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To a question of fighting capacity of territorial parts of the Red Army in the 1920th years

l. A. Burtsev


Work is presented by department of the contemporary national history of the Ivanovo state university. The research supervisor - the doctor of historical sciences, professor Yu.A. Ilyin

In article the analysis of the factors affecting fighting capacity of territorial parts of the Red Army in the 1920th years is given.

>. Burtsev


The analysis of factors that influenced fighting capacity of territorial units of the Red Army in the 1920s is presented in the paper.

the 1920th years in the field of military construction became years of large-scale reforming of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (WPRA), one of the main directions of which was a device of Armed forces of the country on the basis of a combination of the personnel and territorial and militia principles. What was fighting capacity of territorial and militia formations of RKKA during the marked period?

As show archival documents, the level of fighting capacity of territorial and militia parts of RKKA in the 1920th years was influenced by a number of factors. Some of them were in area of imperfection of organizational and methodical nature of holding training sessions. Results of inspection checks of RKKA eloquently testify to the level of learning efficiency of Red Army men-peremennikov on collecting. In the report the assistant Inspektor to RKKA on N.Ya. Kotov Inspektora's infantry of RKKA S.S. Kameneva of November 9, 1925 it was reported that short-term gatherings of peremennik "did not yield positive results owing to lack of the correct approach to their organization, ignorance nachsostavy to what and how to train" [5, l. 1]. According to S.Ya. Kotov's data, parts entered in the camp insufficiently prepared for summer study in the sense of study of plans of training and that carrying out.

In the document the considerable delay of directives for the summer period of training in districts [5, l was noted. 3]. Late instructions on preparation and on summer study entailed universal absence by the time of an exit in the camp of in details developed programs and plans of classes. All this involved big "improvisation" and, often, confusion in the subsequent summer study of territorial-nicknames.

Owing to lack of monotonous approach to problems of collecting in each district singular problems were set (each territorial division in own way approached training). The Western Military District did not set any tasks at all [5, l. 5].

Current situation affected tactical readiness small under -

divisions (platoons and a company) in a negative side.

Estimating the level of combat readiness tercha-sty by results of the maneuvers which were carried out in all military districts except for the Leningrad Military District in 1926, the chief of staff of RKKA M.N. Tukhachevsky in November, 1926 noted: "Maneuvers showed that shots of rifle divisions stand above on combat training, than territorial rifle divisions with the variable structure" [6, l. 20].

In the report of Management on army mobilization and GU RKK'S completion in NKVM "About Results of Territorial Construction for 1927" of June 19, 1928 it was reported: "... general preparation did not achieve desirable results. The weakest point in training of territorial troops are: weakness of general preparation of a personnel komsostav; sluggishness and slackness in actions" [7, l. 2].

The facts given above give the grounds to consider that, considering a question of fighting capacity of territorial parts in the 1920th, it would be fair to speak about its low level.

Other reason of low combat readiness of territorial divisions can be considered an excessive overload of personnel terchasty during the considered period. Load of territorial bodies, besides the solution of the main objectives on training of the draft contingents, during the studied period consisted: in retraining of a komsostav of a stock, in camp gatherings of students of higher education institutions, in test collecting so-called spare (a younger nachsostav and the privates who were in a stock), in training of recruits for topographical groups and local shooting troops, in training of recruits for troops of OGPU [8, l. 83].

Besides, shots of territorial troops took part in training of the youths of premilitary age and persons undergoing military training by an extra army order. All these "dresses" laid down heavy load of personnel of territorial parts, from -

vleky average and younger command structure from its direct duties.

One more reason of low level of fighting capacity terchasty during the studied period, in our opinion, consisted in short duration of direct fighting training at gatherings of variable structure (8-12 months in 5 years) and considerable temporary breaks between them. On the one hand, in force big breaks between training sessions everything acquired on the last collecting prior to the next training session by variable structure was forgotten, with another - it was very difficult to train variable structure during short collecting. In GU RKK'S review about a condition of the Red Army in 1927-1928 of October 31, 1928 it was noted that in shooting territorial parts the preparation them in firing with satisfactory result hardly keeps within the novobranchesky period. In the document it was noted that "it is not possible to train variable structure in firing in a due measure" and "territorial troops have of battalion artillery only a theoretical idea" [8, l. 50].

As far as the volume of program school hours in regular and territorial units differed? In regular units throughout the studied period the number of class periods for the entire period of training was 2452. In territorial and militia - 1984. At first sight, the number of class periods was almost identical. However the provided figures will not give the correct idea of a condition of process of training in territorial parts if not to consider a number of the following factors.

First, inopportuneness of an appearance that-rarmeytsev. According to GU RKK, the appearance those-rarmeytsev throughout the studied period made 95%, i.e. was quite high [9, l. 66]. At the same time data of OGPU indicated that they delay on collecting for 3-7 days and more made "the normal and mass phenomenon" [9, l. 49, 53]. And at considerable number of being late the quality of training not only the last, but also arrived in due time suffered.

Secondly, study of terarmeyets was "beaten" by unauthorized absences. According to GU RKK for 1925-1929, the number being in unauthorized absence reached in places 20%. There are certificates on mass unauthorized goings - up to 1000 people a day on one division [9, l. 66].

Thirdly, the negative impact bore an originality of sociocultural features of staff of territorial parts. Throughout the studied period the bulk of the military personnel (about 4/5) was made by peasants and unskilled workers (skilled workers and employees of the Soviet device were exempted from an appeal) [1, l. 16]. Therefore transition to violent methods in the agrarian sphere negatively affected moods of staff of RKKA. Within the 1920th army "country moods" - keen interest of country layers of army in events in the village shook, desire of the fastest return home, discontent with activity of the authorities towards the village. [15, l. 48-50; 14, l. 88]. Besides, its extremely low general education preparation was characteristic of mainly country Red Army structure during the studied period. Among called up for military service in the Moscow Military District in 1924-1925 illiterate made sometimes about 20%, semiliterate about 60% [4, l. 16].

The above-stated sociocultural features of staff of terchasty RKKA allow to understand logic of creation of territorial divisions on three types: primary divisions with a constant shot of 2400 people and variable structure 10,681 persons; secondary divisions of two types: 604 persons formed at personnel divisions with a constant shot and the variable list of 11,750 people and 622 persons formed at primary territorial divisions with a constant shot and variable structure 11,734 persons; cells of primary divisions with a constant shot of 190 people [3, l. 118].

The ratio of personnel and variable structure was defined in them by the social, cultural and political and general education level of peremennik and also professional level of personnel. It, in turn, was one more reason of low fighting capacity of territorial parts which can be designated as imperfection of the basic device of the last.

The constant shot of a primary division (2400 people) made 16% of its regular structure of wartime while in personnel rifle division the constant shot equaled 34% of structure of wartime. But primary territorial divisions had that advantage that as a part of their constant shots average and younger komsostav made 54% of regular structure of wartime while in personnel divisions it did not exceed 41% [4, l.16]. Other command structure to states of wartime was in variable structure and was attracted on training sessions and also through military and scientific circles and clubs was involved in a continuous communication with shots.

In secondary territorial divisions the constant structure equaled about 6% of the state of wartime. Thus, secondary territorial divisions could not conduct independent combat training owing to small number of shots and lack of an average komsostav as on the existing states it was provided that commanders of platoons of secondary territorial parts had to act as assistants to commanders of platoons of the main regular and primary territorial units [12, l. 28]. During gatherings of recruits and variable structure of secondary divisions the main weight of work with them fell on pervooche-

line territorial and personnel divisions. Owing to shortage of shots in staff and especially lack of a younger komsostav primary territorial and personnel divisions had to give during collecting to the secondary divisions a part of command structure and also a part of the administrative and serving device. As a result preparation of personnel and especially primary territorial divisions as they had to carry out twice gatherings of recruits and variable structure suffered. It, in turn, deprived primary divisions of an opportunity to conduct normal training of youths of premilitary age in the areas and also work with variable structure between collecting and preparation of own shots. At the same time the dependence of secondary divisions from primary and personnel connected them and did not allow them to develop systematic work [13, l. 14]. All this testified to frailty of states of secondary territorial divisions.

As for tretyeocheredny divisions with a shot of 190 people, they represented only a basis for expansion of divisions during the war.

Thus, potentially low level of fighting capacity of a territorial and militia system was put in the initial principles of its device. The specified circumstances did not promote formation of RKKA as uniform solid fighting structure. Serious fighting of such army would be beyond it power. Most likely, in the 1920th the territorial system was aimed rather not at conducting the large-scale military operations, and mainly assumed instilling of a necessary minimum of military knowledge in the greatest of possible to the number of persons of military age.


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