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To a question of sources of "the doctrine of control": U. Bullit's (April, 1936) report and "long telegram" J.F. Kennan (February, 1946)



v. A. Raykova

To the QUESTION OF SOURCES of "the DOCTRINE of CONTROL": The REPORT At. BULLET (April, 1936)

And "LONG TELEGRAM" of J. T. KENNAN (February, 1946)

Work is presented by department of general history the Herzen State Pedagogical University of Russia. The research supervisor - the doctor of historical sciences, professor O.Yu. Plenkov

Article is devoted to the comparative analysis of reports of two American diplomats, William Bullit and George Kennan who offered original interpretations of essence and prospects of the American-Soviet relations. The surprising similarity of their views, despite various historical situation, allows to raise a question of ideological sources of "the doctrine of control".

V. Raykova

ON THE SOURCES OF CONTAINMENT:

W. C. BULLITT’S DISPATCH (APRIL, 1936)

AND G. F. KENNAN'S "LONG TELEGRAM" (FEBRUARY, 1946)

The article is devoted to the comparative analysis of dispatches of the two American diplomats, William C. Bullitt and George F. Kennan, who suggested original interpretations of the essence and long-term outlook of the American-Soviet relations. Surprising similarity of their views, in spite of different historical situations, makes it possible to bring up a question about the sources of containment.

For several post-war decades the vector of development of the American foreign policy was defined by the "doctrine of control" assuming control of the Soviet expansion in every spot on the globe. Her architect George F. Kennan who sent on February 22, 1946 to State Department the extensive telegram containing the analysis of the Soviet history, society, prospects and intentions traditionally is considered. "The long telegram" repeatedly was exposed to the careful and comprehensive analysis [7; 11; 12; 15; 16; 17; 20; 21] that cannot be told about the report of the first American ambassador in the USSR William Bullit of "The politician of the United States in connection with the Soviet Union and communism" [6]. At the same time in the report sent on April 20, 1936 addressed to the Secretary of State K. Hell, also

an attempt to define basic installations of the American policy for communistic Russia was made. Bullit's dispatch was repeatedly published [10, river 291-296; 3, river 154-157], but every time the text of the document was exposed to considerable reductions that significantly distorted its sense. After official declassification of a collection of documents of U.S. State Department in 1979 the report was not published and did not become subject of the complete analysis. Meanwhile, judging by office work stamps on the original of the message which is stored in National archive of the USA in January, 1948 from it the copy for the president Mr. Truman was made that makes think on a possibility of influence of the ideas of Bullit for the American foreign policy thought of the post-war period. Partly answer to this

the question can be received by the comparative analysis of the April report of Bullit and "the long telegram" Kennan.

Despite the rough and eventful decade dividing Bullit's dispatch and Kennan's telegram, both documents appeared in a similar situation, at the time of transformation of a foreign policy of the USA concerning the Soviet state. The initial euphoria caused by establishment of the American-Soviet diplomatic relations in 1933 soon was replaced by mutual distrust and impossibility to reach compromise: negotiations on debts and the credits came to a standstill; the accruing American isolationism did not promote creation of a security system in the Far East; carrying out in Moscow the VII Congress of Komintern in the summer of 1935 and strengthening of repressions in the Soviet society caused an acute crisis in diplomatic relations of two states. By 1936 among the staff of the American Embassy in Moscow the aspiration to carrying out more hard line concerning the Soviet Union is more and more distinctly traced. But this aspiration did not coincide with ideological installations of administration of F.D. Roosevelt who was more focused on interaction from the USSR [1; 8; 14; 18]. During World War II the cooperation of the western governments with the Soviet Russia in all areas reached unprecedented scope, having for a while undermined mutual distrust and rivalry. But already on the result of war, in process of strengthening of positions of the USSR in Central and Eastern Europe, search of more rigid forms of amerikanosovetsky cooperation becomes a paramount task for official Washington. Disappointment and at the same time awareness of need of development of new methods and ways of coexistence are distinctly traced by impossibility to continue and deepen constructive dialogue between two countries in both messages.

Being on formal grounds office reports, according to contents and stylistics Bullit's message and "long those are

a legramma" Kennan represent incomparably bigger. Unstructured, and in places and the contradictory report of Bullit differing in uneasy and gusty style of statement most of all reminds the philosophical and analytical essay in which the position of the author is most naked. Compared the ken-nanovsky "long telegram" of F. Kos-tigliola to the religious text, noting simple and available language, accurate and clear structure, and the effect which is most of all had by the telegram [7, river 168]. Suspension of formulations, laconic style, accurate designation of a problem and practical recommendations - everything demonstrates that "the long telegram" was a fruit of long and deep reflections of Kennan about communism phenomenon.

The aspiration of authors to express the understanding of the nature of the Soviet state and communism was embodied in creation of original concepts. Bullit went on the way of identification of communism with the religious movement, considering that "to consider communism as the religious movement means in fact to choose the correct way for an entrance to the Soviet labyrinth" [6]. Kennan focuses attention on "traditional and instinctive Russian feeling of insecurity" [13, river 20] to which all Russian governors were subject. At first it was the fear of the cruel nomadic people living in the neighbourhood then - before more organized and developed systems of the western countries that induced the Russian authorities "to look for safety only in patient, but deadly fight for total destruction of the competing power, never to make a compromise and cooperation with it" [13, river 21].

Bullit and Kennan presented peculiar concepts of understanding of the Soviet state and communism: as religious trend and historically developed fear of the outside world respectively. In the arguments elected by authors their personal interests, character, education were reflected. For Bullit who had among ancestors of the French Huguenots, followers episkopal-

ache church and the Lutheranism which is under the influence of devout mother, the appeal to religious treatment was very natural [2, river 8; 9, river 4]. Great knowledge of history of Russia, sincere interest in its culture, vast experience of interaction with the Soviet officials of different levels allowed Kennan to get into psychology of the Russian people and governors extraordinary deeply.

Having stated basic reasons, authors passed to the analysis of current situation into the USSR and the prospects of its development. Bullit, seeking to affect various aspects of the current state of the USSR, reports trivial data on the territory and population, operates with economic indicators, calls surnames of the Soviet heads and minor figures. Kennan, on the contrary, focuses attention on the questions having key value for a position of the USA offers the interpretation of views of soviet leadership. Despite various way of supply of material and its internal organization, in Bullit's dispatch and "the long telegram" of Kennan it is distinctly traced as the aspiration to comprehend logic of the Soviet policy and long-term trends of development of the USSR, and similarity in their understanding by authors.

Characterizing the political regime which was established in the Soviet Union, Ken-nan and Bullit unambiguously define it as the police officer whose major line consider suppression of human dignity, identity and any forms of personal independence [13, river 27]. This mode was not "innovation" of Bolsheviks, they only carried on traditions of tsarist Russia. In March, 1936 the message signed by Bullit but made by Kennan and representing fragments of reports of the American ambassador in St. Petersburg N. Brown (1850-1853) [5] was sent to State Department. Despite an eighty-year difference, according to Bullit, Brown's reports "contain the exact description of today's life in Moscow" [6].

A considerable part of documents is occupied by the analysis of foreign policy of the USSR. The defining idea of the foreign policy concept of soviet leadership, according to authors, is the undoubted aspiration to expansion supported with the escalating force of the Red Army [6; 13, river 28]. Bullit and Kennan touch on an issue of a possibility of war against the USSR, seeking to estimate, the fear of soviet leadership of the outside world is how justified by the actual circumstances. In the conditions of a tense international situation of the second half of the 1930th especially fixed interest in this problem was shown by Bullit believing that the valid danger to the USSR can proceed only from Japan, but not Germany [6]. Obviously, in the conclusions it proceeded from absence at the USSR and Germany of the general border that made impossible at that time the large-scale conflict between two overland powers, and other scenarios of the German aggression, in the union with Poland or with use of territories of the Baltic states, Bullit rejected as unrealistic. In turn Kennan claimed that it is absolutely absurd to speak about a possibility of new intervention to the Soviet Union after lessons of the past war and the capitalist countries are not going to solve the disagreements by association in "a crusade against the USSR" at all [13, river 20].

Summarizing the observations, authors, in fact, come to an identical conclusion about variability and inconstancy of the Soviet policy, her frank hostility to the world around including to the United States. "We for a second should not create illusions concerning the fact that it is possible to establish really friendship with the Soviet government or with any Communist Party or with the communist", - Bullit wrote [6]. The known conclusion of Kennan is formulated even more frankly: "We have the political force fanatically devoted to belief that no constant way of coexistence with the USA can be found here" [13, river 29].

What to do with this force? As Kennan neatly noticed, to find the answer to this question, "undoubtedly, the biggest task which our diplomacy ever faced and, perhaps will stand" [13, river 29]. First of all diplomats call the American leaders objectively and to impartially study the nature of the phenomenon with which they deal. It is not less important to improve own society, to effectively solve its pressing problems. Kennan figuratively compared communism to the pathogenic parasite living only in sick fabric therefore a lot of things depend on health and energy of the American society [13, river 30]. At last, appeals to patience, confidence in own forces, bravery and hardness in upholding of the purposes are a keynote of documents of Bullit and Kennan.

So, having offered different interpretations of understanding of the Soviet phenomenon and communism, Bullit and Kennan it is very similar estimated trends of internal development of the Soviet Union, character his politicians on the international scene, and regarding practical recommendations the complete unanimity of authors, despite the decade dividing documents is observed. How it is possible to explain such surprising convergence of views?

Undoubtedly, the considerable role in it was played by personal acquaintance and direct office and intellectual communication of the American diplomats. In 1933-1936 Kennan

worked under the leadership of Bullit in the American Embassy in Moscow, holding a position of the third secretary. Bullit marked out Kennan as the "extraordinary valuable employee" not only who is perfectly knowing Russian, able to conduct negotiations with the Soviet officials, but also having uncommon analytical skills and literary talent [4]. In turn Kennan in memoirs spoke of the Bullit as the great head able and liking to support intellectual communication, creating around himself the favorable psychological atmosphere, but feeding excessive optimism concerning intentions of the Soviet leaders [19, page 58]. The hours-long brisk discussions about a phenomenon of communism and the nature of the Soviet system which were taking place in the American Embassy in Moscow found reflection in Bullit and Kennan's political views. The last admitted that these disputes over problems of the Russian communism "in many respects contributed to the development of my ideas of this phenomenon" [19, page 45].

Close contact with the Soviet reality promoted that the American diplomats who were in the Soviet Union, still in the mid-thirties, much earlier official Washington realized need of carrying out more hard line concerning the USSR for protection of foundations and cultural values of the western society.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. Bennett E. M. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933 — 1939. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985. 226 p.
2. Brownell W., Billings R. N. So Close to Greatness: A Biography of William Bullitt. New York: Macmillan, 1987.368 p.
3. Bullitt O. H. (ed.). For the President: Personal and Secret. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 655 p.
4. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, May 24, 1934. National Archives and Records Administration. SD: 861.00.
5. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, March 1, 1936//Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939.Washington DC: Gov. Printing Office, 1952. P. 289-291.
6. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, April 20, 1936. National Archives and Records Administration. RG 59. SD: 861.01/2120.
7. Costigliola F. Demonizing the Soviets: George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram//The Origins of the Cold War. Fourth Edition/Ed. by R. J. McMahon, T. G. Paterson. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999. P.157-174.
8. DallekR. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 657 p.
9. Farnsworth B. William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 244 p.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939. Washington DC: Gov. Printing Office, 1952. 1034 p.
11. Gaddis J. L The Strategy of Containment//Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950/Ed. by T. H. Etzold and J. L. Gaddis. New York, Columbia University Press, 1978. P. 25-37.
12. Hixson W. L. George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 381 p.
13. Kennan G. F. The Long Telegram//Origins of the Cold War. The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946/Ed. by Kenneth M. Jensen. Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 1991. P. 19-31.
14. Kimball W. F. The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton, Princeton university press, 1991. 304 p.
15. Mayers D. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 402 p.
16. Miscamble W. D. G.F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. Princeton, 1992. 444 p.
17. Stephanson A. Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy. London: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1989. 380 p.
18. D. Dunn. Between Roosevelt and Stalin. American ambassadors in Moscow. M.: Three square, 2004. 472 pages
19. Kennan J. Diplomacy World War II by eyes of the American ambassador in the USSR George Kennan. M.: Centrpoligraf, 2002. 477 pages
20. V.L. Malkov. Unknown Kennan: notes about thinking morphology//the Bulletin of institute of Kennan in Russia. M, 2004. Issue 5. Page 24-39.
21. A.I. Utkin. Fatal telegrams of Kennan//the Messenger of institute of Kennan in Russia. M, 2004. Issue 5. Page 40-44.

REFERENCES

1. Bennett E. M. Franklin D. Roosevelt and the Search for Security: American-Soviet Relations, 1933-1939. Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1985. 226 p.
2. Brownell W., Billings R. N. So Close to Greatness: A Biography of William Bullitt. New York: Macmillan, 1987. 368 p.
3. Bullitt O. H. (ed.). For the President: Personal and Secret. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1972. 655 p.
4. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, May 24, 1934. National Archives and Records Administration. SD: 861.00.
5. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, March 1, 1936//Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939.Washington DC: Gov. Printing Office, 1952. P. 289-291.
6. Bullitt W. C. to Secretary of State, Moscow, April 20, 1936. National Archives and Records Administration. RG 59. SD: 861.01/2120.
7. Costigliola F. Demonizing the Soviets: George F. Kennan’s Long Telegram//The Origins of the Cold War. Fourth Edition/Ed. by R. J. McMahon, T. G. Paterson. Boston, New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1999. P. 157-174.
8. Dallek R. Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945. New York, Oxford University Press, 1979. 657 p.
9. Farnsworth B. William C. Bullitt and the Soviet Union. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967. 244 p.
10. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers: The Soviet Union, 1933-1939. Washington DC: Gov. Printing Office, 1952. 1034 p.
11. Gaddis J. L. The Strategy of Containment//Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945-1950/Ed. by T. H. Etzold and J. L. Gaddis. New York, Columbia University Press, 1978. P. 25-37.
12. Hixson W. L. George F. Kennan: Cold War Iconoclast. New York: Columbia University Press, 1989. 381 p.
13. Kennan G. F. The Long Telegram//Origins of the Cold War. The Novikov, Kennan, and Roberts "Long Telegrams" of 1946/Ed. by Kenneth M. Jensen. Washington, United States Institute of Peace, 1991. P. 19-31.
14. Kimball W. F. The Juggler: Franklin Roosevelt as Wartime Statesman. Princeton, Princeton university press, 1991. 304 p.
15. Mayers D. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of US Foreign Policy. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. 402 p.
16. Miscamble W. D. G.F. Kennan and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1947-1950. Princeton, 1992. 444 p.
17. Stephanson A. Kennan and the Art of Foreign Policy. London: Harvard University Press Cambridge, 1989. 380 p.
18. Dann D. Mezhdu Ruzvel&tom i Stalinym. Amerikanskiye posly v Moskve. M.: Tri kvadrata, 2004. 472 s.
19. Kennan Dzh. Diplomatiya Vtoroy mirovoy voyny glazami amerikanskogo posla v SSSR Dzhordzha Kennana. M.: Tsentrpoligraf, 2002. 477 s.
20. Mal&kov V. L. Neizvestny Kennan: zametki o morfologii myshleniya//Vestnik in-stituta Kennana v Rossii. M., 2004. Vyp. 5. S. 24-39.
21. Utkin A. I. Rokovye telegrammy Kennana//Vestnik instituta Kennana v Rossii. M., 2004. Vyp.
5. S. 40-44.
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