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Category: History


n. D. Egorov


After completion of Civil war the remains of white armies placed in the territory of the foreign states remained one of the most serious potential opponents of the Bolshevist power. In obtaining information on white emigration the large role was played by investigation of the Red Army.

The structure of military intelligence was created even during Civil war. At its organization, structures and frames of investigation of the Russian imperial army were used. Her head, the lieutenant general N.M. Potapov, was one of the first representatives of the high military command who cooperated with Bolsheviks and began to provide them necessary information even before arrival them to the power (possibly, having realized inevitability of it). [1] The famous figure of Bolshevik party M.S. Kedrov knowing N.M. Potapov since youthful years remembered later that "after July days the general N.M. Potapov, the assistant to the chief of General staff and the general quartermaster, offered through me the services to the Military organization of Bolsheviks (and rendered them)". [2]

Among the representatives of the Russian generals who accepted the Soviet power from the first days of its existence and connected with it the life "with total dedication" was many people connected with work of investigation and counterintelligence (M.D. Bonch-Bruyevich, A.A. Samoylo, A.A. Ignatyev and others).

After the October revolution the Head department of the General Staff, registration offices and offices of military control at headquarters of fronts, armies, military districts continued to be engaged in military intelligence and counterintelligence, points of military control in strategically important centers (boundary and seaports, the centers of military industry, etc.), special technical parts (radio-receiving and radiopelengatorny stations, prospecting aviation groups, etc.). In process of demobilization of the Russian army most bodies of military intelligence (fronts, armies, connections) stopped the existence. Military intelligence agents among other representatives of command structure left from service.

Collecting data abroad as one of tasks was assigned to military agents (diplomatic representatives) of Russia. They carried out the activity first of all through official channels and also by studying the military and civil press, but involved also secret agents. Most of military agents refused to recognize the new power. Abroad also independent agents and the whole secret-service networks subordinated to residents of military intelligence in certain countries acted. A number of secret agents of the Russian military intelligence after October, 1917 continued to deliver information to the Bolshevist authorities.

For the first time in the Red Army the division on the leadership in investigation arose as a part of the Supreme Military Council created on March 4, 1918. On the first staff of Management of the Supreme Military Council approved on March 17, 1918 the general quartermaster (involved from the former Rate of the Supreme Commander) with two assistants by an operational part and with two - on investigation was its part. [3] On the new staff of the Supreme Military Council announced by the order Narkomvoyena No. 391 of May 14, 1918, the staff of the general quartermaster was renamed into Operational management (with the assistant by a prospecting part and office of registration service) which was engaged in planning of fighting, preparation of necessary orders on the management of troops; in it the information about the opponent in areas of fighting concentrated, the registration office knew also secret-service investigation. [4]

During creation on May 8, 1918. The All-Russian general staff the management of the 2nd general quartermaster of Head department of the General Staff of old army knowing secret-service investigation was a part of its Operational management.

Also the Operations section of Narkomat on military affairs dealt with issues of investigation.

Continued the existence and naval investigation - registration service at the Sea General Staff which organizationally was a part of the National commissariat on sea

to affairs.

Divisions of these bodies (registration services at the All-Russian general staff and at the Sea General Staff, counterprospecting office at Operational management of the Supreme Military Council, the office of military control created on May 30, 1918 at Operational management of Narkomvoyen [5]) originally also carried out fight against espionage and other counterprospecting functions. As a part of headquarters of the sites and groups of the Veil subordinated to the Supreme Military Council since May, 1918 "offices on fight against a shpionstvo" began to be created.

Apparently from names of information agencies and counterintelligence, their functions included collecting and the analysis of prospecting information (registration), control of activity of faces, suspicious in respect of espionage. Except detention of suspects, these bodies had no opportunities of any active, especially repressive actions.

At the end of 1917 - 1918 the bodies of military intelligence were for the Bolshevist guide of the main source of data not only to armed forces of other states, but also to many other aspects of life abroad. Sometimes the similar awareness cost much to military intelligence agents. So, the headquarters of the Baltic Fleet which at that time had one of the strongest intelligence services received data on contacts of Bolsheviks with the German agents. These data which entered official reports and got on a table of the Bolshevist management cost life to the commander of the Baltic Fleet admiral A.M. Shchasny who was accused of counterrevolutionary activity, according to L.D. Trotsky's order the tribunal is prosecuted and it is shot.

In parallel with creation of information agencies and counterintelligence to armies and on the fleet there was an organization of the extraordinary bodies for fight against a counterrevolution which were under authority of Cheka. The foundation for their creation in army was laid by the resolution of Council of People's Commissars of July 16, 1918. "About the organization of the Extraordinary commission on fight against a counterrevolution on the Czechoslovak front". [6]

In process of expansion of scales of fighting, creations of new fronts and armies were created new front and army ChK and at the same time their functions and the rights extended. Besides functions of preliminary investigation and suppression of "counterrevolutionary activity", the bringing by guilty persons to court of a military court of ChK emergency powers - an opportunity to apply to "malicious enemies of the Soviet power" extrajudicial repressions up to execution on the crime scene, to isolate "klassovo hostile elements" in places of detention, i.e. in concentration camps that was formalized by the resolution of Council of People's Commissars "About Red Terror" of September 5, 1918 were conferred

With creation on September 6, 1918. The Revolutionary Council of War of the Republic (RCWR) headed by its chairman Trotsky which became "the supreme body of the military authority in the country" [7] passed functions of military intelligence to it. The headquarters of the abolished Supreme Military Council was transformed to the Headquarters of Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic (order RVSR No. 1/1 of September 6, 1918), and subsequently - to the Field headquarters of Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic. Operational management with the prospecting department consisting of offices prospecting and registration was a part of the newly created headquarters. [8]

All bodies of counterintelligence at the Registration management of the Field headquarters of RVSR created for this purpose which by order of RVSR No. 94 of October 14, 1918 concentrated the management of bodies of secret-service investigation and military control (counterintelligence) were at the same time joint; the corresponding functions from Vseroglavshtab were transferred to it.

On the state announced by the order RVSR No. 197/27 of November 5, 1918 the Field headquarters entered Operational management with office (since December, 1919 - a part) investigations and the Registration management knowing secret-service investigation and counterintelligence to which collecting and processing of information about armed forces of the hostile states were assigned. The agency of headquarters of fronts and armies (order RVSR No. 34 of January 3, 1919) was subordinated to registration management of the Field headquarters. Registration management submitted to the chief of the Field headquarters, and was headed by the commissioner of the headquarters and one of the member of RVSR.

In headquarters of fronts, armies, military districts, the fleet and flotillas, military connections it was created

the system of bodies of military intelligence - prospecting departments and offices which performed management of operational and tactical (army) reconnaissance, collecting and synthesis of primary information and its transfer in the form of operational and intelligence reports and reports to the high command of the Red Army. According to standard states of field managements of the fronts and armies entered by the order RVSR No. 477/67 of December 26, 1918, operational management of the headquarters of the front and operations section of the headquarters of army included prospecting offices. [9]

However soon the secret defense turned into maintaining Cheka. By the end of 1918 almost in all field army front and army ChK were created. For the management they created on December 9, 1918 Military department of Cheka. According to the decision of RCP(b) Central Committee Bureau of December 19, 1918. The military department of Cheka and its bodies in armies were merged into bodies of military control of Narkomvoyen in Special departments - bodies of Cheka which tasks included fight against "counterrevolution" and espionage in army.

Creation of Special department of Cheka and the institutions subordinated to them was preceded by discussion of fate of bodies of counterintelligence among the top party and soviet leadership. Many party and Soviet workers, agreeing with the idea of merging of counterintelligence under one management, considered it necessary to leave special departments as a part of the Defense Ministry. However other point of view triumphed, and special departments became bodies of Cheka. Thus, fight against investigation of the opponent (espionage) was withdrawn from maintaining military intelligence of the Red Army.

At the head of Special department of Cheka first there was M.S. Kedrov, and since August, 1919 it was headed by F.E. Dzerzhinsky and V.R. Menzhinsky that testifies to exclusive importance which the Bolshevist government gave the organizations of counterintelligence service. The management of front and army departments was also carried out by party workers, but not specialists counterspies. Not fight against espionage, but identification of "counterrevolutionary elements", the organization of total control and shadowing old military experts, all suspicious military personnel in the Red Army became the main objective of special departments. [10]

Special departments received almost unlimited powers as in the field of fight against a counterrevolution and espionage, and for carrying out mass repressions. Under the regulations on special departments approved by VTsIK on February 6, 1919 and resolution HUNDRED of May 13, 1919 the fight against a counterrevolution and espionage was assigned to Special department of Cheka and to the Special departments subordinated to it at RVS of fronts and armies, at the same time Revolutionary Military Councils nominally kept the right of control of work of departments. [11]

In each military unit, the headquarters, establishment and also in respect of extrajudicial repressions rather high efficiency of these bodies in fight against espionage in the years of Civil war is explained by such unprecedented system of mass shadowing, the deployed device of confidential informants almost unlimited rights of staff of Special departments. At the same time thousands of innocent people, not only regular officers, representatives of exclusive classes, but also party workers, red commanders, ordinary Red Army men became the victims.

Activity of bodies of Cheka, including Special departments, became so odious that powers of Cheka were a little limited to the resolution of VTsIK "About the All-Russian Extraordinary Commission" of February 17, 1919: the right of removal of the sentences on affairs investigated by ChK was transferred to revtribunala again. For ChK the right of application of extrajudicial repressions in case of the armed performances and in the areas announced on martial law remained. [12]

Cheka tried to take control of all secret-service investigation also. In April, 1919 as a part of Special department of Cheka the Foreign department was created, one of the main objectives of which was an organization of secret-service investigation abroad. [13]

By order of RVSR No. 1018/186 of June 21, 1919. Registration management was directly subordinated to Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, it was headed by the member of RVSR. Thus, military intelligence was also substantially brought out of control of the Commander-in-chief of all armed forces of the Republic. On the one hand, it demonstrated increase of a role of military intelligence in the organization of management of troops and carrying out operations, with another - about mistrust of a Bolshevist top to the high command of RKKA acting through old military experts. In planning

operations of the Red Army in the first half of 1919 serious miscalculations in many respects because of a lack of intelligence information or their wrong interpretation were allowed. Therefore the military-political management of the Red Army sought to provide itself with reliable information, to secure itself in case of possible treason from military experts of the highest level.

In the Provision on Registration management (order RVSR No. 148/29 of January 1, 1920) on subordination of military intelligence found compromise option: was confirmed that

Registration management was body of the Field headquarters with direct submission of RVSR which through one of the members observed his work.

At the beginning of 1920 attempts at least were again made a little to limit uncontrolled activity of bodies of Cheka. The resolution of VTsIK and SNK of January 17, 1920 cancelled a capital punishment (execution) on sentences of Cheka and revtribunal. [14] The decree of VTsIK of March 18, 1920 cancelled the right of application of extrajudicial repressions in case of the armed performances and in the areas announced on martial law.

However these measures had vague character and from the beginning in May, 1920 of active operations on the Soviet-Polish front were almost nullified. The resolution of VTsIK and HUNDRED of May 28

1920 of power of bodies of Cheka were again expanded, it transferred the rights of revvoyentribunal concerning all crimes directed against military safety of the republic (explosions, arsons, treason, espionage, etc.).

Summer of 1920 Registration management of the Field headquarters of Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic was liquidated. On the new state announced by the order RVSR No. 1391/238 of June 20, 1920, Operational management of the Field headquarters was renamed into Operational prospecting department with a prospecting part in it.

By the end of Civil war in the Red Army there was a harmonious system of bodies of military intelligence which were a part of divisions of the headquarters knowing operational issues and included a prospecting part as a part of the Field headquarters of Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic, prospecting offices as a part of headquarters of fronts, armies, other expeditious associations, prospecting divisions or the persons responsible for investigation, as a part of headquarters of military connections and parts. In the central, front and army submission special technical parts which purpose was an obtaining prospecting information (reception radio stations, prospecting aviation groups, etc.) were created. Tactical (army) reconnaissance was conducted by forces shooting and sabers and divisions.

With the end of Civil war the structure of military intelligence underwent change.

Due to the recovery of diplomatic relations of RSFSR with a number of the countries the office of military representatives abroad to whom among other tasks also collecting prospecting information was assigned was created. The order RVSR No. 1749/335 of September 6, 1920 the provision on military representatives abroad appeared. They were appointed by Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic on representation of the Field headquarters and coordination with People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs, were a part of diplomatic missions of RSFSR, and in special work were guided by instructions of the chief of the Field headquarters.

Also the value of secret-service investigation of Cheka increased. The order of Cheka No. 169 of December 20, 1920 created the independent Foreign department of Cheka subordinated directly to its management. [15]

For creation of uniform governing body of armed forces of the order RVSR No. 336/41 of February 10, 1921. The field headquarters of RVSR and the All-Russian general staff were merged to the uniform Headquarters of RKKA which with some structural changes existed till 1935 [16] Operational management with a prospecting part in it originally worked In the newly created Headquarters of RKKA. Management submitted to the 1st assistant to the chief of staff. Order RVSR No. 785/141 of April 4

1921 the independent Intelligence service of the Headquarters of RKKA was formed, its states are announced, the provision on it is entered. May 26, 1921. The provision on Narkomat of defense was accepted small Council of People's Commissars. [17]

There were changes and in the system of bodies of secret defense. With creation by the resolution

Presidium of VTsIK of February 6, 1922 of the Public Political Administration (PPA) for work in army the Special department of GPU, special departments of military districts, the fleet, armies and offices in cases, divisions, large garrisons, important railway junctions remained.

According to the provision on Special departments of GPU approved by VTsIK on February 6, 1922 these bodies formally had now no right of extrajudicial punishment. All cases of crimes against the Soviet state were considered in court; from maintaining bodies of GPU also criminal cases were withdrawn.

The foreign department of Cheka was transformed to Foreign department of Confidential operational management of OGPU which was headed by M.A. Trilisser. The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of RCP(b) of January 11, 1923 as a part of OGPU created special bureau on misinformations, and then the division dealing with issues of technical reconnaissance. [18]

According to Chapter 9 of the Constitution of the USSR 1924 for "association of activities of federal republics for fight against a counterrevolution" the Joint State Political Directorate (JSPD) at SNK USSR was created.

The general reduction of army at the beginning of the 20th concerned also the investigation device. In November, 1922 the independent Intelligence service was liquidated, and in exchange created (the order RVSR No. 2572/482 of November 16, 1922). Management of the 1st assistant to the chief of staff of RKKA with quick, on preparation and service of troops and prospecting departments; entered into reconnaissance department: the general office with commandant's office, parts of secret-service investigation and information and statistical.

Most managements of fronts and armies and, respectively, prospecting offices of their headquarters was liquidated. Headquarters of the military districts and cases created instead of them had extremely not numerous divisions which were carrying out collecting intelligence information on the state.

Such underestimation of value of military intelligence was wrong that was found soon enough. During military reform (1924). The headquarters of RKKA by order of RSFSR No. 446/96 of March 20, 1924 underwent radical reorganization and was divided into three independent bodies: Headquarters of RKKA, Management RKKA and Inspectorate of RKKA. Problems of "comprehensive military preparation of defense of the country", development of bases of construction of the Soviet armed forces were assigned to the Headquarters of RKKA. [19] As a part of the Headquarters of RKKA the Intelligence service was created again.

The YAK became the chief of investigation of the Red Army for long time. Berzin who headed Razvedupr in 1924 - 1935. He was not a professional military and the more so the intelligence agent, and the party worker, the commissioner, the security officer. During this period of highly educated old military experts young workers, as a rule, the convinced communists actively replaced.

Razvedupr more and more closely coordinated the activity with similar bodies of OGPU (Foreign department of OGPU), and the management of OGPU sought to take in hand the general leadership in investigation.

So, the general Potapov in the autobiography noted that in 1924 he was abroad "according to the instruction of t. Unshlikht, at that time the vice-chairman of RVS USSR, for selection of the French, German, English, Italian and Polish military editions for library of the people's commissar which appeared after war. For this purpose I visited Berlin, Paris and Warsaw..." Actually these trips were carried out on Dzerzhinsky's orders, carrying out which Potapov played a large role in carrying out operation "Trust". [20]

The intelligence service of the Headquarters of RKKA took part also in some other the operations prepared by OGPU at the leading role of the last. It allowed the German intelligence to claim subsequently that "the military intelligence service of the Red Army is used mainly by agents of People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs". [21]

According to the new states of the central institutions Narkomvoyenmor announced by the order RVS USSR No. 100 of January 26, 1925 as a part of the Headquarters of RKKA the Intelligence service remained. The provisional regulations for the Headquarters of RKKA (order No. 687 of June 28, 1925) emphasized the headquarters role

as central body for the leadership in defense of the country. [22]

By the situation announced by the order RVS USSR No. 112/30 of February 19, 1926, the Intelligence service of the Headquarters of RKKA was the central body of military intelligence and consisted of departments: 1) army investigation, 2) secret-service, 3) information and statistical, 4) special and two parts: administrative and cryptographic.

By the new situation announced by the order RVS USSR No. 88/16 of February 15, 1927, the Intelligence (4th) service of the Headquarters of RKKA was the central body of military intelligence and executive body of RVS USSR for military-political work abroad. Were under its authority: 1) the independent organization of deep strategic investigation in foreign

the states, 2) the organization, according to special directives RVS USSR, active investigation in the territory of the foreign states, 3) collecting and processing of necessary information of foreign press, military and political and economic literature, 4) the edition and distribution among the interested bodies of materials by all types of investigation in the form of reports, bulletins, references, reports, reference books, descriptions, reviews, 5) receiving from all departments having foreign information, the interesting materials, 6) the leadership in activity of reconnaissance bodies of military districts, 7) preparation

skilled workers on investigation, 8) management of military and sea attaches, sending them abroad, financing, supply, orientation on the arising questions, 9) performance of the RVS USSR special tasks.

the former structure of management Remained. The head of department submitted to the chief of staff of RKKA, and concerning secret-service investigation and concerning special tasks - directly to the vice-chairman of RVS USSR.

Under the provision on central office of Narkomvoyenmor entered by the order RVS USSR No. 200/40 of October 21, 1929 the studying data on armed forces of probable opponents belonged to maintaining the Headquarters of RKKA among the main questions. [23] Obligations of Intelligence (4th) service generally remained the same.

On the other hand, repressions of the military personnel of the Red Army in the 20th directed generally against even the remaining military experts, the former generals and the senior officers affected also Razvedupr.

The decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of RCP(b) of January 30, 1930 which specified existing and new problems of the Soviet investigation are defined, aimed it at sharp activization of intelligence activities. [24] This decision was critical in the history of the Soviet military intelligence and in many respects defined its destiny up to the beginning of the Great Patriotic War.

For the 20th along with armies of the foreign states, potential opponents of the USSR, one of main objectives of investigation of the Red Army there was a military unit of the Russian emigration.

In process of the end of combat operations in certain fronts of Civil war the interest of investigation of the Red Army switched to those white armed forces which managed to recede in an organized order abroad and there still some time to keep the headquarters, parts and fighting capacity.

More it belonged to the Russian army of the general P.N. Wrangel and to white formations in the Far East, to "semenovets" and "kappelevets", in smaller - to white parts in the Western China (Xinjian), Poland and other border countries.

At first white formations abroad made the real force and posed threat for the Bolshevist mode. Interest in them at military intelligence was retained at the previous level, only methods of obtaining information changed.

In peace conditions the Red Army, its field troops, lost direct fighting contact with the opponent - white army, or such contact (in connection with establishment of diplomatic relations of RSFSR with neighboring states, demarcation of borders, establishment of boundary protection, meetings of boundary commissioners, etc.) became extremely

to limited. From here tactical (army) reconnaissance lost the value as information source: ground reconnaissance, poll of prisoners of war and locals, air reconnaissance, etc.

The exception was made by those areas where cover of border was extremely weak and where it was systematically broken. In the same place, where the Red Army conducted combat operations of limited scale, collection of information by forces of army investigation at the operational and tactical levels continued.

So, Management of the Western front of armies which existed till 1926 continued to collect approximately till 1923 data on the armed White Guard organizations abroad, first of all in the Western Belarus. Management of the Turkestan front of armies from white formations paid special attention to white groups in the Western China which were ordered by generals A.N. Dutov, B.V. Annenkov and others. By November, 1920 the headquarters of the front had data on number and arms of group of Dutov interned in China. Military intelligence (possibly, on a tip from OGPU) in 1924 received personalized lists of the Russian White Guards in the Western China. As now it became known, the Soviet parts repeatedly crossed border in this area, conducted prospecting, fighting and sabotages. During one of similar operations in 1921 the ataman Dutov was killed.

In 1925 the Soviet parts in the territory of China captured the ataman Annenkov ordering Separate Semirechensky army in recent months of existence of the kolchakovsky mode. This action had exclusively political and frightening value. By then the group of the ataman Annenkov did not pose any serious threat, and the ataman spent about three years in the Chinese prison before Fyn Yuysyana who gave it to the Soviet authorities fell into hands of one of the Chinese militarists of the marshal. [25]

In peace time the role of secret-service investigation considerably raised, and the management of it concentrated in Intelligence service of the Headquarters of RKKA. Due to the removal the value of the military and civil press considerably increased in other countries of acceptable restrictions of wartime: both emigrant, and those countries in the territory of which emigrants found a shelter. Military intelligence especially actively sought to receive official documents of military formations of emigration. In materials of military intelligence newspapers, appeals, leaflets of emigrants and their organizations continued to take the important place.

In it a key work on illumination of the general Wrangel by the Soviet military intelligence of the Russian army which in November, 1920 in an organized order was evacuated from the Crimea on the territory of Turkey was conducted. According to the contract of the commander-in-chief of army with the High Commissioner of France in the south of Russia count de Martel all persons evacuated from the Crimea arrived under protection of the French republic. About 60 thousand ranks of army were sent to military the camp with preservation of the military organization and with leaving of a part of weapon by it. Army parts were reduced in the 1st army corps of the general A.P. Kutepov numbering over 25 thousand and located near the city of Gallipoli on the European coast of the Dardanelles Strait. The Don corps of the general F.F. Abramov (about 15 thousand) were placed near Chataldzhi. The Kuban corps of the general M.A. Fostikov (up to 15 thousand) were sent to the island of Lemnos in the Aegean Sea. [26] Command of the Russian army was in Constantinople, occupied by allied troops, in the same place there was most of civil refugees, women and children.

In May - June, 1921 investigation of the Red Army received from the agency from Constantinople reports of quite authentic data and other materials about structure, number, placement and political morale of army of Wrangel, about work of other white organizations, military and not military, about foreign policy communications of army command. [27] Data corresponded to information obtained from the employee of Special department of VUChK who was in Constantinople about activity of white emigration. [28]

To spring of 1921 to command of the Russian army, first of all to the commander of the 1st army case general Kutepov, the price of incredible tension of forces succeeded to restore fighting capacity of army, to lighten the mood of fighters and their moral level. The Russian army was ready to continuation of armed struggle. As a result investigation of the Red Army in October, 1921 received secret-service material about a possibility of landing of troops by forces of the Russian army in one of ports of the Black Sea. [29]

Possibly, in connection with threat of a landing the activity of white army became subject to close attention of the soviet military-political leadership. On November 21, 1921 the commander-in-chief S.S. Kamenev submitted to the vice-chairman of Revolutionary Military Council of the Republic E.M. Sklyansky the detailed report on activity of army of Wrangel abroad. [30] And soon, November 25, detailed secret-service material about the structure of army of Wrangel, with the indication of names of all parts and surnames of commanders arrived. [31]

Over time analytical and reporting documents of investigation of the Red Army became more diverse. More stable, than in the years of Civil war, a situation gave the chance besides traditional intelligence, information, secret-service and other reports to create deeper and informative reviews. Such, for example, as the review prepared in 1921 "Counterrevolutionary armed forces abroad and in the territory of the Soviet Russia" where the main attention was also paid to the Russian army of Wrangel.

Soon military intelligence got an agency in the most Russian army and since 1922 began to receive original orders, orders, announcements on the 1st army corps of the general Kutepov and by other parts.

At the same time sharply in a negative side the attitude of the authorities of France to Wrangel's army was changed. Having lost financial support of France, in 1922 the command of the Russian army transported parts on the territory of Bulgaria and the Kingdom of Serbians, Croats and Slovenes (since 1929 - Yugoslavia) under the agreement with the governments of these countries. The structure of white army changed. Already on March 10, 1922 the reconnaissance report of the headquarters of troops of Ukraine and the Crimea reported about dislocation of army of the general Wrangel in the territory of Serbia and Bulgaria. [32] this and obtained on other channels information found reflection in the new periodic review "Counterrevolutionary Russian political groups and armed forces abroad" for April, 1922 - February, 1923 [33]

At all completeness and reliability it is impossible to recognize the information of investigation of the Red Army as objective. In particular, in it the military threat from white army which meanwhile suffered an acute shortage of means even on keeping of staff, not to mention maintenance of its fighting capacity was constantly emphasized. In fact, its moving to Bulgaria and Yugoslavia and the actual transfer to the labor provision of a number of parts made active fighting against the Soviet Russia impossible.

Thus, military intelligence it is free or involuntarily helped to create the Bolshevist power the myth of continuous threat of "an imperialistic environment" and new intervention which the guide of Bolsheviks successfully used for toughening of a political regime within the country.

Information of military intelligence, probably, served as one of reasons for carrying out a number of "active actions" as they then were called, against white leaders in 1920 - 1924 and at the same time provided a possibility of carrying out such operations. It is necessary to refer attempt at the general Wrangel in 1921 to their number, murder of the general V.L. Pokrovsky in 1923 in Bulgaria and a number of unfortunate actions.

In 1924. The Russian army of the general Wrangel stopped the existence as the regular armed force. On its basis "The Russian all-military union" - the military organization which united ranks Russian imperial and white armies was created. In provisional regulations of September 1, 1924 it was said: "ROVS is formed with the purpose to unite the Russian soldiers concentrated in different countries, to strengthen a spiritual bond between them and to keep them as carriers of the best traditions and precepts of the Russian imperial army". [34] From now on the Russian army of the general Wrangel disappears as the independent armed force from reports of investigation of the Red Army.

Situation in the Far East where from the very beginning all white formations which passed through border of China were formally announced consisting on position of refugees was a bit different. However in practice they remained long time there and were actively used in fight among themselves of the local political elite resisting there. Besides a large number not numerous, but efficient, concerning the level of the Chinese parts, white groups, there were also larger connections: in particular, one of divisions of the so-called "Mukden clique" the Chinese militarists was staffed with the Russian White Guards, possessing very considerable autonomy of internal life and the organization for type of old Russian army.

Therefore secret-service messages about activity of the Russian White Guards in Manzhouli in 20 - the 30th, any information about troops of ataman D.F. Semyonov and the general M.K. Diterikhs in China were surely combined with data on support by their Chinese authorities and Japan, with the information about structure, number, expansion, strategic concentration of armies of Japan and local Chinese militarists, first of all in Harbin, Mukden and Dayrena, and, at last, with data on existence in this region of troops of British and Americans, other European countries.

In Poland the military intelligence lit first of all regions of the Western Ukraine and the Western Belarus where the majority of white formations concentrated. The specifics of work of military intelligence were defined by existence in this region of parts of the former Ukrainian people's republic ("petlyurovets"), the so-called Belarusian people's republic and other formations which were not a part of white armies. Military intelligence first of all monitored emergence and movements of paramilitary groups and their relationship. On the basis of this information the soviet leadership through diplomatic channels put pressure upon the Polish government for the purpose of disarmament of these white groups, arrest and expulsion of their organizers and activists abroad.

Summing up the result, one may say, that in the first half of the 20th the investigation of the Red Army considered the white formations evacuated abroad as uniform armed forces as army without the state and the territory which along with armed forces of other states constituted constant danger to the Soviet state.

Studying the Soviet military intelligence of white army as the independent armed force stops only with its elimination and transformation into "The Russian all-military union" that sharply limited a possibility of any active actions from the most irreconcilable part of emigration. Main subject to investigation of St?

Manuel Stanley
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