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Senators T. Connelly and A. Vandenberg: two-party dialogue in the USA in 1943



v. T. Yungblyud, D.V. Ilyin

SENATORS T. KONNELLI I A. VANDENBERG:

_ _ _ _ *-* *-* _ _ _ _ _ and

TWO-PARTY DIALOGUE in the USA In 1943

Views and activity of senators Thomas Connelly and Arthur Wang-denberga are considered. Their role in establishing interparty dialogue in the senate and in the organization of coordinated actions executive and legislature concerning foreign policy in 1943 is shown.

V. Yungblud, D. Ilyin

SENATORS T. CONNALLY AND A. VANDENBERG:

BIPARTISAN DIALOGUE IN THE USA IN 1943.

The views and activities of senators Thomas Connally and Arthur Vandenberg are regarded, and their role for the establishment of inter-party dialogue in the U. S. Senate and for the organization of coordinated actions of the executive and the legislative powers in the foreign policy in 1943.

For the United States of America the introduction in World War II was followed not only movement from the periphery to the center of world politics, but also resolute correction of model of interaction of all participants of foreign policy process within the country. Closer interaction of the departments belonging to different branches of the power and also intensive dialogue between the democratic majority and republican opposition in both chambers of the congress became distinctive feature of functioning of state mechanism these years. The supreme representative body of the country was the center of interests of all population groups and reflected the mentalities characteristic of the most various regions of the country. Therefore leaders of executive power it is conscious when forming foreign policy stre-

were swept to get support of legislators. Thus, two objectives were achieved: direct — ensuring internal unity of the nation, and consequently, and mobilization opportunities of administration, and perspective — training of legislators for kind perception of post-war plans, and respectively — a post-war international role of the USA. The most far-sighted representatives of opposition understood foreign policy initiatives of the White House and State department and showed ability to the compromises considering new international realities. As a result formation of the international course of the USA in the years of war became one of the brightest examples of successful bipartisan policy in the American history [2, page 297].

* Article is published within the FTP "Scientific and research and educational personnel of innovative Russia" for 2009-2013. (Government contract No. 14.740.11.0659 of October 12, 2010)

In December, 1941 the congressman D. Fla-niagen exclaimed: "Obviously, Pearl -

Harbor was necessary for us. It is Golgotha which will awaken us from self-sufficient complacency to ennoble over greed and hatred, to force to realize a spiritual debt and responsibility and to unite for data protection to us god of ideals of freedom and equality, the world, legality, standards of decency and morals on whom there is our republic" [4, page 6]. The patheticalness of these words corresponded to the patriotic spirit which covered the country after the Japanese attack on Hawaii on December 7, and their sense very precisely reflected the radical change of a national foreign policy paradigm which was expressed in mass withdrawal from isolationism and in recognition of need of the international cooperation for fight against the general enemies and creation of a universal security system in the future.

In the years of war the congressmen and senators were attracted by administration for discussion of various aspects of foreign policy. At first it occurred incidentally. The real break happened in the summer of 1943 at discussion of legal grounds of participation of the USA in Administration of the help and recovery of the United Nations (YuNRRA). The leading role in development of two-party consensus belonged to Thomas Connelly heading Committee on foreign affairs of the senate (State of Texas democrat) and his deputy, extremely influential republican Artur Vandenberg (State of Michigan).

In the White House considered creation of YuNRRA as the first step on the way of formation of the organization for ensuring the general safety designed to replace the League of Nations in the post-war world. At the beginning of June, 1943 Roosevelt held consultations with leaders of fractions of the majority and minority in both chambers of the congress and obtained their consent to support of executive power in it

question [5, river 18]. On June 11 the draft agreement on YuNNRA was published by State Department. On June 22 Vandenberg addressed with the letter Hal and asked to explain whether this document will be sent to the senate for ratification. Hal's answer was negative [7, river 7436]. The similar turn of events caused serious discontent not only Vandenberg, but also Connelly [5, river 19] to whom the state secretary reported even earlier about desire of the president to use for legalization of participation of the USA in YuNRRA the way checked for years — the executive agreement which is not demanding the consent of the Senate. Kohn-nelli called such position "explosive" as rejection of legislators from participation in adoption of such important decision, according to him, created "a dangerous precedent" on the future [8, river 262].

Acting in the debate on this question, Vandenberg noted that claims of senators are caused not so much by contents of the agreement, how many its a form. "The problem is that the obligation of such immeasurable size, connected not only with policy, but also with resources, is established only by the executive agreement which will leave the congress away from the procedure of decision-making, except those cases when there is a question of the allocations necessary for performance of obligations" — senator explained [7, river 7436]. In the offered way of adoption of the draft agreement on YuNRRA Vandenberg beheld attempt without participation of legislators to found "the new League of Nations", thereby "having tested a method by means of which post-war planning will be carried out" [7, river 7435, 7237]. It is very remarkable that arguments of the convinced republican Vandenberg were very in consonance to the point of view of the democrat Kohn-nelli, in the matter expressed categorical disagreement with intentions of heads of democratic administration: "I could insist also on dogovo-

re — he writes in memoirs — but as YuNRRA was designed to be engaged, mainly, in granting by the United Nations billion means of the help to various countries, it would be better to involve in this business and the House of Representatives" [8, river 262-263].

On July 14 Hal and his assistant D. Ache-son by Connelly's invitation send to a meeting of Committee on foreign affairs of the senate. Discussion of a question was heated. During the debate the Minister of Foreign Affairs, on the one hand, and the Chairman of the Committee — with another defended opposite positions while Acheson tried to smooth contradictions. Though Connelly noted later that attempts of the assistant to the Secretary of State were ineffectual, obviously, he was not absolutely right: finally, the parties agreed to a compromise. The state secretary allowed to overpersuade himself and agreed to the solution of a question of participation of the USA in YuNRRA by means of the joint resolution which demanded the simple, but not qualified majority in two thirds of voices (unlike the contract), but not only in the senate, but also in the House of Representatives [3, river 71]. As the main task of Administration of the help and restoration consisted in allocation of billion means for revival of the states, affected from war, attraction to the solution of this problem of the House of Representatives via the mechanism of adoption of the integrated resolution was recognized as justified. Such approach completely satisfied Vandenberg. He regarded the agreed procedure as "the new and direct system of consultations... which will help to avoid desperate situations" [12, river 73]. Promotion of the agreement on YuNRRA in the congress created a precedent for the subsequent similar procedures of interaction of the president with legislature [10, river 71]. The two-party consensus reached thus in

a question of participation of the USA in Administration of the help and restoration it was recorded by vote in both chambers on the basis of what Roosevelt officially signed an agreement on November 9, 1943

Year of the 1943rd was remarkable not only a compromise of YuNRRA, but also some other important events.

Military progress of allies near Stalingrad and in North Africa in the winter of 19421943 designated the beginning of fundamental change in World War II: the strategic initiative passed to the countries of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. A victory on the Kursk arch and the successful beginning of operations on Sicily and the Apennine Peninsula consolidated these achievements. The changed strategic conditions promoted increase of intensity of planning of a post-war peace arrangement, and the American senators and congressmen were directly involved in this process. For 1943 for consideration of the senate and House of Representatives 12 resolutions directly or indirectly touching on an issue of the American participation in a new world system were introduced [7, river 8663]. Some of them had very radical character.

In February, 1943 democrat senator from the State of Iowa G. Gillette submitted draft resolution No. 91 for consideration of the senate (S. Res. 91), who urged the president to convene immediately the international conference with participation of representatives of the United Nations for the purpose of signing of the contract establishing the principles of the Atlantic charter. Gillette's resolution after the first reading came to Committee on foreign affairs, and from there — to specially created subcommittee where Connelly and Wang-denbergom was shelved [12, river 38].

One and a half months later, March 16, 1943, republican senator D. Ball on behalf of so-called B2H2 group (on surnames of senators entering it -

democrats L. Hill, K. Hatcha and republicans of D. Ball and R. Burton) submitted to the senate in the first reading the resolution behind number 114 (S. Res. 114), having more extensive, but not less radical character. The project of four senators assumed that at a conference of the United Nations which initiator of convocation has to be USA it is necessary to make the decision on the fastest creation of the international organization having wide powers in political, economic and military spheres. So, the offered organization was allocated with the right to operate the economic resources directed to restoration of the freed territories, to carry out peaceful settlement of disputes between member states and to form armed forces by means of which it was supposed to stop in the future any attempts of military aggression [7, river of 2030]. In other words, the B2H2 project assumed creation on the course of war of the supranational organization having the international constabulary forces at the order. Having passed the formal first reading, resolution No. 114 was directed along same "route", as Gillette's resolution: Committee on foreign affairs — special subcommittee — "a long box".

With what the called resolutions which had quite anti-isolationist character did not satisfy Connelly, Vandenberg and their colleagues from committee?

On the same day when resolution No. 114 passed the first reading, Vandenberg held two important meetings which results filled with misgivings. In State Department he talked to Hal, and that clearly let know that discussion in the Senate of similar questions prematurely and is extremely undesirable for development of the American-British and American-Soviet relations. During other meeting the British Minister of Foreign Affairs A. Eden on a direct question of Vandenberg whether will cause damage

premature combination of efforts in the field of peaceful planning by ours joint to military efforts, gave the affirmative answer. During another visit to the USA in May, 1943 U. Churchill confirmed Iden's words [12, river 40-41, 50].

Vandenberg shared the concerns Hal-la. On March 24 he wrote down in the diary: "It is obvious that the USA after this war will be involved in the international cooperation even more than it was till its beginning, and we in the general words can announce it. However any concrete obligations are impossible until is any obligations from Churchill and Stalin" [12, R. 41]. Cited Wang-denberga these months is very indicative for characteristic of views: recognizing need of the international cooperation after war, senator by all means sought to keep traditional "freedom of hands" for the USA. Resolution No. 114 of similar freedom of hands did not provide. Connelly in this question argued a little differently, believing that the Congress nevertheless should adopt the resolution, "which would reflect national interests" the USA including to calm allies, and first of all the USSR showing, according to him, concern about post-war plans of the USA [8, river 263]. However, as well as Vandenberg, he considered resolution B2H2 unsuitable because of excessive complexity and inappropriate in this case specification. "Some of points demanded long and thorough study by allies before ourselves could venture them to accept" — senator noted. Besides, any of initiators of this resolution was not a part of Senate Committee on foreign affairs and on this reason as Connelly jealously noted, did not possess sufficient information qualitatively to prepare so important document [8, river 263].

Summer of 1943 official formulation of the relation of the USA to creation of the world organization for ensuring general safety acquired extreme relevance. For this reason the position of the management of Republican Party became the most important factor of process of adoption of foreign policy decisions at the highest state level. The speech in this case went not only about draft resolution B2-H2, but also about the relation to problem per se. The opinion of Roosevelt who was not hiding that the spontaneous activity of authors of resolution N ° 114 "harms efforts on creation of the efficient international organization" [8, river 263] was known. Connelly in New York Times also said that "The Foreign Affairs Committee does not wish that in the senate the untimely and useless debate began" [9; 2, page 301]. Therefore depended on Vandenberg whether it will be possible to strengthen two-party consensus. Several months at it left on being at the necessary "general loss for words".

To the middle of summer of 1943 the necessary formulations were found. On July 2 it together with senator U. Whyte submitted draft resolution M 16 (S. Con. Res. 16). Three paragraphs of this document on behalf of all congress approved warfare with the countries of the Axis to the bitter end, participation of the USA in the international cooperation after war for the purpose of prevention of aggression by "any necessary means" and maintenance "general, durable and just peace on the free earth". Also it was indicated the need of observance for this question of constitutional processes and "awareness of the American responsibility and the American interests" [7, river 6998]. Having passed the formal first reading, the resolution went to the known subcommittee to wait for fall — the senate went on summer vacation.

Its work

became logical continuation of activity of Vandenberg in the Senate

during the meeting of leaders of Republican Party on the island of Makinak in September, 1943. Senator was faced by extremely difficult tasks — to lead views of the American foreign policy of several dozen representatives of political establishment to a uniform denominator and to achieve approval by them of participation of the USA in post-war international cooperation, having avoided at the same time rolling in radical interventionism. "I am in search of an average way between those extremists who & #34; сдал" America, and those extremists who would try to establish complete isolation" — Vandenberg explained the position in the letter to T. Lamont in August, 1943 [12, river 55]. At the same time the unilateralism remained a component of its foreign policy concept: "It seems to me a perfect fantasy that we can impose on America obligations to the world which is still hidden from us in darkness" [12, river 56].

Achievement of a goal was promoted by the fact that on Lake Michigan were not invited to the picturesque island representatives of ultrainterventionist wing of the party U. Wilkie and G. Stassen, the former colleagues of Vandenberg on isolationist camp X. Johnson, D. Nye, G. Phish. The key role in work of a meeting was played not by so odious politicians: governor of New York D. Dewey, senators R. Taft and U. Austin, congressmen Ch. Eaton and F. Bolton [6, river 522; 12, river 57-58]. Vandenberg headed work of Consultative council for foreign policy.

Steel forum results really triumphal for Vandenberg. The declaration adopted on September 9 proclaimed that the purposes of foreign policy of the USA are achievement of a total victory over the countries of the Axis with their subsequent disarmament and to dismantlings of military industry and also "responsible participation of the United States in post-war international cooperation with the creation purpose a shouting -

ganization on prevention of military aggression and ensuring lasting peace" [7, river 7650]. As well as Vandenberg wished, the document did not contain excessive specifics. Moreover, it was emphasized that "at present the specific program on achievement of these great purposes would be impractical, and the specific obligations assumed by Council, Republican Party or the nation — silly" [7, river 7650]. Certainly, it was not without mentions of the Constitution, Declaration of independence, and the Bill of the rights on which, according to republican leaders, it was necessary to lean at adoption of the international obligations.

Resumption of work of the Congress in the fall of 1943 was followed by continuation of fight on the issue of the American participation in future international organization. The difference in comparison with the previous session was that this time both senators, and congressmen were much better prepared for a debate. The way was paved for acceptance of agreed decisions by the previous arrangements [10, river 126]. On September 21 the House of Representatives approved resolution M 25 (H. Con. Res. 25), which author was to very few people a famous representative from the State of Arkansas U. Fulbright. The resolution approved "creation of the international mechanism with the powers sufficient to establish and maintain lasting peace between people of the Earth" and also participation of the USA in such organization [7, river 7724].

In the upper house the situation was more difficult. Every day it was more difficult to members of special subcommittee to keep "under cloth" resolution B2-H2. First, now it could be regarded as outright sabotage of a progressive initiative and could strike reputation of Connelly and his colleagues positioning themselves supporters of the international cooperation. Secondly, approached

the beginning of the Moscow conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain, and the further inaction of the Senate could weaken positions of the American delegation on it.

By the beginning of October the Chairman of the Committee Connelly "ripened" for own draft resolution, B2-H2 alternative to the plan. The new project resembled Fulbright's resolution, but had more developed formulation. Indicating the need of war with the countries of an axis to the bitter end, Connelly's resolution urged "to combine efforts with other sovereign nations on creation of the international organization authorized to prevent aggression and to protect the universal peace". It was separately noted that legal registration of the American participation has to lean on "constitutional processes" [7, river 8620].

Having got overwhelming support (20 voices — pro and only 2 — contra) in Committee on foreign affairs, resolution 192 (S. Res. 192) it was transferred to the senate at the end of October, 1943. Opening the debate on the resolution on October 25, Connelly first of all thanked the colleagues from committee — republicans Vanden-berg and U. Whyte, democrats A. Barkley, U. George, G. Gillette, E. Thomas, the progressionist R. La Follett — for the "diligence, patience and competent actions" shown by them during work on numerous resolutions of post-war orientation. The Chairman of the Committee emphasized that his project is only "framework" on the basis of which developers of the peace treaty will create the detailed structure of the organization for maintenance of the universal peace. He explained with this fact vagueness of wording of the resolution [7, river 8663-8664].

Vandenberg's speech, as the chief representative of republican minority in committee acting in a debate as the second was sustained in analogich-

number key. Vandenberg without wasting words recognized inevitability of participation of the USA after the end of war in the international cooperation in peacekeeping. Vandenberg referred firmness of sovereignty of the United States which was provided by Connelly's project, inviolability of the constitutional prerogatives of the congress in the field of foreign policy and also absence in the text of "unnecessary details" to number of positive sides of the resolution [7, river 8665]. On the last circumstance senator placed particular emphasis, emphasizing that obligations of the USA neither for acceptance time, nor for volume should not advance or surpass obligations of the USSR and Great Britain: "We cannot know with an accuracy what will be the future. We do not know peace plans and the purposes of our allies. Besides, we know that Churchill and Stalin repeatedly promised the people... to advocate the national interests. They will tell as much how many we will tell" [7, river 8665].

In the Senate there was an opposition to the project of Connelly. The supporters of B2-H2 criticizing the project for insufficient definiteness and also adherents of the constitutional prerogatives of the senate in ratification of international treaties were added to not numerous voices of the convinced isolationists opposing post-war international cooperation. The last were afraid of the fact that the resolution will be regarded in the White House as in advance made ratification [5, river 25].

A debate between supporters and opponents of the resolution went several days. Meanwhile on October 30 the Moscow conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USA, the USSR and Great Britain ended with signing of "The declaration of four nations on general safety" which contained separate point on need as soon as possible creating "the general international organization for maintenance of the international peace and

safety, based on the principle of sovereign equality of all peaceful states" [1, page 347].

As a result in the U.S. Department of State decided to interfere with a situation. The assistant to the Secretary of State B. Long after consultations with the management of State Department and the White House led a discussion with Connelly during which he let know that amending the draft resolution according to the text of the Moscow declaration will be the only exit for the senate [5, river 26].

On November 3 Connelly made two amendments which completely disarmed opponents of the resolution to the project. The first, copying the 4th paragraph of the Moscow declaration, referred creation of the international organization to "the earliest date from all possible". The general reference to "the constitutional processes" was replaced with the second amendment with the developed formulation about obligation of ratification by the senate two thirds of voices of the contract on creation of the world organization [7, river 9222]. Vandenberg readily supported both amendments as the first of them "emphasized & #34; суверенитет"", and the second — "placed emphasis on & #34; конституционализме"" [12, river 63]. Two days later, on November 5, 1943 Connelly's resolution was approved by the vast majority of voices (85 voices — pro, 5 — contra) [7, river 9221-9222].

Adoption of resolutions Fulbrighta and Kohn-nelli laid the foundation for a new stage in the course of post-war planning in the USA. From now on it gained more system character. On a simple and fundamental question whether the USA will enter into the Organization for ensuring general safety, the clear affirmative answer was received. Further it was necessary to decide what will be this organization and institutes accompanying it. Executive power acting through the president

was the active party in promotion of plans of creation of the UN

Roosevelt and heads of State Department. However and legislators contributed significantly to development of ideology of participation of the USA in world affairs and to creation of the relevant national legal framework.

Connelly's resolution, having imprinted in the history a name of the chairman of Senate Committee on foreign affairs, was not creation of one author. Its contents began confirmation of ability of representatives of Democratic and Republican parties to look for and reach compromise. As a result there were documents, "the USA which cleared away a track, on which could dvi-

to gatsya to creation of interstate body, having finished thereby the twenty-year period of isolationism" [11, river 45]. Which interparty dialogue, pithiness and effectiveness it was in many respects provided with activity of senators Connelly and Vandenberg, besides creation of direct "products" of legislative activity in the form of resolutions and laws, also set new parameters of national foreign policy consciousness, strengthening positions of administration of Roosevelt on the eve of elections of 1944 and training the population of the country for perception of results of World War II.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Moscow conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, USA and Great Britain. On October 19-30, 1943 M.: Politizdat, 1978.
2. V.T. Yungblyud. Foreign policy thought of the USA of 1941-1945 Kirov: VGPU publishing house, 1998.
3. Acheson D. Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department. N. Y.: Norton Co, 1969.
4. Barnet R. Roots of War: Men and Institutions behind U. S. Foreign Policy. N. Y.: Penguin, 1972.
5. Briggs P. Making American Foreign Policy. N. Y.: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 1995.
6. Cole W. S. Roosevelt and Isolationists. 1932-1945. Lincoln. L.: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
7. Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of 78th Congress. Vol. 89. Wash.: USGPO, 1943.
8. Connally T. My Name Is Tom Connally. N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954.
9. New York Times. 1943. September, 25.
10. RussellR. A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945. Wash.: Brookings Institution, 1958.
11. Schlesinger S.C. Act of Creation. The Founding of the United Nations. Cambridge (Mas.): Basic Books, 2003.
12. Vandenberg A. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.

REFERENCES

1. Moskovskaja konferencija ministrov inostrannyh del SSSR, SShA i Velikobritanii. 19-30 oktjabrja 1943 g. M.: Politizdat, 1978.
2. Jungbljud V. T. Vneshnepoliticheskaja mysl& SShA 1941-1945 gg. Kirov: Izd-vo VGPU, 1998.
3. Acheson D. Present at the Creation. My Years in the State Department. N. Y.: Norton Co, 1969.
4. Barnet R. Roots of War: Men and Institutions behind U. S. Foreign Policy. N. Y.: Penguin, 1972.
5. Briggs P. Making American Foreign Policy. N. Y.: Rowman Littlefield Publishers, 1995.
6. Cole W. S. Roosevelt and Isolationists. 1932-1945. Lincoln. L.: University of Nebraska Press, 1983.
7. Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debates of 78th Congress. Vol. 89. Wash.: USGPO, 1943.
8. Connally T. My Name Is Tom Connally. N. Y.: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1954.
9. New York Times. 1943. September, 25.
10. RussellR. A History of the United Nations Charter. The Role of the United States 1940-1945. Wash.: Brookings Institution, 1958.
11. Schlesinger S.C. Act of Creation. The Founding of the United Nations. Cambridge (Mas.): Basic Books, 2003.
12. Vandenberg A. The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952.
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