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Category: History

DEVELOPMENT of REFORM of Cheka (1921 1922)



A.B. Polyakov

DEVELOPMENT of REFORM of Cheka (1921 - 1922)

The attention to studying problems of history of the state security agencies in the 20th remains enduring for a number of reasons. In practical aspect this interest is explained by the fact that Cheka - OGPU were unique

the state organization, and their activity comprehensive both on solvable tasks, and on coverage practically all spheres of life of the state and society. Bodies of Cheka are OGPU in the center and on places along with the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) and the system of the Soviet authorities were one of three structural components of the Soviet political and social order.

Unique features of development and functioning of the Soviet political police also stimulate scientific interest in studying their history. The main feature of the Soviet intelligence agencies besides the width of powers which allocates them from a number of the intelligence agencies existing in the world and also distinguishes them from modern Russian intelligence agencies, consists in special "double" political legal status (submission of the Central Committee of party and to the government). In this look they became very convenient organization for direct implementation of political decisions of party bodies. Their edge at will of a top of party was periodically retargeted, functions not peculiar to them were assigned to them, they were used as the tool in the race for power happening in party and state leadership more than once.

In this regard it is interesting to analyze as there was a creation of this unique system. It is represented to us that carrying out reorganization of Cheka after Civil war was one of the major stages on this way.

Cheka approached by 1921 with cargo of defects and problems and also very unattractive image which developed in the opinion of citizens of the country and even the own employees. Before the state and party there was a question of its reforming. Some bases for reorganization were recognized officially, others remained informal.

Officially recognized reasons of reform of Cheka can be found in V.I. Lenin's report at the IX congress of Councils: "We are faced by a problem of development of a turn, it is demanded by the new economic policy. And it demands bigger revolutionary legality. It is clear, that in the conditions of military approach when grabbed a throat the Soviet power if then this task was set, we would be pedants, we would play revolution, but revolutions would not do. Than further there is a development of a turn, we a firm slogan will put implementation of bigger revolutionary legality and we will limit the sphere of establishment which was retaliation on any blow of conspirators".1 Resolution of a congress on Cheka so treat a new situation: "Congress

considers that nowadays strengthening of the Soviet power in out of and inside allows to narrow a sphere of Cheka and its bodies, having assigned

fight against violations of laws of the Soviet republic on judicial

2

bodies".

Thus, preparing for reforming of Cheka, the power was guided by the fact that Civil war ended with a victory, the enemy is broken and did not pose already serious threat, also the wave of country revolts declined. It was supposed, as the curve of "gangsterism" declined and therefore to contain the branched repressive device which almost does not have legal restrictions of the activity became senseless. The new economic policy besides objectively demanded further development of the legal civil sphere, new legal rules which would guarantee to some extent successful carrying out economic reforms. Development of a legal system, from a stage of Civil war, "decretive", characteristic of the period, to a stage of the codified right, assumed development of the accurate criminal legislation which would regulate activity of bodies of search, depriving of them an opportunity to conduct preliminary investigation, to judge and pronounce sentences.

So, the official reasons of reform were: completion of Civil war, strengthening of the Soviet power, transition to the new economic policy which demanded strengthening of legality in the country.

About the informal reasons, or the reasons about which it was not told in the press in the form of official documents it is possible to judge by the materials of internal character going between representatives of the authorities in the course of discussion of tasks and issues of reform. In January, 1919 L.B. Kamenev wrote V.I. Lenina about arbitrariness of local ChK and bureaucratization of the office of Cheka and also about decomposition of KGB ranks which indicator was

3

growth of the malfeasances committed by their employees.

About the low moral level of ordinary structure of Cheka it is possible to judge by circular lists of wanted criminals which were distributed by its Registration and statistical department.

In them the workers committing crimes often meet. As a rule, it were waste of money, plunder of cargoes or other material values, abuse of authority at commission of prompt and investigative actions.

Perhaps, it is necessary to add the arisen need of clear lines of authority between law-enforcement institutions (Narkomyust, Rabkrin, Revtribunal, Cheka and militia) to the main motives of carrying out reform and also purely political, concerning appeal of an image of the Soviet state to potential foreign concessionaires.

Actually, the idea of need of reform arose at first during discussion of powers of Cheka and tribunals and at discussion of a problem of relationship of Cheka with Narkomyust. The conflicts of Cheka with party and public authorities went constantly. Their reasons were indistinct division of powers in the Soviet legislation and natural desire of various bodies of authority and management to expand the influence and competence.

So, in 1921 the loud conflict took place between the Bashkir ChK and Bashobkom of RCP(b). ChK tried to purge regional committee under a banner of fight against separatism and nationalism. The conflict reached Moscow and was discussed on Organizational bureau of RCP(b) of the Central Committee. Shifts in the management of local ChK resulted and

5

again there was a question of reforming of Cheka. This case is very indicative: here ChK showed that it can encroach, under convenient conditions, on the power of party bodies. Let she got beaten and had no chances of a victory, but there was a precedent which was apprehended with due consideration and caused concerns.

Not once there were conflicts between Cheka and revolutionary tribunals for a number of occasions, first of all in attempts of tribunals or prosecutor's offices to check activity of Cheka in the field of preliminary investigation and also criteria of jurisdiction of any given affairs to various judicial authorities.

Especially Narkomyust's activity irritated the management of Cheka. Not accidentally already during discussion of reform of Cheka F.E. Dzerzhinsky wrote in 1921: "Return of Cheka under NKYust's supervision drops our prestige - belittles our authority on fight against crimes, confirms all White Guard cock-and-bull stories about our lawlessness, introduction of the commissioner Gubyust means actually change of a course against ChK as Gubyust is a body of formal justice, and ChK - bodies of the disciplined party fighting team".6 In the letter to Ya.H. Peters of September 21, 1922. Dzerzhinsky wrote: "Now NKYust has a conversation that to expel our representatives, to abolish Tribunals and thus NKYUST, having entered prosecutor's office and making reforms in court, will not prepare a shot of workers - will create a justice fiction, eliminating us at the same time from this business. I ask you to undertake seriously this business and to make the plan

7

restoration of our influence...".

The first step on the way of reform of Cheka was taken just in connection with the conflict between it and NKYu on October 15, 1921. At the initiative of SNK the commission under the leadership of at first D.I. Kursky was created, and is later than F.E. Dzerzhinsky for consideration of relationship of Cheka with judicial authorities.

Cheka repeatedly interfered with activity of various public institutions therefore it provoked the conflicts which forced the central bodies of the Soviet power to react to them, to spend time for interdepartmental squabbles. The similar situation developed in 1919 when in response to numerous intervention in activity of railway administration from Cheka to Lenin Ya.M. Sverdlov's telegram with a protest against similar actions of security officers came. At a meeting of Council of Defense at the initiative of Lenin the question was raised for discussion, and there was a resolution of February 24 with an order of Cheka to stop similar practice. Later, in March, there was a resolution on settlement of relationship between Cheka, railway ChK and NKPS.8

About quite unreasonable inquiries of security officers on the powers also the situation in relationship of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and Cheka speaks. In 1921. The foreign department of Cheka submitted in SNK the report about

of activity and the state of affairs in People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs. In this report the security officers pointed out such defects: lack of a firm hand in internal work, open access to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, bad protection, absence of the secretariat and the administration, uncertainty of functions of workers and departments, domination of specialists, domination of Mensheviks and bundovets. The similar criticism of Cheka mentioned basic elements of powers of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs: here both structure of the organization, and personnel policy, and principles of management. Actually all three elements were recognized as vicious.

But security officers were not limited only to criticism, they offered the recipe of treatment of these defects. Measures were proposed the following: to admit for administrative work to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of communists, to deprive of specialists of the right of the intercourse with representatives of the bourgeois states and the rights to supervise the work of political character, to close to foreigners access to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, to reorganize work on sectors, to merge Passport department of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs with Passport department of Special department of Cheka, courier service to subordinate to Special department of Cheka, to transfer management of houses of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs to Special department of Cheka, confidential mail of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has to pass through Cheka.

Actually Cheka suggested to give for the control all administrative work to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and also the personnel policy. In this case Cheka could push the people to all positions in People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and influence foreign policy of the state that could lead to considerable strengthening of influence of security officers in the state.

Fight for People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs continued and after reform of Cheka - the banner picked up it GPU.

The factor foreign policy was the important factor which influenced reform implementation. The Soviet republic needed a respite, confrontation with neighbors and major powers led into a blind alley, "gung-ho moods" and naive revolutionary romanticism needed to be rejected. There came time of cold prudent administrators.

The Soviet Russia won life and freedom, now it was necessary to restore the national economy, and it could be done only in one case - using investments of the foreign states. The rationalism got the best of ideology. There were problems of break of diplomatic blockade and establishing economic cooperation with the outside world. Preparation for the Genoa conference was well under way. Such factor as the political authority and prestige of the state began to play a significant role in these conditions. It was necessary to prove to be the government ready to dialogue. For this purpose the chrezvychayshchina should be liquidated, in particular to reform repressive bodies.

Reorganization of troops of internal service became a prelude to reforming of Cheka.

In 192 0 g all internal troops which were called in the beginning by Troops of internal protection of the republic (VOHR), and later - Troops of internal service (VNUS), were under authority of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs of RSFSR. VNUS actually included all departmental military formations relating to NKPS, People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs, Cheka and Narkomprodu.

For reduction of army and centralization of management of internal troops HUNDRED in January, 1921 adopted the resolution about

reorganization of troops of internal service: all departmental troops united under the direction of the Defense Ministry. At the same time the troops consisting under the authority of Cheka united in a special type of troops - "troops of Cheka". Troops of Cheka became the independent structure which is not entering into the Defense Ministry; in their competence there was a protection of means of communication and communications, borders of the state and warehouses. At the same time their supply went in the area of Narkomat on military affairs, and number was defined under the agreement with RVSR and was approved HUNDRED. In January, 1921 the staff of troops of Cheka was excluded from the RKKA lists, the former commander of VNUS V.S. Kornev.10

became the commander of troops of Cheka

It is possible to carry to a prelude of reform also a situation with abolition of the death penalty. In December 192 0 g of Cheka forbade to make executions to the provincial commissions without the sanction. The fact is that the capital punishment was cancelled earlier, but in connection with aggravation of a foreign policy situation (Soviet-Polish war) and growth of "gangsterism" its application was restored. Cheka, feeling that clouds over it are condensed, in January, 1921 tried to perform with a number of initiatives. Dzerzhinsky in the letter to the Central Committee of RCP(b) of January 13 reported about these initiatives

1921 . Here and cancellation of a capital punishment, but with an exception for serious crimes, and cancellation of martial law in a number of provinces. However, at the same time transfer of judicial functions from Cheka to tribunals was thought of the chairman of Cheka not according to the scheme which is contained in decrees and regulations on revtribunala that is under the law, and by the departmental agreement between ChK and tribunals on places.11

Besides Cheka in this letter called for reforming of the judicial system, but not for reforming of. Here the initiative of revision of prison policy contained for what Cheka even formed the commission. Security officers were "the class principle" the basis for new prison policy: "prison for the bourgeoisie, friendly influence for workers and peasants". 12

The order of the chairman of Cheka No. 10 of January 8, 1921 specified the following measures of retaliatory policy: "...б) Priority hearing of cases of workers and peasants to apply a holiday on bails and recognizance not to leave more widely; to narrow arrest, isolation of the bourgeoisie from workers and peasants in prison; a concentration camp for the bourgeoisie. Any worker and the peasant should not for small speculation and a criminal offense is registered for bodies of ChK". 13

So, in 1921 there was a situation when all conditions promoting reform found relevance in connection with tasks which rose before the party and state country leaders, namely: preservation of the power and carrying out new economic policy.

On November 15, 1921 SNK, having heard D.I. Kursky's report, decided to create the commission as a part of Dzerzhinsky, Kursk and Kamenev who had to prepare in two weeks the resolution on norms of relationship of Cheka and Narkomyusta.14

Later at the initiative of Lenin the question passed from the plane of discussion of interaction of Cheka and NKYu into the plane of discussion of powers of Cheka. Kamenev, the old supporter of reduction of its powers, prepared a sketch of the draft resolution of the Politburo on Cheka. On November 29, 1921 Lenin in the note

Wrote Kameneva: "t. Kamenev. I am closer to you, than to Dzerzhinsky. I advise you not to concede and bring in the Politburo. Then we will defend maximum from maxima. We will confer on NKYu still responsibility for failure to report of the Politburo (or to Council of People's Commissars) defects and abnormalities of Cheka".15

A little earlier, November 18, 1921, at a meeting of the Politburo the question of reduction of the staff of Cheka according to V.V.Kuibyshev and I.S. Unshlikht's report was raised. This question was also assigned to Kamenev's commission, Kursk and Dzerzhinsk.16

1 December Lenin offered the sketch of the resolution on the Politburo: "1. to narrow competence; 2. arrest it is still already right; 3. term & lt; 1 month; 4. to strengthen courts or only in courts; 5. name; 6. through VTsIK to carry out also gt; serious softening".17

These offers were are accepted and formed the basis of the resolution of the Politburo: "6. To appoint the commission as a part of t. t. L.B. Kameneva, Kursk D.I., F.E. Dzerzhinsky for discussion of a question in 5-day time. Directives of the commission: a) to narrow competence of Cheka, b) to narrow the right of arrest, c) to appoint monthly term for the general carrying out affairs, d) to strengthen courts, e) to discuss an issue of change of the name, e) to train and carry out through VTsIK the general provision on change of the name".18

December 14, 1921. The politburo made several important decisions on the mechanism of development of the new provision on Cheka. On the Politburo the question of holding a plenum, a party conference and a congress of Councils was the basic, one of questions of which would be a problem of Cheka. It was decided that Lenin in the speech devoted to opening of a congress in a few words will touch on an issue of Cheka and will explain need of its reforming.

Then in the report on economic policy of the state of Kamenev will in detail explain need of reforming. Further during the debate on the report I.N. Smirnov on behalf of Bolshevist fraction of a congress has to make specific proposals on this matter.

2 On December 8 according to I.N. Smirnov's proposal the IX congress Sovetov adopted the resolution on reorganization of Cheka. In it was heroic work of bodies of Cheka at the most critical moment of Civil war and "the enormous merits rendered by them to business of strengthening and preservation of gaining the October revolution from internal and external attempts" is noted and the decision on its abolition.19 contained

The highest sanction for reorganization of Cheka was so received.

Work on reforming of Cheka was developed prior to a congress. In December Dzerzhinsky's projects and Kursk were born. The provision on abolition of Cheka was drafted in development of the resolution of a congress, it had to define legal status and powers of new penal facility.

Then, at the beginning of a way to reform, positions of Cheka were weakened because on December 31, 1921. Dzerzhinsky was seconded to Siberia as the representative HUNDRED on settlement of all questions connected with export of bread. At the same time it kept posts in subcommittees on Cheka and on Mensheviks. Only on January 9 - 10, 1922 it was replaced in them by I.S. Unshlikht. In a similar situation, naturally, Cheka had difficulties in protection of the interests against reformers. To coordinate

the actions and quickly it became much more difficult to react to maneuvers of the opponents. Due to the new tasks, the current work and separation of the management Unshlikht constantly had to coordinate the actions with the chief that took away time and narrowed possibilities of political maneuvering.

During the period from January 18 to February 4, 1922 Unshlikht prepared several versions of the draft of the provision on the state security agencies and presented them for the analysis to Lenin. On them it is possible to track the discussion process going at the highest levels and to draw a conclusion that under pressure of opinion of most Cheka it was forced to give in gradually one for another.

Actually already at a meeting of the Politburo on January 23 the highlights concerning reforming of Cheka were defined and approved. Position of VTsIK about Cheka was formulated.

2 January, 1922 the approval of the draft of the provision on reorganization of Cheka at a meeting of the Politburo.20 At the same meeting to Unshlikht took place it was entrusted to submit the provision on the Public political administration for preliminary approval of the Politburo. At the same time special attention was paid on reorganization of Economic department of Cheka, and on the issue of distribution of property of Cheka the commission of Presidium of VTsIK was created, as a part of I.S. Unshlikht, D.I. Kursky and A.S. Enukidze.21 It is indicative that officially the structure of the commission had to be defined by Presidium of VTsIK, and actually it was defined on the Politburo of the Central Committee in advance.

At the same time there was a question of the status of employees of new institution, in particular about recognition by their military personnel. This question was also sent to maintaining the commission of Unshlikht.

On February 6, 1922 VTsIK adopted the decree "About abolition of the All-Russian extraordinary commission and rules of production of searches, dredging and arrests". Tasks which were carried out earlier by Cheka were assigned to the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs for what in its structure the State Political Directorate (SPD) under the chairmanship of the people's commissar of internal affairs was created. On places instead of the extraordinary commissions, political departments and also their representatives were created. Bodies of GPU were exempted from the tasks of fight against speculation, official and other crimes which were carried out earlier by bodies of Cheka, and all criminal cases on these crimes were submitted to national courts and revolutionary tribunals for accessory. VTsIK gave bodies of state security the rights of bodies of inquiry and preliminary investigation. They had the right of arrest, search (district representatives of the rights of arrest and search had no), dredging, the right to use in operational and service activity public and secret means and methods, including an agency, to hold search events (secret-service observation of the criminal or suspected persons, groups and the organizations), to look through post and cable and other correspondence both internal, and foreign, to issue the entry visa and departure in RSFSR, to send out of borders of the country of unreliable citizens.22

With creation of GPU practice of extrajudicial hearing of cases by the state security agencies stopped:

"From now on all cases of the crimes directed against the Soviet system, or representing violations of laws of RSFSR are subject to permission exclusively in court revolutionary tribunals or national vessels for accessory". 23

The last measure considerably narrowed powers of GPU and roused security officers to fight for their expansion.

GPU more powers tried to achieve for itself, finance, status and human resources. So, on February 9

1922 on the Politburo the question that it is necessary to leave in the ranks of the state security agencies of communists with length of service one year was brought up, but a request it was refused. However, the Politburo suggested Unshlikht to excite the personal petition for leaving of the communists who are subject to mobilization in number to 500 people. This decision went in line with reduction of the staff of GPU and mobilization of security officers on fronts of economic, cultural, state and military construction.

Other work of Dzerzhinsky still did not give him the chance to influence the course of reorganization of Cheka. On February 22, 1922 Unshlikht was officially appointed the vice-chairman of GPU and the member of board of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs. 6 - On March 7 during telephone survey of members of the Politburo there was a preliminary adoption of the provision on GPU. And on March 9 at a meeting of the Politburo it is situation it was finally approved, and decided to accept its special resolution VTsIK. Then the provision on special departments of GPU drafted by Unshlikht, Kursk and Enukidze was approved.

This day a number of the additions and proposals made by Unshlikht were accepted. So, all extrajudicial sentences of Cheka on the affairs which are not directly political had to be reconsidered as required by the special commission now under the leadership of the representative of GPU besides whom still representatives of the Supreme tribunal and NKYu entered it. As for the political crimes and crimes on a position committed by employees of ChK, review of the sentences on these affairs entirely had to be assigned to GPU.

The third concession for GPU was that the investigation of affairs of his own employees had to be carried on only by forces of GPU.24

GPU also acquired the right to isolate citizens of the foreign states to performing exchange in camps in coordination with People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and with the consent of Presidium of VTsIK.

It is possible to carry to number of concessions also that from now on RVSR had to consult on GPU before making mobilization of the persons of military age working in its bodies. It said about special position of GPU and gave up to his employees hope that shortly they will be equated to the military personnel and will receive full autonomy from army in the personnel relation. All materials of investigative production on affairs, persons under investigation of GPU passing through judicial

bodies, had to after the introduction of a sentence in force go to GPU.25 archive

Besides revolutionary tribunals, national courts and other judicial authorities and investigative institutions were obliged to the copy of all the sentences and resolutions to send on the affairs directed there by GPU and its local offices to GPU on accessory within 4 8 hours from the moment of adjudgement.

Actually on March 9, 1922 yet not ended reforming of the state security agencies generated a counterreform trend. The basic ideas of reform were not called into question, but ways on which approach of GPU was developed later became already visible to raise the political status and to expand the powers. The basic documents which defined an essence of reform were already accepted. Therefore GPU gradually followed a way of inning of the lost positions, using at the same time an internal political situation in the country, the information resources and negative points in activity of the departmental opponents.

Not accidentally at this meeting of Unshlikht brought up a question of "gangsterism" again. In the performance he showed complexity and potential of explosion of a situation, reminded of events of the recent past and offered the recipe of fight. And this recipe is simple: GPU should grant only the right of direct punishment over the criminals, recidivists, robbers overtaken on the crime scene up in arms again to expand application of the reference and conclusion in a concentration camp of anarchists and Social Revolutionaries.26

Unshlikht's proposals found support: It was entrusted to People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs to carry out them by the resolution within three days. The similar decision was contrary to the adopted provision on GPU, but it gained the nature of an emergency departmental measure.

From this day the impact of GPU began to amplify and it began to win the lost positions. On March 22 Unshlikht brought up questions on some paragraphs of the provision on GPU, the employees of GPU concerning the status. He achieved that the conflicts of gubotdel of GPU and executive committees of local councils concerning appointment of the chief of a gubotdel were solved VTsIK. Passed at this meeting and the decision on creation of bureau of assistance to bodies of GPU in the Soviet economic organizations.

On April 27, 1922 achieved GPU on the Politburo of granting the right of direct summary punishments concerning "gangster elements". The decision on it was made out by the commission of VTsIK as a part of D.I. Kursky, N.V. Krylenko, M.I. Kalinin and I.S. Unshlikht. The same commission drafted the adopted late resolution on granting GPU of the right of expulsion of criminal elements.27

On June 12 on Organizational bureau and on June 15 on the Politburo the structure of board of GPU into which all old employees of Cheka entered was defined: F.E. Dzerzhinsky, I.S. Unshlikht, V.R. Menzhinsky, G.G. Yagoda, Ya.H. Peters, V.N. Mantsev, S.A. Messing, V.N. Medved.28

It seemed, reform is completed, but the question of the rights of GPU was brought up again. On September 28, 1922 at a meeting of the Politburo at which there were L.B. Kamenev, I.V. Stalin, A.I. Rykov,

M.I. Tomsky, V.M. Molotov, M.I. Kalinin, N.V. Krylenko, F.E. Dzerzhinsky and G.G. Yagoda, discussion of the draft resolution of VTsIK on the rights of GPU took place. The confidential resolution which granted GPU the right of extrajudicial repressions up to execution concerning a number of criminals and also the right of the exile and expulsion and the conclusion to the camp was as a result accepted. Actually all concessions which GPU received during the period since March 9, were approved by this resolution.29

Further, up to creation of OGPU, there was a discussion of two key questions concerning GPU: its relationship with People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and about reduction of the staff of troops of GPU.

Thus, in the course of development and the adoption of reform of Cheka it is possible to allocate the next highlights.

First, process of reforming of Cheka from the very beginning took place at the initiative of the Politburo of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of the Central Committee. Lenin was the main mastermind of reforming.

Secondly, all formal moments of an approval of decisions on this question at the first stage proceeded from the Central Committee of party. The scheme of decision-making was such: The politburo - a congress of Councils - VTsIK - of the Politburo - the commission - the Politburo. In this scheme the bodies of the Soviet power were urged to give legitimacy to decisions of party bodies.

Thirdly, process of discussion and promotion of projects of reorganization of Cheka took place in the course of departmental confrontation between Cheka, NKYu, revolutionary tribunals, etc. The issues discussed during the debate directly infringed on the interests of a number of departments as it was talked of redistribution of powers. It caused in departments aspiration to protection of the interests. These motives were the cornerstone practically of all projects of reforming. Actually it was statusnorolevy the conflict. In the center of the conflict there were typical aspects of the political status: the place in hierarchies of the political power, set and volume of status duties, a real possibility of any given groups to participate in political life and to influence it. 30

However to you it is not necessary and to exaggerate a role of the departmental conflict. It was partly the reforming catalyst no more; yes, it affected character and the course of discussion, on a position of the parties, but it did not define the direction of reforming. The reasons of reorganization of Cheka were much deeper, they defined the process course. As for party, it represented by the Central Committee and the Politburo acted as the main initiator of reorganization of Cheka. The interests of ruling elite were the defining reforming factor. Departmental motives could influence only in case did not contradict views of party elite, in all other cases they were just ignored.

Fourthly, in the course of development and the approval of decisions on reforming of Cheka it is possible to allocate two stages. The first: November, 1921 - on March 9, 1922 - a stage of approach to powers of Cheka. The second: March, 1922 - 1923 - a counterreforming stage.

Fifthly, all discussion took place in a narrow circle party elite, without involvement of the public, and the role of public authorities was limited to the formal approval of in advance predetermined decisions that it is peculiar to authoritative systems.

The similar nature of the mechanism of development of reform answered realities of that time and followed from features of the Soviet political system.

Notes:

1958

V.I. Lenin. Half-N V.I. Lenin and Cheka of RGASPI. T. 1. Op CIA of Moscow. F

SOBR. soch. T. (1917 - 1922 1. 2558. 2429. Op. 5.

44. Page 328 - 329. years.). M, 1975. Page 545.
9. L. 3, 4; Op. 6. 9. L. 2, 3,
5
6
7
8
9
10 11 12

History of the Bashkir ChK. Ufa. Op. 3. 149. L. 33.

1995. Page 19.

R.R. Mardamshin

RGASPI. T. 7 6.

In the same place. L. 49.

V.I. Lenin and Cheka. Page 165.

RGASPI. T. 76. Op. 3. 239. L. 1.

V.I. Lenin and Cheka. Page 427 - 428.

In the same place. Page 42 5.

The truth for office use: From documents of personal archive of Dzerzhinsky//the Unknown Russia: The 20th century. Prince 1. M, 1992. Page 46.

13 F.E. Dzerzhinsky about revolutionary legality//Historical archive. 1. Page 16.

V.I. Lenin: Biographic chronicle. T.

V.I. Lenin and Cheka. Page 536.

RGASPI. T. 17. Op. 3. 322. L. 2, 3.

V.I. Lenin and Cheka. Page 538 - 539.

V.I. Lenin. Half-N of SOBR. soch. T. 44. Page

News of VTsIK. 1921. On Dec. 30

14
15
16
17
18
19
20 21 22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
11. M, 1985. Page 613.
567.

RGASPI. In the same place. Soviet SU of RSFSR. RGASPI. F In the same place. In the same place. In the same place. In the same place. RGASPI. Glukhova

T. 17. Op. 3. 256. L. 2.

1922.
17.
16.
3.

and revolution it is right. Page 160.

279. L. 2.
1930. No. 2. Page 157.
3.
4.
4,
17

Century

9.

>. Op. 3. 314. L. 1, Political conflicts

6, 7.

>: bases,

typology,

dynamics. M, 2000. Page 94.

Simon Paul Edward
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