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To a question of the Macedonian control system over Greece

UDK 94(381.08


Demetriada, Corinth and Halkida on Euboea had an important strategic importance. Philip V sought for peaceful cooperation with Greeks within the contract of the General World. For the period of a transition period he tried to install a new control system over the Greek states. This system included three levels: first, basic bases which the Macedonian tsar called "fetters of Greece", secondly, garrisons in the large cities and thirdly, the officers caring for the Macedonian interests in a certain region. The most stable element of a system - "fetters of Greece" became a subject of the anti-Macedonian propaganda. Greeks considered Philip the oppressor and the tyrant that as a result promoted crash of its plans.

It is known that three fortresses of Greece were called "Fetters of Hellas" (Ro1u. XVIII. 11. 5; 45. 5). This is Demetriada (Ro1u. XVIII. 11. 5; 45. 5), Halkida on Euboea (Ro1u. XVIII. 11. 5; 45. 5) and Corinth (Ro1u. II. 52. 4; 54. 1; IV. 6. 5; XVIII. 11. 5; 45. 5; R1i1 Aga1 16; Yu. 32. 16. 18). Tit Livy speaks about their strategic situation (32. 37. 1-3) in the following passage: ambassadors of Greeks, accusing Philip in Rome, "made an impression on the senate, explaining location of the land and sea... that for all became obvious that Greece cannot be free, while the tsar holds Demetriada in Thessaly, Halkida on Euboea, Corinth in Akhaye". Poliby (XVIII. 11. 4-9) specifies this remark: "peloponnesets cannot sigh freely while the royal garrison costs in Corinth; lokra, the beotena, the fokidena cannot be quiet when Philip owns Halkida and all Euboea; at last neither citizens of Thessalia, nor magnets can enjoy freedom until Philip and macedonians hold Demet-riada in the hand.... how long the areas called above remain within his power, he without effort again will subordinate to himself Greeks in the first day as he will wish it". Says about value of Corinth already that fact that when his deputy Alexander was postponed from the Macedonian tsar Antigone Guo-nata, became actually independent governor. And if to consider a victory of Corinth in war against allies of Macedonia - Argos and Athens, then it is possible to claim that Alexander reduced Gonat's influence to the south of Thermopylae to minimumu1.

Philip V was not the first of the Macedonian governors who put garrisons in these fortresses. Similar practice of control of dependent territories was put still by Philip II, having considered experience of the states dominating before in Greece - Athens, Sparta, Thebes. These policies kept other cities down, applying exile of opponents, supporting any given government and entering garrisons that, after all, led to internal fight, the conflicts between the states and interstine voynam2. Philip II, probably, well knew consequences of so rigid dictatorship therefore it was limited only to fixing to itself of strategically important policies. After fight at Heroney in 338 g the Macedonian garrisons were located in Corinth, Ambrakiya (Byu of XVII. 3), from which it was convenient to watch territories of Epirus, Etoliya and Akarna-niya, in Thebes (Rush. IX. 1. 8; 6. 5; Byu XVI. 87. 3) and probably in Halkida on Evbee3.

It is remarkable that at that time the specified garrisons were not "chains of Hellas". According to Diodor (XVII. 3), after Philip's death the ambrakiota expelled poppy -

l S.K. Sizov. Achaean union. M, §9v9. Page z ї.

and Hammond N.G. Philip of Macedon. Baltimore, l994. P. l59.

z It is possible that the garrison could appear on Euboea at Alexander: Roebuck of C. The settlements of Philip P with the Greek states in zzv / / Classical Philology. Vol. 4z. §94v. P. va; before destruction of Thebes by Alexander on Euboea could not be garrison as the garrison was located in Thebes, and access to Euboea from the magneziysky coast of Thessaly rather easy; Ellis J.R. Philip P and macedonian imperialism. London, §97b. P. aoa of f.; also Cawkwell G. Philip of Macedon. Bristol, §97v. P. §bv.


Nizhny Novgorod state university


donsky group, Alexander did not insist on his return. At a revolt of Thebes the Macedonian garrison in Kadmey was besieged and was in such situation before Alexander's arrival (Arr. I. 7). The commander of garrison even had no enough forces that most to suppress a mutiny and to punish violators. During fight of diadokh in Greece there were garrisons of several successors of Alexander of Macedon, but only Demetry Poliorket could apply for control of the considerable territory which it exempted from garrisons Cassandra, Poliperkhonta and Ptolemaeus according to the leaflet of the father about freedom grekov4. Nevertheless, Demetrius in some fortresses of Hellas left the groups too. In particular, Corinth was one of the cities which received garrison (Diod. XX. 103. 3). But Demetrius's garrisons, probably, were quite modest, as as Plutarch reports, after fight at Ips the cities, one by one, expelled sentry groups of Demetrius (Demet. XXXI).

Antigonus II Gonat (284-239) and his son Demetrius II (239-229) preferred more tough policy concerning Greeks, similar to that which after Alexander of Macedon's death Antipatr and his son conducted Cassandre. Antigonus promoted introduction of garrisons to some policies and establishment tyrannical rezhimov5 in Greece (Polyb. II. 41. 10; 43. 9; IX. 29. 6; Plut. Arat. 25). His son Demetrius kept this control system. Eventually, distribution of such modes under the auspices of Macedonia pushed a well-founded top of the states to fight against Antigonidov6. By the beginning of the 20th years of the 3rd century through joint efforts of two largest Greek federations - the Eto-liysky and Achaean unions Greece was almost completely freed from the Macedonian domination. Great success in this fight the liberation of Corinth is considered (Plut. Arat. 18-22). Only failures in Kleomenova voyne7 (229-221) which to achaeans were put by Spartans, forced the Achaean strategist Arat to ask for the help the Macedonian tsar Antigonus of Dosonu8. It is remarkable that the last demanded for assistance of return of Akrokorinf (Polyb. II. 51. 4 sqq). After the conclusion of the union with Achaean federation Doson, unlike the predecessors on a throne, did not spread garrisons in Gretsii9. The exception was represented by Akrokorinf, Orkhomen and Gerey (Polyb. II. 54. 2; 70. 4; V. 93. 8), which and remained under Doson's control later for -

4 During the Shooting gallery siege Antigonus declared that all Greeks will be free, saved from garrisons and will receive autonomy (Diod., XIX, 61, 1-4). After this three attempts of "liberation" of Greece followed. To Hellas, troops under Aristodem's command, then were sent to 312 g under Telesfor's command and the same year under Polemey's command. These expeditions achieved some progress. In particular, Diodor (XIX. 78. 2) writes that the garrison Cassandra was expelled from Halkida. However, Polemey's treason interfered with implementation of plans of Antigonus. Therefore in 307 g he sends the son Demetrius who received the order from the father of "release all policies in Hellas" (Diod to Greece. XX. 45. 1; Plut. Demet. VIII. 4). Demetrius freed Athens in which there was a garrison Cassandra (Diod. XX. 45-46; Plut. Demet. VIII, X; ISE. 7. 4). By the end of 303 g in Demetrius's hands there was a most part of Peloponnese and Central Greece; all cities occupied or which surrendered to Demetrius received autonomy and got rid of garrisons (Diod. XX. 45-46; 100-110).
5 About tyrants see: Berve H. Die Tyrannis bei den Griechen. Bd. I-II. Munchen, 1967.
6 S.K. Sizov. Achaean union. Settlement page 17
7 About Kleomenovy war see, for example: D. V Zhigunin. The international relations of the Hellenistic states in 280-220 BC Kazan, 1980. Settlement page 146; I. Droyzen. Hellenism history. T. 3. SPb., 2002; Will E. Histoire politique du monde hellenistique. T. I. 2-eme. ed. Nancy. 1979. P. 343 suiv.; Walbank F. Macedonia and Greece//CAH2 Vol. 7. 1984. P. 461 ff.
8 The Hellenic league was formed in 224 at the initiative of the Achaean union. About the reasons which pushed achaeans to rapprochement with Macedonia see: Plut. Arat. 38. 11; 39; 40. 2; 41. 3; Cleom. 15. 2 sqq; 17. 6 sqq; 19. 1; 22. 4; Polyb. II. 51. 2; 52. 2 and 4. See also: S.K. Sizov. Secret diplomacy in the years of Kleomenovy war//From the history of antique society. Gorky, 1988. Settlement page 58; It. Achaean union. Settlement page 101
9 The prospect of inclusion of all Greece to the sphere of the Macedonian influence was too tempting that Antigonus absolutely refused it. But at the beginning his politician should not have caused discontent of new allies if he wanted to gain a foothold in Greece. Only implementation of allied obligations without claims for bigger gave it time to strengthen its positions for further steps. Therefore Antigonus did not manage to show the true intentions, because he was remembered how "the governor soft and fair" (Polyb. II. 47. 4; 64. 6; 70. 1; 70. 7; IV. 87. 6; V. 9. 9 sqq; Liv. 32. 21; 25).

versheniye of Kleomenovy war. Sources attribute introduction of the Macedonian groups to other cities to the following governor of Macedonia - to Philip.

Really, it is possible to note that at Philip V the Macedonian garrisons were located in many places. In Thessaly, besides Demetriada, the garrison stood in Atraka (Yu. 32. 17. 4-18. 3). The Macedonian groups were in Orey and in Eretriya (Ro1u. XVIII. 45. 5, Yu.

32. 16. 12) and also in Orkhomen (Ro1u. IV. 6. 6; R1i1 Aga1 45). In Leprey in Trifiliya the Macedonian garrison was put during Allied war of 220-217 (Ro1u. IV. 80. 15). Tit Libya has a mention that Karist was strengthened by garrison from Halkida (XXXII. 16. 8), what hints at presence of the Macedonian soldiers at fortress before arrival of a reinforcement. In the largest city of Fokidy, in Elatey, the Macedonian garrison was also located (Yu. 32. 24). Opunt, the main town of East Lokrida, had sentry group of Philip during the second Roman-Macedonian war (Yu. 32. 32. 4). According to recent finds, it is possible to claim that the Macedonian garrison was in one point of East Lokrida, in Kine10. There the military charter of garrison service identical known from Halkida was found earlier. Nakhodka of such document gives to this settlement the strategic importance and allows to assume that similar monuments were available also in other fortresses keeping Macedonian silami11. Besides, the islands of Andros, Paros and Kitna in the Kikladsky archipelago Philip's garrisons had (Yu. 31. 15. 8); there were still Asian cities where Philip entered the soldiers (Yu.
33. 18. 21; 30. 3).

So considerable Macedonian presence in Greece demanded serious justification. In other words, first of all, it is necessary to find out whether establishment of garrisons violation of the allied contract between Philip V and Greeks was. Unfortunately, the text of this contract did not remain, it is possible to speak about separate conditions on the basis of Polibiya's data and on their comparison to sources on the history of the Corinthian leagues existing ranee12. Possibly, in the contract of the Hellenic league formed in 224 g during Kleomenovy war the invariance of state systems which existed at participants of league at the time of signing of the contract, and their autonomy was guaranteed; introduction of garrisons and payment of a tribute was forbidden (Ro1u. IV. 25. 7). On the one hand, Fi-

10 Poliby mentions Kean in 219 g when Philip was transported from Thessaly to Euboea, from there reached Kean, and then through Boeotia and Megarida approached Corinth (Polyb. IV. 67. 6-7). Perhaps, then Kean received the Macedonian garrison.
11 Hatzopoulos M.B. L&organisation de l&armee macedonienne sous les Antigonides: problemes anciens et documents nouveaux. Athenes, 2001. P. 29 ss.
12 The general literature on Philip II, Antigonus Odnoglazy and Antigonus Doson's Corinthian leagues: V.G. Borukhovich. Corinthian congress 338 BC and its value//Uchen. zap. GGU. Issue 46. 1959. Page 199-208; Kondratyuk MA. The Corinthian league and its role in the political history of Greece the 30-20th of the 4th century BC//VDI. 1977. No. 2. Page 25-42; L.P. Marinovich. End of classical Greece (Lamiysky war)//Hellenism: economy, policy, culture. M, 1990; Frolov AD. Corinthian congress 338/7 of BC and association of Hellas//VDI. 1974. No. 1. Page 45-62; Frolov AD. Panhellenism in policy of the 4th century BC//Antique Greece. T. 2. M, 1983. Page 157-207; F.G. Mishchenko. Federal Hellas and Poliby//Poliby. General history. T.1. SPb, 1994. Page 35141; G.S. Samokhina. The panhellenic idea in policy of Macedonia of the end of Highway of century BC//Social structure and the political organization of antique society. L., 1982. Page 104-119; Cawkwell G. Philip of Macedon. Bristol, 1978.; Ellis J.R. Philip II and macedonian imperialism. London, 1976; Hammond N. Philip of Macedon. Baltimore, 1994; Hammond N, Griffith G. A history of Macedonia. Vol. 2. Oxford, 1979; Jehne M. Koine Eirene. Stuttgart, 1994; Larsen J.A.O. Representative government in Greek and Roman history. Berkeley-Los Angeles, 1956; Larsen JA.O. Greek Federal States. Their Institutions and History. Oxford, 1968; Perlman S. Greek diplomatic tradition and the Corinthian league of Philip of Makedon//Historia. Bd. 34. 1985. P. 153-174; Ryder T.T.B. Koine Eirene. General Peace and Local Independence in Ancient Greece. Oxford, 1965; Wilcken U. Alexander der Grosse und der Korin-thische Bund//SB Berlin. Abh.18, 1922. S. 97-118; Wilcken U. Beitrage zur Geschishte des Korin-thischen Bundes//SB. Munchen, Abh.10, 1917. S. 1-40; Wilcken U. Philipp II von Makedonien und die panhellenische Idee//SB Berlin. Abh. 18, 1929. S. 291-318; Heuss A. Antigonos Monophthalmos und die griechischen Stadte//Hermes, LXXII. 1938. S. 133-194; Ferguson W.S. Demetrius Poliorcetes and the Hellenic League//Hesperia. 17, 1948. No. 2. River 112-133; Bengtson H. Die Diadochen: Die Nachfolger Alexanders des Grossen. Munchen, 1987; Hammond N.G., Walbank F.W. A history of Macedonia. Vol. 3. Oxford, 1988; Hammond N. The Macedonian State. Origins, institutions and history. Oxford, 1989; Billows R. Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State. Berkeley-Los Angeles - L, 1990.

lindens obviously violated this agreement with Greeks. However on the other hand, it is possible to remember that fact, as before it happened that the policy which was considered as "free" had garrison 13. By the time of Philip's government the violation of this point became already ordinary phenomenon. More important another: it is necessary to point to that circumstance that many garrisons, for example, on Euboea, appeared in the cities only during military operations - during Allied war of 220-217. As after the end of this war Philip V was soon involved in the conflict with Romans, conditions of wartime continued to justify existence of garrisons in the Greek cities. That fact is remarkable (Yu. 33. 31. 11), that after defeat in the second Roman-Macedonian war Philip lost all these fortresses. Corinth was transferred to achaeans, but in Akrokorinf there was the Roman garrison. Romans reserved Halkida and Demektriada, motivating this step with the same circumstance which the Macedonian tsar used before: approach of new war (with Antiochus).

In that case it is necessary to consider a question as allies perceived similar violation by the Macedonian tsar of the term of the contract of league. It is possible to tell that sources do not give any case in Greece (Asian fortresses were not included into the union) when Philip would establish garrison contrary to will of allies. The well-known incident on Ifom described by Poliby and Plutarch as well as possible confirms this thesis. On the Mount Ifom the messensky Kremlin into which the Macedonian tsar Philip V planned to enter the garrison long ago was located. Philip went for bringing of the victims there. The scene of a sacrifice described by Plutarch (R1i1 Aga1 50), completely coincides with the version stated by Poliby (VII, 11), it is mentioned also by Strabo (8. 4. 8). The hint on a bet of two leaders of the union in messensky fortress can be seen also in Pavsaniya's words (2. 9. 4) that the Achaean strategist Arat "kept the tsar from acts on which that was already solved". Poliby retells dialogue of the Macedonian tsar with Arat who forced Philip to refuse the conceived plan, having hinted at a rupture of the allied relations in case of such violence over messenyana. It is characteristic that the tsar tried to occupy Ifoma peacefully. In case of placement there of the Macedonian garrison Filippo V received a double prize. First, one more strategic point in Peloponnese would be at its disposal. Secondly, Messeniya would refrain from further social distempers and coups. But Arat could not give these advantages in a charge of macedonians. It is worth remembering that in the Hellenic league of 224 g the allies differed in much bigger independence in relation to the central power, than in the similar organizations of earlier vremeni14. Therefore Philip had no opportunity to work without the consent of participating Greeks of league, Arat's threat about cancellation of the union was quite real. Such event as establishment of garrison in the allied city, it was necessary to prove carefully not to draw upon itself charges of aggression.

Sources repeatedly show to

positive sides of establishment of garrisons. First of all, they were a guarantor from social shocks, and in the conditions of wartime - and from treason. Since the time of Aeneas Taktik any commander had to take the fact that the internal enemy is not less dangerous, than vneshniy15 into account. The example with the arcadian city of Kinefoy is characteristic. There the Achaean garrison was put, however in 220 after the reached agreement and reconciliation of the parties it was removed. The come back home citizens took active part in policy life, some of them were elected on polemarkh (Ro1u. IV. 18. 4:

□К© ♦♦ Pi ...) ^) However

the former exiles soon planned to hand over the city to etoliyets (Ro1u. IV. 17. 10), traitors from among polemarkh killed the colleagues and opened gate for etoliysky troops under

13 Briscoe J. The Antigonids and the Greek states, 276-196 B.C.//Imperialism in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1978. P. 149.
14 Schmitt H.H. Die Staatsvertrage des Altertums, III: Die Vertrage der griechisch-romischen Welt von 338 bis 200 v. Chr. Munchen, 1969. S. 216; Klose P. Die volkerrechtlichte Ordnung der hellen-istischen Staatenwelt in der Zeit von 280 bis 168 v.Chr. Munchen, 1972. S. 107; Niese B. Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der Schacht bei Chaeroneia. Tl. 2. Gotha, 1899. S. 336; Will E. Histoire politique du monde hellenistique (323-30 a.v. J.C.). T. 1. Nancy, 1966. P. 355.
15 For more details see: L.P. Marinovich. Socio-political fight and a nayemnichestvo in Greece 4th century BC in the treatise by Aeneas Taktik//VDI. 1962. No. 3. Page 49-77.

Dorimakh's command. The population of the city, including traitors, was killed, their property was plundered (Ro1u. IV. 18. 7-8).

Garrisons were a subject of continued care and attention from the Macedonian tsar. The remained fragments of copies of the charter of garrison service from Halkida and Kina16 concern not so much military matters how many economic. For example, the house-keeper had to watch that the products which are stored in barns remained innocent (□К© П®П*Х en

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ZvH 1 I, at. 1-3),

to take care, that nothing not was is stolen

(fpovtlzstatyucav, about (to a pyu ^фк tp to the V paraevtasvyu affafp tag: 1 I, at. 11-12) and in due time to change what became useless (1 I, at. 12-15), responsibility of house-keepers and frurarkh for plunders was provided (1 I, at. 26-37). For failure to report about malfeasance the huge fine of 600 drachmas was established (1 I, at. 44-46; 1 II, at. 6-9). Even such details as a wine brand which should have been brought were fixed (... □ ®П*Х □ © KIPKH ^©а+ in

X 1 I, at. 18-21). Such details speak, before

everything, the special part assigned by Philip to garrisons in a control system for Greece which was not allowing emergence of the slightest discontent among soldiers, especially mercenaries whose number was znachitelna17. For example, in Corinth where, there was possibly the most numerous garnizon18, usually there were 1300 soldiers - 500 macedonians and 800 nayemni-kov19 (Yu. 33. 14. 3).

It is remarkable that unlike time of Philip II and his successors, during the Roman-Macedonian wars Philip V's garrisons not only held the population from treason, but also persistently defended the fortresses entrusted to them. So during the first Roman-Macedonian war the Romans and Atal besieged Orey on Euboea. It was succeeded to capture the city by him only because they conducted secret negotiations with Platorom20 who let in them the city (Yu. 28. 6. 1-7). And here Halkida's taking at them failed (Yu. 28. 6. 8-12). The Macedonian Kassandriya who was Potidey on Halkidika had strong garrison which during the second Roman-Macedonian war beat off all attacks of Romans and Atal, having forced the enemy in view of hopelessness of actions to raise a siege (Yu. 31. 45. 14-15). Orey in the second war was protected with extraordinary bravery so Romans had to refuse a fast impact and to pass to a long siege, having relied on tools and underminings that finally and solved case (Yu. 31. 46. 6-16). Atal's fleet tried to take Karist, but it turned out that protection is strengthened by help from Halkida therefore the opponent was forced to leave this invention (Yu. 32. 16. 7-8). Only when three fleet - Roman, pergamum and Rhodes approached Karist, fortress was handed over, and to garrison for repayment allowed to leave (Yu. 32. 17. 1-2). Eretriya was besieged by the integrated Roman and pergamum forces, the ships were equipped with throwing tools and obsidional cars (Yu. 32. 16. 10). Nevertheless, defenders kept how many could, at the same time the Macedonian garrison did not allow to hand over the city at once (Yu. 32. 16. 11-16). The Thessaly city of Atrak which had the Macedonian garrison, Romans did not take (Yu. 32. 17. 4-18. 3). The largest fokid-sky city of Elateya where the Macedonian garrison was also put, closed before Romans of a collar. Only after a long siege the enemy managed to occupy the city, but not fortress which macedonians left after conclusion of agreement with the consul (Yu. 32.

16 Tsit on: Hatzopoulos M. B. L&organisation de l&armee macedonienne sous les Antigonides... Appendice epigraphique. 1 I, 1 II.
17 According to the estimates of G.T. Griffith (Griffith G.T. The mercenaries of the Hellenistic world. Cambridge, 1935. P. 72 ff.), garrisons of the Macedonian tsar in total could consist of 15 thousand mercenaries. Philip, of course, could not but know shortcomings of mercenaries which probability of treason was quite high. However as own forces insufficiently for protection of all fortresses was obvious, it was necessary to use mercenaries. Probably, two circumstances provided to the Macedonian tsar their loyalty. First, timely payment of a salary; and secondly, attraction for garrison service of mercenaries of barbaric nationalities.
18 Griffith G.T. The mercenaries of the Hellenistic world. P. 71.
19 V.I. Kashcheev. Hellenistic world and Rome. M, 1993. Page 155.
20 Livy speaks (28. 6. 1-7), that Philip entrusted the city of Platoru. Possibly, the traitor was a commander of garrison.
18. 9 and 24. 7). Opunt in East Lokrida in the middle of war it was captured by an internal distemper, the population called etoliyets and Romans, however the Macedonian garrison did not leave neither because of threats of opuntets, nor at a look Roman troops (Yu. 32. 32. 4). At last, Corinth was attacked by Romans, rodosets, Atal and achaeans who changed to Philip (Yu. 32. 23. 4). Livy notes rare unanimity of the population and the Macedonian garrison. The commander of Androsfen garrison was perceived by inhabitants as the citizen of the policy (Yu. 32. 23. 5). Having learned about the reinforcements hurrying to the aid of Corinth from Halkida, the opponent preferred to raise a siege (Yu. 32. 23. 11-13). In the reviewed examples is remarkable the fact that few chances at garrison to keep the city were own forces against the joint enemy armies. But so-called "chains of Hellas" remained for macedonians, the enemy managed to be taken either Halkida, or Corinth. Moreover, these fortresses had an opportunity to help other garrisons. The hope for arrival of a reinforcement forced Eretriya's garrison to keep a long time, and only when it became clear that help to wait it is useless, fortress was handed over (Yu. 32. 16. 11-16).

It should be noted that garrisons of the Macedonian governor were established not at the same time in all listed above cities and it is not any; on the contrary, Philip systematically created the scheme of control over Greece. According to his plan, in Greece there had to be several strong points where garrisons, and some kind of "rapid-reaction forces" could be based not just if to use modern terminology. Such bases - "fetters of Greece" Demetriada, Halkida, Corinth probably the messensky Kremlin on Ifom and, perhaps treated, one of the Greek policies Illirii21 - Epidamn, Apollonia, etc. However, in the western part of Greece to Philip not everything was succeeded to realize conceived. Garrisons in other cities had to have auxiliary appointment, many of them were established or after gaining this territory, or in case of reflection of the external threat proceeding, mainly, from etoliyets. Possibly, the speculation will not look very bold that over time if not intervention of Romans, need for this second link of control would disappear, and macedonians would withdraw the forces.

Existence of "royal representatives" in Greece is entered in the same scheme of control. At the beginning of Philip's government Tavrion who was based in Peloponnese 22 was it. He was appointed to this position still by Antigonus Doson probably after the victory over Sparta in 222 g (Ro§u. IV. 6. 4; 10. 6; 19. 7). During Allied war of 220217 except Tavriona one more representative of the tsar, but acted in other region. Function of supervision of Central Greece was executed, probably, by Aleksandr23 who settled down in Fokida. From the period of the Roman-Macedonian wars the sources did not keep mentions of such officials in Peloponnese and Central Greece that can be interpreted as them

21 The Greek settlements on the Illyrian coast had no close ties with Macedonia and were focused on the West. It is considered that establishment of the Roman protectorate over Illyria had the investigation a condition of "Cold War" between Rome and Macedonia if to use modern terminology. Granting a shelter by Philip to an Illyrian dicrust to Demetrius after defeat by his Romans and unwillingness to give this adventurer (Liv., 22, 33,
3) in 217 g and also Dassaretida's occupation in fight against other Illyrian leader - Skerdi-laid and a claim of the Macedonian tsar for Apollonia next year - all these steps were regarded by the senate as the act of open hostility. However similar perception of actions of Philip was based on dissimilarity of the Roman and Hellenistic mentality (Smykov E.V. Anthony and Dionysus (from history of religious policy of a triumvir of M. Anthony)//AMA. Issue 11. Saratov, 2002. Page 82). The purposes of the young tsar concerning Illyria at the end of Allied war did not concern Romans. At the same time it is not necessary to say also that the Macedonian governor planned to establish own protectorate over these lands. War with the former ally Skerdilaid - the violator of the General World who attacked lands of the western Macedonia became his next care. Against it, but not against Italy as A.P. Belikov convincingly showed (A. Belikov. Item Rome and Hellenism: problems of political, economic and cultural contacts. Stavropol, 2003. Page 63-64), the tsar constructed 100 lemb for transfer of the forces. Against pirates, fighting for freedom of navigation, the tsar intended to create sea bases on the western coast of the Balkans.
22 For more details see: Sivkina N.Yu. Dolzhnost Tavriona in the Hellenic league 224 BC//Antique society IV: The power and society in antiquity. SPb., 2001. Page 101-107.
23 Walbank F. A historical commentary on Polybios. Vol. 1. Oxford, 1957. River 625; Bengtson H. Die Strategie in der hellenistischen Zeit. Bd. 2. Munchen, 1944. S. 363.

absence. However there are bases to assume that Filokl had similar powers during the second Roman-Macedonian war whose rate was in Halkida (Yu. 32. 23. 11). Tit Livy calls him the royal prefect (Sh) that can quite correspond to a little uncertain Greek term "representative for affairs in Peloponnese"

(□ © ♦♦ p

□ - Ro1u. IV. 6. 4). Unfortunately, there are

no exact data on when Tavrion and Alexander were recalled and during what period Filokl arrived in Halkida. Nevertheless, assumption is possible that Tavrion and Alexander were on the posts before the first Roman-Macedonian war as the last mention of Tavriona belongs to the end of life of Arat, i.e. to 213 g Filokl probably released them from a duty in the course or after the first Roman-Macedonian war. Thus, it is possible to note that the place of basing of the official depended on what region was the least stable. Tavrion was appointed to Peloponnese after defeat of Sparta, Alexander in Allied war watched member states of the Hellenic league which did not take active part in fighting. Halkida controlled sea communications, they gained great value between two Roman-Macedonian wars as the attention of the Macedonian governor was directed to islands and the coast of Asia Minor. In other words, the representative was appointed to the concrete region and to a certain period.

Naturally, it is necessary to raise the question of purpose of this scheme of control most of which stable element were so-called "fetters of Greece". In our opinion, the control system conceived by Philip cannot be estimated negatively. It is necessary to remember that all initial stage of the board he sought for observance by Greeks of the contract of General Mira24. Following the results of Allied war it is possible to speak about success of this line of policy, etoliyets were forced to observance peace usloviy25. However the civil peace could not come suddenly, from the moment of signing of the world between Etoliysky federation and the Hellenic league. Time, a transition period which could take several decades before the General World would become a reality was required. It is quite natural that at the beginning such control system which would hold fluctuating from rash acts and would not allow the violator of the world to remain unpunished was required. The Hellenic league could not serve this purpose completely. First, it included not all states Gretsii26; secondly, control required the tough guide which Philip in the union did not have.

It is quite probable that enemies saw in the created system a fine opportunity to blacken the tsar both before opponents, and before allies. Strong points of the Macedonian control - Demetriada, Halkida and Corinth as the most stable element of a system, became a subject of the main attacks to the Macedonian tsar. The considerable role in it was played by the Philip's words, he called these fortresses "chains of Hellas" (Yu. 32. 37. 4) also gave in a charge of the opponent a hot topic for the anti-Macedonian propaganda. However probably these words were manifestation of evil humour of Philip. Sources note caustic mockery peculiar to it which often looked is inappropriate (Ro1u. XVIII. 4. 4; Yu. 32. 34. 3). His statement to the etoly-sky strategist Feney at the time of negotiations with Flaminin is known, for example, (Yu. 32. 34. 3; Ro1u. XVIII. 4.

4); it is possible to mention also the inscription made on ruins in the Farm, probably, from approval of the tsar (Ro1u. V. 9. 4-5).

Summing up the result of the aforesaid, it should be noted that "fetters of Greece" were a part of very successful and thought-over control system over the Greek states.

24 Characteristic conditions of the General World is the following: 1. prohibition of the interstine conflicts, 2. autonomy of the Greek states, 3. guarantee of the help in a case of breach of the peace, and 4. fight against piracy. Attracting Polibiya's certificates, it is possible to claim that all listed conditions were included in the contract 224 g (Ro1u. IV. 3. 8; 15. 2; 16. 5; 24. 5).
25 Not without reason after conclusion of peace in Navpakta they began to show discontent as Poliby, specifies by that circumstance that the contract "barred them all ways of production on the party and took away from them any hope for the future" (V. 107. 6).
26 N.Yu. Sivkina. Structure of the Hellenic league 224 BC//Problems of history and creative heritage of professor N.P. Sokolov. N. Novgorod, 1998. Page 43-48.

However fully Philip did not manage to create it. For this purpose time and solidarity of allies was required. The first intervention of Romans in the Greek affairs forced Philip to accelerate realization conceived, but in the opinion of Greeks he became the oppressor and the tyrant that, eventually, promoted crash of its plans.


Demetrias, Corinth and Chalcis on Euboea had the important strategic value. Philip V aspired to peace cooperation with Greeks within the framework of the Common Peace treaty. For the transition period the king has tried to establish N.JU. SIVKINA new control system above the Greek states. This system included three levels:

first, strong bases or "fetters of Greece" as Philip himself had once called them, N.Novgorod secondly, garrisons in large cities and thirdly, officers which were in charge of ma-

State University cedonian affairs in the certain area. The most stable element of system - "fetters of

e-mail: Greece" became a subject of antimacedonian propagation. Greeks have counted

Phillip the oppressor and the tyrant, that as a result had crash of his plans.

Stuart Richard
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