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Formation of "East policy" of Germany in the first post-war decades: political and legal aspect



istoriya

Maxim LEVCHENKO

FORMATION of "EAST POLICY" of Germany In the FIRST POST-WAR DECADES: POLITICAL and LEGAL ASPECT

Article is devoted to post-war formation of the relations between Germany and the Soviet Union. The author analyzes the relations of two states in the context of formation of the bipolar world.

The article is devoted to the post-war establishing relations between Germany and Soviet Union. The author analyzes relations of two states in the context of formation of the bipolar world.

"German problem", Christian democrats, "east policy", Hapstein's doctrine; German issue, Christian Democrats, eastern policy, doctrine of Hallstein.

Maxim Vladimirovich LEVCHENKO — to. and. N, associate professor of the Kama state inzhenernoekonomichesky ikademiya (INEKA), Naberezhnye Chelny

minos2003@mail.ru

"East policy" of Germany during restoration of the German state in the basis covered a wide range of problems, the most important of which was relationship with the Soviet Union, with countries of Eastern Europe and separately with the GDR the Final result of "east question" had to be expressed in recovery of the state unity of Germany and return of its historical role of the capital Germanii1 to Berlin.

Conservatives of Germany could not reconcile with the idea of existence of communism which was alien to Western Europe as the political idea and in the basis concealed threat for moral principles of the European society. Therefore it is no wonder that they called for unity of all right forces of Europe in a united front against the left forces.

The theorist of the solution of "east question" the first German chancellor Konrad Adenauer who during the period from spring of 1951 to summer of 1952 formulated three axioms of implementation of policy in the east by right is considered.

1. Implementation of effective "east policy" is possible only in the conditions of uniform actions of the people of free Europe acting for the good of own safety. It meant economic and political integration of the Western European states and also creation and strengthening of military blocks, such as NATO, EOS.
2. The central role in this security policy has to belong to West Germany as from the beginning of Cold War Germany turned into a buffer zone in which the interests of communism and kapitalizma2 faced.
3. The Soviet Union because of the vested interests specially delays discussion of controversial European issues. But the countries of free democracy, working as a unit, can force the USSR to accept conditions of Zapada3.

From all this it becomes clear that actions of conservatives concerning east neighbors came down to balancing between

1 Grewe W.G. Deutsche Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegieit. — Stuttgart, 1960, s. 5.
2 Kabinettsprotokolle, 10.5.1952, s. 279.
3 Schwarz H-P. Adenauer. Der Staatmann: 1952 — 1967. — Stuttgart, 1991, s. 14.

force and negotiations. Finally, "if the West is strong as well as the USSR, then day of negotiations with the Soviet Union came" 1.

An important factor of "east policy" of Adenauer was also the important geographical location of the Federal Republic as the country was between two military blocks. Adenauer wanted Germany to adjoin one of military blocks — the neutrality in a similar situation would be, according to him, is pernicious for the state as the country which does not have the external concept would be simply crushed by the contradictory military alliances, having become in their hands an obedient toy. Besides, for achievement of the foreign policy plans Adenauer needed foreign policy allies, and to the neutral country they were difficult to be had.

Christian democrats of Germany considered that the Soviet Union, as well as all totalitarian states, respects only force. Therefore as soon as the Soviet Union understands that its methods do not influence the western neighbors, militarization undermines from within its force, and further expansion on the West is impracticable, with it it will be possible to begin peace talks.

Adenauer assumed that the reasons which will force the Soviet Union to conduct negotiations with the West ripen in it for a long time. Pointed low living standards of the population and a huge defense expenditure to it; it could not proceed infinitely. Therefore as he considered, there will even be enough attempt of one unsuccessful expansion of the USSR on the West that the Soviet Union sat down at the negotiating table. And, as it was supposed, negotiations from the West have to be rigid and categorical.

Can seem paradoxical, but the USSR and Germany achieved one objective — creation of uniform Germany. And the Soviet Union was here the obvious leader as announced one initiative for another which were rejected by the West German government. The reason was that the Soviet Union supported negotiations on the peace treaty with Germany before education all-German

1 Shyo., 8. 15.

the governments, and his western opponents insisted on the return. That is, the western concept assumed creation of the West German government on the basis of free elections in the beginning, and then — negotiation about the conclusion peace dogovora2.

The first symptom of crisis of "east question" was unilateral admission of the USSR in January, 1955 of the decree "About the Termination of a State of War between the Soviet Union and Germany". To take a negotiation initiative, Adenauer continued to adhere to policy of "international legal reservations" which were allegedly necessary "to keep" the point of view of Germany "in the vital questions". A main objective of reservations was prevention of opinion that establishment of diplomatic relations was considered as refusal of the former legal point of view of the federal government concerning, first, question of borders, secondly, of the rights of the federal government to act on behalf of all German people, thirdly, non-recognition of the so-called German Democratic Republic.

The Moscow talks were an important milestone in formation of "east policy" of Adenauer. In the memoirs he highly appreciated Khrushchev and Bulganin's diplomatic abilities. But at the same time K. Adenauer considered, "that his fight against communism is, first of all, fight between materialism and Christian outlook" 3. The communistic doctrine at the same time always remains invariable and therefore the Christian outlook has to be invariable too to win against communism persistence and hardness of views.

Unfortunate Moscow talks were an important milestone in formation of "east policy" of Adenauer as showed insolvency of his many ideas concerning the Soviet Union.

The beginning of implementation of new "east policy" can be considered establishment of "Halstein's doctrine". Doctrine

2 G.Ya. Bakirova. Reunification of Germany: prerequisites, process and international legal consequences. — Kazan, 2003, page 29.
3 RgsLoko11e yoe8 CDU —Vipyoe8UoMapyoe8, 1953 — 1957, Dysseldorf: Dgoste, 1990, 8. 594, 596.

provided that Germany will maintain diplomatic relations only with those states which have no relations with GDR1. Therefore, the main objective of policy of Halstein was by power pressure to force the Soviet Union more to show consideration for an issue of the association Germany and to make this association according to the plan of FRG2.

In essence the politician Halstein represented barefaced blackmail concerning the third countries. Calculation of Bonn on the fact that the countries, and first of all developing, being presented with a choice was the cornerstone of the doctrine: with what of two German states to maintain the relations, will choose the relations with Germany.

During formation of the doctrine of Halstein in 1955 — 1957 the relations between Germany and the USSR were minimized. It is explained also by the process of de-Stalinization which began in the Soviet Union and national performances which followed it in Hungary and Poland which the government of CDU regarded as the beginning of crash of socialism.

At the same time the chancellor hardened in the view more and more that arms race of Germany only on advantage that the economy of the Soviet Union will not hold on on mass military production and the USSR eternally will weaken. But in public policy K. Adenauer had no objection to show other approaches. For example, in the message of December 10, 1957 Adenauer suggested to sign the pact on mutual non-aggression between NATO and the Warsaw pact. And during negotiations with Mikoyan on April 26, 1958 he suggested to begin process of general disarmament under mutual control.

As for position of the GDR, Adenauer suggested "to give to the Soviet zone the status, as at Austria", having turned thus the GDR into the neutral country. In the memoirs Adenauer explained that he recognized "hope that freedom given to the population of East Germany will be reasonably used when choosing poly-

1 Hubatsch W. Die deutsche Frage. — Wurzburg, 1961, S. 37.
2 Klessmann C. Adenauer Deutschland-und Ostpolitik 1955 - 1963//Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage. - Gottingen, 1988, s. 62-63.

tichesky decisions" 3. In other words, to resolve an issue of the reunification of Germany in favor of the union with Germany

Such innovations in Adenauer's views of the relations with the USSR and the GDR raised the mass of questions and discontent in CDU / CSU, compelling biographers during lifetime of Adenauer to look for suitable political justification. The new doctrine included three slogans: the Austrian way of development of the GDR, "Globke's plan" and offers on cooperation concerning CCCP4. True views of Adenauer revealed only after his death in 1967 with issue of the third and fourth volumes of his memoirs. From "Memoirs" it becomes clear that from the middle of the 50th at Adenauer the impression begins to develop that the Soviet Union began process of liberalization of the foreign policy, including concerning the GDR. Thus, Adenauer expected to use this chance in "east policy" 5.

The Berlin ultimatum of Khrushchev about situation in the Western Berlin was on November 10, 1958 the important event which made pernicious impact on implementation of "east policy" of Christian democrats. Khrushchev said in the speech that time of action of the quadrilateral status of Berlin comes to an end, the western powers have to leave borders of the Western Berlin in six-month time.

The moment chosen by Khrushchev for implementation of the stock was chosen most successfully: "satellite shock", crisis in NATO, a strong dispute in Germany concerning atomic arms of the Bundeswehr formed a strong negative background. Finally slogan of Christian democrats: "Time works for us" led to the fact that CDU got stuck in the solution of "east question" 6 which finally was considered in terms of the Soviet part.

Conservatives recognized that "The Soviet Union managed in given slu-

3 Adenauer K. Erinnerungen 1953-1955. — Stuttgart, 1965, s. 379.
4 Gotto K. Adenauers Deutschland-und Ostpolitik 1954-1963 / Konrad Adenauer Seine Deutschland-und AuBenpolitik 1945-1963. - Miinchen, 1975, s. 156-286.
5 Adenauer und die Europaische Sicherheit//Konrad Adenauer und seine Zeit, Bd.2. - Stuttgart, 1976, s. 103.
6 Noack P. Deutsche AuBenpolitik. S.74.

tea to make deep break of the front of public opinion. Constant visits and countervisits which the Soviet Union and uncountable other countries exchange obviously brought to the Soviet Union propaganda and psychological success which cannot be underestimated..." 1.

Adenauer adhering before "strong-arm tactics" was forced to recognize this circumstance. However he remained surprisingly the colleagues from party absolutely quiet.

If earlier conservatives considered that militarization of the Soviet Union leads to its easing, then after the Berlin crisis of 1958 the Christian democrats began to incline to the idea that in a situation when the Soviet Union understands that the movement to world supremacy clogged, it will be possible by creation of mechanisms of cooperation, for example in the field of arms race, to achieve easing of tension in the world. However at the same time the chancellor Adenauer did not tend to immortalize the Soviet totalitarian regime which will paralyze will of people to most

1 Ayoepaiyeg K. Epppegishchep 1955 — 1959. — Stuttgagt, 1967, 8. 125.

to definition. And all this pushed it on search of ways to weakening of the position of the USSR again. Adenauer, on the one hand, needed maintaining tension in the world for ensuring support of Germany with the western allies. With another — creation of the uniform German state required tension easing.

A final blow to the solution of "east question" was struck by construction of the Berlin wall on August 13

1961 . Activization of policy of "rejection of communism" and aspiration to put power pressure the Soviet Union for the solution of "The Berlin problem" on the scenario of the government of K. Adenauer in the early sixties led to serious international crisis. It became clear to much that to pursue former uncompromising "east policy" it is already impossible. The danger of former confrontational policy is even more realized after the Caribbean Crisis
1962 . In this international situation the crisis of adenauerovsky "east policy" became one of the main reasons of resignation of Adenauer in 1963 and leaving of conservatives in opposition as a result of elections of 1969
Aileen Helen
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