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The Austrian question in Cold War (1945 1955)



246

O.V. Pavlenko

The AUSTRIAN QUESTION IN COLD WAR (1945 - 1955)

Statement of a problem of lectures

"Cold War" knows in historical and politological literature various interpretations. But all definitions meet in one: Cold War was some kind of geopolitical projection of the bipolar world order which developed after war. Power lines of the international confrontation which main content was a rivalry of two superstates, the USSR and the USA covered all planetary space: continents, World Ocean, space. Europe divided in the spring of 1945 by "the stiffened front line" of advance of troops of the Red Army and allies became its epicenter in the first post-war years. The fact of a general victory and unknown rise of the authority of the USSR gave the world a unique chance to overcome opposition of the interwar period. Two contracts were the basis for new alliance. The first - between the USSR and Great Britain, signed on May 26, 1942, about the union in war against Germany and its satellites in Europe and also about cooperation and mutual aid in post-war time (it was cancelled in May, 1955). The second - between the USSR and the USA, signed on June 11, 1942 and containing the arrangement on cooperation after war "for providing the world and safety".

It is no wonder that in military terminology and diplomacy of the 1940th, the formulations indicating awareness of solidarity of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain were distributed in personal correspondence of heads of states of "the big three": "general enemy", "overall objectives of fight", "general allied obligations". The most widespread words of those years - "allies" and "allied policy". They gave the name to the first general governing bodies in the occupied territory of the former Third Reich. Questions of post-war settlement were considered through a prism of allied control. But this chance and remained illusion...

"Cold snap" began already with the last volleys of war.

In 1945 the U.S. President Mr. Truman said that the victory in World War II "put the American people before need to rule the world". USSR, in turn, stre-

shallowing to approve a sphere of influence in Central both South Eastern Europe and China. The global conflict expanding between the USSR and the USA (the last were supported by Great Britain), represented set of problems economic, strategic (first of all nuclear) and ideological character, interdependent and directly defining the decision-making mechanism in "allied policy".

However Cold War had also other party. In an analytical research of Institute of the general history "The World in the 20th Century" (M., 2001) A.O. Chubaryan emphasized: at this time "certain "rules of the game" and a certain stability which led to the fact that neither the USA with their allies, nor the countries of the Soviet bloc overstepped the bound which separated hostility and sharp political and ideological rivalry from real armed conflicts were adopted". Really, despite confrontation, between warring parties nevertheless the possibility of a compromise supported by geopolitical interests and historical traditions remained. Even at the most culmination points of opposition the heads of superstates receded before a chasm of nuclear catastrophe.

Specifics of the Austrian question in 1945 - 1955

Lectures are constructed on the basis of the plot which is important for judgment of Cold War.

First of all, through a prism of the Austrian question it is possible to understand hierarchy of interests of "the big three" and sources of folding of the bipolar world. Austria appeared on the verge "the" and "hostile" worlds: the anschluss of 1938 put the country in a specific situation. If with determination of fault of Germany everything was clear for the winner countries, then with Austria the uncertainty remained: criminal or victim? In process of material statement we will see how these "formulas of fault" depending on a specific political situation will change.

Further. The Austrian question is understood first of all as a problem of the state and national sovereignty of Austria after World War II and its recognition at the international level. Also she decided in many respects by special boundary position of the country between the East and the West, its historical influence on the countries of Central Europe and its borders adjacent on the countries new, "Soviet",

block. Therefore the diplomatic history of the solution of the Austrian question is so paradoxical. Originally prospects of its decision were more real and more dynamic, than at the tangled German question fraught with acute contradictions: the Austrians since November, 1945 had own Provisional government (and since December - already legitimate federal government) while the western Germans received the federal government only in 1949. But if Germany was constituted same year as the sovereign state, then the solution of a question of the state independence of Austria stretched till 1955. Though the common problem remained: within ten years after war both countries remained occupied, and peace treaties were signed with them everything in the same 1955

In what the reasons of so long tightening of the Austrian question consisted? For search of answers we should consider strategy and tactics of diplomacy of great powers. In a historiography this problem did not receive sufficient coverage: priorities remain behind studying the German and Polish questions so far. It is lawful as the fate of Germany and also the German-Polish border caused rigid disagreements between heads of allied powers. The post-war balance of forces in Europe was defined first of all by the status of Germany and its future political policy and also process of gradual Sovietization of countries of Eastern Europe. In hierarchy of diplomatic priorities they came to the forefront. But nevertheless the Austrian question was inseparably linked with a key German question and was caused by internal political changes in countries of Eastern Europe. We will be interested in motives and the line of the Soviet diplomacy in implementation of "allied policy" in Austria and also its tactical actions aimed at providing vital interests of the USSR in this region. Besides, diplomatic documents on the basis of which the presented series of lectures are constructed allow to analyze a possibility of consensus which remained in the diplomatic environment even during the hottest periods of Cold War on the example of the Austrian question.

At last, we understand not only policy of global opposition, but also the fate of millions of people who were involved during this whirlpool of history, recorded by figures in passionless statistical reports as the term "Cold War". When leaders of great powers developed

the principles of equivalent exchange of the states and territories, were remade not only borders, but also human destinies.

Therefore the third problem which will interest us: how did the Austrians in 1945 - 1955 live, will be to tell more precisely - survived? Whom were for them Soviet soldiers - liberators or invaders? How did post-war life at so-called "folks-Deutsche" - the refugees of the German origin expelled from Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia, Hungary and who filled the Austrian cities and villages those years develop?

Again Austria endured cardinal transformation of state system about the history again, turned as Friedrich Gebbel said, one of her poets, in

>. small world,

Where the world conducts a wide experience.

So, we should consider three blocks of problems:

1. the Austrian question in post-war diplomacy of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain;
2. population living conditions in occupation zones;
3. genesis of the concept of the Austrian neutrality in the context of Cold War.

Lectures are constructed on the basis of diplomatic materials of funds of Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation therefore a significant amount of quotes from documents of that time which allow to track changes not only in formulations and words, but also in meanings of relationship between allies will be given in the text.

Sources and literature

The research literature and collections of documents published in Soviet period were focused on reproduction of the official version of the Soviet promotion which was under construction on apologetics of Stalin diplomacy of 1943 - 1953 including in the sphere of the Soviet-Austrian relations. The main document file of the Soviet archives in general was inaccessible to researchers, and publications of materials were carried out under vigilant control, carefully sifted through a censorship sieve. As a result of this selection from the being prepared collections of documents those materials which could svi-cleaned up

to detelstvovat against the official concept which quintessence was stated in the 5th volume of "The history of diplomacy" (M., 1974. Prince 1). This edition which is carried out under edition of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A.A. Gromyko, it was devoted to questions of peaceful settlement in post-war Europe. In twenty chapters the thought that the "Soviet" turn in the history of countries of Eastern Europe was made as a result of mass national enthusiasm by a victory of the Red Army was consistently carried out, and the USSR sought to give comprehensively support during the recovery period to all countries including Austria.

More detailed development of the concept of the Soviet-Austrian relations was made in the monograph by M.A. Poltavsky "Diplomacy of an imperialism and the small countries of Europe (1938 -

1945 )" (M., 1973). The author emphasized the aggressive nature of an anschluss of Austria in 1938 and showed how the western powers opposed to restoration of its independence. The special attention was concentrated on the post-war policy of the USSR directed to full support of the Provisional Austrian government of Karl Renner. In the whole series of researches the Stalin foreign policy was apologetically described, the sequence of fight of the USSR against the western powers for independence and the neutral status of Austria was emphasized. The state contract of 1955 was regarded as the diplomatic victory of the USSR which laid the foundation of strong Soviet-Austrian post-war cooperation. As well as researches, publications of archive materials were intended to document an enormous peacekeeping charge of the Soviet foreign policy (The collection of the main documents of the USSR, the USA, England, France about Austria. In 2 issues of M., 1953 - 1955; Communists in fight for independence of Austria: Collection of documents. M, 1956; A. Efremov. The Soviet-Austrian relations after World War II. M, 1958; V. Beletsky Soviet Union and Austria. M, 1962; USSR in fight for independence of Austria. M, 1965; Roshchin A.A. Post-war settlement in Europe. M, 1984; I.G. Zhiryakov of the USSR - Austria: results and prospects of cooperation. M, 1985).

The similar situation existed till the boundary of 1980 - the 1990th. Fundamental change in a domestic historiography was followed by gradual overcoming inadequate stereotypes, opening of forbidden archival funds, heated debates around questions of the Soviet foreign policy

1930 - the 1950th. For this period the massif of sources introduced into scientific circulation and demanding analytical generalization was created. The feature of a modern historiographic situation is that rates and scales of publications of the documents revealed in the declassified funds outstripped process of scientific judgment of a phenomenon of "Cold War" (History external policy of the USSR. 1917 - 1980. In 2 TM, 1980 - 1981; The USSR - Austria, 1938 - 1979; Documents and materials. M, 1980).

In the western historiography the international opposition of 1940 - received the 1950th the name "the first Cold War". According to this periodization "the second Cold War" came after a short-term discharge of the 1970th and was provoked by invasion of the Soviet troops into Afghanistan and civil collisions in Poland (M.A. Leffler Preponderance of Power: National Security, Truman Adminisration and the Cold War. Stanford, 1992).

In the last decade historians and political scientists had an opportunity for implementation of joint projects with foreign colleagues and open exchange of views on "white spots" with which the Soviet official concept of history of the 20th century was so rich

Under the influence of new archival researches in a number of basic researches - the collective works "Stalin and Cold War" (M., 1998), "Eastern Europe between Hitler and Stalin, 1939 - 1941" (M., 1999) and also monographs by V.K. Volkov "Key problems of the contemporary history of the countries of Central and Southeast Europe" (M., 2000), A.M. Fi-litova "The German question: from split to association. New reading" (M., 1993), V. Mayetna "Cold War and Soviet safety: Stalin years" (Mastny V. The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: Stalin Years. New York, 1996) - the question of motives, the principles, strategy and tactics of the Soviet foreign policy planning was raised. Despite the general heuristic basis, these researches conceptually disperse in treatments rational and irrational Stalin diplomacy. Whether a certain global vision of a post-war situation had soviet leadership, or in each case it was "the policy of the moment", mixture desirable and valid, thinking zashtampovannost, the missed opportunities as a result of dogmatic calculations, initially set tone of hostility and mistrust to allies on

anti-Hitlerite coalition? Whether was Gotova Moscow to continuation of dialogue with the West after the crash of Nazism? Whether such dialogue for the USA and Great Britain was possible? Search of answers inevitably leads to emotional estimated implication of researches. But without their judgment it is impossible to reconstruct a complete picture of post-war opposition.

The same questions are inevitably brought up in two brightest works devoted to history of the Austrian question. The book by the American historian Günter Bischof "Austria in the first Cold War of 1945 - 1955. Force in powerlessness" (Gunter Bischof. Austria in the First Cold War. 1945 - 1955. The Leverage of the Weak. California, 1999) is structured so that readers could make a fair idea of various phases of the solution of the Austrian question between the USSR, the USA and Great Britain. The diplomatic peripetias reconstructed on the basis of the English, Austrian and American documents - the main object of a research of Günter Bischof. The author very strictly characterizes a position of soviet leadership on the Austrian question. But the similar emotionality weakens a little the scientific importance of work in which there are no Soviet sources, and therefore unilateral vision of a problem is presented.

Other perspective of consideration of this problem contains in the book by the Austrian scientist Stefan Karner "the Archipelago of GUPVI. Captivity and internment in the Soviet Union, 1941 - 1956", published in 2002 in Russian by RGGU publishing house. The monograph opens functioning of the system of the GUPVI camps (Head department for prisoners of war and interned) covering the territory of the USSR from Karelia to the Kuril Islands from the Polar circle to steppes of Kazakhstan. They contained about 4 million prisoners of war and interned of which 2.3 million were made by Germans and 130 thousand the Austrians. One of heads is devoted to social and mental problems of the German and Austrian citizens who returned home only in the 1950th. In this regard the author reconstructs a picture of numerous arrests which developed bodies of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs in zones of occupation of Germany and Austria in the first post-war years.

Structure of lectures

Material of lectures is structured according to the pro-blemno-chronological principle. For a basis it is put av-

torsky periodization of stages of the solution of the Austrian question: from the plan of the Danube federation in the years of war to signing of the Austrian State contract in 1955

the 1st a stage - since the end of the 1940th till March, 1945: the Austrian question in diplomacy of "the big three" during World War II and the British initiative;

the 2nd a stage - from March to April, 1945: military operations in the territory of Austria.

the 3rd a stage - from April to December, 1945: Soviet diplomatic initiative.

the 4th a stage - from January, 1946 to December, 1950: diplomatic opposition of the USSR, USA and Great Britain.

the 5th a stage - from December, 1950 to March, 1955: American initiative.

the 6th a stage - from March to May, 1955: execution of the concept of the Austrian neutrality, final completion and signing of the Austrian State contract.

In lectures it is necessary to consider how consistently replaced each other strategic initiatives of diplomatic services of Great Britain, the USSR and the USA as mutual opposition and mistrust in a camp of allies by what methods they tried to influence at each other accrued and, at last, from what sources there was an idea of neutral Austria.

The Austrian question in diplomacy of "the big three" during World War II. The British initiative (the end of the 1940th - March, 1945)

During World War II the greatest interest the fate of Austria was shown by the British government. Since the end of the 1940th the English diplomacy began to develop a question of possible association of "the small countries" of Central Europe in confederation which would coincide with borders of Austria-Hungary which failed in 1918. The idea of reconstruction of this Danube state was based on its special role in the international system of balance of forces. Within the last century the Monarchy of Gabsburgov, according to the European politicians, constrained expansionism of the powerful neighbors - the Russian and German empires. On the other hand, a framework of the state union could neutralize also that powerful potential of xenophobia and ethnonationalism, to -

tory amplified in Central Europe in 1920 - the 1940th the Plan of the Danube confederation was only a part of the program of global reconstruction of borders in Europe on which U. Churchill was keen. It was supposed to create in the future three large confederations - Danube, Balkan and Scandinavian.

It is known that creators of the Versailles system were guided by the principle of "the national state" (borders of ethnosanitation have to coincide with frontiers) popular in the 19th century. Also Hitler used the same principle, taking the Sudetes and annexing Austria. Considering past miscalculations, Churchill saw the future of Europe in the polycentric design created on the basis of regional, cultural and historical communities. On December 13, 1942 he wrote the British foreign minister A. Iden: "It would be very good to have the Austrian military connection if it would be possible to direct it without special difficulties. I am very interested in Austria and I hope that Vienna can become the capital of big Danube confederation". One more quote from the letter of Churchill written in January, 1943: "The Danube confederation leaning on Vienna will fill that gap which was formed after disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Bavaria can be annexed to this group".

But Stalin did not divide this look. The Soviet diplomats during negotiations with the western colleagues absolutely rejected a possibility of creation of regional confederations. On the eve of the Moscow meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs the ambassador of Great Britain A. Kerr handed to the Foreign Commissar V. Molotov the document "Future of Austria" prepared in June, 1943 and accepted by the British office as definition of a position of Great Britain in relation to Austria. In it solutions of the Austrian question were considered: from possible granting the state sovereignty before inclusion of the country in South German, or Central, confederation or Southeast. Emphasis of various confederative options was based on the fact that its inclusion in larger state union will be the most effective remedy of a rupture of traditional ties between Austria and Germany.

However these plans of the British diplomacy were not fated to be carried out. At the Moscow conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, the USA and Great Britain passing from October 19 to October 30, 1943 it was developed joint

the text of the declaration on Austria which was issued as the annex to the confidential protocol. In this document it was noted that allies do not recognize an anschluss of 1938, wish restoration of "free and independent Austria" and support the right of the Austrian people to independently resolve an issue of a political system. At the same time especially made a reservation that this country "takes responsibility which it cannot avoid, for participation in war on side of Germany". Thus, in the Moscow declaration which became subsequently the basic document of allied decisions on the Austrian question with full definiteness it was recorded that Austria was not the victim of Nazi aggression, and her direct accomplice.

Also the decision of the Moscow conference on creation of the European Advisory Commission (EAC) to which the task was assigned "was important to study the European questions connected with the end of military operations which three governments recognize as expedient to transfer to it, and to give to three governments on them the joint advice". Behind this foggy formulation very pragmatic idea looked through: the general center which would coordinate lines of approach of allied armies according to the agreements on the section of spheres of influence reached by "the big three" in Europe was necessary. Judging by correspondence between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, since 1943 the active exchange of views on distribution of areas of responsibility of each of the great powers extending to territories, the countries and resources began.

Despite the first failure, the British diplomacy was not going to miss an initiative in the Austrian question, realizing its key strategic and cultural and historical value in Central Europe. In August, 1944 the British Foreign Office offered EKK for discussion the memorandum of the control mechanism of allies in Austria. The British plan provided that after the end of military operations the power and control over civil authorities has to remain in hands of that commander-in-chief whose armed forces occupy this area. As well as in a case with Germany, three zones of occupation were provided: English, American and Soviet. The fact that activity of allied governing bodies in Austria was closely coordinated with similar structures in Germany, between attracts attention

"direct contact between departments" and "communication on policy issues" had to be made by them. Long military occupation was not in the plans the British Foreign Office: military commissioners, as soon as conditions would allow, were subject to replacement with civilians. In January, 1945 at the request of the Provisional French government EKK allocated the French zone of occupation for territories of Austria.

Thus, during war when intensive diplomatic development of plans of the post-war device was carried out, the initiative in the solution of the Austrian question belonged to Great Britain which was not hiding special interest in the fate of Austria and even it patronizing.

Military operations in the territory of Austria.

Release or occupation?

(March - April, 1945)

{On an overhead projector projector: the card of military operations in March - April, 1945 in the territory of Austria).

At the end of March, 1945 the troops of the 4th, 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts took the offensive in the Brno-Bratislava-Vienna direction. The German tank armies concentrated on these sectors of the front could not show serious resistance because of small number and a lack of arms as the main forces of Germans were concentrated near the Lake Balaton. It was the rapid breakthrough of the Red Army on the southwest: Bratislava was engaged in the first of April, and in several days of a part of the 2nd Ukrainian front entered Vienna from the East and the South. After persistent street fights by April 13 the Austrian capital was completely occupied by the Soviet troops.

In the afternoon earlier in the USA at the age of 63 years the president Roosevelt died. Its place was taken by the vice president Harry S. Truman. With Roosevelt's death the suspiciousness in a camp of allies amplified.

The impact of the Red Army on the West proceeded. Near the Austrian city of Linz there was a meeting of Russians with the Americans who were moving ahead from the West. The joint contingent of the Anglo-American troops which promptly promoted to the Central and Southern Germany and also on the Austrian territory, borrowed actually without fight of the Province of Forarlberg, Salzburg, Tyrol, a part of Carinthia, the western part of the Lower Austria. In Moravia and the Sudetes the German troops continued

still to show fierce resistance till May, 1945

27 April Churchill sent to Stalin and Truman the message about "the procedure of occupation our armed forces of zones which they will occupy in Germany and Austria". Stalin in the letter to Truman of May 2 also emphasized need of that the Soviet command with headquarters of the English and American troops on the basis of the arrangement "defined a temporary tactical boundary line". He emphasized this expression twice. Whether Stalin considered that military occupation of Austria will be completed soon and what its result he expected?

Since the beginning of April, 1945 the allies began to discuss an issue

about functions of the control mechanism in Austria. The basis of discussions was formed by the Moscow declaration according to which the country was responsible for participation in war on side of Germany. At the initiative of the Soviet part the question of payment of reparations by Austria was at once raised. Great Britain, the USA and the USSR recognized in principle a duty of Austria to pay reparations, but postponed consideration of this question for time.

The Soviet diplomatic initiative (April - December, 1945)

This period in post-war history of the Austrian question is of particular importance as allows to consider in details interaction of the new power factors which determined sources of "cold" opposition between allies by the anti-Hitlerite coalition. Naturally, this cooling was shown not only when determining the future of Austria. In the spring of 1945 there was the whole complex of controversial territorial, geopolitical problems on which every month it was harder and harder to reach mutually acceptable decisions. The Potsdam conference of 1945 demonstrated change of persons and styles of the management in "the big three". Stalin faced new partners - G. Truman and the labourist K. Attlee who released Churchill from a duty of the prime minister after the parliamentary elections.

It is considered to be that the well-known speech of U. Churchill in the American city of Fultone in March, 1946 became a signal to Cold War. Then the former British prime minister said that Stalin lowered "the Iron Curtain... from Stettin on Baltic

to Trieste on Adriatic Sea". Churchill warned: the purpose of the USSR consists in "unlimited expansion of the power and the ideas". But contained in these words not only an appeal to new policy against the USSR - in them the situation which already developed by then was recorded. Especially as for the first time he used a phrase "Iron Curtain" in April, 1945. Events of spring of 1945 show how the total mistrust between the USSR and the western powers promptly expanded. It is enough to mention the known fact: in three days after the victory over Germany the USA declared the termination of deliveries to the USSR of military equipment on a lend-lease and returned the American vessels approaching already the Soviet coast.

According to the official Soviet version, on April 19, 1945 the leader of the Austrian social democracy Karl Renner in a personal initiative met in Vienna representatives of the Soviet command - the marshal F.I. Tolbukhin, the commandant of Vienna general of A.B. Blagodatov and member of the Council of War of the 3rd Ukrainian front general A. Zheltov. However oral certificates of veterans who can tell quite frankly about events of the first peace year today cover this event differently. Let's give a fragment from an interview which the major general of aircraft V.A. Tyukhtyaev serving then in the headquarters of the 4th Guards army which conducted operations in the territory of Austria gave to the author of a lecture.

"O.P.: The Austrian communists, how you consider, were popular after war, on a wave of a victory of the Red Army? They had support at the Austrian population?

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: No. Generally there not communists were, and social democrats. And the first with our help, our command, and including our companion from a political department of the Fourth Guards army, found Renner!

O.P.: Found?!

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: And Shepilov. Yes, Shepilov personally with him conducted negotiations. Yes, in mountains he was found. Americans wanted to take him too!

O.P.: He hid?

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: Yes, hid. Yes. But our intelligence agents, with them workers of a political department, Yakov Lvovich Torchevsky was, my friend, as they say, here it was brought and with it conducted negotiations. And he agreed to head the state. It is a social democrat who knew Lenin, and Lenin knew him. It is known teore-

social democracy tic. And it played a good role, a progressive role in the history of formation of the neutral Austrian state. It it is necessary to pay tribute! And we emphasize that our participation that we found it, we intercepted it, but not Americans! Perhaps I to some extent exaggerate it a little that was taken, but nevertheless! Here what it is a formulation? Did not take, and just found it, brought.

O.P.: Found! In the Alps?

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: He was not arrested!

O.P: He lived in the Alps, huh?

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: Did not arrest. In the Alps was and. Did not arrest, of course, him. Just invited. Also helped: it was arranged. Supplied with its and household things. Supplied with food. It is business of our army!

O.P.: And his family was with him?

V.A. Tyukhtyaev: I do not know details. I do not know details. Directly not I was engaged in it. I know who - as everything was made. Then and the Austrians treated kindly when our army left Austria".

Karl Renner was 75 years old. On the century he experienced also dizzy take-off, having become the first chancellor of the Republic of Austria (1918 - 1920), and discharge from policy after an anschluss, and constant fears for safety of the family which remained in the homeland when party fellows or wandered in emigration or decayed in Nazi concentration camps. Beliefs underwent it continuous change. At first sight, this pragmatic politician was the brilliant master of a political mimicry: thinly feeling change of the directions of big-time politics, he tried to follow throughout all life to them, refusing the former principles, with ease leaving last addictions.

the Political biography of Karl Renner reflects all drama collisions of history of Central Europe in the first half of the 20th century. During all life he consistently tried to develop the theory and practice of national policy in this region differing in motley ethnic mosaicity and therefore having high degree of national tension. Every time he tried to create the most effective formula of national survival and consensus for the people of the Austrian state, and every time abrupt turns of history crammed it again and again to reconsider former a cart -

sight.

The native of the German country family of Moravia, Karl Renner originally felt as the Sudeten German, then the Austrian, during an anschluss - the German, after war - the carrier of "the Austrian nation". Originally he was a supporter of the idea of the Danube federation, then - the project of "a socialist anschluss" which began to promote in 1928 when social democrats came to the power in Germany. It consistently protected the rights of the German population in the new states of the Versailles system. In the same 1920th g he was one of initiators of serious discussions among the European social democrats about the prospects of development of the European unity and opportunities of economic integration, considered the plan of distribution of the mechanism of the cantonal organization of Switzerland at the all-European level.

After the serious political crisis of 1934 in Austria and prohibitions of activity of Social Democratic Party, Karl Renner stopped being the public politician. Subsequently he approved the Munich agreement and an anschluss of Austria. In April, 1938 in the Nazi press he made the statement: "As the social democrat and as the supporter of the right of the nations for self-determination, as the first chancellor of the German-Republic of Austria and as the former head of the Austrian delegation in St-Germain I speak to an anschluss "Yes"". The following statement in Pan-German spirit was made by it after input of the German troops on the Sudeten territory: "Fair punishment and establishment of a new order without the bloody victims was possible only by means of the Munich agreements" which "closed and... opened the new page of the European history". (The question of degree of involvement of K. Renner in Nazi policy and discrimination of social democrats in Austria and the Sudeten region is discussed in a historiography so far).

One is clear: in the spring of 1945 the destiny gave in hands to Karl Renner one more chance. And he the first of influential Austrian politicians made a step towads to the Soviet Union. It was one more abrupt turn in destiny made by it for own rescue and rescue of the homeland. At this April meeting with representatives of the Soviet command he confessed in the made mistakes and expressed desire to correct them. First of all, on its initiative the Social Democratic Party was renamed into Socialist to be fenced off of the past connected with recognition of an anschluss. Yes -

leu he stated the plan of formation of Provisional government on the basis of three parties - Socialist, Communistic and National (former Catholic). Renner's initiative and his frank pro-Soviet position were met by the Kremlin with approval. Texts of the official statement about creation of Provisional government, the Leaflet about independence of Austria and also the Declaration of the government were previously agreed with the Soviet part. As a part of the government the Austrian communists received key posts. So, F. Honner, the vice-chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Austria was appointed the Minister of Internal Affairs.

The situation promptly developed. On April 27, 1945 these documents were published. Powers of Provisional government of K. Renner were recognized in the Soviet zone of occupation. Next day the head of Provisional government K. Renner in an official note to the Soviet government asked to recognize the restored statehood and not to deny assistance.

It was already hastily helped including at the highest diplomatic level. Still on April 24 the USSR offered the USA and Great Britain to recognize the newly appeared government. However this initiative was negatively apprehended by allies. The U.S. Governments, Great Britain, France refused. Sharp discontent was caused by separate policy of the USSR which allowed to create the government without preliminary consultations with allies. Also Renner's reputation aroused mistrust. The council of ministers of France at the meeting accepted on May 5, 1945 the document in which was brought to the attention of all allied powers that "again formed government was headed by the person who already held this post and therefore its political views are known in France. Being the head of the government, Renner tried to carry out an economic anschluss waiting for a political anschluss. After accession of Austria to Germany Renner reconciled to it".

The conflict between the USSR and the western allies became complicated not only is opened by aspiration of the Soviet diplomacy and to strictly seize initiative in a question of future Austrian government. Repeatedly in correspondence between leaders of victorious powers

Gottlob Rudolf
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