The Science Work
Site is for sale:
Category: History

Sea counterintelligence of the Russian Empire (Baltic. 1914-1918): history of creation and elimination

UDK 930 © V.O. Zverev, 2010

Sea counterintelligence of the Russian Empire (Baltic. 1914-1918): history of creation and elimination

V.O. Zverev *

An attempt of reconstruction of the main stages of creation of bodies of sea counterintelligence on one of the most responsible sites of naval defense of the country is for the first time made — on the Baltic battlefield. Not only organizational and staff creation of these structures, formation of a legal basis of their activity, formation of the first counterscouting courses, but also tragic end of short history of sea counterintelligence of the period of autocracy is considered.

In recent years in the Russian historiography interest in the history of the domestic state security agencies revives. The unknown before the page of education and activity of royal (military) counterintelligence belonging to the beginning of the 20th century 1 meanwhile unfairly forgotten open there is a past of the special divisions of the Sea ministry, in the same time designed to play a key role the organization of counterprospecting cover of the Russian Imperial fleet.

Meeting the formed lack in scientific knowledge, we will dare to go beyond a chronological framework of a research and to begin with a mention of value of St. Petersburg in realization of military and sea reforms of 1907-1914

After defeat in the Russo-Japanese war the main town of the state, with the central authorities located in it, managements of the Military and Sea ministries, military and ship-building productions, a research and skilled and experimental complex, became the all-Russian center of modernization of armed forces and especially constructions of the latest ships of navy (including for Baltic).

Increase in fighting capacity of the Baltic Fleet became one of priority activities of prospecting bodies of member countries of the Tripartite alliance, and first of all to Germany. In 1907 its secret-service investigation managed to get tactical and technical specifications of the latest "Sevastopol" battle ships which bookmark at the enterprises of the capital began only the SPU -

stya two years. And in 1912 she received the classified information on the being under construction submarines and destroyers on private shipyards in Riga and Li-bave 2.

At the same time sea attaches (diplomatic investigation) as a part of Embassy of Germany in St. Petersburg persistently tried to obtain official permission to visit of shipbuilding plants of the St. Petersburg military district. So, on February 14, 1911 after numerous audiences at the sea minister I.K. Grigorovich the baron Mr. von-Kayserling received his consent to visit of the state and private objects of the defensive industry of the capital occupied in construction of the linear ships main of which there were a Baltic shipbuilding and mechanical Shipyard, the Admiralty shipbuilding plant, the Obukhovsk steelmaking and Puti-lovsky plants 3.

Visual collecting data of confidential and unclassified contents on quantity and quality of the being under construction (being under repair) ships, their technical characteristics (innovations), terms and degree of readiness, etc. became the purpose of similar visits that allowed to create complete idea of fire power and also speed of the course, buoyancy, displacement, maneuverability, range of swimming and other seaworthy qualities of the Russian (Baltic) fleet.

Considering prospecting activity of future opponent, the consecutive, versatile, accented and quite often productive nature of its actions in the St. Petersburg military district and also absence in the state of bodies on

* Permanent author of our magazine.

fight against a foreign sea agency, on January 1, 1914 the sea minister was forced to address the Minister of War V.A. Sukhomlinov with a request for strengthening of activity of the St. Petersburg city counterintelligence "on fight against espionage on the fleet and the plants servicing Sea department" 4.

In the conditions of military-political tension between Russia and Germany which inevitably had to come to the end with armed conflict the similar late and vague measure demonstrated lack of conceptual approach of the central authorities to safety of sea secrets of the state and more likely reminded urgent "patching of holes" on this site of defense.

Really, the steps soon undertaken by military who had a weak idea of specifics of sea service, features of work of the head sea departments, shipbuilding plants, ports, etc. so, the purposes, tasks and methods of naval reconnaissance of the opponent not always were timely and qualified, yielding result. And whether it was possible to demand from created two years before small and professionally weak St. Petersburg counterprospecting office (further — KRO) in which jurisdiction there was one of the largest cities not only Russia, but also Europe, with the population over one million people, the organizations of successful fight against spies "on two fronts"?

Apparently, with approach of World War I there was a sharp need for creation of independent bodies of counterintelligence as a part of the Sea ministry. However realization of the state of the business, so important for protection, demanding, first of all, a uniform position, an initiative and persistence from the highest ranks of the Sea General Staff (further — MGS) and then financial assignments and organizational efforts, lasted for four years (four stages).

I a stage (May, 1914 — on August 1, 1914) —

creation of office of sea counterintelligence of peace time

In May, 1914 the confidential order of the chief of MGS of the vice admiral A.I. Rusin within this department created "skilled" office of investigation/counterintelligence — Special office-work. Four employees entered it: the managing captain of the 2nd rank M.I. Dunin-Barkovsky and three officers-clerks — the captain of the 2nd rank A.A. Nishchenkov, the first lieutenant V.A. Vinogradov and the lieutenant N. Goyningen-Gyune the 1st.

Along with the solution of problems of prospecting character, according to the Confidential instruction for -

to the leader Special office-work of MGS (further — the Confidential instruction) of May 8, 1914 to new body for the first time assigned the organization of practical measures against foreign espionage on "the fleet and in the Sea ministry". Paragraph 9 of the Instruction, in particular, said: "Tasks on counterintelligence and results of its work are entered in the Magazine of tasks and results of work of counterintelligence which is kept in Special office-work" 5.

By an example created in 1911 the St. Petersburg city and military and district KRO, the sea counterintelligence was established and worked in the conditions of an absolute secret. Even in the Sea ministry knew only units about it. As employment in office and personnel shifts in it appears from the Confidential instruction, as well as development of special tasks, had to be agreed only with the chief of MGS. Similar precautionary measures, on the one hand, interfered with penetration (introduction, recruitment) into Special office-work (and its agency) the staff of foreign intelligence services and kept the preventive nature of its activity. With another — deprived of counterspies of support among a general population (first of all, the small shopkeepers, merchants and industrialists dissatisfied with so-called German domination in Russia). Therefore, as well as military colleagues, naval officers had no opportunity to select, expand and update the secret-service device at the expense of the respectable, law-abiding, patriotically adjusted initiative compatriots. Recruitment of employees on subordinated objects, as a rule, gained unilateral character and proceeded from counterspies.

Besides the practical measures which did not bring noticeable results, the considerable volume of time and efforts of employees of Special office-work of MGS was spent for office correspondence concerning foreign espionage at the sea. The analysis of the numerous reports arriving from the Ministry of Defence, Department of police, the Certain building of gendarmes, and answers to them concentrated in affairs of the second inventory of the 418th fund (the name of fund — Sea General Staff) the Russian state archive of navy, showed that in the majority they had the general informative and notifying or informative and fact-finding character and did not provide concrete actions for identification of spies. Fruitless and unpromising cooperation of the structures, so powerful and different in purpose, equally designed to fight against espionage was caused by the interdepartmental competition for the right of the first dokla-

yes I reign about outstanding successes (that, often, was noted by monarchical favor in the form of ranks, titles, awards and so forth) and, as a result, unwillingness to share valuable information of the agency.

From the beginning of fighting, the focused on conditions of peace time, not in time to save up neither knowledge, nor practical experience (including "to get" a split-level agency, to participate in development of spies), small division of naval counterintelligence did not constitute serious danger to reconnaissance bodies of Germany, Austria-Hungary and other foreign powers. Agreeing with it, only little in the management of MGS, differing in ability to forecasting and the analysis of a strategic plan of the opponent, understood that instead of experimental and unique office on sea battlefields it is necessary to create the system of counterprospecting divisions (and, first of all, on Baltic), capable immediately and, the main thing, professionally to react to external threats already in the conditions of war.

However, in view of absence in the budget of pre-war years (in particular, 1914) the planned article of an expense of the Sea ministry on the organization of fight against espionage in wartime (yes it was and it is impossible as this innovation could be regarded by provocation of the military-political conflict), necessary measures for creation of sea counterintelligence service from the beginning of offensive operations against Germany were not taken.

II a stage (September, 1915 — the beginning of 1916) — creation of central office of sea counterintelligence of wartime

At the end of September, 1915 I.K. Grigorovich addressed the Minister of War again, but already with the offer "to allocate sea counterintelligence in the special organization" 6. The sea minister enclosed to the draft of the Provision on sea counterprospecting offices developed in MGS for its consideration in the Defense Ministry confidential letter. According to this document which, by the way, accumulated in itself(himself) valuable manuals from the Provision on secret defense, the task of fight against sea espionage and "in general hindrance to those measures of the foreign states which can harm the interests of naval defense of the empire" 7 was set for new bodies.

Having studied the text, the minister A.A. Polivanov considered timely and expedient creation in structure of the Sea ministry of independent divisions of fight against a sea agency of foreign powers that found the reflection in the response letter.

I nevertheless, despite approval of the designed sea counterintelligence by the Ministry of Defence which experts had an experience of the organization of fight not only against the military but also with sea espionage, did not hurry to start the embodiment of the idea of its creation. The "self-complacency" and the related sluggishness of sea command caused, for example, by relative "calm" on Baltic could serve as one of explanations for that. The German fleet did not conduct offensive operations, and mine zagoroditelnye raids of the Russian destroyers in the Riga and Finnish gulfs were considered in MGS as everyday and monotonous "routine" 8. Active actions from enemy investigation were not also noticed.

At the same time whether it was possible to hope for fast creation of counterintelligence in the state where the idea of counteraction to foreign sea espionage both before war, and with its beginning by forces of special body was if not in embryo, then on the second plan precisely. On belief of certain high-ranking officers and admirals of MGS, sea attaches successfully coped with problems of counterprospecting providing the fleet and objects of the Sea ministry. In view of inaccuracy of this position which somewhere was contrary to the interests of external safety of Russia, and can be taking into account the become complicated situation on fronts, it was still staked not so much on creation of KRO how many on already being available prospecting resource (the put secret-service network, skilled personnel, etc.).

Probably therefore, let and with some delay, on February 8, 1916. Admiralties councils of the Sea ministry signed by the vice admiral A.I. Rusin the updated project of the state of Special office-work of MGS was presented. Its structure already included three prospecting offices (on the Baltic, Black Sea and Pacific battlefields) and only one counterprospecting — sea registration service (further — MRS) 9.

According to an extract from "the Magazine of Admiralties Councils" of March 3, 1916 for No. 5039, his members decided: "To approve the designed state of Special office-work of MGS for representation on the royal statement for enforcement for the period of war, since January 1, 1916" 10.

After coordination of states with the tsar, more than one and a half years later later began wars, in the Russian Empire the sea counterintelligence was created. Started execution of the functions: the chief of Special office-work of MGS captain of the 2nd rank M.I. Dunin-Barkovsky, responsible for sea counterintelligence — on -

a chalnik of MRS the captain of the 2nd rank V.A. Vinogradov, his assistant lieutenant S.S. Kalakutsky and also officers-clerks — the first lieutenant M.M. Poggenpol, the lieutenant R.A. Okerlund and the lieutenant P. S.A. Chabovsky

40,955 rub in the current year were allocated for needs of Special office-work (and only partly counterintelligence). So scanty credit did not assume expenses on selection of an agency, payment of its services, acquisition and the maintenance of safe houses. It was calculated only on cash security of employees of Special office-work, their business trip, an extract and the translation of foreign books and magazines, an other expenses. The fact that the salary of heads of sea counterintelligence was rather low attracts attention. Unlike the heads of control and auditing department of the Ministry of Defence receiving 5800 rub a year, for example, annual earnings of the chief of MRS during the war made only 3750 rub 12

It is not surprising, from the first days of war by the main arena of opposition of the conflicting powers there were not sea open spaces as heads of the Sea ministry assumed, and the overland front. Therefore with movement of all weight of fights of shoulders of military and in view of relative inaction of the opponent at sea boundaries also load of army counterintelligence which heads, respectively, got paid, exceeding earnings of sea colleagues increased.

After completion of organizational and regular construction and financing of the first body of naval counterintelligence of wartime — sea registration service of Special office-work of MGS — it started the solution of a number of tasks, main of which were as follows: to the general management of all offices of sea counterintelligence; organizations of military censorship of "telegrams, mailings and periodicals", to studying correspondence of prisoners of war of sailors; to observation of private radio stations and permission of entry (departure) into Russia to foreigners 13.

From this list it is visible that MRS represented an administrative link of sea counterintelligence, along with the organization of work on suppression of activity of spies in the territory of the country, being responsible for identification of the prospecting centers of the opponent beyond its limits. And here performance of problems of secret-service character of exposure of sea spies and their helpers from among compatriots was assigned to subordinated MRS of division of sea counterintelligence on battlefields, the most important of which was on Baltic.

III a stage (the middle of 1916 — the end of 1916) — creation of territorial divisions of sea counterintelligence on the Baltic battlefield

MRS following later created the Petrograd sea counterprospecting office (further — PMKRO). The order on the fleet and sea department of July 21, 1916 it was headed by the gendarme colonel I.S. Nikolaev transferred to the Sea ministry "with transfer on the Admiralty, the same rank with appointment in the 2nd Baltic naval crew and secondment in MGS for classes" 14.

The decision on appointment of professional "agenturist" as the chief of sea counterintelligence, on the one hand, was natural. It was dictated by absence at sailors of special knowledge, skills in identification, exposure and detention of foreign spies. With another — movement of ranks from Department of police and the Certain building of gendarmes in the Sea ministry was rather an exception to the rules, and in the majority was not welcomed by the high sea command. Regular naval officers — elite of royal armed forces — had undisguised disgust for "dirty craft" of gendarmes. In this regard the chief of the General sea staff vice admiral K.V. Stetsenko, agreeing with appointment of the colonel I.S. Nikolaev, noticed that the similar translations "in general are undesirable as the special oath taken by gendarme officers does not approach military ethics of sea officer ranks" 15.

Along with creation of the Petrograd sea counterintelligence by 1917 the formation of six more offices was completed, namely: at the headquarters of the commander of the Baltic Fleet (chief lieutenant colonel A.N. Nordman); at the headquarters of Sveaborgsky fortress (chief ensign I.K. Simonich); at the headquarters of sea fortress of the Emperor Peter the Great (chief first lieutenant S.S. Kalakutsky); at the Abo-Alania strengthened position (the chief a cornet N.I. Grishkovsky); at the Moodzundsky strengthened position (chief captain P.M. Char-kin) and in the Gulf of Bothnia (the chief the captain of the 2nd rank A.N. Gavrishenko) 16. And KRO at the headquarters of the commander of the Baltic Fleet, as follows from § 16 of "Provisional regulations for sea counterintelligence service on the battlefield", performed the general management of all divisions on fight against foreign spies on Baltic 17.

It is remarkable that from the specified leadership team of counterintelligence only two officers

(S.S. Kalakutsky and A.N. Gavrishenko), judging by their ranks, were personnel sailors, the others were considered attached to crews of the Baltic Fleet from the Ministry of Defence or political police. Identification of counteraction to espionage with "investigation" — business low and unworthy honor of the naval officer — became an absolute obstacle in a way of completing of sea counterintelligence candidates from the Sea ministry. And whether could be differently, many of them were deeply convinced that the highest purpose of the naval officer (his patriotic debt) to repay life for Russia in open fight with the enemy, but not "secretly to spy, sitting out in the back".

The absence of narrow experts of seafaring in a top management of sea counterintelligence on Baltic could not but affect the level of her competence of the solution of office tasks.

IVetap (January, 1917 — 1918) — professional improvement of sea counterintelligence and its elimination

With emergence of service of sea counterintelligence on the Baltic battlefield the similar divisions were created also at other boundaries of naval defense of the Russian Empire (on Black, White and other seas). In this regard need for training of naval ranks in bases of counterprospecting art and coordination of their actions with the army offices resisting to an enemy agency at the front in a front-line strip and the deep back ripened.

For the solution of this task at the beginning of 1917 at Head department of the General Staff (further — GUGS) the Ministry of Defence created special courses "on counter-intelligence service" within which within 28 days the cadets (including sailors) seized tactics and technology of detection and detention of spies 18. It was the important step on the way of mutual understanding and interaction of military and sea structures within origin of profile education and creation of a complete system of counteraction to espionage in the country.

Besides, for optimization of actions of all interested departments there was a need for definition and differentiation of jurisdiction and powers of military and sea counterintelligence and also regions of their jurisdiction. In January, 1917 the head of department of the general quartermaster of GUGS lieutenant general P.I. Averyanov and the count A.P. Kapnistr who is taking up a position of the chief of MGS agreed about holding a special meeting of representatives of the Military and Sea ministries "for

clarifications of details of transfer by bodies of overland counterintelligence to colleagues from counterintelligence sea the corresponding functions performed so far by the first..." 19. Took part in work of the meeting which took place on February 10, 1917: clerk of prospecting office of GUGS colonel M.F. Rayevsky, chief of the central military register office (main office of army counterintelligence) colonel, prince V.G. Turkestanov, head of control and auditing department of the Petrograd military district colonel V.I. Yakubov, deputy chief of MRS of Special office-work of MGS lieutenant colonel A.L. Levitsky and head of PMKRO colonel I.S. Nikolaev.

However as passed and what the special interdepartmental meeting ended with, it is unknown. Some experts in the history of domestic security service consider that materials about results of its activity exist, but today in archives of the country 20 are not found. Meanwhile, perhaps, some of documents (the taking-up questions of the organization of fight against foreign sea espionage in the Russian Empire on the eve of and during World War I) 21, found us in Navy archive of Russia, are capable to shed light on "a white spot" of this fragment of history. Being guided by the facts, as one of versions of results of a meeting it is possible to consider following.

Its participants could come to a conclusion about need of development of the uniform normative document which would regulate efforts of divisions of the Military and Sea ministries of fight against espionage in the empire. And, considering that military had not only more than 5-year practical experience in this sphere, but also the developed legal basis of the activity, and preparation of the draft of the final document was charged to them. Upon completion of work of the commission which is specially created for this purpose at GUGS, on April 27, 1917 P.I. Averyanov sent for coordination to MGS the draft of Provisional regulations for the rights and obligations of ranks of overland and sea counterintelligence service for production of investigations (further — Provisional regulations).

From this document clear that the main objective set for Russian (military and sea) counterspies, consisted in acceptance "all measures depending on them to detection of enemy spies and their organizations and also persons who the activity can promote or favor to the enemy in his military or other hostile operations against Russia and the States, Union with it" 22.

Apparently, the formulation of the general task set for KRO in 1917 had three differences from the back -

chi, the sea counterintelligence facing, for example, offices two years earlier. The first. Its update assumed expanded and accurate and consequently, a conceptual framework clear to heads of the control and auditing department and their subordinates and also executive, judicial authorities and the population. Along with the term "spy" there are such expressions as "organization", i.e. residency (the body directing work of secret-service network) and "persons who. can promote or favor to the enemy in him. hostile actions against Russia.", i.e. accomplices of war criminals (traitors of the Homeland). The specification of precepts of law had to promote not only to simplification of process of exposure of foreign spies (and their accomplices) and attraction them to judicial responsibility (for example, exact qualification of corpus delicti), but also to definition of degree of fault of each of them and purpose of just punishment. The second. It provided execution of allied obligations by armed forces of Russia, as well as their component — service of sea counterintelligence. Her heads were obliged to exchange the intelligence about intentions and the opponent's actions with similar services of member countries of the Entente and to render them necessary assistance. And, as follows from Provisional regulations, the given component in work of counterintelligence important significance was attached. And the third. The task set for royal counterintelligence at the end of war differed in the sketchiness and short-sightedness of her authors in terms of the real and future interests of Russia. If until recently as it was stated above, the counterintelligence resisted to "sea espionage of the foreign states", then now found only "enemy spies and their organizations". So selective, politized and criminal approach forced for a while "to close eyes" to intelligence activities in Russia friendly to it powers (Great Britain and France). Obtusion of vigilance could not only entail loss of the being available military secrets, but also promote creation of complete idea of internal political and social and economic crisis in the country that it was so important for its subsequent easing. Let's remind, a year later, during Civil war, operating with reports of the agency, yesterday's allies began open intervention against the Soviet Russia.

The provisional regulations expanded the list of the rights and duties of staff of counterintelligence in the years of war a little. At the same time for the first time from the moment of emergence of royal counterintelligence and the regulatory base regulating its activity, in on -

a dobny sort of the instruction, some legal limits of powers of counterprospecting ranks were set. For example, terms of keeping of the detained persons "under guards" (from 2 weeks to 3 months) and the conditions influencing their extension (§ 7, 11) made a reservation. Meanwhile some provisions had obviously contradictory character. So, remained unclear to what authority nevertheless development and direct detention of suspects of espionage and high treason of persons were imputed. On the one hand, it is visible that heads of control and auditing department and their assistants (deputies) had the right to subject to "provisional arrest" of the spies who are in development (§ 2) and also to make concerning their some investigative actions (search, dredging). Whereas "ranks of local militia or the bodies corresponding to it" were attracted only for assistance to counterintelligence (§ 5). With another — in § 10 it is accurately stipulated that the requirement about detention "has to be turned to ranks of militia or bodies corresponding to it" and only in the absence of those detention can be made by ranks of counterintelligence service. Organizational confusion on places could be a consequence of inexact, quite often mutually exclusive manuals, one of manifestations of which was an overlapping and counterefficiency of actions of state authorities independent from each other.

June 17, 1917. The provisional regulations for the rights and obligations of ranks of overland and sea counterintelligence service for production of investigations were approved by the chairman of Provisional government prince G.I. Lvov and the colonel Yakubovich replacing a position of the Minister of War 23.

Despite some innovations dictated by realities of military years, the Provisional regulations which were published with obvious delay did not receive the finished and legally thought over contents which was equitable to the interests of external safety of the state in general and specifics of activity of its executive institutes in particular. This normative legal act also did not conceive practical application.

Meanwhile the come true February revolution put beyond the law many components of the autocratic power, and first of all long ago the repressive and retaliatory system debugged and running decades smoothly. The department of police and the Certain building of gendarmes stopped the existence. Dismissals and prosecutions concerned not only the serving ranks of police, their agents, but also the "former" gendarme officers attached to Sea and In -

unlimited to the ministries. On April 26, 1917 the chief of the Petrograd office of sea counterintelligence colonel I.S. Nikolaev was discharged of a post. The same fate comprehended also other his colleagues.

Comparing counterspies with gendarmes, and counteraction to sea espionage with counterrevolutionary fight, the new power did not need special bodies of safety and their heads — professional "rozysknik", in fact, the unique experts combining deep knowledge of questions of the organization of naval reconnaissance of armed forces of the warring states and rich practical experience of secret-service work.

On all sites of the Baltic battlefield the abolition of counterprospecting offices and points began. At the same time, according to "An extract from Minutes of Provisional Government" of April 24, 1917, allocation from the state treasury of funds for "confidential" expenses (i.e. allocations for needs of investigation/counterintelligence) 24 was stopped.

By the end of 1918 the sea registration service MGS was liquidated. Its management which did not support the Bolshevist mode, the beginning actively to cooperate with the English intelligence. Together with the former allies the secret organization code-named which arsenal the political, terrorist, diversionary and other methods of fight designed to undermine the political regime spread in the country entered was created "OK". However soon its activity was opened by the staff of Cheka, and all naval officers entering it were arrested.

The investigation made by security officers established the facts convicting the former counterspies of connections with the English intelligence and antigovernmental activity. The Supreme tribunal of Council of People's Commissars of RSFSR issued the decree according to which the head "OK" R.A. Okerlund was subject to execution, and his deputy V.A. Vinogradov, A.I. Levitsky and some other officers — to serving of various terms of punishment in concentration camps. The sentence was carried out by 25.

Finishing statement of historical events about the course of formation and liquidation of sea counterintelligence of the Russian Empire on Baltic, we will address their aspects, most significant for judgment:

— first, the state acting through the high-ranking sea ranks did not consider need of creation of a system of special divisions on fight against espionage at the sea in anticipation of World War I. Therefore strengthening of fighting capacity of the Baltic Fleet, within implementation of naval programs, activity of the Sea ministry and podve-

domstvenny to it the strategic enterprises and consequently, and the organization of protection of sea boundaries of St. Petersburg were left without the qualified counterprospecting cover that, certainly, could not but negatively affect safety of sea secrets of the Russian Empire;

— secondly, as a result of sluggishness, and sometimes and inaction of the management of the Sea ministry, during the period from 1914 to 1916 navy of the Russian Empire (first of all, on Baltic) and all objects of naval defense of the capital, as before, had comprehensive (military and sea) no counterprospecting providing. The experimental office of naval reconnaissance / counterintelligence of MGS created with obvious lateness which was engaged generally in correspondence concerning espionage with the interested departments received formal purpose, and did not pose a little serious threat to the opponent's agents;

— thirdly, in the middle of fighting the ineffective service of counterintelligence of sea department was created organizationally weak, insufficiently financed, and therefore. So unexpected result became possible owing to the crash of strategic plans of warfare in which main destination was given to the Russian Imperial fleet. From first months of position fights it became obvious that the emphasis will be placed on confrontation of ground forces of the conflicting states. Therefore formation of specialized divisions on fight against naval reconnaissance of the enemy was represented by business minor, and therefore less important and necessary in comparison with satisfaction of needs of the front;

— fourthly, the sea counterintelligence was not perceived by the high sea command as an independent and reliable link in defense of sea boundaries of the state. Therefore from the moment of the creation and up to the end of war it was forced to be in "shadow" of intelligence service;

— and, fifthly, despite the long and problem nature of formation of divisions of sea counterintelligence on Baltic, their emergence, undoubtedly, could become an important milestone on the way of creation of powerful public service within the Sea ministry and origin of a system of counteraction to foreign naval intervention in scales of the whole country. However after the known revolutionary events of 1917 and overthrow of the monarchy when "old regime" power institutions were outlawed, and their employees unclaimed, the base which developed for long military years counterprospecting zashchi-

you sea boundaries of the state were actually destroyed. Having destroyed sea counterintelligence, having lost professional staff, the accumulated experience, secret-service communications and so forth, the Bolshevist country leaders were forced to begin construction of new security service (on the fleet) almost "from scratch".

It is so transient, disgracefully and tragically the history of sea counterintelligence of Russia of the period of a tsarism ended.

1 L.S. Yakovlev. Counterintelligence of Russia the day before and in years

World War I//Materials of historical readings on Lubyanka. 1997. Russian intelligence agencies: History and present. Moscow-Veliky Novgorod, 1999; N.V. Grekov. The Russian counterintelligence in 1905-1917: shpionomaniye and real problems. M, 2000; N.S. Kirmel. Organization of the Russian counterintelligence and its fight against the Japanese and German espionage in Siberia (1906-1917): dis_kand. east. sciences. Irkutsk,

2000; V.O. Zverev. Counteraction to the German military-industrial espionage in St. Petersburg on the eve of World War I. Omsk, 2008; etc.
2 In more detail about the organization of the German secret-service intelligence and results of its activity in the St. Petersburg military district see: V.O. Zverev. Industrial, trade and insurance joint-stock companies of St. Petersburg as commercial cover of military-industrial espionage of Germany in Russia before World War I//the Scientific bulletin of the Omsk Russian Interior Ministry Academy. 2008. No. 4.
3 In more detail about efforts of the German diplomats on collecting intelligence information on objects of the defensive industry of the St. Petersburg military district see: V.O. Zverev, Za-sypkin M.A. Modernization of the Baltic navy as subject of prospecting interest German

sea attaches in boundaries

Simonsen Lillian
Other scientific works: