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From the League of Nations to "The system of general safety": the ideas of the organization of the international community in F.D. Roosevelt's views, 1918-1941



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UDC 94/99

V.T. Yungblyud

FROM the LEAGUE OF NATIONS To "the SYSTEM of GENERAL SAFETY": The IDEAS of the ORGANIZATION of the INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY IN F.D. Roosevelt's VIEWS, 1918-1941

Vyatka state humanities university

At least two milestones designated influence other extreme - its simplification out of - blyudatsya

The United States on development social and what the shnepolitichesky program up to attempts

nomic, political and international about- to enter it in a framework unique polity-

tsess in the world in the middle of the 20th century: "new course" chesky paradigmy2.

F.D. Roosevelt and participation in creation on an outcome of the WTO- In the present article views are considered

swarm of world war of the Organization Integrated F.D. Roosevelt from this point of view his evolutions vzglya-

Nations. If value of "a new course" as events, Dov on ways of providing the world and safety che-

laid the fundamental foundation "kardi- a cut the world organization. It is necessary for

nalny transformations" [1, page 31-32] in the USA and in clarifications of degree of continuity (or preryv-

many states of the West, now Nosta) basic provisions of its concept miropo-

it is possible to consider generally conventional, in a row in pre-war years; for specification of a position

studying theoretical and practical aspects Roosevelt in "a great debate" of the 1930th between from -

foreign policy of Roosevelt with- lyatsionist and interventionists, with one old

debatable problems hranyatsya. Contrast ny, and between idealists and realists, with another hundred -

between inert policy of a neutrality of the 1930th Rhone; at last, for fuller understanding massh-

of and resolute interventionism in years howl- tabs and the nature of a contribution of the president to the theory and

ny was the cause for criticism preziden- to practician of the international relations interwar more than once

that. He was accused of opportunism, besprintsip- time.

Nosta and litsemerii1, eclecticism of views and at the beginning of political career Roosevelt of pozna-tendency to spontaneous improvisations (see, it komitsya with the ideas, popular at the beginning of the 20th century, e.g.: [5]). Among Roosevelt's admirers sometimes on - A. Mahan and T. Roosevelt. However hobby okaza-

1 Historians of the revisionist direction (Ch. Beard, Ch. Tenzil, etc.) were in this regard especially productive (cm: [2-4]).
2 It is possible to designate the specified extremes, on the one hand, by work of Frank Donovan [6] who is unconditionally ranking Roosevelt to liberal idealistically (or liberal vilsonistskomu) to the direction in foreign policy, a position of modern historians of D. Brinkley and T. The Hoops [7], proving that in the 30th Roosevelt completely departed from a vilsonizm and became "realist".

elk short. Though fundamentals of geopolitics and power diplomacy repeatedly found further application in his practician, not only they made an essence of his relation to the international affairs. F.D. Roosevelt was susceptible to the new ideas. Concepts and the doctrines traditional for the American foreign policy, he constantly adjusted and adapted for requirements of time [5, river 4-5; 8, river 93-94, 116-117] that was especially shown at the final stage of World War I and in operating time Parisian (January-July, 1919) and Washington (November, 1921 - February, 1922) conferences. This period is especially important in terms of formation of outlook of future president.

Wilson's proposals on change of a system of the international relations made a strong impression on it and convinced that "the purposeful politician with internationalist beliefs at this conjuncture cannot pave to himself the way by means of aggressive actions and the rhetoric used by Theodor Roosevelt" [9, river 11].

Vilsonizm as "a special paradigm of a foreign policy thought was the phenomenon quite natural for those times" - the Russian historian V.V. Romanov fairly considers [10, page 463]. It developed under the influence of the basic changes happening in the world in the first decades of the 20th century and included the ideas of creation of a new world order and mechanisms of its maintenance. As a conceptual kernel of this program served the principles of moralism and international law. Wilson suggested to found the principal coordinating organ of world politics - the League of Nations which will follow the ideas of open diplomacy, freedom of the seas, disarmament and recognition of sovereignty of the states. The specified points added with postulates of "destiny predetermination" and American "Messianizm" defined the most important purposes of Wilson and his administration [10, page 463].

F. Roosevelt was one of the youngest and ambitious members of this administration. Having seized the vilsonistsky principles, he nevertheless did not wish to apply for a role of the political successor of the president openly. Partly - for tactical reasons (The congress and most of voters in 1918-1920 more and more resolutely turned towards isolationism), but mainly because from the very beginning he considered Wilson's ideas not as the sum of invariable provisions and as the approximate model of the international reorganization which is subject to editing depending on the changing conditions.

Right after the beginning of a national debate on the government program of an exit from howl -

ny he declared himself as about the active supporter of "Fourteen points". "This time of idealism, time of commitment to high ideals, and the world looks at us, wishing to make sure of advantages of those high purposes for which we were at war", - he said at the beginning of 1919 [9, river 12]. However in March of the same year his performances gained more practical orientation. He noted that the League, being a starting point in development of the civilized relations between the people (it compared its constituent documents to the Constitution of the USA), "as necessary in specific details had experimental character, and for this reason some of its components should be altered or in general to reject". But the plan, according to him, was quite sensible, and Americans should in general "have approved the master plan" [11, river 573].

Kenneth Davies noted that Roosevelt better than many contemporaries felt the changes in public moods which were outlined at once after signing of truce with Germany [11, river 561]. Evolution of its views was influenced by also disappointing results of activity of the League of Nations. Nevertheless he did not refuse the idea of peacekeeping and stability through interaction of the states within the authorized international organization. In 1923 at insistance of the wife Eleonora he participated in a competition of drafts of the plan of defense of peace. Roosevelt's "plan" represented a sketch of new edition of the Treaty of Versailles. The author admitted that his purpose consisted in a denial of opponents of the entry of the USA into the League of Nations. "We trust, - he wrote, - that participation... in serious and long efforts on eradication of the reasons of war more than reasonably, to it experience of our history appeals, it corresponds to our interests and that the most important, our prime target to help mankind to improve life". That this objective was achieved, he suggested "to found instead of the League of Nations a new International Conference under the name "Community of the Nations". The offer to change articles of the Treaty of Versailles (Article 5, 10) about voting procedure in Council of League and about powers of Council in case of attack, threat or danger of attack of an aggressor on any state which is the official member of the international community was the most remarkable line of this plan. The plan consisted in excluding the principle of unanimity during the vote concerning application of sanctions or use of armed forces as, according to the author, it was impossible "to justify the procedure allowing one or two states violators to block will of the vast majority" [11, river 561].

The American researchers D. Brinkley and T. Hups believe that at this particular time Roosevelt's farewell to vilsonistsky ideals took place and he passed into the category of admirers of political realism [7, river 11]. The text of "The plan of defense of peace" confirms the return. The thought of future president was in the continuous movement, but it pulsed around the same theoretical provisions, as earlier, at the same time rather not dogmatic treatment of them took place. Roosevelt paid more attention to details of the program now and is interested observed in what the ideas which created a contour of the Versailles and Washington order are embodied.

The victory on elections of 1932 took place in the conditions of prevalence in the USA of isolationist moods that significantly limited possibilities of administration. The president had no doubts of rather general direction of a foreign policy: "In his understanding the isolationism having the tactical advantages in certain cases... was an anachronism" [12, page 111]. The program offered them in 1933 had internationalist focus. Its most striking trait was the idea of neighborliness which became the distinctive sign of foreign policy of administration though the geopolitical format and substantial filling of this idea remained uncertain.

Accepted by the Congress in 1935. The act of a neutrality served as a barrier on the way of involvement of the USA to the sphere of the international agreements and obligations. The act was not the president's child. At the same time its provisions were not bad joined to what the administration tried to do in the field of domestic policy. This circumstance partly explains why the president with so bright internationalist past so phlegmatically reacted to the limiting will of the Congress. The historian Thomas Greer noticed about it: "He realized that. the national states became basic unit of the international community, and America was a subject of his primary concern. For the 1930th he considered that in the best way it is possible to promote national interests of the USA only having kept freedom in world affairs" [13, river 161]. In the international uncertainty the nationalism and the appeal to the Act of a neutrality were explainable tactics.

Time of a performance of Roosevelt reminded draft sketches of plans of global reorganization mira1 on an image of the Pan-American commonwealth. "Our generation devoted itself to development of the principles and creation of mechanisms by means of which this hemisphere can maintain the cooperation relations. The next generation will be occupied with development of methods by means of which the New World will be able to live in the world with Old", - he said in April, 1939 [15, river 310]. The subject of the League of Nations or other forms of the organization of the international community was affected by it extremely seldom at this time that formed the basis for some authors to reproach his or his main sovetnikov2 with isolationism. Nevertheless recognition of need of streamlining of the international relations for his performances in the mid-thirties was present constantly. For the solution of this problem the rest of the world, according to him, should have adopted the main achievements of policy of "good neighbor" [15, river 309]. The president still considered the League of Nations "a support of structure of the peaceful world" [5, river 116], but as in the USA the offers to enter it remained unpopular, the possibility of this step was not even considered. After an exit from League of Japan (on March 27, 1933) and Germany (on October 19, 1933) such attempts lost all sense. For some time he showed interest in the idea of the advisory pact, but succession of events in the Pacific Rim overturned also these calculations.

From the beginning of World War II the peaceful means of impact on aggressors were exhausted. Military force became, from the point of view of F.D. Roosevelt, not only the necessary, but also lawful tool of foreign policy. "Two mad persons respect force and only force", - he said to G. Wallace [17, river 435], meaning Hitler and Mussolini. Roosevelt strengthened a campaign for mobilization of world public opinion in favor of the states fighting against fascism. At the beginning of January, 1941 on radio his performance in which four principles of freedom which, according to the president, were "an antithesis to a so-called new order" were formulated sounded. From now on the mankind knew that in foundation of future world the principles of freedom of speech, freedoms of religion, freedoms from poverty, freedoms for fear have to be underlain, it is possible to come to what only through

1 About "an isolationist form" of policy of Roosevelt which only since 1937 began to be filled with "the globalist contents", I.V. Galkin writes, for example, [14, page 214]. A statement, at least disputable, both concerning "form" till 1937, and concerning "contents" after 1937
2 A.V. Zolov, for example, carry to number isolationist - the adjusted advisers to the president Roosevelt of the Minister of Internal Affairs even G. Ikes and G. Gopkins. Both figures at that time were engaged in mainly internal affairs, but this argument is absolutely insufficient for their reckoning to isolationists [16, page 141].

general disarmament [18, river 610-611]. Such is there was an ideological framework of future world order. And, according to Roosevelt, the United States of America should bear a burden of the leadership in creation of this order [19, river 6].

In the Atlantic charter signed on August 14, 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill formulated the purposes of the states in war. The text of this document had something in common with four freedoms of Roosevelt and became the ideological platform of the American-British interaction [20, page 336-337]. Analyzing the Charter and also discussions between Roosevelt and Churchill concerning contents of its articles mentioned earlier historians D. Brinkley and T. Hups draw very disputable conclusion that during the Atlantic conference the president proved to be "the disappointed wilsonist and the consecutive defender of real politics". Roosevelt's refusal to include in the eighth paragraph of the Charter a phrase about intention of the USA and Great Britain to promote creation after war of the organization for maintenance of general safety is given as the main argument [7, river 39-40]. After polemic with Churchill the president agreed to the compromise formulation saying that "until establishment of wider and reliable system of general safety" the aggressive countries have to be disarmed [21, page 197].

Thus, not the morals and the right, but the international constabulary force will maintain safety guaranteeing the world and stability, and this situation was recorded in the final text of the document. This circumstance, nevertheless, should not be perceived as the decisive argument proving Roosevelt's "treason" to "the liberal vilsonizm" and its transformation into the unconditional "political realist". Opposition of a vilsonizm and real politics, in general, can be hardly applied by consideration of evolution of foreign policy views of F.D. Roosevelt, so organically he was able to combine both approaches. Besides, acquaintance to the idea of use of the international constabulary forces at it happened even during admiration of T. Roosevelt while in the informative plan it deviated very far ideology of the author of big stick policy. In this connection appropriate to give some objections to a conclusion of the Hoops and Brinkley about the "vilsonizmy disappointment" which was allegedly taking place at F.D. Roosevelt.

First, at theoretical reasonings and practical activities of Roosevelt in 1940-1941 so distinctly, as before, there was a moralism which was an invariable value priority of the liberal vilsonizm.

Secondly, emergence of the Atlantic charter was caused by escalation of World War II and

prospect of the introduction of the USA in it. In these conditions the emergence in the text of the document of point on disarmament of aggressors and creation of a security system was more appropriate and more clear than abstract formulations about international law and a new world forum. Wilson created the plan at the end of World War I; Roosevelt with Churchill agreed about future world at the beginning of the Second. The charter did not offer the plan of settlement, and called for mobilization. From here and choice of terminology.

Thirdly, Paragraphs 1-7 of the Charter are thoroughly sated with the vilsonistsky ideas ("refusal of territorial captures", "self-determination of the people", "national sovereignty", "equal access to world trade", "general safety", "freedom of the seas and oceans") and do not give the grounds to doubt that, appending under them the signature, the president was not sincere.

Fourthly, a formulation "the wide and reliable system of general safety" did not exclude creation in the future of the universal body providing functioning of this system. Concepts "organization" and "security system" could correspond at the corresponding succession of events as the international political body and its major function. Safety in that case would turn from the military purpose of the USA and Great Britain into a direct task of the international community which created for the sake of its decision necessary political and military mechanisms with the predominating participation of Anglo-Saxon powers.

Roosevelt, thus, was quite consecutive in the ideological development. The historian F. Donovan called "The practical idealist" him, having explained that, unlike V. Wilson, FDR never "had head in the clouds" and supported the dreams with quite pragmatic decisions and adequate material resources [6, river 1-3]. In the activity he constantly addressed the ideas acquired during the political formation, as a rule, adapting them for circumstances. In this sense the evolution of its views was characterized by the explainable sequence of the intellectual and political positions replacing each other: admiration of the idea of League - recognition of imperfection of its constituent documents and the offer "to correct the made mistakes" - understanding of inexpediency of the entry of the USA into this body in the conditions of increase of military threat - return to a thought of creation of a system of general safety, but already allocated new parameters corresponding to a post-war era. Such development of foreign policy views of Roosevelt did not leave the place for isolationism.

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Patricia Scarlett
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