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The economic relations between the USSR and the USA in the first post-war years (1945 1948)



yu. P. Bokarev

ECONOMIC RELATIONS BETWEEN the USSR And the USA

In the FIRST POST-WAR YEARS (1945 - 1948)

In the first post-war years the leadership of the Soviet Union and personally Stalin counted on continuation of economic cooperation with the western allies on the anti-Hitlerite coalition. The grounds were given for this purpose, on the one hand, the won USSR blood of the soldiers the status of the world power, and on the other hand, the agreements of heads of the USSR reached in the years of war, the USA and Great Britain about the post-war relations and the help of the western allies in recovery of the Soviet economy.

As Europe ruined by war was not able to help economic revival of the USSR, and itself needed the help, the soviet leadership did the main rate on development of the economic relations with the USA. Frame arrangements on post-war cooperation between the USSR and the USA were reached even before the end of World War II. In particular during the Moscow conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain (on October 19 - 30, 1943) the American side said that "the people of the United States as we believe, will be ready to cooperate in business of compensation of the military damage caused to the USSR" 1 fully. Then it was decided to discuss for in the nearest future "implementation of future supply of materials and the equipment. volume, character, technical details and plans". Along with it also concrete agreements were accepted. In particular, there are data that Stalin and Roosevelt agreed in Tehran and Yalta about granting to the Soviet Union after war long-term American

the credit of 6 billion dollars for needs of economic development and 4 billion more dollars for purchases prodovolstviya3.

The Soviet concept of post-war political and economic cooperation with the western countries was developed within the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) created by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee in January, 1942. "The commissions on post-war projects of state system of the countries of Europe, Asia and other parts of the world" led by V.M. Molotov. Within this commission three working groups acted: one prepared offers on Western and Northern Europe and the British Empire (A.Ya. Vyshinsky, A.A. Sobolev), another - across Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe, the Middle East (V.G. Dekanozov, Ya.Z. Surits), the third - on the Western hemisphere, the Pacific basin and East Asia (S.A. Lozovsky, K.A. Umansky). The first offers of this commission were developed in the fall of 1943. In general they were reported at the Tehran meeting of "the big three". In January, 1944. I.M. Maysky presented to Molotov a note "About desirable bases of future world" in which, in particular, the great value was attached to strengthening of friendship and development of economic relations of the USSR with the USA and Velikobritaniyey4.

As the economy of the USSR ruined by war could offer the western allies little, receiving the credits from the western countries was an indispensable condition of such cooperation.

For the sake of this cooperation of the USSR it was ready to go to serious political and ideological ustupki5. Measures for creation of new political image of the USSR were taken. It had to appear not as "vanguard of world revolution", and as the peaceful and civilized state, the reliable partner and the participant of the international community. The revolutionary symbolics and attributes was for this purpose reconsidered. On March 15, 1946 the law under which Councils of People's Commissars were renamed into councils of ministers, and narcomats - into the ministries was adopted. I.V. Stalin so proved these changes: "The national commissioner or in general the commissioner reflects the period of not settled system, the period of revolutionary withdrawal pains both other, and other. This period passed. War showed that our social order sits very tight and there is nothing to invent names such which corresponds to the period to not settled and social order, which

did not settle yet... To pass appropriate from the name the national commissioner to na6

to a rank minister".

In the same direction the preparation of drafts of the Program of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) on which four commissions worked was conducted: 1) P.N. Pospelova,

D.T. Shepilova and M.T. Iovchuka; 2) G.F. Alexandrova, P.N. Fedoseyeva and K.V. Ostrovityanova; 3) O.V. Kuussinena and L.A. Leontyeva and 4) M.B. Mitina and P.F. Yudina. On the project presented by the commission of Mitino and Yudin there are an editing and Stalin's marks. Counting on inclusion of the USSR in the structure of the international community and continuation of cooperation with the West, Stalin allocated and made change to those places of the project in which it was told about democratism of the Soviet social order, selectivity of all authorities on the basis of general, direct and secret suffrage, about responsibility of bodies of the Soviet power to the people. The Mitino project differed in emphasized attention to issues of further development of a democratic society organization. It, in particular, provided broad development of a legislative initiative from below, representation to public organizations of the right to introduce in the Supreme Council of the USSR and the Supreme Councils of federal republics drafts of new laws and also gradual transition to acceptance of all important questions of the state life (as in the field of foreign and domestic policy and management of economy, about, and in the sphere of housing and cultural construction, consumer services) by national golosovaniya8.

In three other projects the problem of democratization of the Soviet system also was in the center of attention. In particular, in Pospelov, Iovchuk and Shepilov's project the theory of development of dictatorship of the proletariat in public gosudarstvo9 was formulated. In all four projects the central problems of party exposed increase in living standards of workers, the solution of a housing problem, acceleration of development of the light and food industry. It was supposed to provide each family with the certain apartment, to increase production and to make public private use by cars, etc. 10.

Projects emphasized peaceful character of the problems facing the country, lack of military expansionist plans at it. The task of a peaceful competition of social and economic systems, all-round development of the international cooperation was set.

On the instructions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) the Institute of the world economy and world politics worked on projects for development of commercial relations with Europe and the USA, and his director E.S. Varga published the monograph "Changes in Capitalism Economy as a result of World War II" containing theoretical justification of close economic cooperation with Zapadom11 in 1946. In it it was claimed that for years of war the western states stopped being body of suppression of "the oppressed masses" a class of capitalists and began to act for the benefits of all society. They entered elements of planning and limit profits of monopolies for redistribution of national income in favor of needy layers the general ства12. At the same time the interests of the state face the interests of capitalists: "Interest of capitalists in high profit and their aspiration to conduct according to it production and during the war is in a constant contradiction with the aspiration of the state to place production and consumption at service to war". It led to the fact that the western states during the war began to limit profits of monopolies, to regulate them.

The general conclusion of the academician came down to the fact that "the question of bigger or smaller participation in government will make the main content of political struggle between two main classes of capitalist society: bourgeoisie and proletariat. More and more amplifying polarization of bourgeois society, division it on two main opposite classes will increase the specific weight of the proletariat" 13.

Thus, modern "the bourgeois state resists to the private interests of monopolies, works for the sake of the interests of all society". It willingly goes for expansion of the mutually beneficial economic relations with the socialist state.

In article "Socialism and Capitalism in Thirty Years" published in October, 1947, E.S. Varga went further away. He said: "Already it is seldom possible to meet somewhere, except for the USA, people who would dare to claim that a capitalist social order... is a desirable form of the organization of human society". According to him, the western society "recognizes that existence of mankind within capitalist society is possible only when holding socialist actions... Many western scientists and politicians say now that transition from capitalism by socialism is historically inevitable and is already carried out. It not only game words, not only maneuver" 14. Therefore the policy of the western states is not completely defined by imperialistic circles and financial oligarchy as the growing impact trade-union and farmer movements and also labor parties have on them. Thus, there is a redistribution of the power between classes.

All this completely crossed out the initial Bolshevist concept formulated by Lenin that socialist transformations have to "rely on military force, on the armed masses, on a revolt, but not on any given, "legal", "peacefully", the created institutions". This thesis found reflection and in "Short course" of history of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) 15. The concept of Vargi went to a section and with the theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" which was furiously defended Lenin and Stalin in fight against "opportunists of different colors".

It is difficult for Vargu to suspect of ignorance of fundamentals of the Bolshevism. Therefore the audit of fundamentals of official dogma undertaken by it seemed from outside unacceptable impudence. But the academician was not limited to it. He offered the model of a post-war peace arrangement excluding confrontation of two social and economic systems. Its sense was that the states were not divided more into "socialist" and "capitalist" that with inevitability led to creation of a system of two hostile camps. The states differed only with the different quantitative ratio of "bourgeois" and "proletarian" elements. This ratio was defined by interstate arrangement of political forces, the confrontation of political parties which was carried out within parliamentary and other lawful forms of fight. Intervention in this internal political fight from the outside, imposing of the type of political and social and economic system to other countries by military or economic methods was completely excluded. From this the conclusion that the steady economic relations between the USSR and the western democratic countries are possible became and are even desirable as they create the situation favoring to strengthening of socialist elements in the management western

stran16.

The Varg was too well known by the Kremlin to state objectionable to it the ideas. And it was impossible to publish such cardinal audit of the Bolshevism in the main state political publishing house and

body of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of the Central Committee without permission and Stalin's consent. The Kremlin leader consciously charged to the checked shots to voice those ideas and concepts which to him as to the guarantor of "purity of the Marxist-Leninist doctrine", it was inconvenient to state. Therefore it is possible to claim that "the great leader and the father of all people", wishing to enter the USSR in structure of civilized countries, gave the command to party ideologists to pass from Bolshevism positions to "the platform of bourgeois reformism" of the western social democracy.

It can find confirmation in numerous records of oral statements of Stalin during the meetings with foreign delegations. I will provide his statements about a ratio between democracy and "dictatorship of the proletariat".

In May, 1946 during the conversation with the Polish government delegation Stalin said: "In Poland there is no dictatorship of the proletariat and it is not necessary... The system established in Poland is democracy, it is new type of democracy. It has no precedent. Neither Belgian, nor English, nor French democracies cannot undertake you as an example and ob17

of razets. Your democracy special".

In September, 1946 Stalin returns to this subject at a meeting with leaders of the Polish Party Sotsialistichnoy again: Whether "Poland on the way of establishment of dictatorship of the proletariat has to go? No, should not. There is no such need. Moreover, it would be harmful. In front of Poland, as well as before other countries of Eastern Europe, as a result of this war another opened... a way of development - a way of social and economic reforms. As a result of the war in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and other countries of Eastern Europe there was new democracy absolutely other than democracies established in some countries before" 18.

Follows from these statements that Stalin in 1946 opposed "dictatorship of the proletariat" and democracy (even if and "new type"). These forms of political system of society exclude each other. According to the Lenin concept "the dictatorship of the proletariat" does not contradict the democratic device because "the narodopraviya of workers of masses" suppresses dictatorship of "a handful of exploiters" for the sake of implementation.

Stalin considered necessary attribute of "new democracy" the multi-party device. Follows from Molotov's diary that during negotiations on November 13, 1944 with the Hungarian delegation on political system the soviet leadership suggested "to create the Hungarian democratic government... with participation of representatives of all parties, representatives of all political trends" 19. In November, 1945. The politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of the Central Committee instructed Voroshilov monitoring formation of the new government of Hungary not to object to "distribution of seats in the new Hungarian government between parties, not to insist on receiving by communists the Ministry of Internal Affairs".

Stalin and his environment criticized those Communist Parties of Eastern Europe which, using presence of the Soviet troops and confusion of other political parties, sought to take perhaps more than the leading posts, without being conformed neither with experience of the appointees, nor with social and economic needs of the country. In a conversation with G. Georgiu-Dezh on February 10, 1947 Stalin said: "In Romania the communists undertook the most important and difficult posts in the Romanian economy. It seemed to them that they won these posts from the bourgeoisie, and actually Romanian bourgeoisie consciously gave them these ministries because knew difficulties and wished to compromise communists".

Stalin attached importance to that the multi-party system was carried out not only at the parliamentary level, but that the governments also consisted of representatives of different parties. Originally all East European governments (except Yugoslavia and Albania) were formed on a coalition basis. Bitter interparty struggle which was not limited to questions of character and scales of nationalization of a private property in the industry, about agrarian transformations, but also about the nature of the political organization of society, the principles of foreign policy was conducted.

When Georgy Dimitrov who came back to Bulgaria refused to conduct dialogue with political opposition and made the decision to create purely communistic government, referring to weak popularity of noncommunistic parties and the Soviet experience of the obshchestvennopolitichesky device, Stalin expressed concern: "Position of the Bulgarian tsek... on opposition raises doubts. Dimitrov, etc. probably want to refuse any negotiations with representatives of opposition concerning formation of the government. It is impossible to recognize such installation as flexible and circumspect" 20.

National democracy became history as "a form of transition" of countries of Eastern Europe from capitalism by socialism. But it was not conceived so initially. If to analyze Stalin's statements of 1944 - 1947 during his meetings with government delegations and politicians of Eastern Europe, then his plan from the East European countries will be found to create "a transitional belt", the social and economic device combining lines of socialism and capitalism. It was supposed that it will cause trust to the USSR and will promote development of its economic relations with the western countries and first of all with the USA.

In the sovetologichesky and being under its influence domestic literature that point of view dominates that the USSR from the very beginning sought to impose to Eastern Europe Stalin model of socialism. "Being covered with need of carrying out democratic reforms and eradications of the remains of fascism, the soviet leadership skillfully directed

the course of events to the course necessary to it to bring communists to power and

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to carry out socialist transformations". However a huge number of the facts demonstrates that in the first post-war years Stalin and his environment, counting on economic cooperation with the West, peaceful and favorable to the USSR, and did not think of planting of socialism in countries of Eastern Europe. They sought for creation in the countries of the political regimes loyal in relation to east neighbor bordering on the USSR, but acceptable and for the western allies.

During reception of the priest Stanislav Orle-manskogo who arrived from the USA on April 28, 1944 Stalin said: "Concerning Poland the Soviet Government has no intentions to interfere with internal affairs and the more so to interpose in the religious matter. What orders, political, socialist [so in the text, probably, meant "social", - Yu.B.] or religious, will exist in Poland — business of Poles. What would we, the Soviet people, like to have in Poland? We would like that in Poland there was such government which would understand and would appreciate good relations with east

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neighbor".

Nevertheless, the American political circles suspected that all this "new democracy" and multi-party system are only a screen. Fierce debate was developed after the categorical statement of J. Birnes that the USA will not discuss contracts with Romania and Bulgaria until there the governments conforming to standards of the western democracy which can be recognized by the United States are not created. And the USSR agreed to the offered changes.

Thus, contrary to fears existing in the West, in the first post-war years Stalin had no intentions to attach to the socialist camp of the country, appeared in a zone of the Soviet occupation, to turn them in the satellites. The part of the "buffer zone" softening contrasts capitalist and socialist economic devices was assigned to them. Stalin considered it a sufficient concession to the West for establishment with it strong political and economic relations.

However among influential political circles of the USA many were negative to continuation of economic cooperation with the USSR. The first signs that their point of view gets the best were shown during the Soviet-American negotiations in August - October, 1945

In May, 1945 the USA stopped deliveries to the USSR on a lend-lease, and in August, 1945 Truman declared completion of deliveries in connection with the end of World War II officially. The USSR immediately appealed to the USA about continuation of cooperation. On October 15, 1945 after long negotiations the contract under which the USA agreed to grant to the USSR the loan for a period of 30 years of 244 million dollars for payment of the goods which were earlier delivered on a lend-lease was signed. However already in

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January, 1947 of the USA interrupted implementation of this contract.

At negotiations on settlement of calculations for a lend-lease of the USA originally insisted 1.3 billion dollars on payment of the USSR that made nearly 13% of cost of all help. At the same time Great Britain had to pay 472 million dollars - less than 2% of cost of deliveries on a lend-lease. In a consequence of the USA reduced the sum financial

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claims to the USSR to 1 billion dollars, and then to 800 million dollars. But all the same the USSR fell into an unequal state.

The lend-lease was not the only stumbling block. The documents on Stalin and Roosevelt's negotiations published in a French press in 1946 in Tehran about granting the USA the credits of the USSR for recovery of the national economy and purchase of food caused scandal on Capitol Hill. Stalin obviously counted on the American credits, but not to put the American administration in a difficult situation, responded to Kingsberri Smith's request carefully: "I do not remember that I and Roosevelt signed any agreement on these questions. But, it is possible that in separate speeches at a conference Three something were something like that promised Roosevelt" 25.

The relation of the leadership of the USA and conservative political circles of Great Britain to continuation of economic cooperation with the USSR was not a secret for the Soviet political leaders. But some time were laid great hopes on a victory of "the realistic line", unprofitableness of confrontation in the world which did not recover from war consequences. In this plan V.M. Molotov's performance at the first session of the United Nations General Assembly is indicative on October 29, 1946. It expressed the need "to reckon with two opposite trends in development of the international relations". The first is directed to "the world among the people and a peaceful competition between them which means also a possibility of development of more and more broad and friendly cooperation and mutual aid between the big and small states". Such trend is equitable to "the interests of all peaceful countries". The second is connected "with a possibility of strengthening in the certain countries of influence of such aggressive imperialistic circles which for the sake of gaining world supremacy can go for reckless aggression and the most risky military adventures. A prophet of such imperialists is Churchill,

which has sympathizers both in England, and in Connected Shta-

26

Considering very serious concessions made the leadership of the USSR to the former allies, applied by it diplomatic

efforts for the sake of receiving the credits extremely necessary for the USSR for restoration of the destroyed economy and return of billion debt on a lend-lease, the statement occurring in literature on the fact that the USSR, having an opportunity to use the considerable financial resources offered it by the USA according to the plan of Marshall refused to participate in it is submitted very strange. How come? Such help coincided with what the Kremlin from the West waited for. And whether really this refusal took place? And whether really such help was offered the USSR?

At first we will consider how this question is treated in literature. Because of the small volume of article I do not apply for completeness and in advance I apologize to authors whose works were not considered. But it is necessary to tell that the same sources are in most cases used, the attention to the same facts is paid and the same conceptual schemes are duplicated.

Reproduction and interpretation of the course of the events connected with implementation of the plan of Marshall and nonparticipation in it of the USSR and the East European countries from the very beginning appeared under a great influence of politicians.

At the end of 1947 the Soviet political leaders initiated a broad promotional campaign on discredit of the plan of Marshall.

In particular A.A. Zhdanov said: "The being of the foggy, deliberately veiled wording of "Marshall's plan" consists in hammering together the block of the states connected by obligations to the USA and to grant the American loans as a payment for refusal of the European states from economic, and then and from political samostoyatelno27

Zhdanov presented business so as if the soviet leadership never estimated Marshall's plan differently. Soviet ideologists, economists and

historians were obliged to share the point of view of the authorities. And if for contemporaries such position reminded that to which the main character of the Krylov fable "Fox and Grapes" got, then over time many facts were erased from memory. All Soviet literature of the end of the 1950th - the middle of the 1980th years reproduces the Zhdanov scheme.

In March, 1948, usually well informed and exact in statement of the facts E.Ya. Bregel in the monograph on stories of a credit system of the western countries so reproduced the course of events: "The English and French governments undertook an unenviable role of the American direct-sales representative. In July, 1947 they convened in Paris a conference for discussion of "Marshall's plan", trying to compel other countries to offer the sovereignty, and agreed to development of the all-European economic program for a pointer of the USA. USSR and countries no28

howl democracies refused to participate in work of a conference".

It is unclear, what concrete facts were meant by Bregel, claiming that British and the French acted not for the benefits, and carried out will of Americans. In June, 1947 Bregel believed that the USA had no concrete plan that it just should be developed. Whether the thesis about "the American pointer" was costs of "Cold War" or behind it there were some concrete facts which became known later?

In response to the criticism of the plan of Marshall developed in the Soviet press Harry Truman, acting in the Congress on March 17, 1948, said: "The Soviet Union and its satellites were invited to the Parisian conference for joint participation in development and adoption of the program of restoration of Europe. But they rejected this invitation. Moreover, they expressed the hostile point of view in relation to the program, trying to destroy aggressively it".

If Zhdanov could rewrite history, then Truman was not able to afford rough falsification. Its phrase is constructed so that the inattentive reader drew a conclusion: The USSR refused to participate in Marshall's plan. But at the same time Truman carefully avoids the word "refusal". Besides, at attentive reading of his speech the contradiction is found: how the USSR could express the hostility towards the program which just should be developed?

In 1955 G. Price's research devoted to Marshall's plan was published the USA. In it the refusal of the USSR of participation in the program of the American help is treated already as the obvious fact. Price did not need to look for proofs. Quite so represented events modern

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to it Soviet historiography. After Price, many researchers in the USA and Great Britain concerning Marshall's plan spoke about refusal of the USSR to participate in it, as about something self-evident.

Among these works, perhaps, it is worth allocating popular, republished many times, since 1969, "The economic history of the USSR" Alec Nouva. The author allowed itself work to glance in sources. Without having found official proposal of the United States to the leadership of the Soviet Union to take part in Marchal's plan, official refusal of the USSR of participation in it, Nouv used less binding formulation: "Offers of the plan of Marshall were considered at a conference in Paris on June 27 — July 2, 1947. Molotov represented the Soviet Union which rejected offers and put pressure upon allies, chto30

they would arrive similarly".

It is obvious that Nouv did not hold materials of the most mentioned conference in hand. Otherwise it is difficult to explain why its image to Molotov's position it is directly opposite to that which comes to light from texts of his performances.

It is possible to give still a set of works of the 1960th - the first half of the 1980th years, but they will not add anything new to considered above. In the western literature that point of view was strongly approved that the USA suggested the USSR to take part in Marshall's plan, but he rejected their offer. In the Soviet literature the problem either was completely suppressed, or was claimed that the USA aspired by means of Marshall's plan to deprive the countries of economic and political independence participating in it. Only from the second half of the 1980th years the revision of positions began.

When access to sovetologichesky literature was open for the Soviet historians, the faith in her was so high that many apprehended the western concepts as the truth. By the end of the 1980th years the western point of view began to be stated in domestic researches and textbooks without references and reservations. "During the post-war period the USSR had an opportunity to receive additional financial resources, having joined Marshall's plan. It, as well as the people's democracies which were in the field of political impact of the USSR, the USA invited to take part in this European project. However the political reasons connected with Stalin's fear of any external dependence and preservation of autarkic views of economic growth led to refusal of the USSR of Marshall's plan, participation in which would facilitate recovery of the national economy after war" — wrote without any references to B.'s sources

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A. Heifetz.

In 1990 in Paris the essay of history of the USSR of Nicholas Vert was published. The trust to it domestic establishment was so high that its Russian translation which was issued in 1992 was recommended by Committee on the higher school of the Ministry of science of Russia as the textbook. However in a question of participation of the USSR in respect of Marshall Vert unfairly states the facts. The text of his book demonstrates about

the fact that the author not just rewrote other historians, and really dug in sources. But then it is difficult to explain the following his statements: "In June in Paris the conference open for all countries including the USSR was held. Absolutely unexpectedly for all on June 26 in the French capital there arrived Molotov in the head of the delegation which number of members and their rank gave food for optimistic forecasts. However in three days the Soviet representatives expressed disagreement with the American project.... Eventually on July 2 Molotov interrupted negotiations, having said that "put under control" the European countries will lose for the sake of satisfaction "needs and desires of some great der32

zhav" the economic and national independence".

Here at once four incorrect positions: 1) The conference was not on June 26 open on July-2. It was the meeting of three great European powers: Great Britain, France and USSR. Its official purpose was to develop a common position concerning in what form Marshall's plan has to be implemented. 2) At this conference the Soviet delegation did not express the disagreement with the American project. At that time the soviet leadership believed that Marshall's plan contained nothing yet, except the offer to grant the loans to the countries ruined by war. The USSR tried to obtain such credits hardly no more than other countries of Europe. 3) Speaking about "needs and desires of some great powers", Molotov meant not the USA, but England and France. 4) On July 2 was conference closing day. The Soviet delegation could leave negotiations only together with all.

Despite this, the specified statements were included into the latest Russian textbooks for higher education institutions and comprehensive schools.

In 1996 in the USA P.A. Sudoplatov's memoirs were issued. According to the author, this edition represents "literary record of mine

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memoirs", made by J. and L. Shekhter. Historians are obliged to treat such editions carefully. It is known, for example, that the same "literary record" of memoirs of the Soviet intelligence agent Walter Kriwizki made by Isaak Don-Levin contained a large number of distortions of the real facts and dispersed from the Kriwizki's testimonies on interrogations in the commission of Congress SShA34.

Nevertheless, these "memoirs" affected a position of a number of the Russian historians. In particular, in A.A. Danilov and A.V. Pyzhikov's book of an event published in 2001 are stated as they were presented by Sudoplatov. Authors even reproduce the quote from Molotov's performance on July 2 which has to prove to readers that the attitude of soviet leadership to Marshall's plan became negative. At the same time they refer on kakuyu35

that "collection of documents from Archive of the President". But the content of performances of Molotov at the Parisian meeting of three powers was not a secret. Their text was published.

Thus, it is possible to note that on the relation of the USSR to Marchal's plan in literature there is a set of ambiguities, reticences and contradictions.

Usually business is represented so as if the speech of the United States Secretary of State George K. Marshall before students of Harvard University was on June 5, 1947 the first step to Marshall's plan. In political practice of the USA there are no examples that the state secretary took before students the important initiative, without having coordinated it with the president and influential political circles. And it is valid, this responsible performance was preceded by two months of development of the general scheme of the plan and its coordination in different instances of State department and with a business community.

What was an incitement to development of the plan of Marshall? On March 28, 1947 within the UN the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) was formed. All European State Parties of the UN became her members. The main objective of ECE was to promote economic recovery of the European countries on the basis of equal, mutually beneficial and organized cooperation of all European countries in economic area within the purposes and the principles formulated in the charter of the UN. ECE sought to concentrate all economic help to restoration of Europe in the hands.

All this caused big concern in the American business community. The USA already had collisions with the UN which wanted to put the International Monetary Fund under the control. It was provided by the Charter of the UN signed in San Francisco on June 26, 1945 and which came into force on October 24 the same year. According to its 57th article in communication with the UN all specialized institutions created by intergovernmental agreements have to be put. At the same time for the international economic organizations the Economic and Social council (EKOSOS)36 provided by the IX chapter of the Charter has to play a role of the coordinating center.

Fight for the IMF ended with the fact that the staff of the UN acquired the right to be present at meetings of Fund, but they did not achieve complete control. However formation of ECE under the auspices of EKOSOS put new problems. Actually it was talked that the USA has to delegate the economic influence in Europe to one of UN committees, the being engaged distribution of all arriving help. It was possible to counteract it only by own initiative going from "general public".

The American public understood a plan not at once. In the press doubts in expediency were distributed to allocate huge amounts of money across the ocean. They with success could be used also in the USA.

Marshall's speech calculated on public presented the plan of the help to Europe as the act of clean charity. Nevertheless the true purposes of the USA in it were easily read: "The United States have to make everything that in their forces to promote return to normal economic conditions in the world without what there can be no political stability and lasting peace". Marshal understood the economy based on private business and the free market relations as "normal economic conditions": "the help has to promote revival of actively operating world economy that political and social conditions allowed to exist to free business". At the same time the USA aimed at opening access to the Western European markets and spheres of capital investment to a business community of the USA and by that strongly to attach to itself Europe economically and politically. Marshall was not afraid to say that the help will be rendered provided that the European countries will conclude certain agreements with the USA: I see

Andrew Clifford
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