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Problems of relationship of intra elite groups in the Russian Post-Soviet elite



ma of the Cossack revival. Rostov N / D, 1996; M.V. Bra-tolyubova, Ya.A. Lerekhov. The Cossack question in the I and II State Dumas of Russia//the Cossack collection. Issue 3. Rostov N / D, 2002. Page 321 - 327; etc.

2. See: A.A. Gordeev. History of Cossacks since Peter the Great's reign prior to Great war of 1914 of Part 3. M, 1992. Page 335 - 336.
3. State Duma. Convocation of I. Index. SPb., 1906.
4. V.V. Shelokhayev. Cadets - the main party of the liberal bourgeoisie in fight against revolution 1905 - 1907. M, 1983. Page 303, 304.307.
5. L.A. Karapetyan. At sources of the Russian multi-party system: North Caucasus region (the end of the 90th years of the 19th century - February, 1917). Krasnodar, 2001. Page 366.

North Caucasian academy of public service

6. State Duma. The first convocation (on April 27 —

• On July 8, 1906). SPb., 1907.

7. V.I. SmDulimov, Kislitsyn S.A. State and Don Cossacks. M, 2000. Page 80.
8. Full collection of platforms of all Russian political parties. SPb., 1906. Page 61 - 65.
9. Tsit. on: M. Astapenko. He was called the author of "Quiet Don". Rostov N / D, 1991. Page 25 - 27.
10. State Duma. Verbatim record. Session 1.SP6., 1906.
11. V.L. Dyomin. State Duma of Russia (1906 — 1917): functioning mechanism. M, 1996. Page 49, 97 - 159.
12. Not proletarian parties of Russia in three revolutions. M, 1989. Page 149.
13. A.S. Orlov, V.A. Georgiev, etc. Bases of a course of history of Russia. M, 1997. Page 395.

_____________________________________ on November 1, 2002

© 2003 S.S. Voskanyan

PROBLEMS of RELATIONSHIP of INTRA ELITE GROUPS IN the RUSSIAN POST-SOVIET ELITE

In one state the political elite is not uniform and solid, it is always divided into groups which existence is based on different factors. Options of relationship both in these groups, and between them are rather various. In the place, a role and the importance they are not equal in political process among themselves, i.e. there is a certain hierarchy. Elitarista call these groups depending on their importance of "superelite", "subelite", etc. [1]. Besides, the hierarchy is not static, it is dynamic, both the importance and influence of some elite groups is replaced by others. However dynamics depends on a set of objective and subjective factors. What and as there took place change of hierarchy of the main elite groups in Post-Soviet Russia, and we will try to analyze in this article.

In 1992 the political elite of the country entered, incorporating several elite groups. Radnkal-reformers were the most influential. Their importance was defined by those key posts which were held by leaders of group in an executive branch of the power. It is necessary to distinguish B. Yeltsin, G. Burbulis (first Deputy Prime Minister), E. Gaidar (Deputy Prime Minister, the Minister of Economics and the Minister of Finance), A. Nechayev (deputy minister of economy), P. Aven from them (the minister of external economic is coherent). Representatives of radical reformers were also in the supreme legislative bodies of the country - the Supreme Council (SC) and the Congress of People's Deputies (CPD). Existence of group and its unity were based on the uniform ideological purpose - the accelerated construction of the democratic constitutional state with the most free market economy.

Following on the importance there was a group which it is possible to call conditionally "moderately left". Her representatives offered gradual carrying out reforms taking into account national and historical features of the country and current situation and in general opposed not Yeltsin whom they sought "to draw" on the party, and team and Burbulis's course - Gaidar. The vice president of the country A. Rutskoi and the speaker of VS R. Khasbulatov were leaders, later they were adjoined by the chairman of the Constitutional court V. Zorkin. This group dominated in VS and UMP. Thanks to a position double. orientations - Yeltsin's support, but against radical reforms — "moderately left" could unite if desired around themselves deputies — both eltsini-st, and antiyeltsinist - and by that to achieve necessary result. The ability to manipulate people especially distinguished from others, according to Gaidar, Khasbulatov [2]. The relations with Burbulis's team - Gaidar were difficult. First, on the party of the last there was a head of state, and it forced "moderately left" to consider this circumstance and to periodically change the tactics of actions and the personal attitudes towards representatives of for the sake of-kal-reformers. So, say, Rutskoi during the trips around regions of the country criticized the government, but upon return to Moscow justified itself that media not so understood it, and in February, 1992 suggested even to Burbulis and Gaidar to reconcile and improve the relations with it, as was made [2, page 160]. However the antipathy to Rutskoi at leaders of radical reformers did not pass, and already later, in the memoirs, Gaidar will characterize Rutskoi so: "extremely limited", "it is not too brave", "poorly educated" [2, page 160, 162]. Secondly, on

relationship of politicians the worsening population economic and social situation in connection with liberalization of the prices to which both the vice president, and the head of the Parliament, and deputies could not but react influenced.

By the third elite group it is possible to call the communists and landowners adhering to the "left" and extremely "left" orientation. Fire of their criticism and rejection were directed against and Burbulis's teams - Gaidar, and Yeltsin. And they criticized both social and economic policy, and the relations with regions (especially for a situation with Tatarstan and Chechnya), and westernized foreign policy. Tactics of this group can be characterized so: to criticize everything and for everything. And considering & that in activity of radical reformers there were many mistakes and miscalculations, there were even enough objective reasons for criticism. Not only deputies of VS and UMP, but also the politicians who are out of walls of parliament, such as V. Anpilov and S. Umalatova represented this group.

The fourth elite group consisted of industrialists. Their ideology was defined as left-right-centrist. The group in general was positive to Yeltsin and economic reforms. But sharp transition to the market and the accelerated transformations were exposed to criticism. Though the economic program of the Government opened huge opportunities for the enterprises and their directors in respect of receiving profit, including in currency, at the same time the enterprises were not ready to independent activity as they got used to work in the system of the centralized economy which guaranteed receipt of the state order and necessary raw materials and acquisition of the made products. Besides, in new conditions when the enterprises did not manage to reconstruct when continuous growth of inflation was observed, the Government shifted care of the so-called social block to the enterprises: material support of kindergartens, summer camps, holiday houses that demanded big gratuitous expenses. A. Volsky, V. Kadannikov, V. Chernomyrdin appeared leaders of group,

V. Shumeyko.

And at last one more group (least influential) consisted of representatives of the liberal intellectuals. One of her leaders - G. Yavlinsky - in 1991 (till fall) even held a post of the Deputy Prime Minister and offered the economic program of a little more evolutionary transition to the market which was called at first "400 days", and then "500 days" during which the main structural transformations in economy had to be carried out. The group generally was popular in the environment of the intellectuals always inclining to the liberal ideology. Members of this group in general supported both Yeltsin, and Burbulis's team - Gaidar which consisted also of representatives of the intellectuals, but radical. At the same time liberals in slu-

disagreement tea with any given actions of the President and the Government openly criticized them.

To summer of 1992, thanks to powerful pressure from deputies, radical reformers were forced to bring out of the structure of the Government of G. Burbulis and to offer posts of the first Deputy Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister to chairmen of the management building Chernomyrdinu and Shumeyko. Thereby positions of this elite group were strongly strengthened, and on the influence it rose to the third place.

The June step of Yeltsin — assignment of duties of the head of the government on Gaidar - concealed in itself for radical reformers more negative, than positive aspect. Plus was that the power of this elite group amplified, but it also was minus, as sharply made active criticism in its address and requirements of leaving the Government of all radical reformers that led to a failure of the candidacy of Gaidar on a post of the head of the Government on the VII UMP in December of the same year and caused its leaving the Government. If Yeltsin directed the Government, then most likely Guy gift would be succeeded to keep as a part of the Government as its influence would be counterbalanced with presence of moderate reformers - Chernomyrdin, Shumeyko and their supporters.

Yeltsin's leaving from a position of the head of the government and his attempt to separate from all elite groups, including Gaidar's, gave to experts a fine opportunity to observe whether it is possible for the head of state, especially in Russia, and whether the politician will be able even if he is a head of state and the charismatic personality, without entering into any groups, to participate actively and successfully in political process. All subsequent events, since July, 1992 before the resignation of Yeltsin in December, 1999, showed a trend of support of radical reformers by Yeltsin. He did not manage and to remain the lonely political player. Any leader always needs available an environment to which it is possible to consult and which helps to exercise control of the organization. Having left the Government, Yeltsin thereby created around himself some vacuum and the need for appearance of one more, own elite group. Since this period begins to gain weight and influence the Presidential Administration (PA), that structure which owing to the duties daily and constantly closely contacted to Yeltsin, thereby strengthening the influence on the President and dependence of the last on it more and more that raised her authority and a role in political process.

The period since the end of December, 1992 on October, 1993 did not make any changes to hierarchy of elite groups. But changes in elite sharply aggravated fight between groups, and October events struck a heavy blow to two elite groups at once — "left" and group Rutskoi - Khasbulatov which by March, 1993 from "moderately left" transfor-

mirovatsya by

in "left" and practically on all questions was blocked with communists and landowners.

Not the really active election campaign of communists in the Federal Assembly (FA) and results of the votes received by them on these elections became consequences of autumn blow. Also the rating of leaders of the beaten groups began to fall sharply. So, if on October 1 in the list of Nezavisimaya Gazeta of 100 leading politicians of the country Khasbulatov held the 3rd place, and Rutskoi - the 4th, then already on November 2 - Rutskoi - the 22nd, Khasbulatov - the 23rd.

January - September, 1993 showed: actively to influence political process, it is not obligatory to borrow any and furthermore an important position in the government or non-state institutions. It is about Gaidar who, having left the Government in December, 1992, at the same time could keep the high rating, and his team which remained in the Government still was the most influential among elite groups. Comparing a situation with Rutsky and Khasbulatov in October - November, it is possible to draw a conclusion that the political weight of any given politician is defined not so much by a post, how many opportunities, abilities and extent of influence on political process.

October, 1993 not only changed hierarchy of elite groups, but warned kind of that that which Yeltsin directly will enter will be the most influential-. And as the President tried to separate from all elite groups, including from radical reformers (he refused to head the electoral list of BP or at least openly to support gaydarovets during elections on December 11-12), became obvious that this group will be formed of those persons who contacts to the President more often, i.e. representatives of his family, protection, administration and partners in tennis (why and many politicians were fond of this game). So the elite group which became literally in a year actually very first in hierarchy of elite groups began to appear. Her members unlike representatives of other groups not so often acted publicly and in media. And to these this. the group was also dangerous as society had no fullest and objective information about its number, structure, the purposes, interests, i.e. there was no clarity that it is possible to expect from it and its influence on Yeltsin.

In process of increase in the importance (and it occurred literally "in the eyes") AP, this structure made enemies more and more and strengthened fear of itself. So, after the October events the head of Head department of protection (presidential structure) M. Barsukov offered Chernomyrdin services of the body headed by it, however was refused. Possibly, October events showed all power of presidential structures and inspired fear and a certain mistrust to them from the head of the government. In January - February, 1994 in media projects and statements about need of reform of AP, predpola-appeared

gavshy a conclusion from it almost all expert and analytical and information divisions to leave only the economic block. Soon the Administration which controlled almost all its financial resources was brought out of AP. AP tried to deprive of two important sources: financial and information. If to consider that the representative of Gaidar's team S. Filatov was the head of AP during this period, then the blow went first of all against this elite group though the first Assistant to the President V. Ilyushin was the leader of elite group which it is possible to call conditionally "Yeltsin's environment";

In February, 1994 there was one more considerable event: chief presidential protection

And. Korzhakov discussed with the Prosecutor General A. Kazanni-kom проблему& amnesties [3]. In the country the norm peculiar practically to all authoritative states arose: involvement and participation in policy of bodyguard (or her head) heads of state. It demonstrated to backwardness of democratic institutes as in the countries of the developed democracy and the security officer, and other officials of the state carry out activity within the functions and do not interfere with activity of other bodies and persons.

By 1996, time of the choice of the new head gosudar-a stvo and political elite, the number of elite groups and their relationship represented a motley and difficult picture.

Ruling elite. It is possible to distinguish three main groups from it. First place on influence was won by group of "immediate environment" where entered T. Dyachenko (Yeltsin's daughter), V. Ilyushin (first Assistant to the President), a bit later - A. Chubais, etc. Influence on Yeltsin was almost unlimited. And in March, 1996 the group managed to replace the head of the campaign headquarters O. Soskovets - the representative of the competing group - with V. Ilyushin.

The second group expressed the interests of military industrial complex, and Korzhakov and Soskovets were her leaders. The relations with "immediate environment" developed intense. Leaders suggested to cancel presidential elections as were afraid that sick unpopular Yeltsin will not be able to win on them what their opponents categorically did not agree with. And Soskovets's replacement with Ilyushin fueled tension between two most influential elite groups even more.

V. Chernomyrdin's group which, thanks to parliamentary elections of 1995, had the representatives (deputy fraction) in the State Duma (SD) was considered as the third most important. Its relations with Korzhakov's group - Soskovets were almost harmonious and in general expressed the interests of large industrialists and a part of regional leaders. And here the relations with the first group did not develop. In the late nineties Chernomyrdin will say that AP made everything that Our home is Russia (NDR) could not receive big percent of votes at State Duma elections in December, 1995. If this is so, then is more probable everything -

go the group of "immediate environment" was afraid and did not allow strengthening of influence of Chernomyrdin and NDR. At the same time, considering that are afraid always of the strong opponent, actions, AP demonstrated recognition of force of Chernomyrdin group. This force consisted in moderation of its ideology that allowed it to find a common ground and to agree also with "left", and "right", i.e. to thereby expand base of the support. About Chernomyrdin's authority poll of experts which was periodically held by Nezavisimaya Gazeta since January, 1995 testifies to the one who has real chances to become the President of the country if elections took place in the nearest future. By October, 1995 the places among politicians were distributed so: V. Chernomyrdin (253 voices), B. Yeltsin (196), G. Yavlinsky (183),

V. Zhirinovsky (130), A. Lebed (128), G. Zyuganov (118).

Not ruling elite. Deputies - communists who made after elections of 1995 one third of the State Duma [4] were the most powerful elite group. This success strengthened influence and communists, and in general "left" even more. In January, 1996 during the international economic forum in Davos (Switzerland) the western politicians perceived Zyuganov as future President of Russia who is present there.

The group of representatives of large business was in the second place on influence. By this time businessmen already actively participated in policy at all three levels - federal, regional and local - on each of them there was business elite. However feature of this group was the fact that it appeared not in the natural way, and by agreement of her future members and actually only for the period of the presidential elections as its structure was so diverse that there was no hope left for preservation after elections. It is especially possible to distinguish B. Berezovsky, V. Gusinsky, V. Potanin from leaders of this group. In this regard in domestic science there was a discussion concerning the place of business elite in policy. So, for example, O. Kryshtanovskaya considers that the business elite is a "component of ruling elite" [5]. It is very difficult to agree with it as the business elite does not possess real, state and imperious control levers. Yes, it can influence political process that will be considered slightly below, but cannot operate this process and develop the solutions obligatory for execution by the government or other institutions and bodies. If those decisions also happen, then only as recommendations, councils, applications. For us the point of view of A. Zudin claiming that the Russian business elite of the studied period consisted of "political capitalists" (Berezovsky, Gusinsky) and businessmen out of policy (Smolyansky, Khodorkovsky, etc.) is closer [6]. Though the term "political capitalists", in our opinion, can be replaced with the term "businessmen-politicians". Unlike most of other elite groups this possessed huge financial resources.

Among slightly less influential, but nevertheless taking rather important and significant place in political elite it is possible to call "members of the Yabloko party" and liberal democrats.

And, at last, presence of the politician who was not entering in one of elite groups was one more distinctive feature of political elite of the first half of 1996. A. Lebed was him. After a gap in February

1996 with the being colleague on the electoral list of the Congress of Russian Communities (CRC) Yu. Skokov the general appeared for a while in political loneliness. Experts had a chance to observe whether the politician having even a certain charisma and popularity and besides not having any state or public POSITION will be able, to manage! without the elite group. As showed events - both an election campaign, and Lebed's stay as a part of ruling elite (June - October, 1996) did not bring the general into any elite group, and he still remained the individual player on the federal political field. And, in our opinion, this tactics of Lebed finally led him to resignation from a position of the secretary of the Security Council (SC) and to an exit from ruling elite -

Thus, in the run-up to the presidential elections which could influence also change of personnel, and change of hierarchy of groups in political elite, several powerful elite groups were allocated at once. Such situation did unforeseen the result of elections. For this reason it is the most pragmatic and the least ideologically adjusted group of business elite suggested two major candidates - Yeltsin and Zyuganov - to agree among themselves about the section of positions of the President and prime minister. But both opponents rejected this offer.

Considering the fierce and basic nature of elections, society expected some collisions between opponents. Collision happened, but - in the most ruling elite. Made proximity of a victory of Yeltsin and the appeared corresponding smell of "pie" property of publicity of relationship between Korzhakov and Chubais's group. In the night of June 20 by order of Korzhakov representatives of the eltsinovsky campaign headquarters were detained

S. Lissovsky and certain S. (there is a version that it was

S. Zverev [7]), taking out from the Kremlin a box from 500 Ltd companies (according to other data, 538 Ltd companies) the dollars which are not registered anywhere as the informal fee for the actors acting during the election campaign of Yeltsin [8]. The attempt to compromise in the opinion of Chubais's society and his team and to exclude from future participants of sharing of "pie" resulted in opposite result. Chubais through TV reporters let out in air "duck" about attempt of group of Korzhakov to carry out a coup d'état to cancel the second round of elections (that, naturally, did not correspond to interests neither "right", nor "left"). For the morning on June 20

the press conference at which Chubais intended to say the same was appointed. However in the morning to the appointed press conference Chubais, having met Yeltsin, suggested it to make a choice between Korzhakov (then Chubais declines all responsibility for results of the second round) and Chubais (then he guarantees the President's victory in the second round). Yeltsin chose Chubais. Korzhakov, Barsukov and Soskovets were at once dismissed. Thus (and the second most important) group in ruling elite became one less.

Later Chubais claimed that the guarantee him victories in the second round forced Yeltsin to make such choice. Perhaps, at the sick Yeltsin (a state in its spring and in the summer sharply worsened) who is still lusting power, the fear to lose it was present, but, in our opinion, he chose the smallest from two evils. Korzhakov, nearly 10 years carrying out his protection and being with him in friendly (were on friendly terms even families) the relations, had such influence that support Yeltsin him, the general would receive the absolute power, and in the conditions of a constant disease of the President would become actually the head of state. Possibly, Yeltsin was frightened that the power of military and military industrial complex whose interests were advocated by Korzhakov's group - Soskovets moreover during the Chechen war, could it is unknown where to get the country and to make him the hostage of this policy. The refusal of Korzhakov's services was for Yeltsin a stump, but the instinct of self-preservation got the best. Besides Chubais had a certain support among business elite, democrats and the West. That Chubais's role in Yeltsin's victory was too overestimated also from his party, and from some of his foes, says the fact to which the domestic scientist B. Vishnevsky pays attention: if Chubais is the great organizer then why, possessing the same resources, he could not lead to the State Duma in December, 1995 the team "Democratic Choice of Russia" (DCR) [9] which collected only 4% of votes?

This event once again convincingly confirmed: 1) race for power is present not only between ruling and not ruling elite, but also in them as there is never uniform elite, and everyone represents set of several groups between which there is a fight; 2) the closer to the power, the more fiercely fight; 3) the power is in some cases more expensive and more valuable to politicians, than unity and unity.

Since August, 1996, time of a large personnel shake-up of the government and presidential structures, and till spring of 2000 in political elite the increased fight between different groups and certain politicians for increase in the status and role place in hierarchy of subjects of policy was observed. There were several reasons of such sharp change of a situation. ■

First, Yeltsin's position and his environments. Considering that Yeltsin gave preference one group, another, there are two possible options:

1) The president tried to please the maximum number of the main subjects of policy to have more broad support. Therefore, for example, as a part of the governments of this period there were representatives from "left" to "right", i.e. not absolutely competent and rational personnel policy of Yeltsin and his environment; 2) The president consciously pursued such policy, proceeding from the principle "divide and rule" [10] not to allow any elite group to turn into the political force, independent, independent of it, though did not hide certain sympathies for radical reformers.

Secondly, increase in the elite groups possessing big resources. Business groups are especially distinguished from such. If to the middle of the 1990th so-called "old business executives" played a major role in economic elite, then since

1996 elite groups of "new business executives" sharply raised the status. Their leaders were generally connected with banking and (or) oil business. By 1996 they got such force that already directly offered the services to major candidates in presidents. According to the fair statement of Zudin, the presidential election campaign became a turning point in the relations of business elite and presidential structures [6]. Since this period the business elite began to interfere with activity of ruling elite actively. And considering that the last was not uniform and consisted of the different groups connected with different political elite groups and members of political (especially ruling) elite the probability of collision of interests of various political and financial clans sharply increased.

Thirdly, course of social and economic reforms. The unity on the matter was not neither in ideologically motley ruling elite, nor in similar not ruling, and all worsening position of the population gave a reason for intergroup collisions even more.

Fourthly, presidency problem. It consisted in the choice of future candidate of two main political forces of the country "right" and "left" that forced various groups of these forces to fight for strengthening of the influence.

By the beginning of 1997 in ruling elite three main groups were allocated: personal environment of the President, Chernomyrdin and Chubais. After A. Lebed's resignation in October, 1996 the situation improved a little, mutual public recriminations practically stopped. And some experts hurried to announce stabilization "the main personnel dominating" elite [11]. But stabilization turned out once again temporary. And an impression was made that collisions happened by the principle: to reject and criticize everything that is offered by the resisting group and to support everything that it rejects and criticizes. So, for example, in the spring

1997 at Chernomyrdin's insistance Potanin was removed from the Government what Chubais categorically opposed. At the same time, when Chubais potre-

bovat to remove from the Government Kulikova (Minister of Internal Affairs), it encountered resistance of Chernomyrdin, and the minister was left alone [12]. -

The conflicts between elite groups grew nearly monthly. And a variety of forms, methods and means increased, beginning from lawful (attempt of an impeachment of the President in May, 1999) to illegal (intervention in private life — "Skuratov's business"), in process of approach of parliamentary and especially presidential elections there are more and more politicians and elite groups tried to criticize ruling elite (and each other), thereby fighting for votes. So, for example, & the Mayor of Moscow Yu. Luzhkov since May, 1998 to accompany the "left" electorate, began • to publicly criticize ruling elite though before was one of Yeltsin's supporters. As a result of October 7, 1998 the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia (FITUR) during the All-Russian action of a protest openly declared the support Luzhkov's candidacies at future presidential elections. Luzhkov on it did not stop and in December, 1998 at a constituent congress of the movement "Otechestvo" created by it said that Yeltsin is not the authoritative leader [13].

Since May, 2000 there is a trend of mitigation of intergroup fight, and the hierarchy of these groups becomes more and more stable, and attempts of changes of the place of any given group are made more and more seldom. Though separate "splashes" are observed till present, for example, the redistribution of senior positions in the State Duma in April, 2002 which led to strengthening of a .vliyaniye of centrist elite groups that demonstrated decrease in level of conflictness in political elite. By this time (spring of 2002) the strongest group turned out presidential where it is possible to include (naturally, besides V. Putin) B. Gryzlov, I. Ivanov, S. Ivanov, S. Yastrzhembsky, A. Gromov, D. Kozak, A. Illarionov, etc. All other elite groups are already not so allocated, and their places in hierarchy of elite groups approximately equal, i.e. there are no obvious and permanent leaders.

Thus, the analysis of relationship of elite groups allows to draw the following conclusions: 1) on the speed of change of the hierarchical place of groups and

conflictness level during the Post-Soviet period can allocate 3 stages: the first - January, 1992 - July, 1996, the second - August, 1996 - April, 2000, the third - May, 2000 - till present; 2) Yeltsin took great pain to support group of radical reformers, periodically appointing her members to the major state positions; to please the interests of other not less influential groups were sacrificed to it; 3) now a certain trend of periodic change of the hierarchical place of any given group remained.

Literature

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5. O. Kryshtanovskaya. Transformation of the old nomenclature in new Russian elite//Social sciences and the present. 1995. No. 1.
6. A.Yu. Zudin. Oligarchy as political problem of the Russian post-communism//Social sciences and present. 1999. No. 1.
7. I. Zasursky. Mass media of the second republic. M, 1999. Page 110.
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International institute of management, Volgograd branch

On November 29, 2002

George Smith
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