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Whom were Soviet soldiers in Eastern Europe in 1945: liberators, invaders, or...?



ky there were in Eastern Europe soldiers of the Red Army in 1945: svoboditel, invaders or...?

A. Noskova. F

History counts the seventh decade after the end of World War II. The further the victory of the Red Army over Germany consigns to the past, the understanding of scale of that opposition to Nazism which was sustained by the Soviet people who put on soldier's overcoats and that price which they paid the lives for the Victory decreases more considerably. Time is ruthless not only to generations of participants of war, but also to public memory. It holds the most considerable and bright facts and, as a rule, "lowers" a great number of those, quite often "ugly" details without which there is no integral and reliable image of a historical event.

It would seem, the debt of chroniclers historians is in keeping for descendants as much as possible a past pravdivuyukartina. The Novsovremenny world divided by objective national, religious, language, economic barriers, political other subjective preferences of a traditsiyamiya and representations the debt istorikazachasty is interpreted also a vosprinima-etsyakakobyazannost to serve someone, to serve someone's interests and requirements.

The historical science not accidentally was considered and it is considered nowadays science political, anyway connected with the imperious mechanism of the state. Well-known and the fact that achievements and shortcomings of this science are actively applied in an applied order national and foreign not only historians, but also, for example, various experts, political scientists, politicians. They use extracted from a historical context to a political benefit though, as a rule, truthful events and the facts of the past, as the mighty instrument of formation of public consciousness in the necessary direction.

Professionalism of the historian depends on his ability to resist under the pressure of a public environment and that internal pressure which is called self-censorship today. It is important to mean it presently when from special storages of an arkhivovrossiya the big massif of new documentary materials is introduced for scientific use that opens an opportunity for responsible scientists to analyze events in all their variety, to build rather full faktograficheskiyryad and to create the scientific concept of history of the country in the XX century.

The powerful flow of new archive materials, documentary evidences, memoirs literature destroyed the former official, unilateral and simplified representations. But it is easy to notice that sometimes the novelty of interpretation by researchers of the past comes down to change of the estimated sign of any given fact from plus on minus that conducts a ksozdaniya of new myths. In it estpryamy reaction to appearance of unknown, not always only positive, data. At the same time that truthful knowledge indulges in oblivion that was revealed and saved up by scientists for many previous years.

Schematical change of estimates is especially large-scale in relation to the Soviet piece of history of the XX century and its key event — the Second world war, a role of the USSR in release and post-war development of countries of Eastern Europe. Around this problem in modern both Russian, and world historical science only scientific discussions continue sometimes rather sharp and not always. And, efforts of politically engaged social scientists are noticeable, restoring the fullest picture of the second half of the XX century, to offer a historic fact as an argument for reorientation of the national consciousness created

Noskova Albina Fiodorovna is a doctor of historical sciences, Institute of Slavic studies of RAS. Article is prepared within implementation of the OIFN RAS project "Socio-political and ethnoconfessional transformation in the countries of Central and Southeast Europe in the XX century"; e-mail: vestnik@mgimo.ru

the party power building "real socialism" in the countries of the region on that vision of the past which new political forces,-hodyashchiyesyau on the power need.

The question is raised by a close up: what did release of the people, a victory over Nazism and fascism or new occupation and defeat for the countries - participants of the Anti-Hitlerite coalition, a national shame and bitterness of military defeat for the countries — unequal allies of Germany happen in Eastern Europe in 1944-1945? From here the second question follows: that the Soviet soldiers of a narodamevropa brought: disposal or enslavement and whom they were — liberators, saviors or invaders, tyrants and robbers? Statement of question "or \or" means the choice "or", contains new ideolo - go - the political hint, and again does not assume the poiskanepredvzyaty answer on neprostoyvopros: in what it, this truth?

If to raise a question differently: what threatened many people of the region if the Wehrmacht overcame the Red Army, then the attempt to doubt the liberating mission of the Red Army loses all meaning. Confirmation of the huge danger which hung over Europe are nowadays "almost forgotten" some researchers and politicians Hitlerite projects "development of a living space of Germany" and the "Master plan of Ost" created by Himmler's department. The Primate of the Polish Roman Catholic Church, the cardinal S. Vyshinsky in yanvare1960 spoke about an essence of these terrible plans: "Germans during the war thought so: we will win war, the rest will be made by crematoriums, we do not need Poles, only their earth is necessary... They would make it if we lost war." 1.

More simply and more precisely it is difficult to tell because on a scale of those values which the human civilization, life of people predstayetkak developed an irreplaceable invaluable gift. Therefore the truthful answer to the distributed questions is obvious: the soldier of the Red Army saved life, exempting the people of Eastern Europe from Nazi occupation and the national fascist treatments.

At the same time, insisting on definition of fighting of the Soviet fronts as releases of a number of the countries, neighboring to the USSR, it is necessary to recognize what it meant not only disposal of the people of threat of physical death in some cases, from loss of national identity and transformation of the countries into the territory of slaves or representatives of the lowest race, into others. At the same time, owing to objective results of war, there was a restriction national-state svobodystran and the people, and as in the east, and in the west of Europe. Let's give understanding of that situation by the contemporary of events of 1945. The Hungarian writer Sh. Marai so expressed the vpechatleniyao to the very first meeting with the Soviet soldier whose face he remembered well:

"It was not hostile, just to horror the stranger". Much more important assessment, this Marai to what was made by this soldier: "These minutes. not I one — the "bourgeois" Hungarian writer in the wooden Hungarian house — with disturbing interest thought of Russians... The great people, at the price of the unprecedented victims went away at Stalingrad stories. and I met one of those who embodied this force today. For many people, for all who were pursued by fascism this young soldier brought also some kind of release, rescue from Nazi terror. But it could not bring freedom because had no it" 2.

Soil the rights and today. But for this soldier, for what he in overcoming impossible, happened lost human shape, the powers that be are responsible. And one of them — the Supreme Commander of the Red Army I.V. Stalin.

During that wartime were, as well as today remain, impossible definite answers to so difficult voprosyv a separation from such basic realities as global plans of "big" allies for the Anti-Hitlerite coalition, each of which tried to obtain satisfaction of own post-war national-state interests. Implementing these plans, heads of the coalition monopolized the right to define the future of the "small" states and the people. F.D. Roosevelt, Churchill and I.V. Stalin has raspredelyalivoyenno-political and territorial "trophies" according to the shares of efforts contributed in defeat of Hitlerite Germany. Soldiers American, English, but, first of all, Soviet armies only provided realization as the general (defeat of Hitlerite Germany, the safe and lasting post-war peace), and the separate national-state interests of the winner countries.

The share of the Soviet material contribution and human losses in a victory over Germany was more powerful therefore in 1945 the Soviet leader received (whether could not receive?) the consent of allies nacontrol that part of the European continent which bordered on the USSR and could serve for it as "safety belt". The Red Army, having reached Berlin, turned plans into reality that meant deprivation of the "small" countries of the region vozmozhnosteysvobodno to dispose of the destiny. In it there was a tragic element of situation, especially those people and the countries which made the feasible national contribution to defeat of the countries of the fascist block. Most emotionally and precisely the essence of the events which were taking place here in 1944-1945 was expressed by the Polish researcher K. Kersten. In relation to Poland she wrote: "There is no doubt that the Polish society, in any case, its majority, endured more than disappointment with a situation and living conditions after war. It is possible to speak about the crash of belief in values which recognized, in loss of trust to authorities who brought., were powerless before

the power approaching from the East. The faith in the western allies gave way to the bitterness equal to former hope. The feeling of the offense caused the people betrayed by allies grew. The atmosphere inherent in defeat time was created. For Poles World War II terminated in both defeat, and a victory. Release from Hitlerite occupation which came from the East and brought the power of communists was not what most of the people what it expected" 3 fought for.

To this quote the reservation is necessary, however. Though the victory of the USSR over Germany was perceived by many Poles as national defeat, arrival of the Red Army was regarded as defeat is far not everywhere and not all population of Poland and other countries of the region. At the end voynyobshchestvenny moods everywhere evolved to the left. In Europe, including Poland, interest in the ideas of socialism, including in the egosovetsky version increased. Therefore it is necessary to recognize as lawful professional approach of Kersten to definition of 1945 as multidimensional event on egoobshchestvenny consequences.

Disposal of Nazism and fascism the vvostochnoyev-ropeysky region was brought by army of the state with other ideological imperatives and a social order. At discrepancy of representations Soviet and national elite about the state purposes and the rights of the people, it involved the conflict of incoincident interests and as a result — emergence of dependence of the freed weaker countries on the strong then country-osvoboditelnitsy4. Such is there was an objective historical reality. Other way for Eastern Europe at a boundary of war and peace could not be in force not only foreign policy, but also internal political circumstances, namely the appeared ability of the East European societies almost on half a century to accept and use possibilities of the Soviet socialism and the union with the USSR.

Therefore in the analysis of events of 1944-1945 the liberating component of a mission of the Red Army was and remains responsible historians of public perception and comparison of these years with the Nazi and fascist past prevailing. And again word K. Kersten: "... Release - connected to defeat — defeat of hope, defeat of a certain order, defeat of a system of values. But this defeat was followed by defeat of Hitlerite Germany — the enemy who threatened biological existence of the people. Even those who saw new occupation in reality of that time, understood its fundamental difference" 5.

In the conditions of the accruing system crisis of "real socialism", disintegration of the Soviet military-political bloc and democratic, revolutionary events of the 80-90th years of the XX century the problem of results of war for countries of Eastern Europe began to be discussed actively in world historical again

community. New postcommunist national elite, proving legitimacy of receiving, consolidation and firmness of the power in the country, "work" at opposition of undoubted own progress with defeats of predecessors, holding back progress of the last in their time. They select and actively apply "arguments" from the past. And again the same sounds "edge" the question posed, release or the Soviet occupation were brought to the region by the Red Army in 1944-1945? But now, for example, among the Polish social scientists, unfortunately, those who answer unambiguously are most active: occupation, enslavement and "a black hole" during 45 let6.

For confirmation of such conclusion and persuasiveness of proofs the complex of the problems connected with various forms of the Soviet presence in countries of Eastern Europe is reproduced. In particular, the purposes of command of the Red Army which entered Europe and the image of the army are in a new way interpreted. Quite often, including in the Russian historiography, at default about mass worthy behavior of the Soviet military personnel, the emphasis is placed on opisaniipre-stupny postupkovsoldat and officers of the Red Army vstrana of Eastern Europe. The negative only generalized character Soviet voyennosluzhashchego* is diligently created. Really, the facts discrediting the image of the Red Army took place and not it to recognize senseless. But hardly on their basis it is admissible to draw a conclusion that Europe was entered by army of new aggressors, marauders and robbers, providently forgetting that millions of Soviet soldiers came to Europe with other purposes. Onichestno never fulfilled the military duty, and shamed nothing themselves and armies of the country.

Meanwhile the problem of estimates of behavior of winner soldiers (and not only Soviet) is not so simple. Of course, the Soviet soldier could not be, and to the oyena was, always only pleasant in every respect. History of mankind confirmed an inevitable dehumanization of any army during fighting, especially so long and bloody character. It is extremely unusable, but one of standards of behavior of field army up to our days. So was also in a case with the Red Army. In 1944 - 1945 Europe was entered by soldiers, many of which spent years in trenches and heavy fighting. On the way they left in the earth of the comrades in arms. In the east behind them the lezhalarazrushenny country and hundreds of thousands shot, which are hung up, burned alive, poisoned with gas of the Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians who were in the territory of the USSR occupied by Hitlerites. State of mind of many of these soldiers was expressed by the famous Soviet poet-song writer M.V. Isakovsky: "Enemies burned a native hut, killed all his family. Where now to go to the soldier? To whom to bear the grief?".

Cruel war created a steady power syndrome in consciousness of people. It is porodilasre-di of leaders of the different countries and its ordinary participants belief that force is admissible and justified both in military, and in peace time. Severe injuries when death unceasingly went nearby, noted consciousness of the Soviet soldiers who so long studied and were able to solve all problems following their ways only by force of arms and hands. In peace conditions the inertia of such thinking could not be interrupted in one stage. Therefore the post-war period was characterized, as a rule, by growth of gangster manifestations which were suppressed with force too.

At contact with unusually other life seen in the freed European countries, thirst of revenge for sodeyanny crimes by Hitlerites rebated ability to overcome natural then hatred in consciousness of soldiers. Sometimes in it sides of the good and evil, legal and criminal were erased. In these conditions among the Soviet soldiers, in the weight remaining capable of many noble and heroic acts also unattractive actions, frequent manifestations of outright crimes took place. Main prichinamima-roderstvo, robberies, robbery, violence and murders were comparisons of knowledge of half-starved existence of the family of the house, about terrible ruin and poverty with the new reality surrounding them which was estimated as wellbeing. The wellbeing of enemies was especially sharply perceived.

All parties of a moral and psychological condition of army were known to soviet leadership. Measures for prevention of crimes were undertaken. On the eve of crossing of frontier and the introduction on the adjacent territory of each of countries of Eastern Europe the State Committee of Defense (SCD) issued signed by Stalin special resolutions which obliged command of field armies to address local community with explanation of the purposes of the Red Army. Such appeals were equally addressed also to the Soviet military personnel. For example, on April 10

1944 in connection with the introduction on the territory of Romania the document in which it was said was published: "The Red Army was included into borders of Romania, without pursuing the aims priobreteniyakakoy-or a part of the Romanian territory or change of the social order existing in Romania". It was recommended "not to create to command of field army in the areas of councils and bodies of the Soviet power occupied with the Red Army. To keep all Romanian authorities existing in these areas and the system of economic and political system existing in Romania without change. Not to interfere with execution of religious practices and not to touch churches and houses of worship. Not to break the Romanian orders and not to enter the Soviet orders". Separate point recommended to announce "in general data,

that all personal and property rights of the Romanian citizens and private societies and also the private property belonging to them, are under protection of the Soviet military authorities" 7. This point was directed also to prevention of robberies and marauding by the military personnel.

Such policies and appeals to protect a private property gave the Front commander the additional grounds to stop - sometimes criminal behavior of soldiers and officers. However, one of the first orders of the marshal K.K. Rokossovsky ordering the 1st Belarusian front after the introduction of troops of the front on the territory of Poland was directed to "pulling up" of the self-discipline of his subordinates weakened upon completion of long approach: to put appearance in order, to move on settlements a system, to observe army regulations. But already several days later, August 3, 1944, the order to strictly stop unworthy behavior of the military personnel of divisions of the front, their illegal actions (withdrawals, requisitions) followed, and simply speaking, robberies, marauding, sale and exchange of weapon for something else. The bringing by guilty persons to court of a military court was provided. Sale of domestic and trophy weapon and ammunition to local community was especially strictly punished. The Capital Punishment (CP), that is execution, was carried out immediately, before a system and, happened, in the presence of locals. Copies of protocols

0 sentences and an ikhispolneniye were presented "for return by the order to troops of the front" 8.

The fact of crossing of frontier and then borders of Germany increased intoxication of army own heroism to which the permissiveness adjoined. There was a certain internal liberation and the joy that reached and is alive, mixed up with already become habitual cruelty, the favor peculiar to our people to defeated died away. During the Hanging and Oder and East Prussian operations when the meeting with the German population came, desire to immediately revenge, punish all as the soldier was able to do it could not but become aggravated. The order of January 19, 1945 followed: vessels of military courts were recommended to pronounce the most strict sentences and to apply VMN for robbery, violence, marauding. It was strictly forbidden to have in military units property of not army appointment. This order was applied in practice and, according to materials of the Main Military Procuracy of the USSR, more than 4 thousand Soviet servicemen paid for such offenses by the zhiznyami9. This figure hardly considered executions on the crime scene and without adjudgement. In Slovakia informed on one of such cases

1 March, 1945 in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) the deputy chief of the Head political department of the Red Army colonel general I.V. Shikin: "Staff

our troops in the Czechoslovak territory behaves well. Many fighters and officers express the satisfaction that they exempt fraternal peoples of Czechoslovakia from the German yoke. In some settlements, separate cases of marauding and violence take place. The lieutenant Levinsky took away various things from apartments of locals for what he is discharged of a position. The lieutenant Konoplenko tried to rape the peasant. On its shout the son, the boy of 13 years came running. Konoplenko shot it and tried to disappear, but was detained. Konoplenko is shot" 10. Were punished, it is sure, many tysya-chiprovinivshikhsya.

The facts of decomposition of soldiers and officers testified to difficult internal state of military units. It caused to the poyavleniyena only of the mentioned document of January 19 and also in April, 1945. The order on change otnosheniyak to the German population (the slogan "Kill the German" was removed), but also public reaction of Stalin to a negative resonance in Europe and mireot cases of obscene behavior of the Soviet military personnel. During the meeting in the Kremlin on January 9, 1945 with the chief of staff of the Yugoslavian national army A. Yovanovichem and the member of the administrative board of KPYu A. Hebrangom Stalin touched upon this difficult subject. Arguing on the rights of the Red Army for food trophies, Stalin reacted to now widely known comparison of behavior of the Soviet soldiers by M. Dzhilas in the territory of Yugoslavia, "who made ruthless acts, without shunning even small marauding", and the English officers who were not participating "in similar excesses" 11. Stalin's reaction was as follows: "It is impossible to characterize army on the basis of separate cases, because of one freak it is impossible to offend all Red Army. It is necessary to understand the fighter's soul. The fighter thinks: all will forgive him, he is a hero, all is possible for it. Fighters were tired, got exhausted in long and heavy war. It is wrong to become on the point of view of the decent intellectual. There are separate cases dishonoring ours boytsov12. We shoot for it." 13.

Stalin returned to this story in April again

1945 during a lunch in honor of signing of the Soviet-Yugoslavian treaty of friendship and mutual aid. As Dzhilas writes, the leader expressed the relation to offenses of the Soviet soldiers such words: ". Imagine the man who underwent war from Stalingrad to Belgrade — thousands of kilometers of its own devastated earth, through corpses of the companions and the closest people! How can such person normally react? And that terrible that he will have a good time with the woman after such horrors? You thought, the Red Army is perfect. And it is not perfect and there cannot be such even if in it there would be no certain percent of criminals — we opened our prisons and sent all to the front. The Red Army is not perfect. Important the fact that it beats Germans — and beats them well, and the rest does not matter" 14.

Similar table-talks did not register, and it is not possible to check the accuracy of reproduction by Dzhi-las of the words pronounced by Stalin. But the day before, in March, 1945, the Soviet leader spoke about the image of the Red Army on reception in Moscow in honor of Czechoslovak government delegation headed by the president of Czechoslovakia E. Benesh. Several options of records of his words are available to researchers. There is no essential difference in records. Let's take for a source the document from the Prague state archive. "The Red Army, Stalin said, in the victorious - approach allows sometimes excessive excesses. I ask you to forgive and not to harbor malice. I ask you to excuse for the fact that in your territory business can reach some obscenities. The psychology of the soldier of the Red Army explains it. Each of them considers himself the hero and believes that to it as to the hero, all is allowed and everything will be forgiven" 15.

In the Soviet record the text about "obscenities" looks so: "The Red Army goes forward, gains victories, but it has a lot more shortcomings. Her fighters. often do an outrage, rape girls. Comrade Stalin told that he wants Czechoslovaks to be not too fascinated by the Red Army that then not too to be disappointed." 16. Twice, in January and March, 1945 the head of the Soviet state publicly asked that in Europe understood and excused fighters of the Red Army.

These documentary evidences on tonality not absolutely correspond to that statement of the relation of Stalin to the outrage created by the Soviet military personnel which is transferred in the memoirs by Dzhilas. In them distinctly there passes the aspiration of the Soviet leader not to justify, and to explain the cause of unattractive behavior of soldiers of army which Supreme Commander he was, and to ask forgiveness for their behavior. Regrettably, but in Dzhilas's interpretation this story is present at a historiography, and is roughly presented, for example, in the movie of the Air Force company "War World War II behind closed doors".

It is impossible to protect and to senselessly embellish an image of the Soviet dictator. But, speaking

about immoral not single acts someone from our fathers and grandfathers, we will ask a question: unless there was only it? Unless the Red Army consisted only of robbers and tyrants? The vast majority was another. How many hard military and peaceful work they enclosed in that in Eastern Europe where it was talked of death of the whole people, life revived and proceeded. And today it is so unseemly to say slander all soldiers of the Red Army how yesterday to be silent about criminals in the ranks of this army. Without reproduction in works of historians of that and other party of all this difficult problem the truth that the Red Army brought to Eastern Europe will not take place.

Recognizing crimes which were committed by the Soviet soldiers, we will ask other question. Unless robberies and violence from strong in relation to weak were committed only by these soldiers? Unless Czechs did not stop echelons with the German families moved from the Sudetes and did not take away from them all personal belongings and money, at the same time "is exclusively rough" treated women and children? Unless did not find corpses of dozens of women, old men and children who committed suicide in these cars? Unless the same Czechs at the end of May, 1945 did not drive on streets of nude German women and not ustraivalipokazatelny beatings of the German men? 17.

On July 4 a zamnarkoma of internal affairs of the USSR the general I.A. Serov sent to the people's commissar L.P. Beria the special report on an arbitrariness of the Czechoslovak authorities at resettlement of Germans from Czechoslovakia where, in particular, wrote: ". In some cases Czechoslovak officers and soldiers in settlements where Germans live, since evening expose the strengthened patrols up in arm and open fire at the city at night. The German population, having got a fright, runs out from houses, throwing property, and runs up. After that soldiers come into houses, take away values and come back to the parts. As a result of such resettlement several tens of thousands of moved Germans who go gathered in the areas bordering on Czechoslovakia [and] beg and starve. There are cases of suicides and" 18.

Also Poles who left the central regions of the country to plunder the whole expeditions the population of the former east provinces of Germany were engaged in mass robbery of Germans. And business was not limited to a meshochnichestvo at all, there were a violence and murders that too has the explanation: Poles from Hitlerites in 6 years of Nazi occupation have been through a lot.

From documents of that time we know that - the moved from the territories of Germany which departed to Poland, German population considered then the Red Army a lesser evil, than those Polish robbers. In this enemy army the Germans looked for protection against hatred of Poles that was confirmed by the editor of the newspaper which was issued by the Soviet military authorities in Poland in German. Acting on May 21, 1946 in Department of foreign policy of the Central Committee of the ALL-UNION COMMUNIST PARTY OF BOLSHEVIKS, he so characterized current situation: "Germans about our commandant's offices, especially at the beginning of the post-war period, speak as of the Golden Age and say:" As it was remarkable when there were your commandant's offices, and now — Poles, and we were gone"" 19.

All this, of course, in the slightest measure does not justify and does not extenuate fault of those soldiers who did not correspond to the image of the heroic and noble liberator created by the Soviet promotion and which is taken out out of borders of our country. They dishonored the image of the Red Army. But, recognizing it, let's remind also another. That who destroyed Nazism

in Eastern Europe, happened, shot not only at a breast. We still do not know, and would have to know how many Soviet military personnel that thousands of kilometers walked and crept on the personal and others' earth, "having made a start a leg from the Urals" as the poet V. Vysotsky wrote, was killed in a back.

Of course, and the Soviet soldiers were different and met them in Eastern Europe differently, and not only the Soviet promotion influenced these meetings. Let's pledge the word to the large Polish writer Maria Dombrovskaya, the contemporary of events. Diary entry on January 22, 1945: "Just imagine, this morning there were Germans, and in the evening we not under the German occupation any more. The Soviet troops all go forward. Probably, already occupied Poznan, Tilsit, Krakow. In the territory of school military, some auxiliary troops settled down, among them there are many girls. Took away all horses, cows, two pigs, hens and eggs. Drink vodka, especially officers much. They are gloomy, impolite, in them there is no spirit of liberators". Further: "There are no news, only rumors which are difficult for checking, there is neither electricity, nor radio. My God, just imagine, that within five years we had such fine daily radio". In October Dombrovskaya wrote down the story by other Polish writer, Ya. Ivashkevich, that the part of his house "is occupied with People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs and the Polish army. Both those, and others steal everything that they can steal" 20.

Data on moods of local community in the freed territories regularly arrived to the top political management of the USSR. The Russian archives kept a set of certificates that most of the population of countries of Eastern Europe waited and met the Red Army and the Soviet people as liberators, and not as invaders at all. In official reports "upward" command did not hide also existence of other moods. Let's give separate examples. So, the marshal G.K. Zhukov ordering the 1st Belarusian front wrote in the report on the course of the Hanging and Oder operation to I.V. Stalin on January 29, 1945: za17 days of offensive combats of army of the front, having passed up to 400 km, cleared all western part of Poland which population "is universal of the opponent and with enthusiastic pleasure met parts of the Red Army" 21. On April 5, 1945, characterizing situation in the freed Bratislava, colonel generals. V. Shikin reported in the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) that "the population meets our troops well., Slovaks express the feelings to joy of release from a fascist yoke and the hot gratitude of the Red Army." 22.

At the same time, documents show that vdo-executions of different levels negative manifestations did not disappear in moods of local community in the freed territories. It was reported about nedo-volstvety that it is necessary to share food with the Soviet military units in conditions

great food and household difficulties to come to recovery and defensive work. So, in the middle of August, 1944 the political department of the 28th army of the 1st Belarusian front reported to the command the following: "In 15 days which passed since the beginning of the entry of the 28th army on the territory of Poland the political bodies carried out considerable work on studying moods of the Polish population... Collected material gives the chance to draw certain conclusions on behavior of Poles, their relation to the Red Army. The vast majority of the population meets the Red Army not only loyally, but also is friendly. The restraint observed in the first days in relation to the Red Army gradually is replaced by understanding of a great liberating role which is carried out by army of the Soviet Union., in many settlements the population meets the parts entering there with flowers, bread salt, kisses fighters and officers. However there are certain persons among the Polish population who show constrained and even hostility towards the Red Army" 23.

Other example: the report of the general Shikin on situation in the freed territories of Slovakia on March 1, 1945 and activity of the Soviet military commandant's offices which helped local authorities to restore economy in the cities and settlements, to use the industrial enterprises, to repair power plants and roads, to open schools and gymnasiums. Characterizing moods of Slovaks, the general emphasized that "the vast majority of the population treats the Red Army kindly, sees in it the liberator from a yoke of fascist aggressors. Among all population groups strongly races-prostranenyt the anti-German moods. Along with it the facts of distribution of false, provocative rumors, cases of refusal of assistance to representatives of the Red Army", connected with unwillingness long to feed comers voyska24 take place.

7 April, 1945 the same Shikin, reporting on a situation in the freed Bratislava, wrote to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks): "The population meets our troops well. In conversations with the Soviet military personnel the Slovaks express the feelings to joy for release from a fascist yoke and the hot gratitude of the Red Army which gave a helping hand

to the Slovak people" 25.

Similar data contained also in information of May 12, 1945 of the chief of the VII Management of GlavPURKKA on moods of the Czech population of cleared regions of the country: "The Czech population, as a rule, friendly met the parts of the Red Army entering on the territory of Czechoslovakia. Crowds of people took to the streets, many houses were decorated with the Soviet and Czechoslovak flags. among Czechs anti-fascist moods are very strong". In the document differences in moods depending on the social status of people were noted: "Representatives of the propertied classes and the intellectuals refuse [recovery] work on tasks of military units. The population of rural areas is ready much more friendly and more willingly participates in recovery and other work". The positive mass attitude of the population towards soldiers of the Red Army was noted not only by political divisions of the Red Army. Officers Soviet razvedki26 reported about them in the reports.

Thus, in the information materials coming to Moscow from field army both the positive perception of the Red Army by the population, and the separate facts of an ugly posedeniye of her military personnel and also hostility and anti-Soviet moods were stated. The Soviet officers charged the last, as a rule, "klassovo alien" to elements, prosperous groups, landowners and some part of the intellectuals. Mass perception of the Red Army by ordinary citizens of countries of Eastern Europe as armies only replaced the power of Hitlerite invaders or "the" fascists, was not noted. In moods the gratitude for exile of Hitlerites and also fatigue from war, ruin and losses of close people, desire of peaceful life and establishment of elementary public order everywhere prevailed. As new occupation of the country the representatives of the Polish pre-war elite who lost the political power in Poland, leaders and participants of a military-political underground and also that part of the Polish society which supported them defined arrival of the Red Army. But it is a separate problem for other research.

1. Rozmowa I sekretarza KC PZPR Wtadystawa Gomutki z prymasem Polski ks. kard. Stefanem Wyszynskim w dniu 11 stycznia 196G roku \\Wtadystaw Gomutka i jego epoka. W. 2GG5. S.284.
Ferretti Erica Cosima
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