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The INTERNATIONAL ROUND TABLE "the PEOPLE AND the POWER IN the RUSSIAN DISTEMPER" the beginning in No. 4-7 for 2010

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the beginning in No. 4 —7za 2010 year

N.V. Lipatova:

It is possible to look at a distemper through a prism of images of revolution. When I asked students a question of what images of a distemper, revolutions, reforms exist in their consciousness, received two different answers. Information scientists answered that it is the wrong Windows installation — put new, and former did not remove. Designers answered that to argue there is nothing: when is "vague", and it is impossible to explain. However, according to them, it is possible to live in such situation. With revolution, on the contrary, everything is clear — so it is impossible to live further.

Despite an external nonsense, in answers there is a certain logic. The fact is that during a distemper some mechanisms which more or less regularly functioned earlier break. They should be replaced on the run. Let's assume, the power cannot exploit army. If to remember 1917, then it will turn out that the greatest problem was represented by soldiers of rear garrisons. They simply plundered the population.

V.P. Buldakov:

And wine warehouses too.

N.V. Lipatova:

All this turned into a dreadful picture. Former mechanisms of control of a distemper did not work any more. But could cope with wine riots at Bolsheviks Red Guards. Certainly, from spontaneous confrontation of soldiers and Red Guards there was also a feeling of a distemper. I.M. Dyakonov in relation to similar situations introduced for scientific use such concept as "total public discomfort".

V.P. Buldakov:

Yes, all are dissatisfied. About it, by the way, still Saltykov-Shchedrin perfectly wrote. I "the Red Distemper" finished him at the time with the quote.

O.G. Bukhovets:

On the eve of 1985 too all were dissatisfied.

V.P. Buldakov:

By the way, Lenin in this regard actually formulated the psychological law of the beginning of revolution. According to Lenin, the revolutionary situation is characterized by a condition of general discontent when "tops" cannot, and "bottoms" do not want to live on old.

N.V. Lipatova:

Yes, but I not absolutely agree that the distemper can end with revolution, and can not end with it.

V.P. Buldakov:

The distemper can include revolution.

N.V. Lipatova:

At a distemper there are mechanisms allowing return to former, let in a little externally changed look. As for

Vladimir Prokhorovich BULDAKOV — and. N, senior research associate of Institute of the Russian history RAL


Petrovich — to. and. N, associate professor; associate professor of philosophy of the Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation, associate professor of UNC "New Russia. History of Post-Soviet Russia" RGGU


Yuryevich —





sciences of Institute


formations and




project "People and

the power in Russian


revolution, it assumes a total break with old. In 1920 school students asked to make peculiar charts of writers. In this regard they took an interest: "And the revolutionary can write verses? He can compose?" Having received the affirmative answer, they placed on top of literary charts of leaders of revolution of Pushkin. It was followed by Trotsky, Lenin, Kalinin, etc. the Time of Troubles causes the shift of historical names and concepts. Modern school students confuse, for example, Stalin with Stolypin too. I asked a question all the time: "Why so?" The answer was as follows: "Because one was engaged in agrarian reform, and other collectivization. Plus the first 2 letters in surnames coincide. What do you want from us? We confuse them".

V.P. Buldakov:

Has to notice that the revolutionary cycle includes restoration, Thermidor, kickback to old. As for actually distemper, it can be understood as the metaphor reflecting total misunderstanding of the events including a fright before deeds.

A.A. Beloborodova:

Today said that on the eve of the revolution the power finds a blindness and divergence. The acceptable policy of the government at the beginning of the 20th century visually illustrates it. So, all unlawful materials everywhere filtered into the press, active promotion of the socialist ideas was actually conducted. Wrote about it at the end of the 19th century Plehve. From the province, complaints to inefficiency of the existing censoring order constantly arrived. Bulygin in 1905 prepared a note about need of introduction of amendments to the acceptable legislation. He suggested to create bureau of the press which would work in court. He offered also material support of that press which broadcast pro-government views. Similar projects were directed to the highest name and by other figures.

Partially their offers were realized. In particular, there was an Informative bureau at Head department for the press. But in what it was engaged? Drawing up reports on the direction of the press which represented was imputed to this bureau a duty

the residue becoming for the highest figures of the state and heads of various departments. And it is, in general, all. On it the power stopped.

In 1905 and in 1914 2 projects of reforms of acceptable department which were not undertaken were developed. In the general, the acceptable policy of the government failed. Therefore if to speak about a distemper, then it is worth remembering that fish goes rotten by the head. The power has to be able to stop disintegration processes in time.

S.V. Karpenko:

All characteristic features of "the second Russian distemper" were shown in the history of the White movement. Among them — administrative anemia of "top" of the White movement, flash of private and corporate egoism, demoralization in the environment of bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie, etc. War, threat of distribution of the Bolshevism on all territory of Russia and deepening of an economic crisis in the country were the decisive factors defining these processes. In the conditions of crisis the position of officials sharply worsened. It became the reason of rapid growth of bribery and embezzlement of public funds. In the fall of 1919 the situation became intolerable. In December of the same year, new monthly salaries were established to officials and also the increase on high cost was given. But also it did not save the situation. The jump in prices which followed because of defeats of denikinsky troops led to the fact that the salary of officials fell up to 25 — 30% of a "hungry" minimum of one person. In the spring and summer of 1920 in the Crimea a salary of officials with all increases a cover from 5 to 25% of a family living wage. To officials it was necessary how to take and extort bribes, to be engaged nothing in embezzlement of public funds.

The soil for corruption "bows" of officials and businessmen was created by the bureaucratic regulation of economy which was carried out by Denikin and Wrangel's governments. First of all, it belongs to the sphere of foreign trade. As in the conditions of a hyperinflation the production did not give "normal" profit, businessmen sent the capitals to foreign trade, seeking to compensate all losses suffered from a hozyaynichanye of Bolsheviks due to export of raw materials. They tried to obtain from Denikin and Wrangel's governments

total freedom of trade. They gave a hostile reception to attempts of regulation of foreign trade. But almost immediately they found a "effective" way of counteraction — distribution of bribes to the officials involved in trade. Bribery among officials assumed an unknown scale: for delivery to trading companies of permissions to export of raw materials from the South of Russia they demanded bribes which size reached 50% of the expected profit.

Denikin and Wrangel tried to struggle with bribe takers and embezzlers of public funds, adopted the laws punishing bribe-takers and speculators by confiscation of property, penal servitude and even the death penalty. Semi-official newspapers appealed to the patriotic feelings: "To take now a bribe — means to trade in Russia!" It did not work. Wrangel went for introduction of the state monopoly for grain export. This measure caused the strongest discontent of mass of trading companies. On the government, charges of "trade constraint", of "a suffocation of a private initiative" fell down. The regulation and melochny — a regulation of foreign trade became tougher, the businessmen became more inventive and more cynical.

Thus, in the conditions of a distemper in the White South the bureaucracy degenerated in corporation of "dealers in Russia". "The Voyennoekonomichesky union" of bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie accelerated decomposition of the white back in 1919 — 1920 and by that promoted defeat of the White movement in the south of Russia.

V.P. Buldakov:

All this very much reminds our time.

I.A. Anfertyev:

Some researchers call the same socio-political phenomenon in the history of Russia a distemper, others — revolution. In my opinion, it is necessary to judge by their concrete social and economic consequences for the country. I consider that revolution destroys obstacles in a way of progress, radically changes all life of society. At the same time former state and public institutes are liquidated forever. And as a result of a distemper the socio-political system remains, the state institutes remain.

In this regard, probably, came it is time to reconsider assessment of events of 1905 — 1907 in Russia which is traditional

for a domestic and western historiography. They were called the first Russian revolution for ideological reasons. In my opinion, these events were a distemper which caused only some modernization of a social and economic system. It is possible to add to it that the distemper can precede revolution, but revolution can take place also without it. An example — revolution of August, 1991 in Russia when in rather peace situation the Soviet Union broke up, and the Soviet power and its backbone represented by the CPSU fell into oblivion.

In my opinion, in the late twenties — the beginning of the 30th there was one more revolution. 1930 it was nearly fatal for Stalin. There were catastrophically not enough funds for industrialization continuation. Acceleration of rates of collectivization led to impoverishment of the people and hunger. It seemed to contemporaries of the secretary general that the myth about his political invulnerability will be just about dispelled. But, unlike the colleagues and figures of opposition, Stalin was able not only to expect, but also to work.

It is well visible on the example of so-called "business" of M.N. Ryutin. On October 5, 1930 at a meeting of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) the decision on its exception of party was made. Stalin let know to society that time of discussions forever consigned to the past. Thus, Ryutin not so much frightened Stalin how many helped it to rally around himself a party and state top and to finally approve the status of the individual leader in party and the state.

Nothing similar occurred at the beginning of the 90th. The power could not resist to opposition. In similar konkretnoistorichesky conditions Stalin acted as the political pragmatist which for the sake of preservation of the power promoted distribution of myths about own insight and genius. Most of those who appeared on its way lowered hands, refusing fight continuation.

Heads of the Russian state with some share of convention can be divided into two categories: those who got the power easily, and those who independently covered a thorny road to its tops. Stalin also belonged to the last, certainly. He was able to take

from any situation a political benefit. Paradoxically, but crises only promoted strengthening of the mode of a personal authority of Stalin, formation of a cult of his personality. Overcoming crisis, it ruthlessly dealt shortly with those who got in his way to the absolute power.

N.A. Savchenko:

It would be desirable to return to a question of a blindness of the power. Here it was quite a lot told about it. My personal research experience convinces me that the power was not such the blind person. It saw danger, could even predict consequences, but did not want or could not take the necessary steps to their prevention for any subjective and objective reasons.

In particular, events of the beginning of the 20th century force the power to address very effective, in my opinion, imperial institute — extraordinary state nadvedomstvenny supervision of senatorial audits. Senators brought rather objective information from places. However, Plehve at the end of the 19th century began to survey regions by means of ministerial inspections. The power, however, preferred to return to institute of senatorial audits. Classified reports got to the emperor, were discussed also by ministers, both in the Senate, and in other highest authorities. They gave rather objective picture of position of administration in various regions of Russia. But no practical decisions from this followed.

Yu.A. Zherdeva:

My performance is devoted to influence of "carnival culture" on the mechanism of mass inversion of values in the urban environment and to its connections with revolutionary processes. The holiday phenomenon in the revolutionary culture of Russia and a revolutionary festival as propaganda mechanism of the Soviet power means. First of all, I am interested in a carnival as the mechanism of revaluation of values as a form of interaction of "people" and Vlast in the conditions of spontaneous Russian "urbanization" of the beginning of the 20th century

By the tradition which developed in scientific literature carnival culture is attributed, first of all, to archaic societies (pre-state, so, and dogorodsky in their traditional understanding), to ancient art and the Middle Ages. As M.M. Bakhtin notes, a carnival

most often contacts the medieval urban environment. In my opinion, Bakhtin's observations indicate a carnival as on some "archetypic" layer of national culture.

Carnival action has such important property as a splash of the vital mental energy which is repressively suppressed by society. Being socially legalized, similar actions act as a certain mechanism of stabilization, reveal the suppressed points of aggression and stabilize national discontent.

In medieval Europe the carnival action carried, on the one hand, spontaneous character (splash of mental energy), with another — gained significant effect on the power, modernizing the system of its relationship with the people. In Russia with increase of imperial traditions this mechanism was initiated by the power or church, having gradually turned into "a monologue of the power". The power actually "usurped" a carnival as a form of a national holiday. The cities which had the administrative nature in Russia became venues of a carnival. The power gave to mass city "festivities" more and more state character even if externally these holidays had the religious form. It is possible to assume that if the rural environment was for such festivals natural, national, then city became artificial, administrative.

If in stable conditions of the state existence prevail official, "consecrated" with the law or religion of a form of the organization of joint actions, then in abnormal conditions, such as revolution — informal ("spontaneous", "national"). Such situation developed in 1917. During the revolution there was "a turning of values", and official culture was succeeded being based under it national, carnival.

However the "karnavalization" of public life which was occurring during revolution and originally having spontaneous character was quickly monopolized by the power. Now the "turned" values were broadcast already by the newest power. Legitimation of a carnival by Bolsheviks was carried out by reconstruction vulgar festive (a funeral of "the victims of revolution", triumphal

anniversaries of October) or farcical (for example, "revolution trains") representations. At the symbolical level it was "legalization" of national culture, its transformation in official. The power approved in such way "vsenarodnost".

In the conditions of anarchy the imperious functions were undertaken by the one who could show power attributes of the power. Most often it was "the person with a gun". However similar Vlast needs recognition from the majority, and such "recognition" is already in the world symbolical. In one case it is imposed by total intimidation of the population: in this case the fear appears means of legitimation of a new system. Other recognitions mechanism of the new power is legalization of its "fair" character. Karnavalization had to remain the mechanism of annual confirmation of this "mandate". From here such great value in the Soviet life of the "revolutionary" holidays which externally had an appearance of festivities, but in practice completely controlled by the authorities.

So the city functioning at the expense of the social mechanisms managed by the power gradually becomes the center of all social life of the country. The carnival for city society and the state system in general acts as the recreation mechanism. And if weakening of the power in Russia by 1917 released the saved-up and repressively suppressed national energy in the form of carnival turning of values, then Bolshevist carnival legitimation restored the mechanism of control of the power over carnival festivals destroyed for the period of the revolution, having stabilized a social system and the political system in general.

V.P. Buldakov:

Perhaps, the carnival can be considered as a distemper prototype in its primitive spontaneous quality. If so, then theoretically the distemper can be transferred to the constructive course.

E.V. Pavlova:

Desacralization of the power is the most important reason of the Russian distemper. Symptoms of desacralization of throne were designated in the first half of the 19th century. The ideas of Education called into question the sacral meaning of the monarchy, and the French revolution and a revolution of 1801 led to the corresponding reflection. Undoubtedly, a role in the course of desacralization of the power was played by an era of "palace revolutions". And it in spite of the fact that in the Russian society traditionalist ideas of the power continued to dominate.

Discussion by future Decembrists of a question of regicide became one of bright manifestations of the begun process of desacralization of the power. Among Decembrists there were much those who critically treated a postulate on sacrality of throne. The view of representatives of a radical current of this problem was not unambiguous.

At the time A.I. Herzen explained a phenomenon of regicide and a revolution with need of fight against unlimited autocracy and tyranny. He came to a conclusion that the Russian thought silently agreed with regicides.

According to Petrashevists, the autocracy is unworthy the person. It generates an arbitrariness and despotism. Petrashevists denied divine origin of throne and openly discussed a possibility of regicide. They considered that the tsar who forgot the debt is a servant of a Satan.

Thus, in a radical wing of the Russian social thought of the 19th century the process of desacralization of throne was shown in denial of its divine origin, in change of ethical accents (good — the evil), in assumption of a possibility of regicide and in criticism of its concrete actions. The first symptoms of manifestation of desacralization of the imperial power which at the beginning of the 20th century gained irreversible character were that. It became the main factor which predetermined its crash in 1917

Ackermann Harald
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