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The theory of cultural circles (on the basis of the analysis of the Mongolian gains)



(on the basis of the analysis of the Mongolian gains)

It is considered to be that the last quarter of the 20th century was time of crisis of historical science which was caused by a new wave of criticism in relation to the existing methodological approaches. Result of this criticism, by words Zh. Revel, the condition of "epistemological anarchy", domination of "microhistory" and a narrative was (Revel 1998: 82). However revival of interest in the historical theory is observed in the last decade; substantially it is connected with activity of the American school of historical sociology and with works of such famous historians as Sh. Eyzenshtadt, T. Skochpol, J. Goldstone. Studying new methodological approaches is conducted also in Russia; in this regard it is possible to call, in particular, L.E. Grinin, I.M. Dyakonov, L.S. Vasilyev, A.V. Korotayev, E.S. Kulpin's works.

In the context of methodological search it is necessary to consider also the new addressing the theory of diffusion as to the explanatory tool of the Russian history, undertaken in V.V. Alekseev, S.A. Nefedov and I.V. Poberezhnikov's article (2000). Authors of article try to interpret the main events of medieval history of Russia on the basis of the theory of cultural circles - the istorikoetnologichesky concept very popular in 20th and 30th of our century. It is known that the creator of this concept Fritz Grebner considered that the similar phenomena in the culture of various people are explained by origin of these phenomena from one center (Ogaeieg of 1911). Grebner's followers believe that the most important elements of human culture appear only once and only in one place as a result of great, fundamental opening. Fundamental opening are the opening allowing to seize new resources and opportunities in modern terminology, it opening, expanding an ecological niche of ethnic group and promoting increase in its number. It can be achievements in the field of production of food, for example the house -

the stikation of plants allowing to increase population density in tens and hundreds of times. It can be the new weapon or new military tactics allowing to move apart dwelling borders at the expense of neighbors. It can be the vehicles allowing to open and develop new lands. As fundamental opening it is possible to consider also new technologies promoting achievements in the areas mentioned above: for example, development of metallurgy of iron, on the one hand, allowed to create the iron axes and plows which facilitated development of a virgin soil, on the other hand, made possible emergence of new weapon - iron swords. Effect of fundamental opening such is that they give to the people pioneer decisive advantage before other people. Agriculture development, for example, led to the fact that tribes of farmers, having opened all the lands, began to move in the territory of hunting tribes and as they had superiority in number, neighbors could not interfere with them. Hunters were pushed aside to forests and to mountains; part of them joined farmers, adopted their culture and, in turn, transferred them some traditions of natives. Thus, there was a cultural and social synthesis which result was an emergence of new tribes and the new people, but these new people kept the cultural complex connected with agriculture use and kept it in that specific form which was given it by the people pioneer. The resettlement wave, meanwhile, continued to move further, gradually forming a cultural circle - the field of distribution of this cultural complex.

As it was noted above, fundamental discoveries, as a rule, are made once and in one place. Theoretically, of course, it is possible that the fundamental opening which generated the taken cultural detour will be repeated in other place, but in reality the probability of such event is close to zero: speed of dissemination of information on fundamental opening does not leave time for its independent repetition.

F. Grebner allocated several cultural circles in the territory of Australia and Oceania. The cultural complex of a "east Papuan" circle is often given as an example: agriculture with cultivation of tuberous plants, fishery through networks, the board boat, a fire saw, a heavy club with a thickening on

the end, the hut with a dvukhskatny roof, spiral weaving of baskets, a wide board, wooden or wattled, two exogamic classes with the female account, the secret men's unions and dancings in masks, a cult of spirits of the dead and skulls, lunar mythology, the cannibal myth, plastic images of spirits, a circular ornament, a signal drum, a pan pipe, a single-string musical instrument, the sounding plates and some other cultural elements (Ogaeieg of 1905). It is easy to see that this cultural circle are the cornerstone of the three first an element which are fundamental opening, other elements play the "accompanying" role, but they are important as their distribution bears with itself significant changes in culture and the social relations. Besides, these elements play a role of the peculiar markers helping to designate more accurately borders of a cultural circle and to clear the direction of its distribution.

Created nearly a century ago, the theory of cultural circles passed a long way of development; at one time it was exposed to criticism, but then the authority of the theory in general was restored, and it is still effectively applied in archeology and ethnography (Vasilyev 1976: 3-36). As for application of the theory of cultural circles in historical science, this unusual occurrence mainly applied when in the conditions of insufficiency of written material the historians used archaeological and ethnographic data (NeyueShet 1938). The nationalist and ethnoconfessional prejudices stimulated by politicians were an essential obstacle in a way of distribution of the theory of cultural circles. Nevertheless presently the important role of diffusion of innovations does not raise doubts at most of historians; for example, in studying history of Modern times the theory of diffusion is an important component of the theory of modernization (Alekseev, etc. 2000).

The meaning of the new addressing the theory of cultural circles consists in a perenimaniye historians of the general idea concluded in this theory: a fundamental discovery is made once and in one place, it generates a migration and diffusive wave which, extending, creates a new cultural or civilization circle - simply speaking, a new civilization. Most often as fundamental opening the new weapon acts, and the migration wave takes a wave mode of gains. Classical

an example of such wave is the gaining Alexander of Macedon which led to formation of that cultural circle which is called the Hellenistic civilization. It is possible to list many elements of the cultural complex defining this civilization: standard examples of the Greek architecture, ceramics, coins, clothes, characteristic features of the social organization of policies and klerukhiya, etc. enter this complex. However the main element is the Macedonian phalanx; she gained the victories which glorified Alexander (Sopo11u 1981: 73). Creation of a phalanx nominated to the arena of history to very few people the famous mountain people before - macedonians. Having seized the cultural areas of Greece, macedonians then extended the Greek culture across all Middle East, but in relation to fundamental opening the Greek cultural elements had generally accompanying character.

The perenimaniye of this opening by opponents of macedonians, in particular Sparta was the main recognition of power of a phalanx (Plutarch 1964: 93). Fundamental opening (in this case - new weapon) gives decisive advantage in hands of the owners and to resist their impact, the surrounding people are forced to adopt this weapon hasty. This circumstance - a perenimaniye of weapon of the opponent - is the evidence of fundamental nature of this military innovation. At the same time this perenimaniye is the main component of the mechanism of diffusion: after a perenimaniye of new weapon tactics of its use and the military organization which often is a part of the social organization is adopted (for example the system of klerukhiya or a local system). Also the cultural elements accompanying fundamental opening, such as political institutes, clothes, customs, etc. are in most cases adopted, but this perenimaniye is formal is not necessary any more, and depth of these loans testifies to force of that pressure which renders the people pioneer on neighbors. Before a wave of gains the diffusion wave moves; borrowing new cultural elements, the surrounding people join a new cultural circle.

Thus, the cultural and historical school represents history as a dynamic picture of distribution of the cultural circles generated occurring in different countries fundamen-

talny opening. The history of the certain country within this concept can be presented as the history of adaptation to the cultural circles running from different sides, as the history of transformation of society under the influence of external factors, such as invasion, military threat or cultural influence of powerful neighbors. In historical science such transformations in relation to specific cases are designated as an ellinization, a romanizition, Islamization, a westernisation, etc. In the annex to the history of Russia often say that at first our country belonged to the Byzantine cultural circle, then, after the Mongolian invasion, the Russian culture underwent strong east influence, and after Peter I's reforms became a part of the European cultural circle (Oshp8 1963: 355-368; M1geku 1952: 183-186; Ê«úú^ку 1953). However if interpretation of reforms of Peter as familiarizing with European civilization does not cause objections in most of historians, then the role of the Mongolian invasion is a subject of an old discussion. "It seems that Russians were ashamed of that time when they were subdued by "Asians", - the American historian P. Silfen noted. - To some extent the Russian researchers were capable to turn insufficiency and uncertainty of the available certificates of the advantage". Without having the exact guidelines, historians had an opportunity to explain the facts in the own way and to develop theories according to the historical and political concepts prevailing in their time. Thus, Solovyov and Rozhkov could claim that Mongols had no significant effect on the Russian life while Sergeyevich could prove that ethical standards of conquerors caused to Russians deep and irreparable damage. Certificates was so a little and they so depended on personal perception that "nobody could prove another its wrongfulness" (81^еп 1974: 91).

Such situation is characteristic also of a modern Russian historiography. "A question of impact of the Mongolian invasion on development of the Russian society - one of the most difficult in the history of Russia, - A.L. Horoshkevich and A.I. Pliguzov note. - The extreme lack of sources complicates the answer to it therefore quite possible is an emergence of such works in which any impact of invasion on development of Russia" (by Horosh-kevich, Pliguzov is denied 1989: 22).

It is curious that the similar situation developed recently and among the western historians investigating these problems. Today the fullest research of a problem of distribution of administrative institutes of the Mongolian empire in Russia belongs to Donald Ostrovsky, however Ostrovsky's concept meets objections from hyper severe researchers (Ostgowski 1998; 2000).

P. Silfen clearly formulates the situation reasons: limitation of certificates and also lack of the accurate methodological principles. It is represented that the theory of cultural circles intended for use in a situation of insufficiency of certificates can meet this methodological lack to some extent.

Passing to concrete consideration of the Mongolian cultural circle, it is necessary to install first of all the reasons of its emergence and the extension, to point to that fundamental opening which played the defining role in it. There is no doubt that Mongols had military superiority over the opponents, but what scales of this superiority were? Let's give one example. In September, 1211 the Mongols met in fight at fortress to Huykhepkh with army of the powerful empire of Jin. It was the regular army consisting of professional soldiers-latnikov. "In vanguard expose lance bearers who are called "ин" - "firm", - the sunsky historian Xu wrote about tszinyets Man blue. - Soldiers and their horses are dressed in armor". Lance bearers who made about a half of army were followed by the archers dressed in easy armors. Lance bearers rammed the opponent's system, and archers made volley, having rushed into it on depth of hundred steps. The number of tszinsky army was about 500 thousand soldiers - it were the best troops which are brought together from all huge empire (Vorobyov 1975: 277-278; Meng-da to a bey-l of 1975: 72). Mongols there were no more than 100 thousand - nevertheless the tszinsky army was totally broken and almost destroyed.

Historians differently explain the causes of the Mongolian victories: some speak about talents of the Mongolian commanders, others - about the accurate military organization, about maneuverable tactics. However it is known that Mongols borrowed the tactics and the organization at

Jin and empire of Liao defeated by her (Larichev, Tyumina 1975: 112; Kychanov 1973: 81), that in hundreds of fights for the 13th century ordered Mongols different (and not always talented) commanders - nevertheless they almost always won. So in what the cause of these victories consisted? The answer to this question was one of tasks of the embassy directed by the Pope to the yard of the Mongolian khan. The erudite monk Plano Karpini heading this embassy left the detailed description of weapon and tactics of Mongols.

"Weapon all at least have to have it, - Plano Karpini wrote, - two or three onions, or at least one good, and three big quivers full with arrows, one axe and ropes to pull tools. The rich have swords, sharp at the end, cutting only on the one hand and a little curve... Some have armor... Iron tips of arrows are very sharp and cut on both sides like a two-edged sword. It is necessary to know that every time as they will catch sight of enemies, they go on them, and everyone throws three or four arrows into the opponents; and if they see that they cannot defeat them, then recede back to the; and they do it for the sake of deception that enemies pursued them to those places where they made an ambush.". Plano Karpini focuses attention on shooting arms and shooting tactics of Mongols (the Travel. 1957: 50-53, 62).

With Plano Karpini's conclusions the certificate of the Armenian tsarevitch Gayton has something in common. "With them it is very dangerous to start fight, - Gayton in 1307 told, - as even in small skirmishes with them there are a lot of killed and wounded, as at others in big battles. It is a consequence of their dexterity in archery as their arrows punch all types of protective equipment and armors" (tsit. on: Kirpichnikov 1971: 78).

"In fights with the enemy they get the best here is how, - Marco Polo demonstrates, - to run away from enemies are not ashamed; running away, turn and shoot a bow. The horses were accustomed as dogs to turn extensively. When they are driven, on the run fight nicely yes strongly, also precisely, kind of stood face to face with the enemy; runs and turns back, shoots straight, beats both enemy horses, and people, and the enemy thinks that they are upset and defeated, and itself loses, because as horses at him are shot down and people is fairly interrupted. Tatars as will see that they interrupted both enemy horses, and people there is a lot of, turn back and fight nicely, bravely, razo-

ryat and defeat the enemy. Here so they won many fights and submitted many people" (Marco Polo 1940: 65). In "the Great Chronicle" of Matfey Parizhsky certificates of different authors that Mongols "incomparable archers", "surprising archers", "excellent archers" repeatedly repeat. One of the Hungarian bishops emphasizes that Mongols more skillful archers, than Hungarians and Cumans and that "onions at them more powerful" (Matfey Parizhsky 1997: 268, 270, 277, 283, 287). Foma Splitsky and the Hungarian monk Yulian who notes that "swords and copies, they, by hearsay, fight less skillfully" (Foma Splitsky 1997 write about the same: 111; Anninsky 1940: 87).

Thus, certificates of sources agree that Mongols were beautiful archers: they released clouds of arrows which flew further, than at other people, and struck with such force that killed horses and punched an armor of riders. Mongols possessed unusually powerful onions which besides allowed to support the high rate of firing, - such conclusion follows from certificates of contemporaries.

We will address certificates of archeology now. The second half of the 20th century was marked by a number of outstanding opening of the Russian archeologists; thanks to A.P. Okladnikov, G.V. Kiselyov, V.E. Medvedev, N.Ya. Merpert, D.G. Savinov, L.R. Kyzlasov, E.M. Hamzina, Yu.S. Khudyakov's researches and some other experts the picture of development of medieval cultures of nomads of Central Asia and the Far East was recreated. Data acquisition about emergence during the period which is directly preceding the beginning of the Mongolian gains, new type of onions was one of results of these researches. At the heart of the onions widespread in the Great Steppe earlier, in the I millennium BC, the onions which are once created by tribes to a hunn lay. It were onions with side bone slips which fixed rigid zones of a wooden blank of onions (kibita). As these zones did not participate in creation of reflex effort, onions of hunnsky type had the big sizes - about 160 cm. In 1-U centuries the same gunnsky onions dominated on broad lands of steppes from Cupid to Danube, but then on the basis of this design the set of new options appeared. Selection of new designs continued up to the 12th century when together with Mongols to the arena of history there were the Mongolian onions. These onions differed from hunnsky onions in what had

not side, but one frontal bone slip playing essentially other role - it did not deprive the site of a kibita of elasticity, and, on the contrary, increased elasticity, adding effort of the bone plate located on the center of onions to reflex effort of a wooden blank. The bone plate has the maximum strength - approximately twice more, than wood (about 13 kg/mm), and respectively, being straightened, creates twice bigger effort. Luka of this kind call "reflexing"; at the small sizes (about 120 cm) the Mongolian onions had big power, and this power could be increased if desired, adding bone overlays for onions shoulders. Besides, in comparison with other onions the Mongolian onions were more flexible and the bowstring was delayed on bigger distance therefore it made longer impact on an arrow and told her a bigger impulse (Savinov 1981: 155, 161; Khudyakov 1986: 121, 140, 142; Neme-rov 1987: 214-215; McEwan, Miller, Bergman 1991: 46; Chambers 1974: 55-57).

According to the Chinese sources, force of a tension of the Mongolian onions was not less than 10 preschool educational institutions (66 kg) that at least by one and a half times exceeded the power of tszinsky onions (7 preschool educational institutions, or 46 kg). H. Martin determines force of the Mongolian onions in 166 pounds (75 kg) and notes that they did not concede to the well-known English onions which ruined the French knights in fights at Kresi and Poitiers. Yu. Chambers estimates force of the Mongolian onions at 46-73 kg, and English - at 34 kg. After the English onions the most powerful onions in Europe were Hungarian - their tension is estimated at 32 kg; let's remind that these onions resisted Mongolian in fight at Shayo which ended with terrible defeat of Hungarians (Meng-da to a bey-l of 1975: 7; Kychanov 1973: 277; Shavkunov 1987: 2O0; Martin 1950: 195; Medvedev 1968: 34; Chambers 1974: 57; Szabo 1959).

The small sizes of the Mongolian onions did it convenient for the horse archer; it allowed to aim and fire more precisely at high speed - till 10-12 shots in a minute. Yu.S. Khudyakov compares military effect of emergence of the Mongolian onions to effect of other fundamental opening - emergence of automatic weapon in the 20th century. Rate of fire of the Mongolian onions had not smaller value, than its power, it allowed the Mongolian soldiers to reduce a fight distance, gave them confidence that the opponent will not resist "heavy rain of arrows" (Khudyakov 1997: 124).


to New onions there corresponded the new type of arrows. In the Mongolian time received prevalence of an arrow with flat tips in the form of a shovel or a shamrock - so-called "srezn". Flat tips flew with greater speed, than three-blade, and the quiver included bigger quantity of flat arrows, than three-blade. The majority of flat arrows had feather width to 25 mm and weight up to 15 g, they not really differed on weight from the tips applied before. However along with usual "sreznya-m" quite often met huge tips up to 15 cm long, feather of 5 cm wide and up to 40 g. At a usual ratio of weight of a tip and an arrow (1:5, 1:7) arrow with such tip had to weigh 200-280 g. Heavy arrows were one more evidence of power of the Mongolian onions; they had huge destructive power and intended for defeat of horses (Medvedev 1966: 55; Kiselyov, Merpert 1965: 192-193; Khudyakov 1991: 122-123).

According to Yu. Chambers, the range of fire from the Mongolian onions reached 320 m, and the range of the English onions - 230 m. The stone stele found in 1818 near Nerchinsk is stored in the Hermitage; the inscription on this arrow says that when in 1226 Genghis Khan organized a celebration concerning one of the victories, the winner in a competition of shooters Esugey Mergen fired an arrow on 335 Alta (538 m). However at such distance it was almost impossible to hit the mark, and the aim range of fire from onions of the Mongolian type was much less - it made about 150 m. The arrow of the Tatar onions of the 16th century at distance of 200 m killed a horse or punched a chain armor through (Chambers 1974: 64-66; Izmaylov 1997: 106). On power onions did not concede to arkebuza, and much more surpassed them in rate of fire; however to learn to shoot a bow it was much more difficult, than to learn to shoot from an arkebuza. Modern sport bows are valid a tension "only" in 23 kg, but firing from them demands good physical training, and even to the athlete not easy to produce about one hundred arrows for day of competitions. Onions of the Mongolian type demanded extraordinary strong hands: the emperor Frederick II especially noted that at Mongols "hands are stronger, than at other people" because they constantly use onions. Besides, the special skill was required: the Mongolian archers used for capture of a bowstring special

a ring with a hook which played a role of the trigger mechanism. Plano Karpini demonstrates that Mongols from three-year age taught the children to shoot a bow, gradually increasing its sizes. Thus they increased muscles of hands and fulfilled the firing mechanism at the level of conditioned reflexes. In principle training in archery since early childhood was characteristic of the nomadic people since the time of Huns, but the fact is that more powerful onions demanded from the shooter of special physical and psychological qualities, and there had to pass a lot of time before Mongols mastered new weapon. It was extremely difficult for soldiers of other people, and sometimes and it is impossible to learn to shoot well the Mongolian bow even if they would get it as a trophy. The Arab author of manual writing to HU of century on archery noted that in its time (century later after falling of the Mongolian dominion in Persia) many secrets of firing were already lost (Pastukhov, Plotnikov 1983: 7-8; Travel. 1957: 36; Medvedev 1959: 14, 31, 32; Bichurin 1950: 39).

It was even more difficult to arrange production of onions of the Mongolian type. Production of slozhnosostavny onions demanded big skill. Tree layers, bone slips and tendons stuck together under a strong press then onions were exposed to drying sometimes within several years. The end of production of onions was followed by special ceremonies. Masters in production of onions were highly esteemed, and even the great khan did them honors. Highly appreciating (and even esteeming) the onions, Mongols, naturally, sought to save them from bad weather; it was for this purpose used to a naluchya which together with a quiver was called "сагайдак" (Yermolov 1987: 153, 154; Markevich 1994: 22).

The Mongolian onions were adopted by other people as a part of a complex of the cultural elements defining a cultural circle. Let's stop first of all on those elements which were connected with arms. New weapon demanded application of tactics which would provide use of all its advantages. The Mongolian light cavalry rushed along the front of the opponent, watering it with a rain of arrows; if the opponent advanced to the attack, then she addressed in imaginary flight, but during this "flight" archers, having turned back back, shot the persecutors and their horses. Powerful onions and massive arrows allowed

to kill horses, and, really, the sources quoted above demonstrate that defeat of horses was nearly the main element of this tactics. If the opponent persistently kept on the strengthened position, then to the attack there was a regiment "mangedey", - the name means it "belonging to god", that is "suicide bombers". The task "мэнгэдэй" was in that (perhaps, at the price of big losses) to start infighting, and then to feign flight and yet to force the opponent to pursue archers. When during long prosecution the opponent was weakened by losses and upset the ranks, he was exposed to sudden flank blow of "a zasadny regiment". As "The intimate legend" testifies, thus the decisive victory in fight at Huykhepkh was gained. It should be noted, however, that tactics in itself "мэнгэдэй" was not new, it was used by Huns, Scythians and many other steppe people, a classical example of application of this tactics is the victory a tyurok over Byzantines at Mantsikert (1071). Advantage of Mongols was only that new onions allowed them to apply this old tactics with great success (Chambers 1974: 64-66; Khudyakov 1986: 225; Kozin 1941: 179).

The full prevalence at Mongols of shooting tactics is even more shaded by that circumstance that, according to sources, only very few of the Mongolian soldiers had an iron armor. Giving a number of certificates such, A.N. Kirpichnikov notes that Mongols tested "a chronic lack" of a protective armor which was usually got as trophies or was produced by captured masters (Kirpichnikov 1989: 186; Kiselyov, Merpert 1965: 199). Archaeological data confirm this conclusion. It especially contrasts with heavy weapons of the main opponents of Mongols: soldiers Jin (chzhurchzheny) and former, domongolsky, masters of steppes - kidany (Khudyakov 1991: 147, 148; Gorelik 1987: 169). Apparently, in this case the conscious refusal of a part of soldiers of heavy weapons which is explained by the fact that an armor of that time all the same could not protect from the arrows which are released from the Mongolian onions took place. The effect of emergence of new onions was the same as effect of emergence of firearms: he forced most of soldiers to remove an armor. Heavy weapons constrained

movements of archers also reduced the rate of fire of firing; it was not required to the soldiers who were not involved in contact fight. Besides, for convenience of firing the Mongolian archers used short stirrups: having stood up in stirrups, the archer could stabilize partly rolling and more precisely aim. However short stirrups made the rider unstable in a saddle and complicated conducting infighting. Mongols entered infighting only when opponents were covered with wounds by arrows and the outcome of battle was almost turned; this last attack was carried out by rather not numerous groups of a heavy cavalry (Ostrowski 1998: 51).

It is characteristic as well the fact that actions of the Mongolian heavy cavalry did not draw to themselves the attention of contemporaries, and sources did not keep their description. Still there are no finds of the Mongolian shock copies, spurs, special saddles with an emphasis and other specific devices for collision blows (Hra-pachevsky 2004: 202). In some battles the Mongols had no heavy cavalry, for example, in big fight at Dzhe-bel-as-Salikhiye in Syria at all (Arendt of 1962: 98-99). The lack of heavy weapons especially is indicative that fight took place in 1300 when the Mongols dominating over Iran received more than enough weapon from the Iranian handicraftsmen.

Protective arms of the Mongolian soldiers were in detail studied by M.V. Gorelik (Gorelik 1983; 1987). Archers carried an easy quilted armor from leather, felt or thick fabric, such armor in Mongolian was called "Khatanga degel" ("a firm dressing gown"). Tyazhelovooruzhenny riders were dressed in lamellar armors; metal plates fastened on thongs therefore armors were called "to a hudesut huyag" - "the armor penetrated, stitched (belts)". Other type of armors ("bekhter") was the chain armor strengthened on a breast and on a back by metal plates, sometimes instead of several plates for strengthening of a chain armor round iron "mirror" (such armor in Russia was called "zertsaly") was used (Gorelik 1983: 248; Khudyakov 1991: 148). According to experts, a metal armor of the Mongolian soldiers only slightly differed from an armor kidany and Chinese; the same treats also a metal horse armor. One of types of a horse armor - "a soft armor" - was borrowed by Mongols to Blizh-

it is mute the East where such armor became popular at the end of the 12th century. Thus, in the field of heavy weapons the Mongols did not create anything essentially new.

"The Mongolian commanders sought for resolute collision with the opponent, - Yu.S. Khudyakov writes. - The belief in the invincibility was so high that they engaged with superior forces of the opponent, trying to suppress his resistance massive firing" (Khudyakov 1986: 136). Thus, tactics of Mongols was generally shooting, but the efficiency of firing was so high that R.P. Hrapachevsky compares it to the fire power of regular armies of Modern times. R.P. Hrapachevsky and Yu.S. Khudyakov believe that only development of firearms put an end to domination of horse archers (Hrapachevsky 2004: 198; Khudyakov 1986: 137).

"Weapon always was more "international", than other pieces of material culture, - A.F. Medvedev wrote. - Its new types, more perfect and effective, appeared at any given people, are borrowed and extend much quicker, than jewelry or instruments of labor. Lag in military science. could lead to independence loss. It also was the cause of rather fast distribution of some types of arms at the next people". Process of distribution of new weapon is archaeological traced as an area of finds of onions and arrows of the Mongolian type - these finds serve as the main markers of a new cultural circle. At the same time it is important that the tips of the Mongolian type relating to XIII-XIU of centuries were found and where Mongols were not at war, - in Smolensk, Novgorod, Pskov (Medvedev 1968: 51, 75-76, 78).

As finds of onions and their parts are rather rare, the question of distribution of the Mongolian onions is more difficult. It is known that by 16th century in Russia were able to do the reflexing onions, but when their production was mastered, remains not clear. Chronicles demonstrate that attempts of a perenimaniye of the Mongolian arms began already soon after invasion. Archaeological data demonstrate that from the middle of the 13th century in arms of the Russian soldiers the traditional chain armor ("armor") gradually gives way to lamellar "armor" of the Mongolian type; the word "armor" gradually goes out of use (PSRL 1962, t. 2: 814;

Medvedev 1959: 119-121; 1968: 13; Nightingales 1988: 515; Kirpichnikov 1976: 33).

Process of a perenimaniye of the Mongolian weapon in the Middle East is covered by sources in more detail, than in Russia. Rasheed-hells-dynes demonstrates that in Persia the weapon for army of ilkhan was produced in the big state workshops - "karkhan" organized by Mongols. In these workshops mainly local handicraftsmen turned during gain into slaves worked; weapon became "on the Mongolian customs" and with the assistance of the Mongolian masters. By the beginning of the 14th century the production of the Mongolian weapon was developed by the free handicraftsmen working out of a karkhana. Distribution of the Mongolian weapon was facilitated by the fact that most of soldiers of army of ilkhan was made by Turkic peoples, and, having armed this army, Mongols supplied a tyurok (and Arabs) with new weapon and taught treatment of him. Turkic peoples were military estate in all states of the Middle East and also in Egypt, in Central Asia and in India; thus, the samples of weapon brought by Mongols could extend freely in the Turkic military environment on all extensive region. It is natural that, having got to Turkic peoples and Arabs, the Mongolian onions were described by researchers as "Turkish" or "Arab", but all this there were same reflexing onions dominating both in the Middle East, and in Russia. "Arab, both the Russian, and Turkish onions of the Middle Ages were produced by absolutely similar principle, incorporated similar similar materials details and even on appearance and the sizes resembled at each other. For this reason Fletcher and other foreigners who visited Russia in the 16th century noted that the Russian onions are similar to Turkish" (Rasheed-hells-dynes of 1946: 301-302; Medvedev 1968: 13).

Tells about loan of the Mongolian weapon also a perenimaniye of the corresponding terminology. First of all the terminology connected with onions was adopted. The Slavic word "tul" was forced out by the Mongolian word "quiver". Onions complete with a quiver and naluchy began to be called "sagaydaky" or "saadaky", a cover for a quiver - "tokhtuy". Big arrows (characteristic of Mongols) were called in Russia "джид", other kind of arrows - "tomara". Also defensive weapon was adopted. The easy quilted armor of archers in Russia was called "тигиляй" (from mon-

golsky "дегель"), a heavy lamellar armor - "куяк" ("hu-yag"), the strengthened chain armor - "bekhterets" ("bekhter") (Brandenburg 1871: 76-78). In XIU-XUI of centuries the Persian handicraftsmen producing the Mongolian weapons were famous on all East, as well as in Russia. Over time initial Mongolian names of different types of weapon were replaced Persian or Arab (Anninsky 1940: 341; Brandenburg 1871: 76-78; Gorelik 1987: 196; Vinkler 1992: 251; Kirpichnikov 1980: 99-100). Defensive weapon was adopted more slowly, than onions and arrows. The bulk of nomads of Eastern Europe remained is faithful to the old armor, a chain armor; in burials of kipchak the chain armor meets ten times more often than a lamellar armor of the Mongolian type (Fedorov-Davydov 1966: 35).

Speaking about distribution of the Mongolian weapon, it is necessary to mention as well gunpowder. Gunpowder was the Chinese invention. Mongols quickly borrowed powder grenades "ho public joint stock company". In Russia the word "gunpowder" is for the first time mentioned at the end of the XIII century in the so-called "Novgorod dictionary" (Arendt of 1928: 453; Schoolboy of 1980: 161, 162, 178).

After arms the military organization and tactics was borrowed. The decimal organization, rigid military hierarchy and severe discipline were not the invention of Mongols. "Much of what is quite often attributed only to Genghis Khan's genius, - N.N. Kradin notes, - actually was only repetition. what already happened in the history of Halkha-Mongolia 1400 earlier". Division of army into dozens, hundreds, thousands was borrowed by Mongols kidany and Jin, and then entered by them in all won countries. V.V. Bartold wrote that the military device a tyurok of the 15th century was "heritage of the empire of Chingiskhana", in Oprah?

Sutton Abner
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