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O. Spengler and the third Reich

O. Spengler AND the THIRD REICH

With arrival in Germany on January 30, 1933 to the power of Nazis the camp of the German conservatives faced the problem similar to the problem which arose at formation of the Weimar republic in 1919 Such conservative politicians as F. von Papen and A. Gugenberg hoped by Hindenburg's reykhsprezident and "vstavit v ramki" army of Hitler, and to use the National Socialist Movement in the strategic interests. On the other hand, their own freedom of action was very limited noyuy to the power. Before them there was a choice: to adapt to the mode and to cooperate with it or to render to it, in any given form, soprotivleniye1.

Most of them did not see a special reason for resistance. In such traditional yunservativnykh circles as officials, army, the universities and the industry readiness for direct or indirect support of the regime of Hitler was rather big though at the same time not everyone was delighted with methods by means of which the new power fought against "left". Denial of communism, socialism and the Weimar republic and also their opportunism and positive expectations from arrival to Hitler's vdast prevented most of conservatives to understand really that politically they were already in hands new rezhima2. Optimistic expectations of the vice-chancellor von Papen - "a cher z 2 months we so will drive of an itler into the corner that he will begin to squeak" - appeared illyuziyey3.

Conservative and revolutionary intellectuals after January, 1933 were on stavlena before the same choice though in quality pu blitsist they had no powers of authority. In general their relation to the new mode was ambivalent. On the one hand, they found many ideas in national socialism, with another - separated from the Hitlerite movement in view of the fact that the plebeian nature of national socialism did not correspond to their elitism. Reaction to coming to power of Nazis and further strengthening of the totalitarian state was various. Some neo-Conservative intellectuals, eventually, joined national socialists and were ready, especially at first, - like "the crown lawyer of the Third Reich" K. Schmitt - to legitimate crimes of the mode. Others, such as E. Jung, in vain tried in 1933 - 1934 in on the sledny moment to influence, from conservative positions, the Nazi movement. In "The German review" the mode was criticized known at that time pu by a blitsist R. Pekhel. Writers E. Yunger and G. Tserer went to apolitical "internal emigration".

Degree in which conservative and revolutionary intellectuals saw reflected the ideas in fact of the Third Reich, defined them on the lytic relation to Hitler's regime. Their vision of the future of conservative revolution yu much was similar to national socialist. Conservative revolutionaries hoped for revival of the German nation in the form of new solid Community of the People and for crash of the hated "system of Weimar" too. Contents and a form of the ideas indicated many parallels with national socialism. For example, they were uniform in fight against payment of military reparations and libe-ralno-demokratichesyuy a party system. In the beginning they even hoped for recognition and implementation of the own ideas. But many revolutionary conservatives were disappointed when the Third Reich went in other way. Confrontation of their ideological projects with daily practice of violence of ruling regime as it was expressed in sanctions against Jews, forced them to make the decision which was motivated not only a polity - ideologically, but also is personal, first of all morally. Not everyone had sufficient civic courage of an eye -

to zyvat resistance to the Nazi regime. At many the professional future depended on it. On the other hand, this social group was in the forced situation which is completely determined by the repressive policy of the new power. If any conservative revolutionary did not recognize leadership of national socialists, then it was threatened by danger to appear in a camp of opponents of the mode, with the problems accompanying it.

It is necessary to consider that the criticism of the Nazi regime some conservative revolutionaries was based not on democratic principles, and carried anti-liberal, antidemocratic and, first of all, elite and conservative character. Views which representatives of the conservative camp adhered to the Weimar republic in recent years after coming to power of Nazis, got other political expression. What in the last days of Weimar was considered by some conservative intellectuals as a real political alternative to national socialism, namely the whole palette of authoritative and conservative and corporate social models, Nazis of the Third Reich was considered as opposition to their policy and treachery of national socialist ideals. Who and that it was necessary to rank as the national movement, was defined now by not conservative circles, but Nazi leaders. The ego concerned also all conservative organizations, institutions and the press though at first this process of discrimination proceeded sluggishly, irregularly and opportunistically.

Actions of conservative revolutionaries in days of the Third Reich should be considered in interrelation with their ideas and political active-tyyuvperioddo 1933. With raising of national socialism after 1930 the role of conservative and revolutionary intellectuals very much changed. In the first years of existence of the Weimar republic they haughtily and with neglect looked at the National Socialist Movement, especially when "the drummer and the collector" Hitler looked for at them supports and tried to join to nim4. After 1930 there was a change of roles. Conservative revolution was now only a part of the wide national movement on "release from Weimar" in which Hitlerite NSDAP dominated. The ruthless criticism of the Weimar democracy from a conservative and revolutionary wing paved "the spiritual way for growth of national socialism" 5. But this fact does not explain various reaction of these intellectuals to emergence yet and is real to the stvovayena of the Hitlerite state. These distinctions were connected with revaluation of influence of "spirit" by them and their problematic relation to a phenomenon of Vlast. As a result national socialists did not accept elite claims of conservative revolutionaries for domination in cultural, social and political with fer. The publicists of conservative revolution considering themselves by the true "spiritual aristocracy" of Germany insisted on the primary right for gaining "the national revolution" 1933 and

hoped on the basis of this right to take in the future key positions in a political rukoyudstvo gosudarstva6. Here again the dillema of conservative revolution, though in other look was shown, than it was v1918-1919gg Then radical political and world outlook ideals of conservative revolutionaries, owing to defeat in war and revolution, were far from political reality. Now their elite and romantically - the conservative picture of the world was disturbed by cooperation with national socialists and the correct assessment of new masters. Their spiritual radicalism and aristocratic elitism did not correspond to rough reality of the Third Reich. They considered that came to the power "плебс".

After January 30, 1933 their hopes to act as political colleagues of the new mode dissipated. Vlast was stronger than "spirit", and on the lytic movement of masses is stronger than spiritual elite. The victory was gained not by those who, having the great ideas, insisted on the syuy rights, and those who, using violence and neglecting all forms of a reflection and intelligence, these rights were taken. Claims of representatives of conservative revolution for the spiritual and political management of Germany of Nazis were never considered and seriously and not vosprinimalis7. In "a thousand-year Reich" for conservative revolution of the place it did not appear.

As an indicative example of difficult relations between spirit and policy in the first years of the Third Reich the destiny well-known can serve fit a sofa and the historian O. Spengler. If to study his ideas and a way of life, then involuntarily there is a question: but whether there were similarities and differences between neoconservatism and national socialism even more interpenetrating and difficult razdelimy, than about it goyuritsya above. What style of behavior - collaborationism, timeserving, resistance, a social angazhment or internal emigration - can be found in Spengler during rule of Nazis?

The answer to this vopro with in many respects zavistit from a political position of the researcher. What one, adhering to conservative orientation, considers as "the heroic resistance" 8, for Marxist the styuveda is general is not what other as politically naive, and, therefore, wrong pozitsiyey9. Each of the called positions in pure form in reality does not exist. The historical reality is more many-sided and difficult.

Sharp change of an internal political situation after January 30, 1933 "Years of the decision" gave to Spengler's work to some extent the nature of an anachronism. Also as to "the Decline of Europe", success to the book came absolutely differently, than it was imagined by the author. In 1917 he wanted to maintain the first book the victorious peace, but its pessimistic tone sounded in unison to mood of the nation which lost war. Now in

1932 -1933 he tried to warn Germany about "red" danger from social bottoms and about "color" danger from the outside, but the trouble came from other party and was brown. Exactly thanks to this sharp

to change of political climate "Years of the decision" got big support from readers. With introduction in Germany of one-party political system the first phase of creation of dictatorship was complete. Construction of the totalitarian state was well under way. Now from conservative positions "The years of the decision" could be regarded as the long-awaited critical comment on Hitler's regime on the other hand, sharp attacks of Spengler to Marxism and labor movement can be considered as justification of national socialist terror.

After all, "the red danger" was eliminated by Nazis. Thousands of communists and social democrats soon after the fire of the Reichstag were grabbed and flung on February 27, 1933 in prisons, and already on May 10, in connection with a campaign against the Bolshevism, Jewry and internationalism, with assistance of the universities, books of the "esthetes and writers" despised by Spengler were burned. In compliance with the decree on state of emergency caused by the fire of the Reichstag in Germany parliamentary democracy was abolished, and the law of March 20, 1933 conferred to Hitler unlimited powers. In July, all were forbidden, except for NSDAP, political parties. Spengler never separated from all these political events.

Here quite lawfully there can be a question as far as it was ready to oppose the Nazi regime. How did Spengler treat coming to power of Hitler and creation of the Third Reich?

"Years of the decision" arose literally on border of two eras. Of Spengler to them wrote in the preface that the first 106 pages of the book were printed not long before January 30, 1933, and the rest was written already on hardly coming to power of itlera10. He proved change of originally conceived name "Germany Is in Danger": "I changed nothing to these since I write not for months or the next years, and on the future (...) Only the name I chose other not to cause misunderstanding: not national seizure of power is danger, and dangers which arose, partly in 1918, partly much earlier and continue to exist and until now. (...) Ger a mania is in danger. My alarm for Germany did not become less" 11.

Despite this attempt to rise once again over parties and to be right, Spengler, of course, could not evade from assessment of events after January 30. Its relation to coming to power of national socialists was dual. On the one hand, they realized to what he sought during 1918 - 1933, namely for destruction of a parliamentary system of Weimar. With all gravity he reminds about Xu a contribution to this process: "Nobody could expect a national revolution of this year better me. I with peryugo hated day dirty revolution of 1918" 12. Everything that he wrote about policy, was caused by desire to promote the fastest crash of the Weimar republic. "National pereyurot 1933 was something powerful and will remain to that for us and in the future. With that elementary transpersonal power with what it was carried out, with that du -

shevny discipline with which it passed - all this was in Prussian from beginning to end, like approach of 1914 which in a flash changed souls". On the other hand, he openly criticizes national socialists and reminds new masters that "for triumph and ecstasy there is neither time, nor an occasion". "This coming to power happened in a tuft of force and weakness. I look with fear at with what noise pass daily celebrations" 13. According to Spengler it would be more correct to keep enthusiasm "on the date of the valid and final progress", namely in external politike14. Each revolution at hudshat positions Ger of a mania abroad, on it he criticizes ultimate feeling of triumph and on lytic inexperience of national socialists. "And these national socialists hope without the world and against the world to be equipped and to have an opportunity to build the castles in the air without, at least, silent, but very sensitive counteraction from the outside" 15.

To seizure of power by national socialists Spengler remains at such ambivalent position up to fall of 1933. The contribution national sotsia-listiche syugo kulturfilosof considered movements in blasting the Weimar republic powerful, but as soon as business reached political practice of the new power, he began to doubt strongly in is capable sta national socialist in oyaedy and with pleasure would see in the head of state conservative go sudarstvenny figures.

Possibly, Spengler expected that Hitler will not cope with duties of the chancellor and his government of races will be formed. In "Gsdakh" he writes decisions: "Elements which udoyulstvy from the power consider as result came to the power and wish to immortalize the state lasting only moments. (...) What looked as the beginning great will end with the tragedy or the comedy" 16. In February, 1933 he expresses to A. Knittel the opinion on Hitler's government: "The modern fascist ministry showed you as, of course, and to thousands of others, finally correct opinion on Hitler and Gugenberg. I could tell you about it many details which, however, not prednazanachena for letters. Possibly, soon after elections there will come confusion and to true national forces mother how it is possible to save the national movement from disintegration in case parties begin to burst from grotesque inability of their leading cliques" 17 follows an obd.

The German researcher D. Felken accuses Spengler of a certain double-dealing, pointing that that; despite critical remarks to NSDAP, on March 5, 1933 nevertheless voted for "Nazi-sotsi" 18. The ego the indictment looks too superficial because Spengler with a keen intuition inherent in it though showed sometimes some naivety, all was not so simple. True the fact that in the first months of government of Hitler he at heart hoped on ro future political adviser of the government. But yut as far as it was ready to perception of anti-Semitic tricks of national socialists as, for example,

boycott of Jews - remains on April 1, 1933 to unknown. One is clear: it was careful of too close contacts with the new government. Unlike such revolutionary and conservative intellectuals as K. Schmitt, M. Shpan and M. Heidegger, Spengler did not join the ranks of NSDAP.

But what was degree of its proximity to the new power?

The Nazi regime which without support of conservative forces could not become the real owner in the state and successfully carry out imperious functions, not once led Spengler into temptation to participate in process of a statement of the new power. From the very beginning national socialists tried to talk over neo-Conservative intellectuals and at first did not touch even those who critically fire ssya to their arrival to vdast. On March 17, 1933 Spengler received the telegram from Goebbels and with a request to broadcast on March 21 the speech on the occasion of "Day of Potsdam". This day the prussachestvo and a swastika - old and new Germany had to unite with a big pomp, - and this union had to be sealed with handshake Hindenburg and Hitler. Despite desperate requests of the sister and the friend A. Albers, Spengler after some thought everything rejected a request of the minister of national education and propagandy19. Most likely he did not want to be put to the propaganda cart of the new mode.

It is possible that this political abstemiousness affected and on its refusal to head the Institute of general history and culture in Leipzig founded by K. Lamprekhg. But also after this refusal Spengler remained the "saloon" person in the opinion of national socialists. In October, 1933 before this prestigious institute rose in about with about the successor of his director Walter Getz. After the first candidacy was rejected for political motives, the commission in May, 1933 with the consent of the Saxon Ministry of science headed at that time by the national socialist Wilhelm Harnake entered a name of Spengler in the list of candidates. Thereby the commission noted not only its philosophico-historical and political works which made him "the great pioneer of the national future", but in the letter reported to the minister also that the students entirely support this decision. In several days after exchange of views with Harnake, Spengler received the letter from the sociologist Mr. Freier, the dean of philosophical faculty of the Leipzig university and its congenial admirer in whom he of togas tried to persuade him to accept the invitation? 0.

Spengler refused, having referred to the fact that he since 1911 always worked alone, and always paid for long conversations and performances head bo I pour. And on it about dashing about it cannot carry out numerous, connected with a professorial position obyazannosti21. Its rejection of any sort of "professional science" and the academic status was behind these arguments of the personal plan. But about all this in his letter there was no line. Besides, as fit life sofas he did not want to adjoin any philosophical school or the direction. Its Carti -

on the world had too many personal lines, and intellectual independently St and freedom for it were sacred. To the minister political motives too were not mentioned by Spengler in the letter. Yes they, most likely, in this case were not of great importance. As a result of G. Freier it was appointed the director of lamprekhtovsky institute who under its management was engaged in "political education of the German people in the spirit of national socialism" 22.

On July 20, 1933, shortly before the trip to an annual Wagner musical festival to Bayroge, Spengler completed the work on "Years of the decision", and 25 iyu la, at a posrednicha a stvo of Elza Knittels, the wife of the newspaper magnate Albert Knittels, at it the conversation with Hitler in his apartment in Bayreuth took place. E. Knittels told about the main motives of this meeting lasting an hour and a half from a kulturfilosof after war: "... He could spend the Fuhrer through dangerous reeves if he sometimes could discuss with it political situations" 23. In the diary of his sister it is told only that interlocutors touched upon subjects of France, evangelic church and trial in the matter of an arson of the Reichstag, and it is noted that Spengler returned to Munich the satisfied course razgovora24. Other people knowing the philosopher, opposite noted his dissatisfaction with a meeting. But kind of this meeting did not end, it was positive, allowed Spengler, a time later, to send to Hitler a copy of the book "1jdy decisions", having accompanied with the letter with a request to study its contents: "Dear mister Reichs chancellor! I dared to send you a copy of my new book which I ask to accept. I would be glad, whenever possible orally, to hear your opinion on it" 25.

News of obtaining the book came soon, but not on followed further reaction of Hitler, and the second meeting did not take place. It is possible pre-on to live that the meeting did not make a special impression on the Reichs chancellor, and, especially, "Years of the decision" did not cause in it interesa26. Spengler's opinion on Hitler, according to his sister, on the contrary, was yes to leu not negative. With a certain arrogance, but also favor he spoke a voyaeda of the Third Reich: "Anything special, but something wants, something does and he can tell something (...) very decent person, but if you are with him alone, then you do not feel its relevancy at all" 27. Most likely Hitler was for Spengler a person not of his intellectual level. In this case, most likely, "spirit" and Vlast excluded each other again.

The criticism Spengler of national socialists and their Fuhrer in "Years of the decision" did not give to the authorities a direct reason to seize this the book. A talk about its ban was carried on, but Hitler personally did not allow it though he as Spengler learned later about it, characterized the book as "very pessimistic" 2 8. On it the author received a positive review, among other, from the famous German industrialist and the newspaper magnate P. Reysh,

yutory told him that "Years of the decision" is the best of what is written by Spengler after "Decline of Europe". Friends and colleagues from the conservative camp - Augustus Albers, Karl Volfskel, Roderick Shlyubakh, Yohe-ze f Maria von Saden-Frauenchofen and the crown prince Wilhelm - positively spoke of the book. But for national socialists Spengler appeared from this point in the form of a certain problem.

In August, 1933 in the press the Nazis opened a campaign of persecution of Spengler. The philosopher Alfred Boymler who became later the head of department of science in A. Rosenberg's department, August 31, 1933 a day before opening of a Nazi party congress, accused him of non-recognition of "greatness of the German Fuhrer" 30. Break in relations with Spengler of his former friend, the chief of foreign department of NSDAP Ernst Ganfstshtengel was the second sign of not goodwill of the authorities. At the beginning of November, 1933, having returned from Italy to Munich, Spengler found in the mass of correspondence the letter from the Ministry of national education and promotion in which it was asked to write a note about a referendum in Saarlande31. In the response letter addressed to Goebbels he reported that he never took part in election campaigns and does not intend to undertake it in the future. However, it expressed readiness to appear in print with article about an exit of of an er-mania from the League of Nations, but on condition of the termination in the future "unqualified attacks in some bodies of the national press, especially in "The cross newspaper "" 32. He emphasized lack of personal concern about it: "Personally they are indifferent for me, but in my aspiration to influence events in Germany they are a hindrance which should be eliminated. When I in Bayreuth talked several months ago to mister Reichs chancellor, he told me that he attaches great value to attraction to public policy of nonpartisan people. I entirely share this belief, but it does not manage to be made in view of the fact that the criticism of the people standing out of party from the press passes reasonable limits" 33. Besides, Spengler asked about a personal meeting with the minister national about sveshcheniye and promotion to state him "some reasons". Appears from this letter that, despite attacks in a press, it left open a question about perhaps st of performance to a strategicha of sky functions of the adviser of the Nazi regime, or to be in one form or another to it useful.

From a position of historical prospect it is possible to tell that in this situation Spengler obviously overestimated the opportunities. After repeated sharp attacks of Boymler in the press the polemic concerning "philosopher pessimist" 34 rose again. It had mainly philosophical and ideological character and concerned the book "Years of the Decision". This polemic was carried out with the permission of Goebbels who decided "to undertake" seriously Spengler. But soon he finished artillery preparation and advanced to frontal attack. On December 5, 1933 Goebbels shortly and ruthlessly gave to the press the following instructions: "Continuation of a discussion about Spengler is undesirable.

The government asks not to write lines about this person" 35. The sentence to Spengler was an ego. The prophet, kulturfilosof and the political ideologist on wave of a hand was forgotten. Comments on "Years of the decision" and on radio were forbidden.

Along with already mentioned Shpenglero's criticism of m of national socialism and its unwillingness to cooperate with the Ministry of national education and promotion, the cause of the measures taken by the government against it was to an uspa x books "Years of the Decision" and the extensive discussion which followed after its exit. Big circulation is a quantitative index of its success. To the middle of September, 1933 60 thousand copies, on September 22 - 80 thousand, and on October 30 - 100 thousand were sold already. In total 150 thousand were sold and by that the record of sales of "the Decline of Europe" 36 is broken. Work in which theses, various, not consistent with national socialist ideology, are submitted, of course, could not be discussed long with impunity. Party ideologists, and the first among them Rosenberg, could not assume that the conservative revolutionaries who were already "badly" understanding national socialist ideology by means of Spengler in general departed from its fundamental provisions. The reason for that that measures against Spengler were not taken immediately, his popularity in the 20th both within the country, and abroad was. The invitation in Lamprekhga institute superfluous to that the certificate. In December, 1933 he fell into disgrace though he was not boycotted his works. Apparently, on - the tsional-socialist management not absolutely excluded an opportunity to sgoyuritsya somehow with old conservative and revolutionary intellectuals to incline them to direct cooperation. The young conservative intellectuals who are openly sympathizing natsio-cash-socialism were ready to cooperate more actively after 1933 with the new power, than their old "difficult" colleagues.

The publications directed against Spengler continued to be published. These lampoons are interesting that they draw the accurate line of demarcation between national socialism and Spengler's ideas. Already in

1933 the brochure Arpura Tsveyningera, the national socialism which acted as the defender was published. He accuses Spengler of what his "cold" pe the ssimizm and a skeptical position prevents it to understand "I smother on - the tsional-socialist movement" 37. The critic considers that Spengler does not realize consequences of the ideas and estimates insufficiently what was reached by this movement. Besides, Spengler does not show special sympathies to "kindly to warm feeling of the social sincere movement", comprising, on belief Tsveyningera, kindness to the tribesman and sense of justice - "the German justice, but not any other" 38. The defender of national socialist values characterizes Spengler as the liberal-re of the shareholder who is not supporting the interests of workers of mass of the German people and unfairly deriding the ideas of "autarchy" and romantically - idealistic "sources of features of the people" 39.

He condemns the famous compatriot in lack of sympathy to the general fight of national socialism for complete vital Germany. Tsveyninger considers that the look of the philosopher pessimist is turned back, in upper the 18th century which were still "in shape", without noticing as here and now all German people, after centuries-old "life out of a form", at last, are brought to "form" by means of updating.

In 1934 on behalf of NSDAP Johann von Leere, the head of foreign policy department of the German higher school of policy and a reykhslyayter of the national socialist Union of the German students undertook approach to Spengler. By then this student's functionary published a series of anti-Semitic pamphlets and already had ill fame. In private conversations Spengler critically spoke of this unfortunate spetsia-liste40. Its participation in various international meetings was always followed by scandals.

In the brochure "World Political System of Spengler and on — Tsional-socialism" Lssrs speaks; that coincidence of views of this philosopher and national socialists takes place only in criticism of the Weimar republic. There zhg where it is about "positive affairs", national socialism and Spengler adhere to the opposite points of view. It characterizes "Years of the decision" as the "harmful" book representing not that other as ideological approach to national socialist mirovozzreniye41. Like Tsveyningera, Leera, consisting the member dotma-ticheski-antis the emitsky movement "Blood and Soil", pis it is scarlet about "cool contempt" of Spengler for the people and lack of feeling of solidarity with workers. Instead of aspiration to "the state of the creating work, national socialism and the German Community of the People" that is peculiar to Leers, Spengler wishes creation "state machinery of violence of the big capital led by Caesar relying on gathering of landsknechts and without any communication with living nationality" 42. He considers that Spengler wants to see on the place of Hitler Caesar who has to bring living standards of the German workers to the level of "the operating mass of Blacks" 43. Not the high salary of workers, but payments for reparations and the international capital, on firm at Leers's bezhdeniye, are the reason to an eyunomicha syugo crisis. National socialism fights against crisis by means of elimination of opposition of work and the capital while Spengler costs on positions of reactionary and liberal capitalists.

Other points critics Leere and concern the determinist Xu of treatment Spengler cultures, his aristocratism and, of course, its rejection on - tsional-socialist rasoyuy theories. Conservative elitism and cultural pessimism it is impossible to unite with the racial theory of fascism therefore the critic, like Tsveyningera, rejects shpenglerovsky interpretation of race which, according to him, is not that other as "idolization of incorrectly understood vitality" 44. In confirmation of correctness of the point of view he quotes Hitlerite "Main kamf". "Incest and

the decrease in racial level connected with it is the only cause of death of old cultures" 45. Spengler, - continues further Leere, - "denies the creating forces of blood and race. Instead he designs cultures which are "in shape" or "out of a form"" 46. Besides, he considers that the philosopher incorrectly otsenivt and characterizes "yellow" danger, that is Japan. He sees weakening of the Western European powers which won Germany World War I in strengthening of this state and welcomes this process. Leere supports closer political and economic cooperation of Japan and Germanii47.

In conclusion of the criticism of the personality and Spengler Leer's ideology puts menacing vopro with: "Actually, how long we will suffer still a malicious reactionary oplevyvaniye of shrines expensive to us?" 48. According to him, as Spengler it is difficult to put such person in prison, but be it a communist, it already there would be long ago. Such remark comprised, for those times, de facto the ban on a profession. The line separating verbal aggression of the national socialists similar to Leers from physical abuse of other followers of the mode became thinner and thinner.

Absolutely other, but was not less distressing the critic Ernst Günter Gruendel, contained in his book "Years of Overcoming" 49. Its emergence - an indicator that on "Geda decisions" played a role in attacks not only a polity-ideo logical disagreements and purposeful actions from the authorities, but also personal motives. In 1926 Spengler asked the friend P. Reysh to provide financial aid to the writer Gryundel who is in need. Besides, he gave to him a valuable advice during its work on the novel. When it became clear that this work is written in the spirit of "racial hygiene", Spengler stopped any contacts with the author.

In 1934 Gruendel who joined this time to the National Socialist Movement napis is scarlet to Spengler the letter in which it was talked generally of "Years of the decision". He regretted that Spengler did not become "the great witness of national socialism" 50. The reply to this letter most likely did not follow. In revenge for not followed reaction the mentally unstable writer published the book "Gsda of overcoming", in a go-Torah Spengler was awarded with such epithets as "thinker sadist" and "sunset melodramaturg" and also a cannonade of curses. What to this book really did not get, so it substantial criticism. In it Spengler was opposed to Hitler in an image of "evil genius" and "great criminal" 51. The negative attitude of Spengler towards Hitler, according to an unfair statement of ryundelya, was allegedly caused by what cultures philosophers wished to see as future leader of Germany not of the corporal-outcast, and the general Hans and von Seekga. Gruendel questions: what place do the intellectuals similar to Spengler have to take in the new state? "They are not leaders, not advisers, not followers, and islands liquidly a shelter -

ache the intellectuals in the sea of general rise" 52. But fortunately, Gruendel considers, such islands become less and meet more and more seldom.

The twist of fate in this case with costs that Spengler, the ideas which had anti-intellectual coloring underwent criticism from a natsistvuyushchy antiintellekgual. For the kulturfilosof seeking to support healthy political forces and to help them and also not the person interested to pass intelleyuualy and "the civilized writer", these attacks made impossible further classes by policy. After the personal meeting, unfortunate in December, 1933, with Hitler his contacts with national socialists were almost stopped trying. Events on June 30

1934 led to a complete separation with the National Socialist Movement. His old political colleagues were politically or are physically destroyed, or cooperated with the new mode. On hardly it Spengler had only science and literature - his areas of "internal emigration". Since then he was surrounded by loneliness and the growing hatred to the mode. He writes the former schoolmate in the letter: "As for the second part of my book, I did not write lines yet. Yes it also does not make now sense as I write books not for their withdrawal" 53.

Remains to unknown whether Spengler prior to events was afraid on June 30, 1934 of arrest of which Leere, or even physical violence so dreamed. One is clear: he felt very uncomfortably, well realizing danger from the mode. He knew of murder of the philosopher Theodor Lessing on August 31, 1933 he Was also informed also on other "actions" and acts of violence of national socialists. His friend Karl Volfskel, the Jewish writer, left Germany and settled in Italy. That Spengler really felt among Nazis uncomfortably, tells his decision not to go in 1934 to a festival to Bayreuth. Instead of in "brown crowd" to listen to Wagner's music, he decided to create the unusual document which can be considered as its political testament.

In this 12-page text which name - "Germany, you should not die" - it was taken from a soldier's song of times of World War I, Spengler proves the political engagement shown by it at once after issue of "the Decline of Europe" 54. The truth he tries to reduce extent of the political impact, saying that he was never engaged in active policy, and paid more attention to questions "technicians and sciences". The former self-confidence in tone of this document is not felt, but the ambiguity of contents is available. An ego the text of the person who lost in the Third Reich political l

Castaldo Rebecca Lia
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