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Hunger of 1932-1933 general tragedy of the people of the USSR





UDC. 94(47)(082.1)

hunger of 1932 1933 - the GENERAL TRAGEDY of the PEOPLE of the USSR

© V.V. KONDRASHIN Penza state pedagogical university of V.G. Belinsky department of national history and technique of teaching history email:

V.V. Kondrashin - Hunger of 1932-1933 - the general tragedy of the people of the USSR//PGPU News of V.G. Belinsky. 2009. No. 11 (15). Page 117-120. - In article on the basis of the analysis of results of long-term work of the author on a subject of hunger of 1932-1933 in the USSR in the central and regional archives arguments against the official concept of the Ukrainian historians about genocide by Famine-Genocide in 1932-1933 of Ukraine are adduced. It is proved that in fact it was the general tragedy of the people of the USSR caused by results of Stalin agrarian policy.

Kondrashin V. V. - Famine 1932-1933 - the general tragedy folk USSR//Izv. Penz. gos. pedagog. univ. im. V. G. Belinskogo. 2009. No. 11 (15). P. 117-120. - In article on base of the analysis result perennial functioning(working) author on subject of the hunger 1932-1933 in USSR in central and regional archives happen to the arguments against official concept Ukrainian historians about genocide holodomor in 1932-1933 Ukraine. It Is Proved; that actually this was a general tragedy folk USSR, conditioned result Stalin agrarian policy.

Now in historical literature and journalism two main points of view concerning hunger of 1932-1933 are presented to the USSR. The first point of view is supporters of the concept about Famine-Genocide in Ukraine as specifically Ukrainian phenomenon as genocide of the people of Ukraine from the Stalin mode on purpose not to allow an exit from the USSR of the Soviet Ukraine [9]. The second point of view - their opponents, in the majority the Russian historians. On their argument we will also stop in this article.

The Russian researchers began to write about hunger of 1932-1933 to the USSR in the second half of the 1980th years. For the first time this subject sounded then in publications of historians-agrarians of Institute of history of the USSR of Academy of Sciences of the USSR, and then Institute of the Russian history of RAS, V.P. Danilov, N.A. Ivnitsky, I.E. Zelenin [10. Page 23-35]. In them also the alternative point of view was defined on a problem of hunger of 1932-1933 in the USSR. Its essence in the following: hunger of 1932-1933 - the tragedy of all Soviet peasantry, result of implementation in the USSR Stalin model of the forced industrialization which caused violent collectivization and compulsory preparations of agricultural products, first of all grain-collections, for the sake of increase in the amount of grain export and satisfaction of requirements of the growing industry.

This position is documented in the published multivolume collections of documents "The tragedy of the Soviet village: collectivization and a dispossession of kulaks" [21], "The Soviet village eyes of Cheka-OGPU-NKVD" [20], left within the international projects organized by V.P. Danilov. Its participants, including the author of the present article, on the basis of the analysis of documents, earlier inaccessible for researchers, from the central and local archives published in the above-mentioned collections and which did not enter them prepared numerous publications on collectivization stories in the USSR, including hunger of 1932-1933 [10. Page 474-486].

participation in them of the famous western scientists was feature of projects of V.P. Danilov: River of a devi-s (England), S. Uitkroft (Australia), L. Viola (Canada), L. Samuelson (Sweden). In many respects thanks to participation in the specified projects S. Uitkroft and R. Davies managed to write the joint monograph devoted to the analysis of a situation in agriculture of the USSR in 1931-1933, having got acquainted with which R. konkvest in the letter to authors of the book pointed to its scientific value [7].

In the 1990th - the beginning of the 2000th years in Russia there were researches of hunger of 1932-1933 at the regional level in which authors on local material confirmed the above concept is-

torik of Institute of the Russian history of RAS. Among them, first of all, it is necessary to call E.Yu. Baranov's publications, G.E. Kornilov about hunger in the Urals, P.V. Zagorovsky and S.A. Esikov about hunger in the Central Chernozem area, T.D. Nadkina about hunger in the Republic of Mordovia, N.E. Kaunova about hunger on average the Volga region, A.A. Hermann about hunger in the Republic of Germans of the Volga region, E.N. Oskolkov about hunger in the North Caucasus, etc. In them distribution of hungry disaster in 1930-1934 across all territory of the USSR is proved: in Ukraine, on Don, Kuban, in the Volga region, CChO, South Ural, Western Siberia [10. Page 474-486], Kyrgyzstan [3]. On dramatic nature and consequences the hunger in Kazakhstan became absolutely exclusive [1]. The publications of the Russian historians and their colleagues which are available at the moment from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus allow to conclude with full confidence that to a degree in 1929-1934 practically all country and urban population of the USSR starved.

The author of the present article learned by own experience that the tragedy of 1932-1933 in Russian regions left not less indelible mark in national memory, than in Ukraine. Researching hunger of 1932-1933 in the Volga region and in South Ural, he bypassed 5 areas and in 102 settlements interviewed about 700 eyewitnesses of the tragedy [11]. Their certificates can be put in one row with the published memoirs of the Ukrainian peasants in known "To the national book memorial "Hunger 33" of Lidiya Kovalenko and Vladimir Manyak. In each Russian village which got to a hunger zone as well as Ukrainian, remembered and still remember the thirty third year. Not casually, for example, in the regional settlement Small Serdoba of the Penza region inhabitants established the memorable sign - an obelisk in memory of the victims of the thirty third year, and on the outskirts of the settlement on the place of mass burial of the victims of hunger - an orthodox cross.

Attentive studying sources specifies that there was a process of gradual and simultaneous entry of the collectivized regions of the USSR into hunger, and there were uniform origins of a hungry situation in the basis in grain regions of the country in 1929-1934. Hunger was a consequence of anti-country Stalin agrarian policy (violent collectivization) which destroyed traditional, centuries the existing system of survival of the village in the conditions of hungry accident. During the collectivization and compulsory preparations of food, inseparably linked with it, in the village there is no insurance reserve of grain left and other products in case of hunger. The dispossession of kulaks withdrew from rural life of the fist which was traditionally helping the poor during hunger. The situation was aggravated by actions of the power for fight against spontaneous population shift from hunger epicenters.

Communication of hunger and industrialization as the last became the reason of hungry export is obvious to the Russian historians. In 1930-1933 from the USSR over 10 million tons of grain were taken out. Epicenters of hunger appeared first of all grain -

the Vyya the regions of the USSR announced by zones of continuous collectivization where wheat and a rye for export were traditionally grown up. And the lion's share of the Soviet grain sent for export in the early thirties (70%), fell on two regions of the USSR - the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasian edge, and other - to the Lower Volga and CChO [14]. In them as a result of compulsory planting of collective farms and pumping from all of them food resources in 1932-1933 there came mass hunger with all its horrors. Thus, first of all, economic specialization of areas predetermined tragedy scales in concrete regions of the USSR.

Communication of collectivization and the hungry tragedy is obviously looked through on the example of Kazakhstan (entering as autonomy RSFSR) where in 1929-1930 owing to thoughtless nationalization of the cattle and the overestimated plans of skotozagotovka the cattle-farmers began to die of hunger. The similar situation, though with the smaller human victims, in 1930-1931 was observed also in other regions of the USSR which appeared in a zone of continuous collectivization.

Negative results and miscalculations of the system of planning of agricultural production chosen by the Stalin management, especially plans of the state preparations of food are obvious. They were obviously overestimated in terms of a production condition of collective farms and all agrarian sector in general. Their performance by means of administrative and repressive measures destroyed agriculture, undermined the interest of peasants (collective farmers and individualists) in honest work, caused their resistance in the form of theft of grain, an unauthorized otkhodnichestvo, negligent work on farms and in the field.

Strengthening of violence over the peasantry which reached the culmination in the fall of 1932 in the grain regions of the USSR (Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Lower Volga) where by means of emergency measures from the village on account of grain-collections the main food stocks were withdrawn became response of the power to the crisis of agriculture created by it. The hungry pestilence of 1933 turned out to be consequence of these measures.

Sources known to experts indicate approximately same mechanism of repressions against the peasantry which is carried out by the Stalin mode for the purpose of implementation of plans of grain-collections. The October Plenum of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of the Central Committee of 1931 about grain-collections concerned all grain areas. The extraordinary commissions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of 1932 on grain-collections were created almost at the same time in Ukraine, Kuban and in the Volga region. "Black boards" for the grain-collections of areas which did not implement the plan were entered in Ukraine, the North Caucasian edge, the Volga region and other regions. Confiscation of all food at peasants for failure to follow the plan of grain-collections took place in 1932-1933 in many grain areas. An arbitrariness of local authorities concerning rural toilers during grain-collections was universal about what I.V. Stalin can judge at least by M.A. Sholokhov's letters on a situation in Vyoshensky district, and


also to the facts of universal eviction of the Cossack villages in Kuban for "sabotage of grain-collections".

In 1933 not only in Ukraine, but also in Russian regions all horrors of mass mortal hunger were observed. So, for example, during record of memoirs of eyewitnesses of hunger in the Volga region and in South Ural us it is established that in 1933 the cases of cannibalism and a trupoyedstvo took place in such villages of the Saratov region as New Ivanovka, Simonovka of Kalininsky district, Ivlevk of Atkarsky district, Zalyotovk of the Petrovsky area, Ogaryovk, Burasa Novoburassko-go of the area, It is new Repny the Yershov district, Kalman-tay of the Volsk district, Shumeyk of Engelsky district, Semenivka of Mokrousovsky district, in the village of Kozlovka of the Penza region, in such villages of the Volgograd region as Savinka of Pallasovsky district, Kostyrevo of the Kamyshin district, Serino, Moiseevo of the Kotovsk district, the Stepmother of Kikvidzensky district, Eterevka of Mikhaylovsky district, the Spur of Frolovsky district, in the village of Kanuyevka of Bezenchuksky district of the Samara region. These facts are confirmed by numerous archival documents [2, 4, 6].

Documents demonstrate that not only concerning Ukraine and Kuban, but also other regions of the USSR in the winter of 1933 Stalin established blockade with the purpose to lock hungry people in a hunger zone, to forbid them to leave it. It is about the directive of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of the Central Committee and SNK USSR of January 22, 1933 according to which it was necessary to stop mass departure of peasants "behind bread" from the Ukrainian SSR and the North Caucasian edge. On February 16, 1933 this directive was distributed also to the Lower Volga region (now it is the territory of the Astrakhan, Volgograd, Saratov regions, the Republic of Kalmykia) [21. Page 644]. In Russia as well as in Ukraine, OGPU and local activists caught and returned on the places the starving peasants [5].

Not less than 7 million people became the victims of mass hunger of 1932-1933 in the USSR...

In our opinion, scales of the victims of hunger were directly proportional to the specific weight of grain regions of the USSR in grain-collections and grain export.

So, for example, data of All-Union population censuses of 1926 and 1937 show that at least four regions of RSFSR of that time - the Saratov region, the ASSR of Germans of the Volga region, Azovo-Chernomorsky edge, Chelyabinsk region - were damaged not less, than Ukraine. The comparative analysis of materials of censuses as follows fixes reduction of country people in the regions of the USSR struck with hunger in the early thirties: in Kazakhstan - for 30, 9%, in the Volga region - on 23, in Ukraine - on 20.5, in the North Caucasus - for 20.4% [8. Page 120].

Proceeding from the above, according to the authoritative Russian demographer V.B. zhiromsky, for hunger in the early thirties outside Ukraine, in the territory of RSFSR, without Kazakhstan, not less than 2.5 million people [13], and together with Kazakhstan which was a part of the Russian Federation - about 4-5 million people died. At the same time losses of the population of RSFSR of hungry 1934 are not considered [23].

The most important question of a subject are the reasons of the huge victims of Ukraine during hunger in comparison with other regions of the USSR. In our opinion, most precisely in determination of size of demographic losses of Ukraine in 1932-1933 S. Uitkroft as the expert who thoroughly studied sources on this problem and the most authoritative foreign researcher in the field of studying demographic losses of the USSR in the 1930th years [22] and also S.V. Kulchitsky, one of authoritative Ukrainian researchers of the tragedy are [12]. They gave number of the victims of hunger-3 - 3.5 million people.

Huge losses of Ukraine for hunger are defined, on the one hand, by the sizes of the territory of the republic and number of its population living in rural areas, in a zone of continuous collectivization. On the other hand, they became result of drastic measures of the authorities on establishment of control over spontaneous migration of the starving population which purpose was in preservation of collective-farm production. The nature of these died, besides, was defined by the huge territory of Ukraine, its boundary, strategic situation in comparison with other grain regions of the USSR.

In this context it is necessary to point to a row, the essential, in our opinion, aspects of a problem needing an explanation within the concept of genocide of the people of Ukraine Famine-Genocide. It is about policy of the Stalin mode during hungry disaster in 1933. It does not look policy of "genocide" in terms of the following facts.

By our calculations based on the analysis of the sources published in the third volume of the collection of documents "The tragedy of the Soviet village: collectivization and dispossession of kulaks" (t. 3), in 1933 in total Ukraine received 501 thousand tons of grain in the form of loans that was in 7.5 times more, than in 1932 (65.6 thousand tons). Russian regions (without Kazakhstan) respectively received 990 thousand tons, is only 1.5 times more, than in 1932 (650 thousand tons).

From where grain for Ukraine undertook? In our opinion, vtomchisleizaschyotprekrashcheniyavesnoy1933goda grain export from the USSR which decreased by 5 times (from 1800 thousand tons in 1932 up to 354 thousand tons in 1933).

Whether Ukraine in 1933 of food and seed loans from the Center received much? Almost as much, how many in 1922 all Soviet Russia from all international organizations participating in assistance starving in Russia (568 thousand tons).

Why such huge amount of grain was sent to Ukraine in 1933 from the Center? Because in the Ukrainian SSR there was the most critical situation in grain areas which threatened disruption of a sowing campaign what the Stalin management could not allow because of a special role of the republic in grain production of the country.

Documents on that are known to historians, as. V. Stalin in 1933 personally authorized the direction to Ukraine of grain to the detriment of the Russian regi-

it. There is only one fact. On June 27, 1933 the secretary of the Central Committee of RC (b) at M.M. Hatayevich sent to 23 hours 10 min. to Stalin the cryptographed message of the following contents: "The proceeding last 10 days continuous rains strongly delayed ripening of bread and harvesting. In collective farms of a number of areas it is completely eaten, all bread which is released by us is eaten up, food situation strongly became aggravated that in recent days before cleaning especially dangerously. Very much I ask if it is possible, to give us 50 thousand more poods of a prodssu-da". On the document there is I.V. Stalin's resolution: "It is necessary to give" [15]. At the same time on the request of the chief of a political department of Novouzensky MTS of the Lower Volga region of Zelenova which came to the Central Committee on July 3, 1933 for food aid the collective farms of a zone of MTS were given refusal [16].

>" the resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of June 1, 1933 "On distribution of tractors of production of June - July and a half of August, 1933" according to which of 12100 tractors planned to delivery to regions of the USSR, Ukraine had to receive 5500 tractors, the North Caucasus - 2500, the Lower Volga - 1800, CChO - 1250, Central Asia - 550, ZSFSR - 150, the Crimea - 200, the Southern Kazakhstan - 150 contradicts the concept "genocide by Famine-Genocide. Thus, Russian regions, combined, received 5700 tractors (47%), and one Ukraine-5500 (45.4%) [17].

In the same key it is necessary to consider also the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) of December 20, 1933 on purchase of 16 thousand working horses for Ukraine in BSSR and the Western area. Considering a real situation in the USSR in 1933, including distribution of hunger and on the territory of Belarus and the Western area where people died of hunger, it is possible to see that Ukraine got undoubted advantages in this part, in comparison with other regions of the country [18].

and, at last, even decisions of the Politburo of the Central Committee of December 23, 1933 and of January 20, 1934 about expansion of the individual truck farming extremely necessary in the conditions of the permanent hunger which began in the USSR in the 1930th years "pro-Ukranian" look. The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) decided to resolve to be engaged in 1934 1.5 million workers in own individual kitchen gardens. "the Ukrainian share" of workers-gardeners in the lump of the workers of the USSR allowed to occupation by truck farming made 500 thousand people, or 33, 3% of them! [19].

In our opinion, redistribution in favor of Ukraine in 1933 of the listed material resources and other measures for strengthening of its economy do not fit into such understanding of actions of the power as "genocide".

The main conclusion to which the author as a result of long-term researches of this subject, following came: hunger of 1932 - 1933 - this general tragedy by Ukrainians, Russian and other people of the former USSR, the tragedy of all Soviet village. And this tragedy should not separate, and unite the people.


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