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In the second catch the people of the northeast Caucasus in the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian political relationship not the 70th years of the 18th century

UDK 94


© 2008 of L.A. Badayev

Chechen state university, Chechen State University,

364037, Grozny, A. Sheripov St., 32 364037, Grozny, SheripovSt., 32

The relations of Russia with the North Caucasus in the second half of the 18th century, importance of this region in expansionary plans of Iran and Turkey are considered. The importance of the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiysky agreement which reflected economic and military superiority of Russia over Turkey is emphasized. Special attention is paid to a role of Russia which, acting as the guarantor, tried to reconcile the conflicting parties.

In the given article the question is revued about the development and the deepening of Russian and North Caucasus relationships of second half of 18 century.

The importance of North Caucasus in expansion plans Iran and Turkey. In the article emphasized the meaning of Kuchuc-Kinargysk treatment reflecting economical and military superlity of Russia over Turkey, strengthening the economical links with Russia. Special attention is given to the role of Russia in its trying to reconcile the enemy sides and by the same coming out in the capacity of guarantee of calmness.

Many researches of pre-revolutionary and modern writers are devoted to the analysis of political position of the people of the Northeast Caucasus in the Russian-Turkish and Russian-Iranian relations in the second half of the 70th of the 18th century [1-6].

However in one of them the activity of various ethno-political formation of Dagestan and Chechnya in the Northeast Caucasus in expansionist and strategic plans of Russia, Turkey and Iran is not exposed to special consideration. And meanwhile it is absolutely necessary as differently it is impossible to give correct estimates and the policy of these powers in the Northeast Caucasus in the considered time.

The purpose of the author of this article, relying mainly on new archive materials and also on results of the previous researches, to characterize foreign policy orientation of possessors of Dagestan and Chechnya in strategic plans of Russia, Turkey and Iran in the Northeast Caucasus in the second half of the 70th of the 18th century

After crushing defeat by land and by sea during the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774 sultan Turkey was forced to go to peace talks with Russia. On July 10, 1774 the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiysky peace treaty was signed between Russia and Turkey.

It provided independence to the Crimea, Russia received the ports of Kerch and Enikale, lands between the Bug Rivers and Dnieper, Don and Eey, were confirmed its rights for Kabarda [7], legal registration of joining of Kabarda to Russia thereby came to the end. The Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiysky peace treaty reflected economic and military superiority of Russia over sultan Turkey [1] and also had important

value for all North Caucasian people. It undermined prestige Ottoman Ports, promoted rise of liberating fight in the region, to strengthening of its economic relations with Russia which had an opportunity of development of Central and Northeast Caucasus Mountains. Inclusion of the Central Ciscaucasia in structure of Russia promoted further strengthening of ties of the North Caucasus with Russia. From now on influence of Russia grew in the region every year. L. Hoperskaya and V. Chernous note that "from 18th century along with maintaining traditions of gradual development and deepening of the Russian-North Caucasian relations the trend of inclusion of certain territories of the North Caucasus in structure of the Russian Empire is shown. Some oaths of allegiance of Russia of mountain societies and feudal lords brought under the Russian military pressure carry not so much voluntary how many compulsory character" [8].

Thus, there is obvious an importance of the Northeast Caucasus in expansionist and strategic plans of the adjacent countries.

Nevertheless Russia, considering difficult world situation and being afraid of negative reaction of shah Iran, sultan Turkey and the Western European powers (England and France), pursued careful policy in the region. Focusing attention on further strengthening and expansion of trade and economic relations with the local people, considering trade as one of ways of distribution of the influence in the Northeast Caucasus, the Russian government rendered to local possessors military aid in suppression of peasants uprisings. So, for example, in Chechnya when a people at large in 1770 opposed strengthening feudal

operation, the Russian command in the Caucasus supported the local nobility, having sent military forces against peasants there [9, page 300-301].

At this time in the Northeast Caucasus internal wars did not calm down. Using acute contradictions between the Dagestan possessors, the Fata-li-han, the governor Cuban, won round Tarkovsky of a shamkhal, Kaitag an utsmiya and with their support captured Derbent. The Kazikumukhsky possessor Magomed khan, having agreed with nukhinsky Melik-Ali Beck, took to Noah. However by means of the Derbent and Cuban governor of Fatali-hana the risen inhabitants of Nukhi banished Magomed khan. Soon there was a gap between Fatali-hanom and utsmiy Amir-Gamza. The first expelled the Kaitag tax collectors from Derbent, the second began to look for a case to revenge Fatali-hanu. Having used its departure from Derbent, utsmiya made an attempt to capture Derbent.

In 1774 the Avarian khan of Nutsal-han, having brought together huge army, Fatali-hana opposed the governor of Derbent and Cuba. To the aid of the last arrived also "to many people Dargwa". Soon there was a fierce fight between these groups as a result of which the army of Nutsal-hana was broken and the governor at negotiations was also killed.

Strengthening of the Cuban khanate as a result of association of a number of the Azerbaijani possession disturbed not only the Dagestan possessors, but also Irakli II, the kartlinsko-Kakhetian tsar under the power of whom were the Kazakh, Shamkhor, Shamshadil that in turn accelerated creation of the Fatali-hanu anti-coalition into which the Kaitag utsmy Amir-Gamz, the kazikumukhsky governor Magomed khan, the kazanishchen-sky possessor Tishsiz-Mahomed, etc. entered [3].

In Dagestan the Russian government also tried to conduct more flexible policy, showing "disinterest" in the Dagestan affairs. So, when in 1774 it appealed to Russia about the help in internal war and its acceptance under protection of Russia, the empress Catherine II to the commander of the Russian army general lieutenant I. Medem indicated in the message on the need of search "a way of a decent deviation... from valid to it (Fatali-hanu. - L.B.) assistance from our party in his far-sighted plans..." [10]. At the same time the Russian government demanded from Kaitag to leave an utsmiya Derbent "without anything on it enemy attempt" [11].

Meanwhile events in Dagestan took an undesirable turn for Russia. In the summer of 1774 at Gavdushan the governor Derbent and Cuban Fa tali-khan got beaten in battle. His opponents occupied Cuba and began a siege of Derbent [4]. Fatali-han addresses for support Russia. The Russian government, considering its request as supporter of Russia and wishing to punish Kaitag the utsmiya for death of the academician S. - G. Gmelin who was contained at an utsmiya in captivity makes the decision to send on March 1, 1775 in

Dagestan a military expedition under command of the general I. Medem.

At the beginning of March, 1775 Tarkovsky's group joined the Russian troops transported through Terek shamkhat Murtazali. In the town Iran-harab this joint military group Amir-Gamz inflicted defeat an uts-miya. As a result Derbent was deblocked. So, Fatali-hanu, to the Derbent khan, by means of the Russian troops and Tarkovsky's groups of shamkha-la was succeeded to interrupt a nine-month siege of Derbent [12]. Sent to gratitude of Fatali-han to Catherine II keys from Derbent and again asked to accept it under the Russian protection [3]. After it showed willingness to become a citizen of Russia Tarkovsky shamkhat also some possessors of Dagestan. In August, 1775 the influential Chechen possessor Roslanbek Aydemirov as a sign of fidelity of Russia as the amanat sent the son Geldibey to Kizlyar [13].

In 1784 the Russian government ordered to P.S. Potemkin to send to Tarki the headquarters officer to a shamkhal with the diploma about acceptance it in the Russian citizenship and also with the letter, a sable fur coat and a saber, "having given it manual; with what prilichnostiya it has to deliver the royal diploma and other to a shamkhal: to found the resolution ought with it" [14, page 134-135].

Meanwhile Tarkovsky shamkhat Murtuzali died. The successor his Bammat also began to try to obtain adoption of citizenship of Russia. Together with it the Kaitag utsmy Amir-Gamz, the Avarian khan Ummah khan, the kazikumukhsky governor addressed the Russian government [15].

Changes of foreign policy orientation of possessors of Dagestan and Chechnya in favor of Russia, naturally, were alarming the governments of the Ottoman Empire and shah Iran. The inquiry Turkish reis-efend concerning an expedition of the Russian troops to Dagestan demonstrates to it. In the answer of the Russian consul the bewilderment concerning such inquiry as "was expressed... these lands are Persian" [16]. In the official answer the Russian government recommended to Fatali-hanu to look for protection at the Iranian government [4].

Meanwhile internal war of the Dagestan possessors was resumed with a new force. The commander of the Russian army in the Caucasus I. Medem decides to render military aid to the governor of Derbent and Cuba to Fatali-hanu. St. Petersburg was forced to send a military reinforcement to the aid of I. Medem, and soon the anti-Cuban coalition of the Dagestan possessors was broken, owners were forced to capitulate and ask the world. At the request of Fatali-hana for the aid to it and also for safety of trade of Russia in East Caucasus in Derbent the garrison numbering 500 people was left, the main forces of the Russian troops had to return to Kizlyar.

It should be noted that thanks to the help to Russia the Cuban khanate not only restored the strongly

the reeled situation, but also strengthened influence in the region.

The eminence of the Cuban governor of Fatali-hana adhering to the pro-Russian orientation, existence of the Russian garrison in Derbent strongly disturbed the governments of Persia and Ports. The Ottoman sultan and the Persian shah demanded an immediate withdrawal of Russian troops from Derbent. St. Petersburg did not wish to complicate the relations with Porta with which, according to Catherine II, "peace is restored and with her put many still not ended at all remain" [17].

In 1776 to I. Medem made the second prevention for intervention in affairs "... in places, Persia belonging" [4, page 158].

Spring of 1776 the Government of the Russian Federation, without wishing complications in the relations with Iran and Turkey, withdrew the troops from Derbent and to bar the way for intervention in Severo's affairs - East Caucasus, decided to achieve reconciliation of possessors of Dagestan with the governor of Derbent and Cuba Fatali-hanom. The Russian command in the Caucasus managed twice (on March 24 and in April, 1776) to carry out in the settlement of Darbakh collecting in which Fatali-han, utsmy Amir-Gamz, Tishsiz-Magomed of boynakskiya, Rustam qadi Tabasaran, Magomed khan of kazikumukhskiya and the representative of Russia major Fromgold participated. The first meeting was unsuccessful. The second meeting was more productive. At it the peace agreement was reached. The Kaitag utsmy and Tabasaran qadi undertook "to leave the Derbent and Cuban khan by the subject possession which are quietly marked to him to own also any offense his citizen, it is equal also to it not to repair, in the auction between his and our people and robberies not to do any insanity, and opposite to that to show everyone any assistance" [18].

Thus, thanks to support of the Russian government the recognition of territorial integrity of the Cuban khanate was reached.

In obligations of the Dagestan possessors also the Russian interests were especially stipulated. "Subject Rossiysko, - it was specified in them, - as well as we designate the Christian law to people, both trade, and to visitors for another matters through our borders not to do also any grabitelstvo and capture and, except a subject on former establishments, not to take" [18].

As a result owners of Dagestan undertook to meet a condition: "If in what against this or against that before the given our oath we are careless and what the disorders concerning for rossiysko citizens or to the Derbent khan and his subject will occur from us or from which of us the undersigneds, then are subject to inevitable anger e. and. century and for that to worthy punishment in what I am eaten" [5].

So, the reached agreement had to provide tranquility in East Caucasus, favor to development of trade and economic relations

the people of the region among themselves and with the countries of the Middle East.

However soon between Fatali-hanom and the Dagestan possessors interstine fight ran high. This time the Cuban khan gained a victory, he managed to achieve a statement maysumy Tabasarana of the protege Magomed-Guseyn-beka. The Russian government through the Kizlyar commandant demanded from Magomed khan kazikumukhsky that "would remain quietly at the possession" and would not disturb Fatali-hana standing under the Russian protection.

At the beginning of summer of 1776 to Georgiyevsk to P.S. Potemkin there arrived the vizier of Fatali-hana with the application on acceptance of the Derbent and Cuban khanates to the Russian citizenship [14, page 141].

In Chechnya the intense situation also remained. In July, 1776 the Russian authorities knew of the decision of residents of the Chechen villages of Germenchuk, Shali, Alda and Maloy Atagi to organize attack on the Russian parts deployed in Nowra [19]. But these performances had local character and were not organizationally connected between themselves therefore had no serious consequences for Russia.

Meaning the further plans in the Caucasus, Russia wanted to act as the guarantor of tranquility and the world in Dagestan. However in the spring of 1776 as it was already specified, the attempt of the Russian command in the Caucasus to reconcile the conflicting parties did not make success [6]. It should be noted that until the end of 70 - x of the 18th century Russia tried to show externally lack of the interest in the Caspian region [4]. Thus, the Russian government at least externally tried to adhere to articles of the Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiysky world of 1774 concerning the Caucasus.

Since fall of 1777 because of the amplified anti-Russian propaganda of Ottoman agents in the Caucasus the situation in the Northeast Caucasus sharply became aggravated. As the Russian government knew, among "the mountain people of Kabarda and Kumyks" rumors "about allegedly gatherings of Ali-pashoyu of anatoliysky 80 thousand troops for war" [14, page 71] against Russia were spread.

Meanwhile Russian-Ottoman tension was so fueled that in 1778-1779 Russia and Turkey stood on a war side. The situation was stabilized by the Aynaly-Kavaksky convention (March, 1779) signed between them.


1. Druzhinina E.I. Kyuchuk-Kaynardzhiysky world of 1774 of M., 1955. Page 172.
2. P.G. Butkov. Materials for a modern history of the Caucasus from 1722 to 1803: In 3 parts 1. SPb., 1869.
3. V.G. Gadzhiyev. A role of Russia in the history of Dagestan. M, 1965.
4. O. Markova the Item Russia, Transcaucasia and the international relations in the 18th century. M, 1966.
5. G.B. Abdullaev. From the history of Northeast Azerbaijan in the 60-80th years of the 18th century Baku, 1958. Page 170-171.
6. A. Bakikhanov - K. Gyulistan-i Iram. Baku, 1991. Page 139.
7. Contracts of Russia with the East political and trade. SPb., 1868. Page 15-24.
8. Khopyor L., V. Chernous Russia and North Caucasus: history and present//Ethnopolitical vestn. Russia: Inform. - anat. bulletin M., 1993. No. 1. Page 58-59.
9. P.G. Butkov. Decree. soch. Part 1.
10. AVPR, t. The intercourses of Russia with Persia. 1778 - 1800, op. 77, 467, l. 1-7.
11. In the same place, 471, l. 2-3.
12. P.G. Butkov. Decree. soch. Part 3. Page 138.
13. CGA RD, t. 379, op. 1, 989, l. 31.
14. P.G. Butkov. Decree. soch. Part 2.
15. RGADA, t. 23, 13, Part 2, l. 254; 13, Part 13, l. 28, 136.
16. AVPR, t. The intercourses of Russia with Turkey. 1776, 473, l. 60-61.
17. Sb. RIO. T. 154. Page 299.
18. AVPR, t. The intercourses of Russia with Persia. 17761777, 478, l. 58.
19. CGA RD, t. 379, op. 1. 102, l. 17.

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