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State regulation of rural economy Buryat Mongolsky the ASSR in the period of the New Economic Policy: experience and lessons

The peasantry in Russia


state regulation of rural economy Buryat Mongolskiy the ASSR in the period of the New Economic Policy: experience and lessons

In article it is proved that in the period of the new economic policy the social-class priorities caused by the doctrinal idea of socialist transformation of the Soviet society, but not economic feasibility were the cornerstone of methods of state regulation of rural economy.

The article proves that the social-class priorities formed the basis of state policy of rural economy during the NEP period in the Buryat-Mongolian ASSR. They were caused by doctrine of the socialist transformation of Soviet society, but not by economic efficiency.

new economic policy (New Economic Policy), Buryat Mongolsky ASSR, tax, land management, price, credit policy of the Soviet state; new economic policy (NEP), Buryat-Mongolian ASSR, fiscal policy, land managing, pricing and lending policy of the Soviet state.


Maksimovna — to. and. N, associate professor of history of the Fatherland of the Buryat state university, Ulan-Ude

The period of the New Economic Policy was very peculiar, unique strip of national history of the 20th century. On the one hand, during its implementation the model of interaction of state regulation of economy and chastnokhozyaystvenny activity was realized that allowed to restore generally in historically short time pre-war level of production. With another — the New Economic Policy was characterized by acute contradictions therefore to a certain extent it is possible to speak about its crisis and regularity of its replacement at a boundary of the 20th — the 30th model of command and mobilization economy. It is very important to consider both those and other aspects of the New Economic Policy in modern conditions to take the corresponding historical experience, especially at the level of territorial subjects of the Russian Federation as the majority of Russian regions significantly differed not only starting opportunities, but also geographical, climatic, sociocultural features.

Overcoming deep post-war crisis of 1921 — 1922, cancellation of a surplus-appropriation system, trade legalization, permission of land lease and employment, growth of cooperative forms of agricultural production and sale promoted rather fast rise in agriculture.

In Buryat Mongolsky the ASSR by 1928 by the key quantitative indices of agrarian production was reached pre-revolutionary level. However agriculture of Buryat Mongolia of the period of the New Economic Policy did not become dynamic, really commodity for a number of reasons: it is technical and economic backwardness, methods of state regulation of rural economy, so-called "regulators" Soviet economic sistemy1.

State regulation of rural economy in 20e in Buryat Mongolia, as well as countrywide, underwent the known wavy changes: instead of direct, go-

1 N.P. Nosova. Formation and development of a system of public administration by agriculture of the Soviet Russia (1917 — 1929): yew.... and. the N is M., 1992; N.A. Grik. The Siberian peasantry and the Soviet regulation of economy in the 20th years//the 20th century: historical experience of agrarian development of Siberia. — Krasnoyarsk, 1993, page 154-157.

new tax, credit, price, land management policy began to be carried out by a logo of administrative violence of the period of military communism. However there were still social-class, but not economic priorities.

It is known that at the X congress of RCP(b) the transition from a surplus-appropriation system to a prodnalog was proclaimed. Besides reduction of the amount of tax (in comparison with a surplus-appropriation system) and accounting of a harvest, the number of eaters, the cattle, the tax had pronounced class character: poor people received privileges or in general were exempted from payment. With education Buryat Mongolsky the ASSR in 1923 all national and local taxes paid by the peasantry were united in a unified agricultural tax (single agricultural tax) having income and property character. Since 1926/27 began to tax domestic crafts, employment revenues and other not agricultural classes of peasants. As these classes were already assessed with a tax (trade and income), included only a certain percent of not agricultural income established in a legislative order in a single agricultural tax, and so-called fists paid from the total sum of income, i.e. were assessed twice.

Shortcomings of a tax system were shown permanently throughout the New Economic Policy. So, in the report of the government "About results of a campaign for a single agricultural tax for 1925-1926" it was noted that "... the main lack of carrying out collecting a single agricultural tax is untimely accounting of subjects to taxation, weak consideration of complaints by fiscal commissions because of what also payment of an agricultural tax on the party submitted applications" 1 was delayed. Difficulties in carrying out tax policy arose also in connection with discrepancy of a scale of taxation with economy of economy of the republic. So, in Buryatia the poor economy at small crops had 8-10 beasts whereas in the central provinces the economy reckoned as already prosperous with 4-5 beasts, i.e. the Buryat economy by beasts was from 8-10 econo-

1 Russian center of storage and studying documents of the contemporary history (RTsHIDNI), t. 17, op. 21, 583, l. 250.

michesk slabym2. The standards of profitability established by the center from the earth and the cattle did not answer reality. So, the average standard of profitability from crops across Buryatia was established in 40 rub from tithe whereas according to republic STU the net income from tithe was 24 rub. There was a divergence between taxation of urban and country people. While in the city the lowest free minimum established income in 500 rub, in the village the economy having such income was assessed as prosperous. So, for example, in Nelkhayskom to the hoshena of the Alarsky aimag the average economy had 370 rub of the assessed income, paying at the same time 34 rub 20 kopeks of a tax (9.24%). In Verkhneudinsk the economy with income in 370 rub was exempted from income tax on a free minimum, and the tax in 34 rub was paid by the economy having

1 240 rub dokhoda3.

The similar tax system and also low purchase prices of agricultural products led to the fact that peasants ceased to sell for nothing bread to the state that became the reason of crisis of grain-collections. So, on the integrated plenum of Buryat Mongolsky regional committee of party and regional Control commission in May

1928 it was noted that ".v an issue of grain-collections there were big roughnesses both from the central bodies, and from aymachny. Directives were late, and the local organizations, thinking that preparations will go spontaneously, in this part did nothing. And only when all began to think of preparations when they began to send telegrams from the center, only then the aymachny organizations got to work. the 107th article was news to the peasant and created a scandal" 4.

In 1928 a peculiar reform of an agricultural tax was undertaken: individual taxation of "kulak" farms not on standard, and on the valid income; inclusion in an agricultural tax of earlier not assessed objects (pig-breeding, beekeeping); increase in standards of profitability, for example, on a mowing - from 7 to 8 rub on tithe, on sheep - from 1 rub 50 kopeks to

2 National Archive of the Republic of Buryatia (NARB), f.1, op. 1, 245, l. 6 (about).
3 NARB, t. 753, op. 1, 378, l. 13, 17, 18.
4 RTsHIDNI, t. 17, op. 21, 569, l. 70.
2 rub; reduction lgot1. Tax changes of 1928 actually became means of expropriation of a prosperous part of the peasantry. The ascending scale of raises of a tax - from 5 to 25% was entered into BMASSR, and farms were distributed in such a way that 35% were exempted from a tax on bednosti2. Besides, signs on which the economy could be assessed with a tax individually were defined: systematic use of wage labor, possession of mills, milkchurns, kruporushka, etc., systematic letting of difficult farm vehicles with mechanical engines, classes buying up for the purpose of resale, trade, usury, letting of apartments. All farms having attendants of religious cults were carried to number of kulak. Each economy having at least one of above-mentioned signs treated kulak and was assessed with a tax in individual poryadke3.

The discontent of the peasantry with tax toughening was shown in utayka of subjects to taxation, in refusal of payment of a tax. However non-performance of tax tasks involved in time administrative prosecution which main forms were fines, confiscation of property, imprisonment. During the period since 1928 on

1929 in Buryatia the property
2 356 farms was described, 163 persons were brought to court and condemned, 280 fists (according to not full data) underwent fivefold oblozheniyu4. In regular information reports about a condition of grain-collections it was reported that "the .kampaniya passes sluggishly. For November 10, 1929 in the Barguzin aimag 6.7% of an annual task, in Agin - 1% were performed. Activity of the poor and a serednyachestvo negative, dissatisfied with last year's preparation, they say that, having handed over bread, they should buy it on 6 rub again, as last year. Kulachestvo vsyaches-
1 Buryat Mongolsky ASSR: materials to the report of the IV congress of Councils. 1926/27 - 1927/28 / / BMASSR CEC and SNK edition, page 156.
2 An agricultural tax of 1928-1929 in the conditions of Buryatia//Life of Buryatia, 1928, No. 4-5, page 60.
3 NARB, t. 248, op. 20, 15, l. 100-102.
4 Buryat Mongolsky ASSR: materials to the report of the IV congress of Councils. 1926/27 - 1927/28 / / Edition

CEC and SNK BMASSR, page 155.

ki tries to avoid delivery to the state. Hide where it is possible, even in the forest" 5. The refusal of peasants to hand over bread at so-called "fixed purchase prices" presented the republic with a fait accompli of a failure of grain-collections. In attempts to find recovery from the crisis of the power resorted to the most rigid means of pressure upon the "sabotaging" peasantry. Emergency measures actually meant "declaration of war" to the peasantry, however they allowed to achieve a change in grain preparation, to provide the city and army with bread, to keep rates of industrialization.

Experience of taxation in the period of the New Economic Policy showed mutual distrust of the power and taxpayers, especially if the last treated a prosperous layer. As the economic lever tax policy was used very ineptly and was far from the declared purposes of economic and political character. Economically tax policy forced the peasantry to curtail production, to reduce own income and to pass to subsistence economy. Class orientation of a tax system to some extent supported the poorest groups of the peasantry, but poverty was not reduced. The economic policy of party in the village pursued the mutually exclusive aims and in general could not make considerable success: restriction of prosperity slowed down economic progress of the village, and "favoritization" of the poor expanded poverty as the phenomenon of political character. Accurate class orientation of tax policy has pernicious effect on development not only economies, but also on a socio-political and moral condition of society.

Thus, in the sphere of taxation of country people of the politician of "a reasonable maximum" (growth of taxes in process of growth of productive forces and material well-being of the village) it was replaced with the forcible theory and practice of "maximalism" fed and podhlestyvayemy with the class principle. The factors causing thirst of the individual and cooperated peasantry for expanded reproduction lost the force in the second half of the 20th. To work it became conscientious and productive it is unprofitable and even opas-

5 NARB, t. 475, op. 1, 451, l. 123, 123 (about).

but: in the village, practice of reckoning of diligent owners to the category of "fists" with the subsequent deprivation of the political rights and execution of numerous natural and monetary duties widely extended. Took away the prospect of economic rise from peasants. Existence of a class of free agricultural producers was put by the Soviet power under a question mark.

The price policy of Bolsheviks was the important state mechanism regulating rural economy. "The distortion of the prices" painfully affected the agrarian sector. It is necessary to establish the fact that, despite repeatedly made directive decisions on reduction of prices of manufactured goods, throughout implementation of the new economic policy the discrepancy of the prices of agricultural and industrial output remained. So, at the III Congress of Councils BMASSR in 1927 the deputies noted that ".vopros about reduction of prices very important, but for some reason it still does not move off dead center. We even observe that necessary for peasants goods the prices rise by some, but do not go down. For example, cost carried reached the cost of the whole cow or hundred poods of bread" 1. Thus, throughout implementation of the New Economic Policy the price policy of Bolsheviks more and more gained the nature of a bureaucratic arbitrariness until finally went bankrupt during crisis of grain-collections in 1928. Errors of state policy on the prices became one of the reasons of folding of the New Economic Policy.

The essential regulator of rural economy in the period of the New Economic Policy was the Soviet land management policy. Buryatia was one of regions of the country where land relations historically were difficult, tangled, in many places aggravated between societies, in societies, between the Russian and Buryat population. Therefore extremely important elimination dalnozemelya, uzkopolositsa, a strip farming was represented. Carrying out land management works, local authorities in the first

1 The third congress of Councils Buryat Mongolsky ASSR. - Verkhneudinsk, 1927, page 45.

turn met the needs of poor people and low-power middling persons. Out of any turn, with allocation of the best lands, land management of collective farms was carried out by land bodies. However in wide scales land management in Buryatia was not carried out. In land societies, gripping household and hereditary land use of the country yards, especially in the Buryat land societies which fixed in undivided possession behind prosperous farms the arable, farmstead and utuzhny lands which are once occupied in one way or another from public land fund continued to exist. In the report of the representative of NKZ Ochkovsky "In Burrespublika for July 20, 1926" it was said about a condition of land management that "use of the earth in the Russian areas happens on so-called revizsky draft soul so far. The woman does not use the earth, only in certain areas the section happens on the eater. Among the Buryat population still almost exclusively gripping and patrimonial land use" 2.

If the Soviet researchers of one of the main reasons for failures of land management policy considered opposition of a kulachestvo, then in a modern historiography connect them with absence of qualified personnel, money and technical forces. In 1923-1924 in Buryatia there were only 8 technicians-land surveyors, in 1924-1925 the land management device consisted of five people of administrative personnel and 27 tekhnikov3, in 1927-1928 - respectively 4 and 604. Also monetary allocations for land management were scanty. In total for 1923-1928 the financing of works on land management made 463.6 thousand rubles 5 Therefore in Buryatia land management was limited to mezhselenny settlement and covered 29.1% of acreage of agricultural use, 2.5% - vnutriselennogo6. Thus, quantitative results the land surveyor -

2 RTsHIDNI, f.17, op. 21, 583, l. 254.
3 Russian State Archive of Economy (RSAE), t. 478, op. 3, 3205, l. 24.
4 N.R. Mangutov. Agrarian transformations in the Soviet Buryatia (1917-1933). - Ulan-Ude, 1960, page 90.
5 In the same place, page 90.
6 NARB, t. 285, 369, l. 4-8.

the ny works which are carried out in the 20th were small that was caused by weakness of land bodies and insufficient financing of these actions.

The credit policy of Bolsheviks was the important "economic" lever of regulation of agriculture. With transition to the new economic policy the crediting of the agrarian sector began to be carried out by development of a state and cooperative system which was based on the funds which are released by the state and formed by fund-raising from the population in the form of shares and deposits. The need for the credits was huge, not accidentally credit associations became the most popular form of cooperative associations as it was individually difficult to obtain the credit. Money was borrowed under mutual responsibility by all society and provided with all property. From 1924 to 1927 the agriculture of Buryat Mongolia obtained 3.5 million rubles the credit, 75% of this sum were allocated by the state, 25% - credit kooperativy1.

At distribution of proceeds of credit the class principle was steadily observed: the most part - to poor people, smaller - to middling persons, almost anything - to fists. So, the share of crediting of the poor from 44% in 1925-1926 rose up to 69.5% in 19271928, and the share of crediting of prosperous peasants respectively decreased from 7 to 2%2. Social policy in the field of crediting led to extremely contradictory results. On the one hand, the cost efficiency demanded refusal of irrevocable crediting of poor man's farms, from another - all amplifying crediting of low-power peasants led to increase of sobesovsky moods, decline of credit discipline, growth of overdue loans.

Since 1928 it was headed for replacement of "fist", strengthening of the cooperative movement with the subsequent transition to collectivization. This political line found reflection in economic measures of the government including concerning the credit. In 1926 in Buryat Mongolia prosperous made 6% of structure credit tovari-

1 V.P. Tyushev. From history of the preparatory period of collectivization in Buryat Mongolsky the ASSR//Scientific notes Buryat Mongolsky ped. Inta, 1953, issue 4, page 83.
2 NARB, t. 1, op. 1, 148, l. 76.

shchestvo, in 1927 - 4%, in 1928 - 2.3%3. Thus, by the end of the 20th the credit stopped being funds of the solution of any given problems of agriculture and gained exclusively political character - became the tool of collectivization and class consolidation. In 1927 nearly a half of all long-term credits (48.4%4) was provided to collective farms, many of which could not return it. For example, the Bokhansky credit association for February 1, 1929 had overdue loans for the sum of 25,141 rub, from them 80% were the share of local collective farms, Nelkhayskoye - for the sum of 11,620 rub, from them 77% - on kolkhozy5.

Despite a number of examples of positive impact of crediting for social and economic processes in the village, the general model of credit policy of those years was imperfect.

Experience of state regulation of economy shows that its major component is the purpose which can be defined by a number of factors. It can be directed to maintaining balance of an economic system, can be connected with production improvement, and can be defined by implementation of the political idea. The policy defined the purpose of state regulation of rural economy in the 20th. The Soviet power needed to create such mechanism of management, to reveal such levers of impact on the agrarian sector which would give the chance of implementation of the main doctrinal installations. Ignoring of market laws, social-class priorities led to a gipertrofirovaniye of functions of state regulation. Economic and pseudo-economic regulation, ideological influence, administrative pressure were levers of this influence. The increasing centralization and aspiration to nationalization of all spheres of country economy, carrying out transformations from above became result of a doctrinal zadannost, from outlined was the market relations, freedom of economic activity - to speeding up of development of the socialist sector. By the end of the 20th

3 RTsHIDNI, t. 17, op. 21, 588, l. 28.
4 In the same place, t. 17, op. 21, 561, l. 138.
5 In the same place, t. 17, op. 21, 570, l. 43.
Gerhardt Adolph
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