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© 2009 of L.A. Badayev

Chechen state university, Chechen State University,

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The question connected with activization of the anti-Russian promotion from Turkey and participation of separate possession of Chechnya and Dagestan and in performances against the Russian government is considered. The thin and careful policy of Russia for the people of the North Caucasus pursued in 1785-1791 is shown

In this article scrutinized the question connected with antirussia propaganda fro side of Turkey separated possessions of Chechnya and Dagestan, in address against Russia&s government. The author shows the subtle and careful policy of Russia in respect of people of North Caucasus, holding in period from 1785-1791.

We will try to give characteristic of that situation which developed in the Northeast Caucasus because of continuous internal wars and which was dexterously used in the plans by the leading powers, having turned the region into a bargaining chip.

We used many archive materials including new to show tough collision of interests of neighboring countries, their political and ideological opposition which ended finally with the Russo-Turkish war.

At the beginning of 1785 in connection with the amplified anti-Russian promotion from Ottoman Turkey in the Caucasus the intense situation was created. Seeking to lift the people of Chechnya and Dagestan on "svyashchen-

ny war" against Russians and to incite them against Georgia, Turks spared no expense.

According to the Turkish historiographer of the Gev-det-pashi, to the Dagestan governors were sent by the sultan of the diploma in which he urged them "not to give beliefs to speeches of Russians... not to give in to cunning them and I will deceive... to render hardness in resistance and not to allow the enemy before possession of Iran and Dagestan. With the purpose to win over them and to cajole each of them decent gifts were presented" [1, page 378-379]. In the summer of 1785 Dagestan visited also kapydzhi-bash - the Turkish military leader - about the sultan's firmanam in which the last called Muslims for "holy war" against Russia in the Caucasus [2, page 178]. It should be noted that not all vla-

detel of Dagestan responded to proposals of Turks. And still some did not resist a tempting possibility of enrichment at the expense of Ottoman treasury and robbery of East Georgia. One of the first Ports the Avarian possessor the Um-ma-han responded to an appeal. The first campaign took place in the spring of 1785. In the second campaign perfect in August - September of the same year, the Avarian governor Ali-Sultan Dzhengutayevsky and the akushinsky qadi accompanied. Total number of the Dagestan groups was about 20 thousand people [2, page 178].

Along with Akhaltsikh's party East Georgia was attacked by Suleyman pasha. Besides, at this time at fortress walls Kizlyar from 10 thousand group appeared the sheikh Mansour. Perhaps, P.G. Butkov when he writes that "all of them acted according to one plan traced from Turks" is right [2, page 178].

The Russian government officially demanded from the Akhaltsikhe pasha to stop the policy of the organization of diversions and military attacks from Dagestan to Georgia. However the pasha evaded the direct question "they other nation an essence" [3, page 209].

On the eve of the beginning of the Russo-Turkish war of 17871791 Akhaltsikhe Suleyman pasha Portoy it was offered to interfere all measures with Russia in the Caucasus and to bring Georgia to a disastrous state, to frighten governors of the next possession that "they did not follow the example of Georgia and did not look for a patronage Russian" [4, page 230].

Having received the order Ports and big money, Suleyman pasha developed broad anti-Russian propaganda in Dagestan. The Akhaltsikhe pasha specified in the address to the Derbent governor of Fatali-hanu that the movement of the Russian troops "to Persia..., to all of us, Muslims, a yak coreligion., is mean and regrettable", calling it and other possessors of the Northeast Caucasus to intercede "for belief and not to give. sow to the muddy water seeking to our harm to make a free channel" [5, l. 61].

At the same time Suleyman pasha set Dagestanis on Georgia, called them for devastation and ruin. In August, 1783 the Akhaltsikhe pasha sent the appeal to the Avarian nutsal, to Tarkovsky to a shamkhal and dzhengutayets with a request for rendering military aid to it for attack on Georgia, promising each participant 50 rub. Following 1784 Suleyman pasha in the next appeal to possessors of Dagestan promised to compensate all expenses connected with a campaign to Georgia. As a result of it certain Dagestanis passed in the secret ways into Akhaltsikh for commission of attacks to Georgia. According to some sources, in Akhaltsikhe there were about 4 thousand mercenaries from Dagestan.

Including Dagestanis "citizens", and Dagestan the "subject" territory of the Ottoman Empire, the sultan government on numerous protests of the Russian government concerning hostile actions of the Akhaltsikhe pasha did not give any answer [5, l. 81, 198]. At last, in December, 1784. Port declared to the Russian ambassador officially that "It is proud -

zhistan, Mingrelia... the same as lands Muslim, and in particular coreligion Dagestan of Turkey" are "subject" Ottomans and protests of Russia concerning its actions "subject and subject... to it territories, belong to the category of inappropriate efforts" the Russian government and are intervention in internal affairs of the sovereign state [1, page 176].

In April - May, 1785 groups from Dagestan 2 times intruded in borders of Georgia, having captured up to 600 people. Besides, Ottomans called Ummah khan Avarian for a campaign to Georgia, having appointed it to contents a huge salary. Suleyman pasha also asked Dagestanis to send to him up to 3 thousand people, promising to deliver them food and also a reward, "what will appoint" [6, page 25]. Thus, having rejected protests of Russia, Port continued to organize attacks of Dagestanis to Georgia.

In March, 1785 in the territory of Chechnya the powerful anti-Russian movement, the first in the history of the North Caucasus, under the leadership of the sheikh Mansour (Ushurm) breaks out. Not so much promotion Ports how many antinational policy pursued by the Russian administration in the region, its approach to sovereignty of the local people was the reason of creation of the anti-Russian coalition of the North Caucasian people. In this plan it should be noted rough actions of the Kizlyar commandant who was constantly interfering with internal affairs of possessors and local people of the Northeast Caucasus often without cause, demanding from them hostages (amanat) and other duties. So, Sh.B. Akhmadov in the work points to the reasons of participation of Chechens and other people of the North Caucasus in the anti-colonial movement: "... Commercial relations of Chechnya with Russia at the end of the 18th century did not gain due development, - he writes, - as economic actions of tsar's authorities, the customs duties, the exchange yards and any other bans constrained this development that in turn caused discontent of the people. thereby aggravating tension of the relations between the Chechen societies and tsar's authorities" [7, page 384-385]. The policy of a tsarism in Chechnya often was followed by retaliatory expeditions, arsons and destruction of villages, destruction of crops, etc. [7, page 385-386]. The same situation developed also across all Dagestan. But the relation to the anti-Russian movement under the leadership of the sheikh Mansour of the Dagestan possessors was ambiguous.

So, for example, Tarkovsky shamkhat Ummah khan the Avarian, kazikumukhsko-kyurinsky khan Mahomed and his son of Surkhay-han at first did not support Ushurma [8, page 137-138]. In response to Ushurma's appeal to oppose Russia the Avarian khan answered it: ".ved at Russia of forces there is a lot of, and Dagestanis have no forces and means and therefore Dagestanis cannot be at war against Russia. It and to Dagestan will not bring any advantage" [9]. Tarkovsky shamkhat Murtuzali was limited to a visit of the son to the camp of insurgents. Perhaps, also the first failures of the sheikh Mansour and anti-affected here

feudal orientation of the movement and also action of the Russian troops against risen, etc. [10].

However in September, 1785 already reported to the commandant of Kizlyar about support of a part of the population of a shamkhalstvo of the movement of Ushurma: "peasants depart from a shamkhal and join in army of the Imam" [11]. It should be noted that also Kumyks, Kumykiya Zasulakskaya's Nogais joined the movement. But already to the middle of 1786 the social base of the movement in the Northeast Caucasus began to be narrowed steadily. Many participants of the movement obrashchatitsya to the Russian command in the Caucasus with a request for forgiveness. The closest associates of Ushurma abandoned insurgents and came over to the side of Russia. As a result in the summer of 1787 Ushurma was forced to move from Chechnya to Zakubanye.

Turkey was interested in continuation of the anti-Russian fight of the North Caucasian people headed by the sheikh Mansour and frequent attacks of the Dagestanis on Georgia distracting big military forces at Russia. It should be noted also that on the eve of war the Ottomans managed to achieve a withdrawal of Russian troops from Tiflis in exchange for the obligation of Dagestanis from now on not to commit an assault on Georgia. The Russian government went to this requirement Ports, trying to delay time of the beginning of war.

However Russia on the eve of the Russo-Turkish war of 1787-1791, considering the created situation in the Caucasus, and in particular in the Northeast Caucasus, in connection with Ushurma (Mansour's) movement decided to take preventive measures. So, fall of 1787 the Russian troops under the leadership of brothers Gorichey were sent in Dagestan and Kabarda. The Russian government, taking such actions, sought to cut performances of Chechens from other people of Central, Northwest Caucasus Mountains and Dagestan which support allegedly could create quite real threat of the Caucasian line and to Kizlyar. Thus, the Russian government was afraid of repetition of events of summer of 1785 when Kizlyar was surrounded by troops of the sheikh Mansour.

In November, 1787 major general I.P. Garics undertook written obligations at Kumyk (endireev-sky, kostekovsky, aksayevsky, bragunsky) possessors in "fidelity and obedience" of Russia and a promise to refuse "to repair attacks" together with Chechens on the Russian limits. As a result of the taken measures the Russian authorities the performance of the Kumyk possessors of Dagestan against Russia did not take place [12, l. 17].

A. Potyomkin reported

In March, 1788 to St. Petersburg about a successful result of a campaign of major general I.P. Garics in Kumykiya Zasulakskaya [12, l. 21].

The Russian government realized fragility of the taken military measures, despite positive results of a military expedition of fall of 1787 therefore it looked for other ways of peaceful relations management with possessors of the Northeast Caucasus. Russia headed for strengthening and expansion of economic, political connections with the Caucasian people, did everything that "to gain attachment of the people of the Northeast Caucasus" [12, l. 21].

Major general I.P. Garics, based on personal observations and numerous messages, addressed to the prince Potyomkin specified in the official report of February 3, 1788: ".ya I find arrangement, kind to us, in all mountain people and, perhaps will be your grace, I can bring together army from them" [13].

However in 1796 the anti-Russian propaganda in Chechnya and Kumykiya Zasulakskaya from outside Ports amplifies. The bragunsky possessor Ros-lambek Mudarov in the message reports about it to the Kizlyar commandant when he points to preparation for the anti-Russian performances in Chechnya and Dagestan [8].

In 1790. Port set to the central part of the North Caucasus 30-thousand army under command of Batal-pashi. The Turkish government connected far-reaching plans with this campaign. Batal-pasha expected to subordinate Kabarda, to capture Kizlyar, to put pressure upon Dagestan and Transcaucasia, to become stronger on the coast of the Caspian Sea and in general in the Caucasus. However in September, 1790 the Russian troops under command of the general I.I. Hermann gained a victory in fight at the Tokhtamysh River over army of Batal-pashi. In this fight Batal-pasha was taken prisoner [14].

It is well-known that Ushurma was generally supported by peasants of the North Caucasus, and the Dagestan possessors, except for a part of Zasulaksky possessors and uzdeny, supporting the sheikh Mansour only till 1787, preferred or to remain on side of Russia, or externally showed loyalty to it. The statements of the famous researchers Sh.B. Akhmadov and V.H. Akayev who note that Ushurma was till summer of 1790 only in Chechnya from where he tried to excite a rebellion among Chechens and Dagestanis again are quite convincing and logical, and in the fall of 1790 moved to Kuban [15]. It is confirmed by documentary sources and demonstrate stay in the fall of 1790 of Ushurma in Dagestan. So, at the beginning of September he stayed in Tarkakh with a shamkhal, and then went to Dzhengutay to Ahmed khan where resolved issues of the organization of a campaign to Kizlyar [16, l. 41-49].

Apparently from correspondence of the Kizlyar commandant major Gryzlov and the top military commander of the Caucasian case general second lieutenant A.B. Balmain, the Russian command in the Caucasus seriously belonged to the arriving data from Chechnya and Dagestan, constantly tracing quickly changing situation in the Northeast Caucasus.

The major general Savelyev, informing in the letter the Kizlyar commandant Gryzlov on approach of Batal-pashi in Kuban, warned him to be ready to attack "big heaps" and to keep "the strongest care" [16, l. 39].

On October 14 reported to the Kizlyar commandant that Ahmed khan Dzhengutayevsky "left with subject to him about 500 people. to Mount Charkusu where was located waiting. to himself from the Chechen villages of inhabitants, and moreover asked a shamkhal that it sent to it the son and would allow the black people of its possession, to connect to it". But Tarkovsky shamkhat did not send either the son, or the people to Ahmed khan [17].

The Kizlyar commandant for full clearing of a situation on places sent the envoy to Kumykiya Zasulakskaya and foothill Dagestan. Soon Gryzlov's envoy sent it the message in which that reported that Endirey, Chirkey, Hubar's inhabitants stated readiness to be at war against Russia. Soon, however, they, having received news of defeat of Batal-pashi in Kuban, refused the planned performance. Further the envoy reported that Ushurma, having received news of defeat of Batal-pashi in Dzhengu-taye, decided to return back to Chechnya. Thus, documentary materials show that the Dagestan possessors actively supported Ushurma and that this support was not limited to time frames of summer of 1785

Spring of 1791 Ottomans still tried as P.G. Butkov specifies, to excite Caucasians and Dagestanis" against Russia, "though it is vain" [2, page 231]. It is explained by the careful and thin policy of the Russian authorities in the region. So, G.A. Potyomkin suggested "to caress during the Russo-Turkish war gifts of possessors of Kumykiya Zasulakskaya, shamkhat also other possessors of the Northeast Caucasus" [18].

In 1791 the Russian government considered Tarkovsky's complaint of a shamkhal to the head of the Kizlyar customs, "repairing any difficulties to trade people" and specified to the Astrakhan and Kizlyar customs not to interfere with trade and economic relations of local community with Russia and that ". there was from them any justice and tenderness of visitors for the bargaining to the people subject to us there" [19].

In April, 1793 the Russian government ordered to the commander of the Russian troops in the Caucasus general I. Gudovich: ". for further benefit of our subject Kabardians, shamkhat Tarkovsky, the possessor Dagestan. and other people, behind the Terek River and Mulka of living, dispose supply with their salt from Lakes Mozharsky as these people abound more scotomas and different products, than money, to arrange exchange where decently", at the same time paying attention to the maintenance of the Caspian flotilla in a due state [19].

This policy of the Russian government got a response from possessors of the Northeast Caucasus. In 1791 in St. Petersburg there arrived the delegation consisting of Kumykiya Zasulakskaya's possessors, Tarkovsky sham-challah of the Derbent khan and other possessors of the Northeast Caucasus with a request to accept them in the Russian citizenship. On April 19, 1793 I. Gudovich accepted oaths of citizenship of Russia from possessors Za-sulaksky Kumykiya and Tarkovsky of a shamkhal again. Shamkhal was made in a rank of the privy councilor with annual pension in 6 thousand rubles. In October of the same year the governor of the Derbent khanate Shikh - Ali khan in a prisust-viya of the Russian officer swore on fidelity of Russia [20]. Russian the government wanted to compensate by such policy a lack of the troops of the region and to ruin plans of sultan Turkey seeking for use of possessors of Chechnya and Dagestan in fight against Russia in the Caucasus. Brilliant victories rus-

sky troops on the land under A.V. Suvorov's command and the Russian fleet led by F.F. Ushakov forced sultan Turkey to ask the world.

On December 29, 1791 in Yassakh the peace which ended the second Russo-Turkish war of 17871791 the Yassky world of 1791 was made did not give Russia of new territorial acquisitions in the North Caucasus, but strengthened its positions to Ciscaucasia. According to Article 6 of the peace treaty, the Ottoman government confirmed that it recognizes Kuban as "as border in that party between both contracting parties".

Thus, most of the people Zakubanya were left for Portoy. However this dependence of the zakubansky people had now formal character. Their considerable part did not recognize this dependence and sought for final accession to Russia.

In general the Yassky world of 1791 had great political value for Russia and the North Caucasian people. Russia strengthened the positions in Northern Black Sea Coast and in the North Caucasus. The Yassky contract also fixed Kabarda's occurrence, Balkaria, Ossetia in structure of Russia.


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2. P.G. Butkov. Materials for a modern history of the Caucasus from 1722 to 1803: in 3 t. SPb., 1869. T. 2.
3. O. Markova of the Item Russia, Transcaucasia in the international relations in the 18th century. M, 1966.
4. R.M. Magomedov. History of Dagestan. Makhachkala, 1968.
5. RGVIA. T. 52. Op. 1. 286. Part 1.
6. N.F. Dubrovin. The history of war and dominion of Russians in Caucasus. SPb., 1872. T. 2.
7. Sh.B. Akhmadov Chechnya and Ingushetia in XVIII - the head of the 19th century. Grozny, 2002.
8. SmirnovM.A. Politician of Russia in the Caucasus in the 16-19th centuries M., 1958.
9. RGVIA. T. 52. Op. 2. 52. L. 121.
10. Chechnya. History and present. M, 1996. Page 169.
11. A. Bennigsen. People's movement in the Caucasus in the 18th century. Makhachkala, 1994. 80 pages
12. RGVIA. T. 52. Op. 2. 487.
13. In the same place. 483. L. 3-4.
14. History of the people of the North Caucasus from the most ancient times to the 18th century of M., 1988. Page 458.
15. Sh.B. Akhmadov, V.H. Akayev. Liberation movement of mountaineers of Chechnya and the North Caucasus under Mansour's leadership in 1785-1791//the Sheikh Mansour and osvo-

boditelny fight of the people of the North Caucasus in the last third of the 18th century. Grozny, 1992.

16. TsGARD. T. 379. Op. 3. 8.
17. In the same place. 82. L. 64.
18. RGVIA. T. 52. Op. 2. 32. L. 178.
19. AVPR. T. The intercourses of Russia with Persia 1791-1799 Op. 77/6. 472.
20. AKAK. T. 2. Page 294-295; 1. L. 53.

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