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Russia in the Central Asian region: three centuries in geopolitics mirror



SVYAZ of TIMES

V.V. DUBOVITSKY

RUSSIA IN the CENTRAL ASIAN REGION: THREE CENTURIES IN GEOPOLITICS MIRROR

Change of a vector of the Russian foreign policy with unambiguously westernized on Eurasian, occurred in the first years of the 21st century, with special sharpness asks about the place in foreign policy of the countries of the Central Asian region. In the neighboring countries five states (Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan) hold very peculiar geopolitical position connected in many respects with the history of relationship of their people with Russia (most) for the last three centuries. Forward and various process of entry of the region into the structure of Russia which captured the period almost in two hundred years (1700-1895) became the first and its main feature. Let's begin with the fact that the overwhelming part of the region was a part of the Russian state at the request of the people inhabiting it. Avoiding charges as from representatives of vozrozhdenchesky ethnic movements of Central Asia ("Russians won us"), and the Russian Westerners modernists ("brought together them to the own harm, so many means spent for ungrateful"), we will give the basic facts of this process which will explain a lot of things.

In passing it is necessary to agree with initial historical correctness of assessment of the facts of voluntary joining of any given ethnic groups, public entities, certain territories or settlements. References that Asian lords did not ask the people of his opinion in those days are obviously insolvent and call into question any historical event including the contemporary history which gives us constant

History and present, No. 1, March 2009190-222

examples of inconsistency of actions of the dominating elite and opinion of the people operated by them. Finally not to get confused in motives, moods and real actions, it is necessary to recognize that the decision of the authorities of any given country was expression of will of the people (except those cases when such decisions caused historically recorded protest actions: revolts, revolts, collective petitions addressed to the authorities, etc.).

A lot of things become clear if in the beginning to remember the reasons of accession of the region to Russia. Fight for an exit to the seas, on wide trade and maritime routes was a main objective of foreign policy of Russia of Peter's time. In our opinion, fight for an exit to the coasts of the Baltic and Black seas lost in the period of Kievan Rus' which began at Ivan IV during the Livonian war of 1558-1583 was attempt of restoration of the meridional waterway "from the Varangian in Greeks", the entry of the Russian state which was the major element in world history.

The difficult military-political situation created in the North Caucasus and in Prikaspiya was the main reason of the military and diplomatic efforts of Peter I on the southeast (Caspian and Central Asian) direction made already in the middle of Northern war with Sweden. Russia during this period in the geopolitical plan was open to injury from the southeast owing to a number of adverse conditions, of which were main:

a) vulnerability of borders in view of lack of natural barriers and weakness of artificial defensive works;

b) neediness of the back in view of existence of the pro-Turkish moods among the known part of the Turkic and Muslim nobility consisting in the Russian citizenship;

c) a condition of continuous war between Russia and its porubezhny neighbors, in the majority the Muslims of Turkic origin consisting in the Persian and Turkish citizenship.

Rapid growth of the industry, trade and the huge military expenses of Russia at the beginning of the 18th century which sharply increased needs of the country for a silver and gold coin became one more reason of activization of the Russian policy in the region. Therefore beginning

since 1714 Peter's government began to take vigorous measures to research and development of gold and silver deposits in Siberia and in the Urals. At the same time the tsar raised a question of development of trade relations with producing countries and exporters of precious metals - Spain, India and the Central Asian khanates - Khiva and Bukhara. In this regard providing water (across the Caspian Sea and the Amu Darya River) to a way to India for trade became a main goal of activization of policy of Russia in Central Asia. Consistently continuing the geopolitical line on restoration of a meridional way "from the Varangian in Greeks", begun still by Ivan IV, Peter I understood that his southern termination continues to be controlled by the powerful enemy of Russia - the Ottoman Empire: mastering (1699) Azov actually gave nothing to the country. In these conditions Peter I makes the decision on the shift of the southernmost tip of a meridional way to the east - to the basin of the Caspian Sea that, according to him, in combination with restoration of the waterway across Uzboyu gave to the country strategic break in an exit to "the warm seas" at once - a direct connection with India.

The subsequent events showed that the way to Central Asia from the coast of the Caspian Sea is extremely difficult, and water - simply deadlock, fantastic. As a result of right after failure of embassy of A. Bekovicha-Cherkasskogo in 1717 on the "Caspian" direction of the contacts with Central Asia undertaken by Peter I in 1700-1717 there is a strategic kickback which was expressed in elimination of the fortresses and stationing sites of the fleet on the peninsula of Mangyshlak and in the Balkhansky gulf ("Red waters") founded for providing this direction in 17141715. Nevertheless, the concept of the waterway to India still for many years remained attractive in geopolitical plans of Russia concerning Central Asia and disappeared only at the end of the 19th century after specification of a geographical picture of Pamir, Afghanistan and Northern India.

In 1722 Peter I justification of the "northern" direction in geopolitical advance to Central Asia expresses - the option of a protektirovaniye of the territory lying on the way to the states of the region is chosen. Actually political form of the decision

did not differ from the Khivan khanate practicing in 1700-1703 a protektirova-niya and the similar decision on the Bukhara khanate planned in 1714. But it was planned already in traditional forms of territorially continuous geopolitical expansion characteristic of the Moscow state of the 15-17th centuries. However implementation of this concept of Peter I happened after the death of the emperor (1725) at his closest successors, in the first third of the 18th century, from the territory of South Ural. The address of the khan of the Small Kazakh horde (Zhuz) of Abulkhaira about citizenship of the patrimonial association headed by it addressed to the empress Anna Ioannovna is considered the event recognized as historical science opening process of accession of the Central Asian region to the Russian state. It is possible to agree with such opinion, except for the come true fact already mentioned accession in 1700 to the Russian Empire of Khiva.

In the second half of the 18th century it should be noted some braking in intensity of the relations of Russia with Central Asia that, in our opinion, happened because of the general europocentristsky orientation of the Russian foreign policy of this period.

The geopolitical situation on the Eurasian continent in the second half of XVIII - the beginning of the 19th century was noted by a factor of strengthening of Russian-English contradictions in Central Asia and is characterized by active penetration of England deep into of the region of the Middle East, known as realization of "the strategy of an anaconda". Since the beginning of the 19th century Central Asia becomes the field of the accruing geopolitical rivalry between England and Russia, first of which considers the region in quality:

a) a buffer zone between the Russian Empire and the British India;

b) sales market of goods of the English industry.

In the 1840th in the state policy of Russia in the southeast there is a transition to actions for "promotion of borders" for control of safety on steppe space of Central Asia. Thus, there is a process of gradual transformation of methods of geopolitical control over region space: from a protektirovaniye of the Kazakh childbirth and patrimonial associations (zhuzes) to gradual introduction of the central power by stroitelst-

va on caravan routes of the militarized strengthenings and to mass involvement of Kazakhs in an orbit of economic interests of Russia. The complex of the military-political events of the Russian government held for the 40-60th of the 19th century led to complete control over the central and southern part of the Kyrgyz steppe (Kazakhstan) and closely moved country borders to an agricultural zone of Central Asia. The measures taken during the called period led to complete cessation of attacks of nomads on the border regions of Russia and respectively to the termination of a slave trade by the Russian citizens. Thanks to the listed actions one more important result was achieved: internal reconciliation of the Kazakh childbirth. So, at the beginning of the 50th of the 19th century many generations which were at enmity among themselves childbirth of chiklinets, karakesek and dzhagalbayev made the peace, than stabilization of a situation and safety of caravan tracks on space between the Orenburg line and the northeast coast of the Aral Sea was reached.

the 1830-1860th of the 19th century are characterized by powerful width expansion of England on the Middle East and counteraction of Russia already on approaches to Central Asia - in Afghanistan and Iran and also attempts of formation of the anti-Russian military-political coalition from the Central Asian states and breeding associations. The problem of counteraction of the English expansion in Central Asia rose in 1857 in connection with preparation by England of invasion into Persia even more sharply.

Before the Government of the Russian Federation, and first of all its military authorities, there was a question of the organization of strategic defense on the southeast direction for the purpose of cutting off of development of geopolitical expansion of the main European opponent in the south of Eurasia. The geopolitical expediency dictated to Russia need of creation of a barrier:

a) by direct accession of the competitive territory;

b) by means of creation on the way of the English expansion of buffer zones and the states.

In the 50th - the beginning of the 60th of the 19th century the first of the listed ways becomes the main direction of counteraction of the English expansion. In our opinion, there is it first of all creation of a buffer zone from the breeding unions the Turkmen which appeared in the greatest proximity from the territory which is directly controlled by British on the Middle East was inefficient first of all because of weakness and political instability of these associations. Besides, the constant conflicts with the Kokand khanate arising because of attacks on kochevya the Kazakhs who are in the Russian citizenship accelerated the solution of a question of connection of the Orenburg and Siberian ambits. According to government circles, in this case "Russia will reduce the extent of the borders and in case of the European war, ruling in Kokand, will constantly threaten the East Indian possession of England. Only here we can be also dangerous to this our enemy" (Belyavsky 1904: 8).

Thus, need of impact on the distant, vulnerable flank of the European opponent for conditions when Russia had undoubted advantages as the continental power which had the powerful overland army which had vast experience of fighting in the steppe and desert area was the main geopolitical factor of further advance to Central Asia.

It should be noted that in advance of Russia to Central Asia huge, and sometimes and decisive, a role was played by a landshaftnogeografichesky factor, but with rare exception it is not considered in the analysis of historical events. The geopolitical methodology allows to meet this lack. It is necessary to remember that Russia from 16th century, from the moment of accession of the Astrakhan khanate, and then and defeat of the Siberian (Nogai) kingdom, at the southeast boundaries leaves to a strip of steppes, from antiquity known under the Persian name Dashti-Kipchak (The Kyrgyz steppe, Kazakhstan), 6.5 thousand km long, stretched from the delta of Volga to Altai. All this new boundary has practically no natural barriers capable to serve as effective protection against continuous attacks of nomads. As robberies on caravan tracks and trade of slaves were practically "the industry what

nomik" nomads, it was talked not just of fixing of an ambit for frictionless economic activity and even not of protection of border from smuggling, and of defense of boundaries what generally and the most part of boundary relationship with the Central Asian region on an extent more than came down three hundred years to. So, the impossibility to control the world and cross-border security and passability of caravan tracks to Central Asia in XVIII - the beginning of the 19th century led eventually to transition from policy of the mediated control over Kyrgyz-kaysatsky zhuzes through the system of elective sultans and flying groups to promotion to the steppe of fortresses and strong points, to their connection in "line", "distance" for the purpose of removal of an uneasy political element to the back of the country, as well as for the termination of access to it of forces, Russia not controlled, - hivinets, kokandets, the English agency. Such concept in the Russian Central Asian policy becomes prevailing in 1842-1853

the Landscape and geographical factor also acts as priority in December, 1863 when ruling circles of Russia make the decision on connection Orenburg (in its Syr Darya part) and Siberian the ambits located in the waterless semidesertic area. Owing to such arrangement food, and sometimes and fodder, supply of troops was made on communications up to one thousand long and more kilometers from South Ural, Siberia and Lower Volga area.

Need of final definition of the southern border of the state in Central Asia in fertile oases was repeatedly proved by military and civil authorities of Russia 19th century. In particular, on it it was specified at a meeting of command of troops of the Orenburg and Siberian lines in a fort Perovsky on August 31, 1861. Here it was noted that occupation of fertile oases near Tashkent, Turkestan and other Kokand cities will create necessary conditions for food supply of the Russian troops on the Syr Darya part of the Orenburg ambit located in semidesertic areas (Serebrennikov 1908: 201). The military historian V. Vodopyanov also points to influence of a landscape and geographical factor: "First of all, gaining the cities of Turkestan and Tashkent was obvious need

not only for strong connection of the Siberian and Orenburg lines, but also economically because accession of such rich land as Turkestan and Tashkent, could deliver to Russia large sums; remaining on Cheese Darya, we would own the most fruitless, poorest area of Asia whereas in the neighbourhood - the rich land abounding with nature gifts. Unfortunately, the political and financial position of Russia of that time did not allow to undertake resolute approach against Kokand, and we for a while calmed down" (Vodopyanov 1996: 17-18). Even more definitely other military historian of the last century, the lieutenant general M.A. Terentyev points to this geopolitical factor: "The next acquaintance with the projected border specified that the Karataussky ridge, serving as natural border, at all, however, did not facilitate business as messages between groups and supply with their stocks would be extremely difficult, and northern slopes of the ridge, besides, are very rather poor water. Therefore it was recognized as necessary to be approved down the river as Arysu (Arysi. - Century of D.) and to occupy the fortress Chimkent located on connection of ways from Kokand to our borders and owning, thus, knot of the important trade ways conducting from our borders to Bukhara, Kokand and Kuldzhe" (Terentyev 1906: 278).

Thus, definition of the southern border of Russia in Central Asia for the 60th of the 19th century was substantially connected with landscape and geographical factors that in combination with a certain political situation in Europe and events in zones, border with the Kokand and Khivan khanates, caused offensive of the Russian troops at the territory of agricultural oases of Central Asia. The landscape and geographical factor was, thus, not the main reason, but the trigger of a military campaign of 1864-1865

Implementation of the plans of establishment of new border adopted on December 20, 1863 brightly shows transition to a new stage of creation of a geopolitical system of Russia and is key in all further events in Central Asia on the question studied in this work.

Penetration in new

became the main geopolitical outcome of two military campaigns of Russia in Central Asia in 1864 and 1865

for it geocultural space of ancient agricultural cultures of the persoyazychny people. In a zone of influence of Russia there was rather extensive agricultural strip on average a current of the Syr Darya River with the cities of Turkestan, Chimkent and a number of small oases of present Southern Kazakhstan. In June, 1865 under control of Russia there was the richest oasis of Central Asia - Tashkent that opened a possibility of political control over the Fergana Valley and also created prerequisites to an entry in the Central and Southern Transoxiana. Proceeding from views of government circles of Russia of territorial acquisitions in Central Asia, it is possible to assume that this process would stop in the summer of 1864 after accession of Chimkent, but the Russian government did not consider what deals any more not with the families of Kazakh nomads, and with the steady feudal public entities of the agricultural people which had accurately fixed territory (in any case, the old "state kernel"), historical traditions of statehood, prestige in the Muslim world. To end war here, at that boundary where the MFA of Russia would like, her military simply could not: neither Kokand, nor Bukhara wished to consider lost the richest oases of Chimkent, Turkestan, Tashkent, and immediate military superiors forever, "to the closest discretion of which the way of execution of the enterprise was presented", were forced to continue war, occupying the next center of communications, strategically important bridge or the pass. That is the war in Central Asia which began as "steppe" for control over semidesertic space, more and more turned into war to capitulation, defeat of the hostile state or the main forces of its army as it usually was in the European campaigns.

Signing between Russia and the Bukhara khanate of the peace treaty of June 18 (on other sources - on June 23) 1868 (so-called "preliminary", that is preliminary) played an important role in peace-making in the region and that is especially important, in formation of a system of protectorates. The "Treaty of friendship between Russia and the Bukhara khanate" signed in Shaar on September 28, 1873 became the second major document in this sphere. Two more documents: "Protocol of additional rules"

of June 23, 1888 and "Rules about management, economy and improvement of settlements near railway stations Chardzhuy and Bukhara" (National policy... 1997: 219-224) - concerned inclusion of the territory of the khanate in transport infrastructure of Russia. In total from 1868 to 1896, considering also the "preliminary" contract, between Russia and the Bukhara khanate eight contracts and separate agreements were signed.

The huge value for inclusion of protectorate in the military-political and economic system of the sovereign was played by laying through the territory of the Bukhara khanate of the Central Asian railroad which construction was begun on east coast of the Caspian Sea in 1880. The called road from the very beginning was planned as a strategic way of supply of the Russian troops sent for accession of the Achaltekin oasis for the purpose of an exit to a zone of influence of Great Britain in Afghanistan and counteractions to its further advance to Central Asia (Terentyev 1906: 4). By 1915 when this way was paved on the one hand - to the Fergana Valley, with another - before strengthening Termez, it turned into the major lateral way for armed forces of Russia in protection of tellurokratichesky interests in the south of Eurasia.

In 1886 thanks to establishment in the khanate of the Political agency of relationship between Russia and Bukhara were lifted to new level.

A bit different in comparison with the Bukhara khanate was the fate of creation and functioning of two other Central Asian protectorates - in the Khivan and Kokand khanates. However and their protektirovaniye played a positive role in structuring the new geopolitical relations in the region.

Thus, the protectionist policy of Russia in Central Asia pursued during the period from 1868 to 1917 was directed to achievement of quite concrete geopolitical result: ensuring political control and economic use of resources of the region with the minimum costs of administrative activity and without creation of conflict situations with the main talassokratichesky opponent - Great Britain. Neob-

hodimo to recognize that in forty nine years of existence of this system she showed the efficiency first of all in the plan political and in much smaller degree - in the field of economy.

During accession of Central Asia to Russia the solution of one of the most sensitive and tangled issues of world geopolitics of the 19th century connected with control over strategically important point of the Middle East - the Pamir uplands was reached. The geopolitical value of the Pamir uplands is in many respects connected with unique arrangement of this mountain knot which is the center of a convergence of a number of the largest mountain systems of Eurasia. The ridges which are crossed on Pamir were in the millennia not only natural barriers to full-fledged trade and economic relations or formidable boundaries of protection against enemy invasions, but much bigger - a watershed between civilizations, in particular Muslim and Confucian. It is characteristic that rather small area of the first of them located in Kashgaria and Dzungaria (East Turkestan, Small Bukhara) that is territories of present Xinjiang, goes beyond the mountain barriers of Pamir and Tien Shan adjoining it limiting distribution of a Muslim civilization from the northeast. The permanent geopolitical conflict in this area which is taking place from the moment of Islamization of Central Asia became result of it (Abylkhozhin, etc. 1998: 75). The special role of Pamir in the geopolitical system of Eurasia is emphasized also by the modern geopoliticians specifying that "the Mountain and Badakhshansky region makes deep geopolitical meaning... Therefore religious specifics of Badakhshan and his strategic situation give EagAaM'u's chance to participate actively in the solution of the major geopolitical problems which meet just in this area" (Dugin 1997: 357-358).

Time of emergence of "the Pamir question" can be considered 1876, that is the moment of elimination of the Kokand khanate which part the territory of East Pamir was. Understanding a huge strategic importance of Pamir which is crossing of mountain ways not only on Sarykol's territory and to Ladakh, but

and to Kashgaria and the "Afghan" Badakhshan, Great Britain at the beginning of the 80th supported claims of China for the territory of Pamir for creation of a buffer zone between Russia and the British India. In the second half of 1883 there is also an occupation of Mountain Ba-dakhshana by the Afghan troops.

In the developed situation Russia was forced to react input to Pamir in 1891-1892 of the troops and creation in 1892-1895 of the system of boundary protection with China and Afghanistan on the Sarykolsky ridge and the river Pyandzh.

Thus, one may say, that the active advance of Russia to the region of Central Asia which began in the late thirties of the 19th century was caused by safety of borders and caravan trade and concerned originally only steppe spaces of present Kazakhstan. Accession of agricultural oases of Central Asia in the 60th of the 19th century was connected generally as with the aspiration to occupy more favorable points and natural boundaries in the operational and tactical plan in fight against the Central Asian actors, and against strategic objectives of creation of threat to the vulnerable flank (British India) of the main geopolitical opponent of Russia - England. The second of the listed factors constantly increased in connection with activization of the British policy in the south of Eurasia in the second half of the 19th century

In an agricultural zone of Central Asia Russia sought for minimization of acquisition of territories, preferring establishment of political control over public entities for what the protektirovaniye form which showed in general good result in the Russian-Central Asian geopolitical interaction was chosen.

Thus, during 1864-1895 in a foreign policy of the Russian Empire quite certain Russian-Central Asian vector was created thanks to what the country directly adjoined the territories (Turkestan Governorate-General) and territories of the satellite (Bukhara khanate) to a zone of influence of the main talassokratichesky opponent on the planet - Great Britain. Since the beginning of the advance to the southeast begun in the 16th century, Russia for the first time on this direction came to borders of the countries from a stable gosudar-

stvenny structure, but the nomads who are not directed by dynasties. It, at last, brought stability to borders, so, and stopped the further movement in this direction. The major factor in completion of formation of the Russian-Central Asian vector of tellurokratichesky geopolitics was also the fact that in the advance Russia reached a historical and cultural area of the most stable and related to it in the cultural, historical and mystical plan of an element in the region - Iranian (as acting through the Tajik population of Central Asia, and Iran in the Zakaspiysky region).

Geopolitical expansion of Russia in the 19th century and inclusion of the Iranian element in its geopolitical system of the next 140 years gave it if not a new passional push, then "a passional outlet". Russia represented for it the related factor relying on settled agricultural tradition: for the Iranian element it was not destruction of a landscape, but its support. For the nomadic world - on the contrary.

In case of continuation of development of Russia still, imperial, ways the support on tyurkizirovanny, apparently, would lead (sarta) and tadzhikoyazychny settled population in Central Asia to domination of the Iranian ethnic element. If to consider at the same time the opinion of the MFA of Russia expressed in 1872 that the boundary on the Pyandzhu Rivers - Amu Darya is temporary and that further "inevitably it is necessary to seek other, more rational border, to adjoin it stronger boundary (and such boundary in the considered part of Central Asia is only Hindu Kush, this main watershed between the river systems of Amu Darya and Indus)" (AVPR: L. 65), Russia tended to make the most correct geopolitical decision. With all convention of historical assumptions it is possible to regret that political realities of that time did not allow to include in a zone of influence of Russia the territory planned originally under Russian-English agreement 1869-1873 of, that is space of the present northern provinces of Afghanistan only. In this case an overwhelming part of the Tajik population of the region would get to a zone of influence of Russia that would allow at favorable istoriche-

sky conditions to create much more powerful, than now, the Tajik national state.

Consideration of issues of geopolitical interaction between Russia and Central Asia during 1917-1991 extremely difficult because of the nature of the most state education which the Soviet Union which was as a matter of fact the unitary state was. According to many modern researchers, in the Soviet Union the economic relationship "the center - the periphery", including Russia - Central Asia, did not keep within the standard scheme "the mother country-colony" (Post-Soviet... 1998: 10). Did not keep within this standard scheme and geopolitical relationship. Here it is rather appropriate to speak about participation of multinational ruling elite of the USSR including Central Asian, in the Soviet geopolitics in general.

Transition to this state it is possible to consider a short period after the October revolution until formation in 1922 of the Soviet Union when in the conditions of Civil war and foreign military intervention of the outskirts of the former Russian Empire appeared in an uncertain geopolitical condition of rather former state center.

In 1918-1919 the defeat of communistic revolts in Germany and Hungary and also a reality of Civil war in Russia forced the Bolshevist country leaders to address the geopolitical analysis of a situation. So, in the memorandum of the chairman of RVSR of September 20, 1919 the general plan of military-political actions on the Middle East which main goal is destruction of a strategic source of raw materials of the countries of the Entente is given: "The road to India can be for us more passable and shorter at present, than the road to the Soviet Hungary. To break unstable balance of the Asian relations of colonial dependence, to give a direct impetus to a revolt of a people at large and such army which on the European scales now cannot have large value yet can ensure a victory of such revolt in Asia. Meanwhile, international about -

the stanovka develops, apparently, so that the way to Paris and London lies through the cities of Afghanistan, Punjab and Bengal. It is necessary to concentrate somewhere on the Urals or in Turkestan revolutionary Academy, the political and military headquarters of the Asian revolution which can be much deesposobny the 3rd International in the nearest future. It is necessary to start more serious organization in this direction and to concentration of necessary forces of linguists, translators of books, involvement of native revolutionaries already now - all means and ways available to us. Asia can become the arena of close revolts. Our task is in in due time to make necessary transferring of the center of gravity of our international orientation. In any case, the European revolution as though was removed. And what is already perfect out of doubt - ourselves were removed from the West on the East" (Trotsky 1990: 12).

Thus, tellurokratichesky geopolitics of historical Russia (which turned in 1917 into the Soviet Russia) gained new ideological motive and became for a short time more aggressive, than at the Russian Empire. Here the parallel with the geopolitical situation which roused Russia to more active policy in Central Asia after unsuccessful results of East (Crimean) war of 1853-1856 is lawful. In L.D. Trotsky's plans the direct continuity of the geopolitical steps which are not depending on change of ideology and not similarity of historical conditions at all is visible. The important part of the military-political base in fight for the East was assigned to Central Asia in the geopolitical line of the Soviet Russia. For providing stated purposes with the leadership of the Soviet Russia in 1918-1922 a number of steps on elimination of territorial autonomies not controlled by Moscow was undertaken: in September, 1920 as a result of the military operation in the territory of the Bukhara khanate the Bukhara People's Democratic Republic which was "red protectorate" of the Soviet Russia was formed. In February, 1920 the Khivan khanate becomes the Soviet republic also.

Use of the doctrine of world revolution in respect of the East led to the fact that in May - June, 1920 in the territory

Persia (in Gilyan. - For century of D.) the Persian Socialist Soviet Republic was organized, the Council of People's Commissars is created, the program of the new power is published. The revolutionary movement inspired from Turkestan in Gilyan soon degenerated in civil strife and got beaten; the same destiny expected also the numerous groups of "Asian revolutionaries" created in Afghanistan, Xinjiang and other countries of the East and Turkkomissiya's subordinates, Turkbyuro and Kavkazbyuro.

Thus though the new power also did not manage to turn Central Asia into "base of world revolution" for the foreign East, however for 1918-1920 the geopolitical control of the center over the region was completely restored.

Carrying out during this period in the territory of the region of national and territorial disengagement was one of the main geopolitical steps taken by the central power of the USSR in coordination with local national party elite of Central Asia. With sufficient completeness and persuasiveness this difficult and diverse process in the long-term consequences is shown in a series of works on this subject of the academician R.M. Masov. Pantyurkistsky forces of Central Asia, "having learned by experience in impossibility of implementation of national autonomy of the Turkic people of Central Asia out of the Soviet power, decided to make the power established by bayonets of the Red Army the tool of national self-determination only for Turkic Muslims" (Masov 1991). There are serious reasons to consider that the discrimination against the Tajik population shown during national and territorial disengagement was a part of the planned international actions directed to weakening of tellurokratichesky influence in the region. National territorially principle separation of the territory of Central Asia along with domination in the leading circles of the Turkestan Republic of pantyurkistsky elements led to the fact that the settled iranoyazychny ethnic component - Tajik - received the tiny economically weak quasi-state which is not allowing it in the next years existence of the USSR to develop DOS -

secret culture of its geopolitical role and economy (Post-Soviet... 1998: 272).

The territory of Central Asia was used in 1929 as the base for conducting the military operation in Afghanistan during Bachai Sakao's revolt.

Central Asia played an important geostrategic role the period of the Great Patriotic War. The region formed base of action of the Soviet troops in Northern Iran (the Province of Khurasan and Gui-lyan) for ensuring transfer through this country of the Anglo-American help for the USSR.

Most of modern researchers estimate the fact of introduction of Soviet troops at Afghanistan as the step, necessary from the geopolitical point of view, taken for prevention of the width expansion of the USA in the region of the Middle East caused by serious defeat of talassokratichesky forces as a result of the Iranian revolution of 1979. However the geopolitical losses suffered by the Soviet Union in the east right after sending of troops and consisting in falling of prestige of the country, first of all in the Islamic world consistently increased for all 80th Due to the war in Afghanistan in counteraction of the Soviet geopolitical line the most various forces united: talassokratichesky, pro-American Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, on the one hand, and eventual tellurokratiche-sky allies - Iran and China - with another. One of the most serious long-term consequences of deterioration in the relations with the countries of the East of steel the amplifying politicization of Islam and emergence of Islamic extremism in the territory of Central Asia. Thus, the situation around Afghanistan was the powerful catalyst of development of centrifugal trends in the Central Asian region. Invested generally with a religious vozrozhdencheskuyu a form, they for the 80th gained the increasing strength in all republics of Central Asia.

In general a withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan in 1989, and soon and the political indifference created in the Russian government circles to this country with

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