84 people; for distribution of false and provocative rumors - 906 people; for robbery, robberies, murders, plunder of socialist property - 13,022 people; deserters - 10,610 people; evading from execution of military service - 24,651 people; for violation of a blackout

>- 8,964 persons. From among the detained persons: it was brought to administrative responsibility - 23 3279 people; received various terms of imprisonment - 44,168 people; are sentenced to a capital punishment (execution) - 887 people [14, l. 1-30].

Thus, the developed emergency on fronts on near approaches to Moscow demanded harmonious and accurate work on protection of the back of the Red Army. It was necessary to solve this problem in difficult conditions. Diversions and provocations from an agency of the opponent caused mass riots in the capital. The military-political leaders of the Soviet state immediately took measures. In Moscow the state of siege was entered, the military authorities was allocated with emergency powers that finally helped to strengthen the back of the operating Red Army in the shortest possible time and to bring rigid order, so necessary for the being preparing counterattack of the Soviet troops.

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Marshall Smith
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