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trends of illumination of history of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939-1940 in a domestic historiography


to the 70 anniversary of the end of the Soviet-Finnish war

Yu.A. Nikiforov, R.F. Subkhankulov.

Article is devoted to the analysis of a modern domestic historiography of the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 — 1940. Authors focus attention first of all on discussion of the problems connected with the reasons and results of war. In article it is shown that as a result of fruitful discussions of the last 20 years will make significant progress according to earlier poorly studied plots of history of "Winter war". In a historiography conclusions are drawn that the reasons of war are irreducible only to the Soviet-Finnish bilateral relations which were under construction in a direct connection with the general development of the international situation characterized by gradual aggravation of a situation in Europe. Historiographic judgment of results of war leads to a conclusion that, despite statement of communication between "the winter war" and strengthening in Helsinki of revanchist political forces in 1940 — 1941, there are no sufficient bases to claim, the chtofinlyandiya would not become the satellite of Germany in case "Winter war" does not take place at all.

at - | about the beginnings of the 1990th history Soviet and financial (Was among Alyandsky war to those which study was extremely complicated. In the Soviet historiography, in fact, there were no special works where the war reasons would be investigated. Out of sight of historians there were also questions connected with its results: a problem of accession of Finland of the kagressivny coalition headed by Germany for participation in attack on the USSR in the summer of 1941, a question of influence of results of war on determination of aggression terms by Hitler, etc. Restriction of access to the documents concerning to Tim to events was an objective prerequisite of such situation. Estimates and representations, widespread in literature, corresponded to the general assessment of the reasons and results of the war given by soviet leadership in official documents and performances.

In Soviet period almost for half a century in a historiography the representation according to which the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 — 1940 was provoked by the Finnish side dominated. At the description of the reasons of its emergence it was indicated first of all hostile policy of the Finnish ruling circles for the USSR, dependence of Finland on the countries of the West (both contradictory blocks) which imposed it a role of "the military base of the imperialistic states". Responsibility for emergence of war was conferred, thus, on the powers of the West which "provoked" Finland to a military performance against the USSR and also "reactionary circles" of Finlyandii1.

Similar estimates, however, were characteristic first of all of the publicistic literature intending for the mass reader.

Yury Aleksandrovich Nikiforov is a candidate of historical sciences, the senior research associate of Institute of general history of RAS, Ruslan Fanzilevich Subkhankulov is a soikatel of Department of history of the Military university Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, e-tapas: 9035038012@tap. highway

Against the background of normalization and strengthening of good neighbourhood between Finland and the USSR by the end of the 1950th they gradually faded into the background, and in this situation remembered events of "winter war" more and more seldom. Moreover, war, as a rule, was called not war, but "armed conflict". Till 1980th the historians, in effect, avoided in detail to investigate a position of the leadership of the USSR and policy which it pursued on the international scene in the late thirties, including concerning Finland. It belongs to works of such famous historians as E.A. Ambartsumov, V.G. Fedorov, Yu. Komissarov (Yu.S. Deryabin), V.V. Pokhlebkin, etc. 2

As for war results, their official assessment from the Soviet Union was given first of all through a prism of a safety task of Leningrada3, and entered the Soviet historiography of World War II as standard. Right after the end of World War II the famous political figure O. Kuusinen in a number of publicistic works on character proved a thesis that Finland was the satellite of Hitlerite Germanii4. Its articles, as well as articles of some other avtorov5, polemic were pointed against statements about existence of relationship of cause and effect between the Soviet-Finnish war of 1939 — 1940 and the decision of the Finnish leaders to join a Hitlerite "campaign on the East".

In the Finnish historiography within decades after war the theory of "a log in a prompt stream" 6 according to which Finland came into war with the USSR in 1941 into force of "the Soviet threat", i.e. against the desire dominated, and only "pribegnut to the help" Nazi Germanii7. This concept, apparently, was the general for the western historiography of the period of "Cold War" what reproduction of the corresponding estimates and interpretations as in German, and English-speaking post-war literature8 testifies to. Efforts of those Soviet historians who until the end of the 1980th anyway researched voprosa9 were directed to criticism of the theory of "a floatable log" and to the proof that in 1940 — 1941 there was a dependence of Finland on Germany and. The most consecutive justification of falsehood of this theory was given in works of the St. Petersburg historians N.I. Baryshnikov, V.N. Baryshnikov, V.G. Fedorova10.

At a new stage of development of a domestic historiography there were prerequisites for more in-depth study of history of World War II and elimination of a number of "white spots". Events

1939 — 1941 drew special attention of historians and the general public as were studied in insufficient degree and, in addition, served as a subject of topical political debates. In the late eighties officially existence of the confidential protocol to Soviet German nonaggression pact of August 23, 1939 was recognized for It gave an impetus to revaluation of a number of events of the end of the 1930th — 1941, including events of the "winter war" recognized "as one of the most closed" before subjects for issledovaniya11. Unfortunately, during "reorganization" the lighting in historical and publicistic literature of the subjects which are earlier closed for extensive discussion was conducted under visible effect of a social and political situation. Various historical "sensations" and history in general were used in an ideological campaign for undermining legitimacy Soviet gosu-darstva12. It negatively affected quality of the published materials on historical subjects: statement of the difficult, debatable and low-studied questions often was superficial, the analysis and an explanation were substituted for emotional estimates, conclusions of authors at deliberate categoriality were poorly reasoned. At the same time specialists historians had no opportunity in order that in new conditions of "publicity" to immediately offer society the researches based on impartial studying just declassified documents which carrying out required time.

Many articles about the course of war and events, it predshestvovavshikh13 which authors hurried to satisfy the interest of the reading public in "white spots" of the Soviet history were published. According to V.N. Baryshnikov, grinding of sight of estimates of the Soviet-Finnish war was critical 1989 god14. Then there were works which admitted that the initiative of the beginning of war proceeded from the USSR. Besides, the edition of earlier classified documents and also not published memoirs of prominent statesmen of the USSR, a vchastnost, N.S. Hru-shcheva began and And. Kollontay15. By the present moment the considerable number of the sources which allowed to bring studying "winter war" to qualitatively new uroven16 is introduced for scientific use.

From now on is conventional that the Soviet-Finnish war was begun with the Soviet Union. In Mined so-called boundary provocations of the Finnish side, including shots on November 26, 1939, cannot be considered as the war reason as the decision

about its beginning was accepted in Moscow under the influence of failure of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations of fall

1939 . Boundary incidents were used by soviet leadership for strengthening of diplomatic pressure upon Finland and - as in a case with incident in Mined - a reason for unleashing of the conflict.

The most irreconcilable criticism of Stalin foreign policy leaned on a wide range of representations according to which the USSR conducted an expansionist foreign policy, and cooperation with neighboring states was not included into the action program of the soviet leadership setting as the purpose their submission and inclusion in structure of CCCP17 at all. Also the opinion on "uselessness" of the Soviet-Finnish war which was regarded as the error of soviet leadership which caused negative for the USSR posledstviya18 became widespread.

Idea of "uselessness" and "accident" of the Soviet-Finnish conflict means denial of the look, traditional for domestic historians, connecting emergence of war with a problem of need of safety of Leningrad in the conditions of the begun World War II in Europe, proximity of passing of the Soviet-Finnish border and a possibility of involvement of Finland in the coalition of the states hostile to the USSR. Nevertheless, M.I. Semiryaga wrote that "the main factor which predetermined... the Soviet-Finnish conflict, there was a nature of a political situation in the region of Northern Europe, especially bilateral relations between the USSR and Finland.... Certainly, Finland could not attack the Soviet Union, however the soviet leadership did not exclude that some power of the West could even without its consent use the territory in the aggressive purposes" 19.

More radical position which with good reason can be characterized as revisionist in relation to the Soviet historiography is presented in K. Alexandrov, B. Sokolov, P. Aptekar's works and some other the authors carrying rather publicistic, than scientific character. Emergence of the Soviet-Finnish war directly contacts "an expansionist foreign policy" of the USSR for "incitement of world revolution" 20 here. The known facts are interpreted first of all proceeding from general idea about intention of the Stalin management to commit an assault on the adjacent countries that "to unyoke Europe of capitalism", and diplomatic initiatives of the USSR,

the borders aimed at change by sfinlyandi-it - as only one of the means used by Stalin for creation of conditions under which occupation and "Sovietization" of Finland will become possible. The Soviet rhetoric about threat of "safety of Leningrad" - only a pretext for transfer of border "is farther on the West" 21.

In the mid-nineties to this point of view inclined also M.I. Semiryaga who said a discussion entrance on pages of the Rodina magazine that for determination of nature of "winter war" "it is not obligatory to analyze negotiations of fall of 1939. For this purpose it is necessary just to know the general concept of the world communistic movement of Komintern and the Stalin concept - great-power claims for those regions which were a part of the Russian Empire earlier. And the purposes were - to annex in general all Finland. And to anything a talk about 35 kilometers to Leningrad, 25 kilometers to Leningrad." 22.

As V.N. Baryshnikov fairly noted, the thesis about the expansionist purposes of the leadership of the USSR in the 1930th is not based on the analysis of the Soviet foreign policy in the 1920th — the 1930th or any earlier classified documents of this period. As the main proof of existence of these purposes serves first of all "winter war" which is interpreted as attempt of "Sovietization" of Finland and also some other the foreign policy actions of the USSR undertaken in 1939 —

1940 (the introduction of RKKA on the territory of Poland on September 17, 1939, inclusion in structure of the USSR of the Baltic states in the summer of 1940) and also the corresponding interpretation of contents of the nonaggression pact with Germany on August 23
1939 and confidential protocols to it. The characteristic of approach to sources of the called group of authors can be considered mistrust to recorded in the Soviet official documents (statements of the Soviet government, transcripts of bilateral negotiations, etc.) of a position. As a rule, giving the comment on any given quotes from sources, these historians mean that the official position of soviet leadership (or personally Stalin) was exclusively hypocritical and tactical, not declared purposes of achievement of world supremacy designed to facilitate achievement true. Also the fact that Stalin expansionism contacts in this case the doctrine of world revolution and activity of Komintern, "great-power ambitions" and claims for geopolitical inheritance of the Russian Empire that, apparently, it is difficult to coordinate is represented characteristic. It is represented,

this uncertainty first of all is connected with difficulty of justification of that and other option with a support on sources.

The wide expansionist purposes, in fact, are just attributed to soviet leadership. M.I. Meltyukhov, for example, considers the history of emergence of "winter war" as one of episodes of global fight of great powers for expansion of the influence in the world. Its approach distinguishes recognition of independence of this fight of the nature of the political regime existing in any given country and the dominating social and economic relations. War, Meltyukhov considers, it is simple "one of methods of relationship of the states on the international scene" 23. Meltyukhov attributes to the Soviet Union the purpose of "global reorganization of a system of the international relations" and, respectively, interest in emergence new world voyny24.

The opposite point of view first of all proceeds from recognition of existence of real military threat for the USSR in the 1930th, and concern of the leadership of the USSR of a problem of providing and strengthening of safety of the country is considered as reasonable. "For the Soviet Union the situation around Finland was closely connected with security of the USSR, especially if to consider that from it to Leningrad there were only 32 km, - the academician A.O. Chu-baryan specifies, for example. - The leadership of the USSR was constantly disturbed by activity of Germany in this country and also close ties of the Finnish elite with Great Britain and France" 25.

The revisionist point of view as it was already told, first of all was presented in periodicals of the end of the 1980th — the first half of the 1990th. Historical researches of the end of the 1990th and later period contained more developed statement of the circumstances which led to a war considering a number of the factors which are not reduced only to an ideological indoktrinirovannost of soviet leadership in any way.

As justification of interest of the leadership of the Soviet Union first of all in safety of the borders serves the history of negotiations of the USSR with Finland in 1939. Territorial concessions which the Soviet government got from Finland had to improve geostrategic position of Leningrad, anyway. This position was formulated by Stalin during negotiations accurately and unambiguously: "We ask that the distance from Leningrad to the line of border would be

seventy kilometers. Our minimum requirements are that, and you should not think that we will reduce them. We cannot move Leningrad therefore the line of border has to be transferred" 26. In 1996 there was known earlier secret transcript of a meeting of the highest command structure of the Red Army going to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) on April 14 — 17, 1940 on which Stalin, summing up the war results, spoke as follows: "War was necessary as peace talks a sfinlyandiya did not yield results, and safety of Leningrad should be ensured certainly because its safety is safety of our Fatherland" 27. Thus, these and others available sources of historians reflect first of all the pragmatical nature of motivation of the Stalin actions which are not connected directly with implementation of any ideological doctrines.

History of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations

1938 — 1939 it is in detail considered in V.N. Baryshnikov, M.I. Meltyukhov, V.Ya. Si-pols, A.O. Chubaryan, A.V. Choubin's works, etc. As it is represented, the content of negotiations demonstrates intention of Moscow to achieve improvement of the positions on Baltic, and occupation of Finland was not included into intentions of soviet leadership. Having made sure of impossibility to get from Finland concessions in the diplomatic way, the soviet leadership made the decision to begin voynu28. A.V. Choubin, in particular, emphasizes that references to a neutrality of Finland as on the circumstance guaranteeing it nonparticipation in the coalition hostile to the Soviet Union are insolvent. The neutrality of the small countries as experience of the European war showed, was not an obstacle for the German aggression. Therefore Stalin had bases to be afraid of disembarkation of the forwarding corps of the opponent of a vfinlyan-diya and his pass through its territory for blow to Leningradu29.

As for references at reconstruction of the causes of conflict to Comintern ideology or Stalin velikoderzhavy, A.V. Choubin considers, the content of the Soviet-Finnish negotiations in the fall of 1939 demonstrates that these general motives did not play an essential role at the solution of a question, to be or not to be to war. ". If Stalin held in the head only the interests of "the world communistic movement", - he writes, - he should not have bargained because of border kilometers. All the same then communists will get everything. And war should not be waged - war of aggression undermines authority of the communistic movement./.../Another matter - great-power

claims. But to bargain because of kilometers again it is silly. AStalin - here you are - bargained, wasting the precious time which remained till winter" 30.

The contents of the Soviet offers on transfer of border also testify in favor of this point of view. The Soviet requirements, A.O. Chubaryan pays attention, had the long historical past. For example, on the eve of World War I the Russian General Staff prepared the memorandum where the threat of attack of Germany with use of the territory of Finland is characterized approximately the same as it saw each other later quarter of the century to Stalin and the General Staff of the Red Army. The Soviet delegation asked Finns to give way to B1920 of during negotiations on the conclusion of the Tartu world a part of the territory on the Karelian Isthmus north of Leningrad and some islands in Finnish zalive31.

It is necessary to recognize this argument as rather convincing: really, the content of negotiations during which the Soviet part persistently tried to obtain transfer of border, repeatedly correcting the offers ("bargained") in hope that Finns will make a compromise, demonstrates that for soviet leadership during this period on the forefront there was a problem not of implementation of any ideological doctrines, and achievement of improvement of the geostrategic positions in anticipation of participation in world war.

It is not contradicted even by recognition of one of the war purposes from the Soviet Union reduction to the power in Finland of "the national government" led by. Kuusinen, as M.I. Meltyukhov believes, for example, considering that it "in general would remove a question of borders" 32. The fact is that the idea of creation of "O. Kuusinen's government" was improvisation of the Soviet part to which it was decided to resort when the Soviet-Finnish negotiations came to a standstill and the Stalin management was inclined to power option of permission konflikta33. It is represented that till fall of 1939 the soviet leadership did not assume to attack Finland and the more so it did not mean its occupation. Only failure of negotiations of fall of 1939 pushed Stalin to the decision to begin in war. Of course, in the Kremlin could study option at which the Red Army will manage to solve an objective of defeat of the Finnish army and, perhaps, zanyatkhelsinka at short notice. Nevertheless, the final decision concerning the fate of Finland could be hardly made before the successful end of military operations. In any case, materials on the basis of which it is possible to judge

about existence in the Kremlin of absolutely certain plans concerning the future of Finland, it is not enough today to draw a final conclusion on this matter. It should be emphasized as in a historiography it is possible to meet today absolutely baseless assertions as if the Russian historians "practically everything are unanimous that the aspiration of the Soviet government consisted in accession of Finland and education in its territory of the socialist state or even the federal republic." 34. As we saw, the relation of historians to this problem is far not so unambiguous.

Prior to the beginning of the 1990th the studying history of formation and functioning of "the Teriyoksky government" ("Kuusinen's governments") was extremely complicated as historians could use, in fact, the official documents only published by the Soviet press. Only after the collapse of the USSR there were prerequisites for scientific research of all complex of the problems connected with the purposes of the government of the Soviet Union in war against Finland. Including the history of "Kuusinen's government" also came under the spotlight. The most serious research on this subject is N.I. and V.N. Barysh-nikovykh35's monograph today. Generalizing the material which is saved up by modern science, authors give additional confirmations concerning the fact that the initiative of creation of "government" proceeded only from the Soviet part, open Kremlin control methods of activity of his members and concretize a circle of people standing behind realization of this idea. Authors emphasize that assistance of implementation of the general plan of "winter war" 36 was its main goal. First of all, declaration of "government" vte-riyoka was directed to split of the Finnish society, its disorganization in war against the USSR. In documents of "Kuusinen's government" it was emphasized that "The Finnish Democratic Republic as the state not of the Soviet type cannot be a part of the Soviet Union." 37. As for prospects of this "government", they had to depend on support of its actions by the population of Finland.

Estimating creation of "Kuusinen's government" as large political oshibku38, N.I. and V.N. Baryshnikov convincingly show that creation of "the national government" was not a fruit of any long born plan. This step, along with the decision to begin war with Finland, was insufficiently

it is prepared, and its implementation was far from perfect.

We will note that in many works the history of emergence of the Soviet-Finnish war comes down only to a plot of negotiation process, and then opposition of the USSR and Finland. However influence on the course of negotiations, so and on the solution of a question to be or not to be to war, rendered other powers. In our opinion, consideration of the Soviet-Finnish war in a wide context of development of the situation in Europe during pre-war crisis allows to consider at identification of the causes of conflict some other which not always are coming into the view of factors that gives the chance to paint more panoramic and objective picture which is not reduced in general to the bilateral relations of the USSR and Finland (even taking into account a position of Germany and existence of the confidential protocol to Soviet German contract of August 23, 1939). A.G. Dongarov in 1990 paid attention that "the true, fundamental reasons lay beyond the scope of the relations between two countries. Not the ideal, Soviet-Finnish relations taken in itself, let did not mean inevitability of armed conflict" 39.

For experts clearly that scientific reconstruction of the causes of the Soviet-Finnish conflict is impossible without the general background of the European policy which had significant effect on the Soviet-Finnish relations. Tension sources in the Soviet-Finnish relations were connected with the general aggravation of a situation in Europe, a condition of the relations of the USSR with Germany and England. The conflict of interests of great powers involved the increasing number of the small countries which fate began to depend on the course of global confrontation in the orbit. Aggression of Germany in Europe against the background of carried out by England and France politicians of "pacification" brought Europe to new world war. As for the Soviet Union, it could not seriously expect to remain away from the conflict which was potentially posing threat to its state independence and existence inhabiting it narodov40. V.S. Hristoforov, for example, emphasizes: "It is represented obvious that events of Winter war should be considered first of all not in a bilateral format - either only the USSR or only Finland as it was typical for the Soviet historiography or for Finnish is guilty, and to look at events more widely, having analyzed the political positions taken by all powers, so-called

"small" and "great" which mutually exclusive interests faced in the conditions of the begun World War II on the northern flank of Europe" 41.

The beginning of war between Germany and the Anglo-French coalition and also the Soviet-German nonaggression pact of 1939 can be considered, first of all, as direct prerequisites of emergence of "winter war". As a result of attack of Germany on Poland, the announcement England and France of war of Germany and also the achieved negotiated settlement of the Soviet-German relations created a situation in which decision-making in the Kremlin on use of military force for the solution of a question of transfer of border became possible. Existence of these prerequisites did not mean, however, inevitability of emergence of the Soviet-Finnish war - its immediate causes are connected, on the one hand, with intension of soviet leadership to achieve improvement of geostrategic positions in the Baltic region for strengthening of own safety, and on the other hand - with a position of the government of Finland which chose variantzhestky opposition and rejection of the Soviet requirements.

Speaking about assessment of results of "winter war", the general assessment of the Soviet-Finnish war as unnecessary adventure which results in general had first of all negative character for ours strany42 was characteristic of historical journalism of the first half of the 1990th. The victory in war reached by the Red Army quite often was characterized as "Pyrrhic" (M.I. Xie-miryaga, B.V. Sokolov), authors even found it possible to tell some about "defeat" of the Soviet foreign policy strategy, etc. 43

Similar estimates acted as basis for consideration of more private plots. In particular, one of the most often called consequences of war is the influence on a position of Germany rendered by its course and results and its policy for the USSR. As a rule, existence of a direct connection between the course of the Soviet-Finnish war and policy of Germany for the Soviet Union after its termination was approved. For example, G.L. Rozanov wrote in the monograph "Stalin — Hitler" published in 1991 that the course and the result of war "significantly influenced" the decisions made in Berlin concerning CCCP44.

G.L. Rozanov showed that during the Soviet-Finnish war Germany took a position of "a formal neutrality with secret support of Finland" as to its interests

most of all there corresponded the long conflict weakening the USSR and fueling its tension with England and SShA45. In Berlin watched closely the war course, and made the decision on reduction of terms of preparation of war against the USSR in a type of the detected weakness of the Red Army. Thus, G.L. Rozanov considered, one of results of "winter war" the "updating of the schedule of acts of aggression" made by Hitler that gave the grounds to the historian began to estimate "the Finnish adventure of Stalin" as a mistake and prestupleniye46.

The weakness of the Red Army which was detected allegedly during the Soviet-Finnish war was regarded, in turn, as the reason that the Soviet Union ceased to be considered as the reliable ally in London and Paris. "Finnish campaign of the Red Army, - A.M. Noskov wrote, for example, in "The military and historical magazine", - kind of for an instant highlighted that imbalance of military power in favor of fascist Germany which resulted from split of anti-fascist forces both in each of the European countries, and in Europe in general. The Soviet Union did not begin to be considered as a serious factor of force or the reliable ally in the come war any more" 47. War, specifies Socks, led to a bigger isolation of the Soviet Union on the international scene, "the western powers began to take openly hostile stand on the USSR, considering it as potential opponent". P.B. Lipatov agrees with it: "War with Finland and bombings of the cities complicated world situation of the Soviet Union" 48.

A.M. Noskov also believed that the losses suffered in "winter war" demanded a respite for the Red Army, caused the necessity of reorganization and re-equipment. It as if generated fear and uncertainty at soviet leadership, as became the reason for carrying out policy of "pacification" of Hitler. As for Germany, in Berlin there was a confidence that the USSR will not be able to assist France and Anglii49.

In this way also M.I. Semiryaga argued. According to him, the general mark of fighting capacity of the Red Army made in the European capitals was low. Military attaches "very critically spoke of professionalism of the Soviet commanders of all ranks, their inability to organize interaction in the battlefield, carelessness concerning life and health of Red Army men. Extremely low level of military discipline in the Red Army was noted". On the basis of these reports in the capitals of the western powers drew a conclusion about the general weakness of the USSR

militarily. London and Paris considered that the Soviet Union cannot be considered as the serious partner in possible negotiations on military cooperation, and in Berlin the opinion as if an USSR-colossus on clay feet with whom it will be easy to cope in the forthcoming military stolknovenii50 dominated.

This thesis was willingly picked up by those authors of whom the accusatory bias at illumination of foreign and domestic policy of the USSR of the period of the 1930th was characteristic. "The lack of talent of the Soviet command which was found in the Soviet-Finnish war strengthened Hitler's determination to be at war with the USSR", - claimed, for example, on pages of the Leninskaya Pravda newspaper of V. Huo-lodkovskiy51.

Indeed, as for Germany, there are certificates in favor of the fact that in the German leading circles after the Soviet-Finnish conflict began to incline to a thought of a possibility of achievement of an easy victory over Soviet Soyuzom52. However documents and opposite character are known: for example, on March 8

1940 Mr. Hitler in Mussolini's letter gave such assessment of results of "winter war": "In view of supply opportunities, no force in the world could or if could, then only after long preparations to achieve such results at a frost in 30 — 40 degrees and on such area, kakikhdostigl Russian." 53. So this question, in effect, was not exposed to a serious research in a domestic historiography, and the statements wandering from work in work need documentary confirmation. Especially, not absolutely clearly, the thesis about acceleration of preparation of Germany for attack on the USSR in connection with "winter war" as it is known that the basic decision on the beginning of preparation for realization of a plan of a campaign on the East was made by Hitler in the summer of 1940, after defeat of France is how fair, and depended first of all on succession of events on western fronte54.

A.M. Noskov suggested also that the leadership of Germany made the decision on preparation of the operation "Vezeryubung" on occupation of the base in Northern Europe under an impression of weakness of the Red Army. This assumption does not find any support in sources. On the contrary, if to address long ago famous historians to the documents connected with planning and preparation by Nazis of the operation "Vezeryu-bung", then will become obvious that capture of Norway was closely connected with the general strategic concept of Hitler and his plans of conducting World War II, according to which

creation of the base to vseverny Europe had to "facilitate performance of tasks in war against Russia" 55; direct implementation of these plans in the spring of 1940 coordinated with the course of military confrontation with Angliyey56. Another thing is that the Soviet-Finnish war in the winter of 1939 began to be considered in London as a convenient pretext for establishment of control over the ports of Scandinavia for to prevent transportation of raw materials to Germany. The activity of Britain in this region, in particular, hijacking of the German Altmark transport in the Norwegian territorial waters, convinced Hitler of gravity of threat. Foreign researchers, in particular, specially studied this question E came to such conclusions also long ago. Zimke57. Only in such foreshortening "the winter war" can be considered as one of the factors which influenced adoption by Hitler of the decision to carry out preventive capture of Norway during this period.

One more thesis which was actively used in journalism of the 1990th - the statement borrowed from the western literature of the period of "Cold War" that Finland, there is no winter war" would remain neutral in future Soviet-German conflict. This point of view expressed, first of all, in the Finnish historiography earlier. ". If not "winter war" in which we lost the tenth part of the territory Finland, perhaps, would not become Hitler's ally in the forty first, having preferred a neutrality of "the Swedish option", the Finnish army moved to that summer only to take away selected", - the Finnish historian Yu claimed. Nevakivi58. The subjunctive mood used by Yu. Nevakivi - the Russian authors attracts attention, though did not investigate in a special way the matter, expressed much more resolutely, and often such statements were made by the people far from history by the nature of professional zanyatiy59.

Responsibility for participation of Finland in attack on the USSR and the Siege of Leningrad is assigned, thus, to Stalin and his confidants. V. Holodkovsky directly accused soviet leadership that it the unreasonable anneksionizm "prevented Finland to be neutral". "There is no Soviet-Finnish war, - he wrote, - Finland would be neutral., and it would ensure safety of Leningrad enough" 60. The same way K. Alexandrov argues: "Aggression of 1939 became a decisive factor of an open performance of Finland in 1941 against the USSR which led to the Siege of Leningrad and millions

died of hunger" 61. They were echoed by P. Aptekar: ".svoy own hands created one more opponent in war prior to which there was only one year, three months and nine days" 62. In 2004 the monograph by P. Aptekar in which the author reproduced the corresponding theses saw to the public: "Finland from the probable opponent after this war turned into obligatory during attack of any state on our country" 63. P.B. Lipatov also pointed to communication between winter war and attack of Finland on the USSR in 1941 64

We will note that the called historians, despite categoriality of the statements, did not offer a little reasoned justification of existence of relationship of cause and effect between the Soviet-Finnish war and attack of Finland on the USSR in 1941 P. Aptekar, for example, is limited to the quote from M. Starinov's composition of "The saboteur's note" where the last wrote: "As a result of bloody unpopular war. the border was removed on the West., but Finland from the English French block passed into the Hitlerite camp, and it brought pozzh?

Michael Ramirez
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