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Features of dynamics of military-political position of hadzhretsky Kabarda in the conditions of transformation of the international status Zakubanya (the middle 1829 - 1830)



ISTORIYA of the PEOPLE of DON AND NORTH CAUCASUS

UDC 94 (471.64) 073

FEATURES of DYNAMICS of the MILITARY-POLITICAL PROVISION HADZHRETSKOY of KABARDA in the conditions of TRANSFORMATION of the INTERNATIONAL STATUS ZAKUBANYA (the MIDDLE 1829 - 1830)

© 2011 T.H. Aloyev

Institute of humanitarian researches of the Government of KBR and KBNC RAS, Pushkin St., 18, Nalchik, 360000, kbigi@mail.ru

Institute of Humanities Researches of Kabardino-Balkar Scientific Center RAS, Pushkin St., 18, Nalchik, 360000, kbigi@mail.ru

Features of military-political position of the population migrating from Kabarda's center in its zaku-bansky part are investigated. The main forms of interaction of Kabardians East Zakubanya, the Adrianople peace treaty which received hadzhretsky Kabarda's name, and the Russian Empire during an initial stage of effect of provisions signed between St. Petersburg and Istanbul in September, 1829 come to light

We research the peculiarities of the military and political situation among the population which migrated from the center of Ka-barda to its zakubanskaya part. The research focuses on the main types of cooperation between the Kabardians of the Eastern Zaku-banye (known as Khadzhretian Kabarda) and the Russian Empire at the beginning of Adrianopol Peace Treaty (signed between St. Petersburg and Istanbul in September 1829).

Geostrategic, military-political and the subject legal status of zakubansky (hadzhretsky) Kabarda to the middle of 1829 in many respects was defined by external factors. From them the following circumstances had the most expressed imperative character. First, in 1829 the Russian command started construction of the military line on river. Big Zelenchuk, directly directed against "runaway" Kabardians [1, page 279]. Secondly, the commander of the Caucasian line lieutenant general Emanuyel then, in March, rejected the initiative of the confrontation termination announced by leaders of hadzhret [2, page 135]. And, at last, the defining role in the further fate of hadzhret was played by signing in September, 1829. The Adrianople treatise between St. Petersburg and Istanbul on which the last recognized sovereignty of Russia over Zakubanyem, in particular and over the western territories of Kabarda keeping de facto the independent status after gaining the center of the country in 1822. The boldly newest reference points of the Russian policy in the region, perhaps, were designated in Nicholas I's letter to the top military commander in the Caucasus I.F. Paskevich on September 25, 1829, at once after conclusion of peace: "Having terminated thus one nice business, another is necessary to you, in my eyes so nice, and in a reasoning of straight lines polz, much the major, - suppression forever of the mountain people or destruction rebellious. This business does not demand immediate approach, but resolute and mature execution..." [3, page 58].

In general, unlike previous year, in 1829 the significant recession of military activity on the Line is observed. It should be noted that the Russian troops incurred the lion's share of military losses in 1828 in fights with Adyghe near the right flank and in the territories adjoining it [4, page 22 - 23]. Apparently, and in 1829 the specified area remained the most dangerous (for both parties) the site of the Caucasian line. However weakening of opposition was indisputable.

Such situation arose thanks to interface of definiteness of prospects (at least, from the Russian Empire) the subsequent interaction of military-political forces in the Northwest Caucasus with ambiguity of forms and temporary parameters of their manifestation. In other words, the Russian Empire, having received carte blanche concerning the Western Circassia and zakubansky (hadzhretsky) Kabarda and having defined the main format of interaction with them, did not get on well yet (at the second half of 1829) to put the bulky imperial absorption mechanism of recently acquired territories in action. On the other hand, the main carriers of resistance of the Western Circassia are abadzekh, Shapsugs, Natukhais and Ubykhs - did not create the integrated political education which is flexibly reacting to hostile influence from the outside. Moreover, it is possible to speak, as the specified subethnic groups and princely possession of the Western Circassia (the last regardless of that, swore they during the previous period on allegiance of Russia or not) in it

time were in a condition of "confusion" in the face of radical change of a habitual geopolitical picture in the region.

Unlike them hadzhretsky Kabarda's leaders (before more than once showing existence of the consolidated subjectivity) had no illusions about probable scenarios of further interaction with Russia. Considering this circumstance, it becomes clear that certain "passivity" of hadzhret was a consequence of conscious policy of waiting at this time, the being most equitable to their interests in the conditions of scarcity of military potential (in comparison with resource opportunities of the largest West Adyghe subethnic groups), in military opposition of Russia had dispositive character and was not result of destruction of its political will. It visually is confirmed by initiation and participation of zakuban-sky Kabardians in the most noticeable actions of 1829, for example attack of group of the prince Kuchuk Azhdzheriyev in April on the Nogai ulus of Ismail Aliyev and elimination of the last who was one of the chief spies and the conductor of the Russian command on the right flank and also destruction in September, 1829 summary group Dzhambulata of Bolotokov (which considerable part, apparently, Kabardians) the Cossack travel page 297 of 62 people led by the centurion A. Grechishkin [5 made, - 301].

In general the invariance of the general mode of relationship between the parties in the specified area continued to generate the habitual and corresponding to it interaction forms when in St. Petersburg still in details did not develop an algorithm of increasing the presence at all Zakubanye and in particular on the right flank.

Rather bright illustration of this statement is raid of the Russian troops in the area of resettlement of the Abazins-shkaraua who were in a political orbit of hadzhret-sky Kabarda undertaken at the very beginning of 1830

The commander of the right flank major general Antropov "on January 10, having taken from strengthening of Kaladzha... 300 people of the Navaginsky infantry regiment, 200 Cossacks and 2 horse tools performed with it in twilight to the Kizylbayevsky aul... Kumnilalo, lying on the right side of Small Laba, on the Ondryuk River (Andryuk (owls.), Andrygu (Adyghe.). - THAT.)". Further in a source it is said: "Expecting that on big distance the infantry will not manage to reach by the dawn the aul, the gen. - m Antropov sent forward on lynxes only some Kozakov, for an uchineniye of the first unintentional attack on sleepy inhabitants; but this party, without reaching 2 versts to the aul, it was open from the dawn of day shots and shout the Circassian, being on cervine hunting why Cossacks also managed to capture only 5 women, 2 six-year-old children and 20 pieces of a cattle. After that arrived with group and the gen. - m Antropov and, seeing that Circassians left to forests, was located with army for rest, having ordered to burn down meanwhile the aul" [6, page 885].

On the way back, the groups which were flown down from the next Abazin and Kabardian auls imposed

to the Russian troops "strong firefight", "repeatedly rushing with checkers with intention to beat off the prisoners; but all those attempts were reflected with success successful action of artillery..." [6, page 885].

Collision continued until troops receded 20 versts below from the ruined aul, and costed to Antropov's group 5 people the killed and 4 contused. Losses of Adyghe were 6 people the killed and 4 wounded. Despite relative small number of losses on both sides, the general Antropov, apparently, then solved a task, very important in terms of safety of the Line, - after a while after raid the command knew of the death of one of hadzhretsky Kabarda's leaders of the prince Kuchuk Azhdzheriyev. In a source this event is characterized as follows: "Between the killed there is an equestrian, also famous beyond Kuban, and the general disturber of mountaineers the Kabardian prince Ku-chuk Hadri-girey" [6, page 885].

Not accidentally these events find quite bright reflection in the Adyghe folklore. The ancient song "The Andes-rygu zauem and gjybze" (Crying about Andryuksky fight) is just devoted to January (1830) raid of the general Antropov. Thanks to it, before us there is real (of course, with exaggeration elements) a picture of that fight, and we recognize some characters of the considered plot whose names are not mentioned in the dry army report. So, the dead - the notable nobleman Zhanhot Dokshukin and somebody Kanamat are presented here: Dokshukiny your Zhanhot small, without turning around, works with weapon. In day of doomsday

Zhanhot small dismounted (died).

About the second dead in the song it is said: Kanamat (when) was taken out (from us), Day (was) in sad (afternoon), double crying.

It is remarkable that in this song, as well as in another "Labedesham I gjybze" [7, page 96] (Crying of the Labinsk inhabitants), a possibility of appearance of the Russian troops around location of the Circassian settlements contact actions of traitors:

The guns shooting from army In which there (is) Kaplanuko terrify... Let Allah will punish those Who gave the Cossack army.

The hadzhretsky leader who rather died in 1830 in the song it is said:

Here on Ridge Andryuka Secha begins, Azhdzheriya the son, Kuchuk, the Heads of Cossacks plays [8].

Thus, in the song the version about death of the prince Kuchuk Azhdzheriyev in Andryuksky fight is not confirmed. However in the arising divergence between data of the Russian document and the Adyghe song it is possible to see not only contradictions, but also complementarity of folklore and written sources. Considering what in one of the numerous songs devoted to circumstances of death of the famous prince does not speak -

sya about Kuchuk's death Azhdzheriyev in fight (it agrees one, he dies of the wounds [9] got in battle, and in others the reason specified "a children's disease" - smallpox [10]) and also allowing a possibility of obtaining above-mentioned information the Russian command later certain time after Andryuksky fight, it is possible to assume that participation in fight though played a fatal role for the prince, but he died not on the battlefield.

Anyway, it is quite obvious that in the winter of 1830 the priority in military activity on the Line belonged not to hadzhretsky Kabarda, but the coalition of Shapsugs, abadzekh and Natukhais which many thousands groups loosened stability of the Cossack defense in the lower reach of the Kuban River. In the donosheniye sent to St. Petersburg, the field marshal I.F. Paskevich reported on February 6, 1830: "The Zakubansky people despite a present state of affairs (apparently, action of conditions of the Adrianople contract means. - THAT.) do not cease to undertake invasions into our limits, and these attempts from them in particular are turned recently on borders of army of Chernomorskago to what present crossings convenient there through Kuban on ice most promote" [11, page 882].

At all incomparability of military potential of the western Adyghe and hadzhret cannot ignore the situation which developed in the considered time when "runaway" Kabardians showed influence "disproportionate" to the number and military activity in East Zakubanye that allowed them to threaten directly occupied Kabarda's center. At least once during 1830 the Kabardian militia was forced to gather for counteraction to threat because of Kuban [12]. The fact that since evacuation of a considerable part of the population of KA bards to its zakubansky territories in 1822 all raids in the center of the country were initiated by hadzhreta well-known and does not demand additional confirmation.

Much more important (in terms of the tasks set in the real work) to reveal degree of "ponderability" of the Kabardian presence in Zakubanye when the Russian Empire already started military submission of all subregion. In this plan it is not surprising that the most eloquent characteristics of hadzhret (to the extent that they treated their military-political parameters) and that "niche" which was occupied by the massif of the population migrating from Kabarda's center in its zakubansky part are reflected in departmental documentation of their military opponent - the Russian Empire.

In this regard the official report made by the major general Bekovich-Cherkasskim and the colonel Gasfort addressed to Paskevich of September 17, 1830 is very curious: "... the most notable Kabardian princes and noblemen with their surnames and subject left for Kuban. Kabardians continue to be held in respect between other tribes which gave them a haven. The most part of runaway Kabardians lives on Urup in contiguity with Bashilbayami" [11, page 905].

Adequately notes that here authors of the report managed to show in extremely lapidary expressions

three fundamental parameters characterizing sociopolitical community of hadzhretsky Kabarda. First, the instruction that the feudal nobility migrating in a zaku-bansky part of Kabarda represented "the most notable Kabardian princes and noblemen" allows to recognize the last by the most capable part of the political elite which was tearing away conformism in the relations with the new authorities and capable to carry on traditions of independence (in the conditions of concept feudalism "most notable" and "most influential" are practically always identical). Secondly, in the report quite unambiguous statement of preservation of a hadzhretama of very comfortable positions is reflected in East Zakubanye which were characterized if not by the former durability of syuzerenno-vassal dependence of the people of the subregion then existence of the continuing dominating ideological influence on them. And, thirdly, localization of settlements of the most part of "runaway" Kabardians on the Urup River meant that human resources of hadzhret were still concentrated in borders of KA bards by this time, or in contiguity with the territory of related besleneevets: on the right bank of river. Big Laba of the fiefdoms of princes Murzabek Hamurzin, Ismail Kasayev, Kuchuk of Azhdzheriyev and also notable noblemen Kudene-tov, Anzorovy, Kandurovy and Kubatovy [12]. Thus, the Kabardian population Zakubanya, despite pressure from the East (the Zelenchuksky strengthened line) and a possibility of further migration to the west of the basin of the Urup River, in general preferred to remain within historical borders of feudal Kabarda. It in turn illustrated the aspiration of hadzhret to keep independence in the fullest volume.

For understanding of degree of representativeness of the estimates presented in the report it should be noted that one of his authors, the major general Bekovich-Cherkassky, itself was the representative of one of four princely families of Big Kabarda - Bekmurzinykh. Moreover, he participated in retaliatory expeditions against the tribespeople more than once and, in particular, was one of responsible for destruction of the hadzhretsky aul of Ali Karamurzin in April, 1825 [13, page 62 - 65]. Therefore it is hardly possible to reproach him with ignorance of the subject considered by it. It is more interesting to that to get acquainted with reasons which were put forward in the report for the solution of "a hadzhretsky question". There it is specified: "... what it would be useful to cause back to Kabarda on residence of the being Kabardians who are nowadays on the run beyond Kuban, ostavya, however, without respect declared them an izlishniya and claims, not joint with present position of edge, and harassments (the demands about return to hadzhreta of possession made in 1824 in Kabarda's center, destruction of the fortresses built there, restoration of sharia court, etc. - T.A.)" [14, page 155 - 156 mean]. "This measure is necessary how many and in order that, remaining further between the Zakubansky people, they could not arm them again against Russia because it is noticed that till this moment Kabardians always were the first instigators and participants of the robberies commited in there

our limits, carrying away ordinary the example and those a knee which expressed before to us loyalty" [11, page 907].

Whatever the incentive motive to drawing up this document and regardless of possible value judgment by his authors of a role for - the Kuban Kabardians was, one may say, that statement of that fact that during the considered period hadzhretsky Kabarda made long-term and steady impact on ethnopolitical processes in East Zakubanye is reflected in it, significantly influencing arrangement of military-political forces in the subregion.

Along with the reasons of a "humanitarian" order promoting preservation of a hadzhretama (under permanently adverse conditions) the status of the independent and powerful center of force in the subregion, also the factor of military potential of zakubansky Kabardians had imperative value. Thereof will be reasonably useful to address the materials which are more or less authentically reflecting some parameters of numerical structure of hadzhretsky society. Their analysis will allow to draw certain intermediate conclusions on quantitative a component of military-political potential of hadzhretsky Kabarda.

In this regard comparison of data from two sources made almost synchronously is represented very curious. The first of them is the "Maps of Lands of the Mountain People Lying between the Black and Caspian Seas" application and is dated on August 1, 1830 [12]. The quantitative data on the Abazin divisions and the West Adyghe principalities submitted in it are identical to data of the table of the population Zakubanya made in September of the same year [11, page 905]. Perhaps, it also allows to assume that documents were not made separately from each other or even that their authors were the same persons, however the September table is not the copy of the August (1830) annex to the specified card. Say the observed divergences in the form of writing of various names of subethnic groups of Adyghe and Abazins about it, presence of some of them at one document and absence at another.

Besides that is especially important, an impression of identity of two documents violates significantly the differing data on "runaway" Kabardians presented to them. If in the August document the number of zakubansky Kabardians is defined to 700 yards and 300 military people, then in the September table these indicators reach 1000 yards and 600 military people that reflects the evolution of ideas of the actual military potential of hadzhret happening (for a short time). In this regard it should be noted and designated productive (in terms of calculation of the valid number of hadzhret) a trend when authors of the table, having increased the number of the Kabardian yards only by a third, doubled number of soldiers. And it is right as in hadzhretsky society of an uorka owing to certain reasons had

bigger specific weight, than among the Kabardians remaining in occupied territories of the country.

Taking into account such circumstance, an impression fell-liativnosti approach of the author(s) of the table only amplifies. For example, the number of the bzhedugsky yards in both documents is estimated at 1000 yards and respectively at 800 soldiers, i.e. it turns out that with other things being equal bzhedug were exposed by troops one quarter bigger, than Kabardians. But such approach will not be coordinated with historical reality. First, Kabardians concerning other Adyghe principalities had very numerous as Kabarda throughout centuries was forced to exercise military-political and fiscal control over the multiethnic periphery what principalities of the Western Circassia were freed from specific weight of uorksky estate. Secondly, the new orders established in the center of the occupied Kabarda most painfully struck upper the population which lost the functions and privileges. Thereof the Kabardian noblemen occupied disproportionately bigger specific weight among hadzhret not only during mass migration in 1822, but also in the subsequent - in connection with appearance of new immigrants from Kabarda's center. This statement is right even taking into account the considerable losses suffered by zakubansky Kabardians for years of active opposition of Russia.

Other example not of absolutely clear calculation is connected with makhoshevets. When the number of the yards of the last is designated by 300 units, the number of army reaches 500 soldiers. Thus, it turns out that in the Makhoshevsky principality (which was considered as one of "quietest" in the Western Circassia) [15, page 174 - 175] the military class among the population surpassed similar estate at hadzhret in specific weight three times.

The question of number and military potential of had-zhret demands a separate research, however (even agreeing with the above-presented figures) is undoubted that together with resources vassal and allied to hadzhreta of the Abazin divisions a cornel-bekovtsev, tamovets, bashilbayevets and barakayevets zakubansky Kabardians had in the considered time high military potential, than any West Adyghe principality.

Literature

1. Essays of history of Karachay-Cherkessia. Since the most ancient times before Great October socialist revolution. Stavropol, 1967. T. I.
2. V. Tomkeev. The Caucasian line under control of the general Emanuyel//the Caucasian collection. Tiflis, 1898. T. 19.
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14. Alexey Petrovich Yermolov's notes. Part 2. 1816 - 1827 of M., 1868.
15. S. Khan Weight. Notes about Circassia. Nalchik, 1978.

Came to edition On May 11, 2010

Ronald Ross
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