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Participation of the 2nd Hungarian army in summer 1942. Approach of Wehrmacht on the southern site of the Soviet-German front



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PARTICIPATION 2-Y HUNGARIAN ARMIES IN SUMMER 1942. Approach of WEHRMACHT ON the SOUTHERN SITE of the SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT

N.V. Filonenko

Voronezh State Agricultural University of Cd of Glinka

e-mail: an@vsau.ru

In work the process of participation of the Hungarian armed forces in aggression against the Soviet Union in days of the Great Patriotic War is considered. The course of combat operations in the Soviet-German front with participation of the 2nd Hungarian army in the summer of 1942 on the basis of the analysis of trophy documents of domestic archives is lit.

The main goal set for Wehrmacht for summer of 1942 was in that, according to directive No. 41 signed by Hitler on April 5, 1942 "it is final to destroy forces which remained at the disposal of Councils and to deprive of them as far as possible the major military-economic centers". It was for this purpose necessary "saving the provision on the central site", that is on the Moscow direction to seize Leningrad in the north and to establish connection on the land with the Finnish troops, and on the southern flank to make break to the Caucasus. First of all all forces which are at the disposal focused for carrying out the main operation on the southern site for the purpose of extermination of the Soviet troops to the west of Don, occupation of the oil Fields of Caucasus and passes through the Caucasian ridge.

Preparation for offensive operation on the Voronezh direction was complete by the end of June, 1942. The general plan of this operation which received a code name of "Blau" came down to drawing two blows to the meeting directions: one of the area to the northeast of Kursk to Voronezh and from the district of Volchansk to Ostrogozhsk. As a result of these blows the German command expected to crush the Soviet troops on the Voronezh direction, having surrounded a part them to the west of Stary Oskol. Then to come to the Don River from Voronezh to Nova Kalitvy and to occupy bases on its left coast, and to turn the tank and motorized divisions 4th of tank and 6th armies on the South for development of approach in the right bank Dona1.

According to this plan shock groups of fascist troops were developed. East of Kursk, between upper courses of the rivers of the Pine and Diet, on the 110th kilometer sector of the front the 2, 4 were developed tank German and the 2nd Hungarian the armies united in army group under the general command of the commander of the 2nd German army general Veykhs. The main forces of the Veykhs group as a part of 12 infantry, 3 motorized and 4 tank divisions were concentrated in the area to the north and to the northeast Shchigry. On the right wing of group, on the 40th kilometer sector of the front, 3 infantry Sh-go divisions of the army building of the 2nd Hungarian army were developed. In general for June 24, 1942 at the disposal of the army Veyskh group was: 506,398 people, 95,423 horses, 799 tools, 828 antiaircraft guns, 82 self-propelled tools, 378 anti-tank tools, the 587th thane-kov2. The northern flank of group was provided with the 55th army case which incorporated 3 infantry divisions and infantry brigadu3.

1 History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union of 1941-1945. In 6 volumes. T 2. M, 1961. Page 417-418.
2 Szabo P. Don-kanyar. Budapest: Covina, 2001. S. 87.
3 Operations of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the Voyennoistorichesky essay. M, 1958. T. 1. Page 596.

Against the 55th army case and the army Veykhs group from the area Livny to Rzhava on a 1bo-kilometer sector of the front 2 armies of the Bryansk front defended (the 13th under command of the major general N.P. Pukhov and the 40th under command of the lieutenant general of artillery M.A. Parsegov.). As a part of these armies there were 11 rifle divisions, 2 shooting and 3 armored brigades. Two rifle divisions and one shooting crew of these armies were deployed on the second strip of the defense passing across east coast of the river Kshen. In their back, in a reserve of the Bryansk front, there were two tank and one cavalry cases, one rifle division and two armored brigades. Besides, behind the right wing of the front in a reserve of the Front commander were concentrated on the Tula direction the 5th tank army, one tank and one cavalry korpusa4.

The fact that the Hungarian parts will participate in spring and summer approach, was defined in January, 1942 when in Budapest for negotiations on this question there arrived the field marshal Keitel. He at the request of Hitler demanded to direct to the Soviet-German front 15 Hungarian divisions, 2 mountain crews, one cavalry crew, an armored division, 10 divisions for execution of security service. However the Hungarian government which is made sober by defeat of the German troops near Moscow, but did not refuse support of Germany made the decision to send only the 2nd Hungarian army and 7 security divisions to the Soviet-German front. Were a part of the 2nd Hungarian army: The case Sh-y - the 6th easy infantry division (22, 52 infantry regiments), the 7th lpd (the 4, 35 software), the 9th lpd (the 17, 47 software); GU-y the case - the 10th lpd (the 6, 36 software), the 12th lpd (the 18, 48 software), the 13th lpd (the 7, 31 software); VP-y the case - the 19th lpd (the 13, 43 software), the 20th lpd (the 14, 23 software), the 23rd lpd (the 21, 51 software); the 1st aviation group (since 15.10.42 aviation crew). Besides, the 101st antiaircraft division, the 101st division of heavy artillery on the mechanized draft, the 150th motorized artillery division, the 101st motorized antiaircraft division and the 151st engineer and engineering battalion were under supervision of the headquarters of army the 1st armored division (the 30th tank and the 1st motor-infantry regiments, the 1st prospecting and the 51st anti-tank battalions). Each division had an artillery regiment and divisions of support which number was identical to number of a division. the 2nd Hungarian army contained more than 200 thousand chelovek5.

In Hungary the mobilization of parts of the 2nd Hungarian army began on February 24, 1942. Six weeks were allotted on training of troops by the beginning of approach the army would be in full strength thrown on the Soviet-German front. The Hungarian parts began to arrive in the district of Kursk in April, 1942. The first there arrived the case GGG-y. It was billeted from April 18 to May 14 in the neighborhood of Kursk. Then its the 7th lpd replaced with front lines the 68th German pd, and the 9th lpd -

the 16th German md, having occupied the line of defense in 40 km. the 6th lpd of the Hungarian case was temporarily directed to GGG-go to fight against guerrillas. In two months of position fights of loss of the 7th lpd made 171 persons the killed and 340 wounded, the 9th lpd - 29 killed and 102 ranenymi6.

Despite aspirations of the Hungarian command, it was not succeeded to throw all parts and divisions of the 2nd Hungarian army on the Soviet-German front by the beginning of summer approach. In combat readiness it appeared only GGG-y the army building which took part in approach. For strengthening of the Hungarian parts, the colonel general Veykhs made available to the Hungarian command four infantry and one motorized the German divisions and subordinated to it UGG-y the German case. The 7 and 9 lpd had to participate in approach samostoyatel-

4 Operations of the Soviet armed forces in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945 the Voyennoistorichesky essay. M, 1958. T. 1. Page 597.
5 Szabo P. Shouting. her. S. 306-311.
6 Archive of Institute of military history of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (further - IVI Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation Archive). T. 190. Op. 232. 9. L. 70.

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but, the 6th Hungarian lpd and also the 387 and 16 md Germans had to participate in approach in interaction with UGG-m German korpusom7.

In the morning on June 28, 1942 after artillery and aviation preparation of connection of the army Veykhs group took the offensive against troops of the left wing of the Bryansk front. In the first echelon of its shock group between an upper course of river. A pine and the area Shchigry came 7 infantry, 3 tank and 3 the motorized divisions. The aircraft continuously supported by strong groups on 100-150 planes approach. At the same time a part of bombing aircraft struck blows to areas of concentration of the Soviet army and front reserves and also to command posts and communication centers.

GGG-go's approach Hungarian and UGG-go of German of cases proceeded freely in the beginning. The commander VP-go of the German case reported at 3:45 to the commander of the 2nd Hungarian army: "Parts, especially on the northern flank, strongly move ahead. A northern part of the village of Morozovo - a northern part of the forest - height 244.7" 8 reached the area. At 4:10 GGG-go's command reported cases: "Approach of the 9th division consistently develops. It already reached the area to the west of the farms of Kabitsa and Prudok, to the east of the village of Dmitriyevka and the farm of Eskov. The small, but amplifying fire influence of artillery of the opponent is carried out on all front line" 9.

At 4:50 the commander of the 9th lpd received the report from the commander of the 17th software that the 2nd battalion of a regiment stopped because of strong machine-gun and automatic fire from the western outskirts x. Bar. As a result of counterattack of a company of the Soviet soldiers the left flank of battalion trembled, and only under the threat of execution on the place, the commander of battalion could constrain soldiers. There was an emergency, besides ammunition appeared on an outcome. The commander of the 9th lpd ordered to the chief of artillery of a division to open by all available forces fire at the counterattacking Soviet parts, and the commander of the 17th software to throw into fight a regimental reserve (3rd battalion) on x. Bar. To a divisional reserve (2nd battalion of the 47th software and the 9th hussar squadron) for providing the left flank of a division ordered to move forward to the area to the east x. Dubrovo, height 261.6. By 8:00 on the right flank of a division the 1st battalion of the 47th software, having lost 50% of staff, came nearer to x. Kabitsa. the 1st battalion of the 34th software and the 1st battalion of the 17th software the covering group reached the region of 2 km to the east of of Dmitriyevk - height 260 where stopped. 261.6 2nd battalion of the 47th software sent for providing the left flank to the region of height reached x. Dubrovo. On it GGG-go's advance cases forward prekratilos10.

Approach of Hungarians was resumed at 13:00, but the active resistance of the Soviet parts in particular near the villages of Klenovka, Lipkovo and x. The bar was stopped by approach. At 15:30 the commander of the 9th lpd reported to the commander GGG-go of the case: "On my belief, from x. The bar in the southern direction can be expected the attack of large forces of the opponent. Fatigue, hunger, losses in staff induce to refuse approach today and to be prepared for reflection of the Russian counterattacks" 11.

In the report of the army Veykhs group it was so told about a situation for the evening on June 28: "The royal Hungarian army together with the northern flank of the 3rd army case took the offensive in the southeast direction and successfully broke through a first line of defense of the opponent. Overcoming persistent resistance, the army overcame the line of 1 km to the east Christmas, the western outskirts of Klenovk also reached group of houses to the north of Klenovk. On this line the approach of our parts was suspended. the 7th army case, coming together with the right flank of the 6th

7 IVI Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation archive. T. 190. Op. 232. 9. L. 6.
8 In the same place. L. 13.
9 In the same place. L. 14.
10 In the same place. L. 15.
11 In the same place. L. 16.

Hungarian lpd, also suspended offensive at lines of resistance of Sukho-dol-Morozovo (center), and the left flank of this division Nikolskoye came the Second. the 387th pd quickly coming, one regimental group crossed the Tim River in the area the Crassula and Sarochnoye. The advanced Parts 16th mpd crossed the Tim River around Karandako-vo and, continuing to come further in the southeast direction, the Belovsky Yards" 12 rushed on the northern outskirts of the settlement.

about about about about

the magazine of fighting of the 2nd Hungarian army the following interpretation of events contained on June 28, 1942: "GGG-go's approach cases was not successful. If in front of the case significant forces of the opponent are concentrated, then failures of approach will not bring damage, and we will surround large forces. If in front of the case there are strong rear guards under which cover the opponent delays the main forces, it will be unprofitable for the general provision of approach". And further the conclusion is drawn: "Therefore, the case GGG-y all means and power has to come on June 29" 13.

Proceeding from results of the first day of approach, the commander of the 2nd Hungarian army gave the order on problems of the parts subordinated to it for June 29: "... to tank parts of the Hungarian army to break to Stary Oskol, UGG-ma to the German case by the main forces to break in the direction of the village of Efrosinovka. To GGG-m to the Hungarian case, in interaction with parts to VP-m of the German case to take heights lying in the southwest direction of Tim. Then, with assistance of aircraft to come for Tim and to capture him" 14.

In the morning on June 29 the 2 and 3 battalions of the 17th software reached the village of Baranchikovo. Battalions were followed by the accompanying group as a part of the 9th hussar squadron, the 17th motorized machine-gun platoon, the 17th samokatny platoon at the left. Here encountering the resistant resistance of the Soviet troops, Hungarians occupied heights to the northwest of page. Rotten. On approaches to the village the battalions were covered by powerful artillery and infantry fire. At 18:00 the Hungarian battalions at the price of big losses approached page. Rotten. Here the Soviet parts with a new force opened fire, Hungarians trembled, and began to recede. At the repeated attack under cover of artillery to the 3rd battalion from the North, to the 2nd battalion from the South it was succeeded to rush into the village. Rotten. Bloody fight ran high. At the price of big losses the Hungarians occupied the village. Rotten, then reached heights to the east of page. Rotten and there were dug round.

Along with great or smaller success of battalions on the northern flank of the 9th lpd, on the southern flank the 1st battalion of the 47th software located to the north x. Kabitsa throughout the day did not move ahead. The Soviet parts which were before battalion took refuge in dumetose ravines. Remaining invisible, they shot at each coming division with mortars. While the 9th lpd tried to reach from the West Mr. Tim, on the northern VP-mu direction to the German case on June 28 it was succeeded to force the Tim River. With big losses the 6th Hungarian lpd reached on June 29 the northern outskirts of the village of Korovenka, the 16th German md reached the village of Repyevka. Those German-Hungarian parts managed to leave to the area to the east of Tim, having created danger of an environment of the Soviet parts defending Mr. Tim.

The commander of the Hungarian army so estimated results of two days of approach: "Rainy weather is favorable to the opponent. Approach of army group of Veykhs slowed down. Approach of the 6th German army 28 and 29 of June did not even begin. The opponent does not accept resolute battle. The only positive circumstance is that unlike previous day we managed to create a united front of approach" 15.

12 The central archive of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (further - CAMO). T. 500. Op. 1. 245. L. 22-23.
13 IVI Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation archive. T. 190. Op. 232. 9. L. 17.
14 In the same place. L. 18.
15 In the same place. L. 20.

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On June 30 the 9th lpd continued approach. In the south the three-battalion fighting group under command of the commander of the 17th software (1st battalion of the 17th software, the 1st battalion of the 47th software and the 1st battalion of the 34th software) came through x. The Gnilinsky Yards on height 260.0. In the north dvukhbatalyony fighting group under command of the commander of the 2nd battalion of the 17th software (2 and 3 battalions of the 17th software) of the area to the east of page. Rotten attacked the northern outskirts of the village of Stanovoye. Fighting groups supported in the south three, four batteries of the 9th artillery division in the north. The southern fighting group managed to occupy at 9:45 height 252.3 and at 16:00 - height 262.0. The northern fighting group after heavy fighting could reach the village of Stanovoye. But here the amplifying resistance of the Soviet troops stopped the Hungarian parts, besides, because of the begun rain the artillery battery lagged behind. Without support of artillery the Hungarians hesitated to continue approach. The commander of the case Sh-go who was here stopped at 16:00 approach and ordered to the main forces of the 9th lpd in the morning on July 1 to concentrate against positions of an anti-tank ditch. He ordered to leave one battalion for providing on the northern outskirts of the village of Stanovoye. With nightfall the 3rd battalion of the 17th software took positions at heights located on the northern outskirts of the village of Stanovoye. the 2nd battalion of the 17th software reached the area to the northeast of the village of Dubrova late night. On the left flank the 7th lpd during the day occupied height 258.1.

In the morning on July 1 the commander of the 9th lpd decided to continue break of an anti-tank ditch what reported to the commander of the case about. The commander of the case Sh-go agreed with the plan of the commander of a division and ordered, to the 3rd battalion of the 17th software which was in the north to occupy the village of Stanovoye to clean the road for Tim. However, at 8:40 the commander of the 3rd software battalion 17-g reported to the commander of the 9th lpd that his prospecting patrols freely entered the village of Stanovoye. In the direction of Tim is also not present the opponent. Then the commander of the 9th lpd ordered to battalion to occupy the village of Stanovoye, further to move ahead to the area to the west of Tim and to occupy heights to the west of the city. to the 9th hussar squadron ordered to occupy heights to the north of the city. the 3rd battalion of the 17th software, having respectively rearranged, began to move ahead through the village of Stanovoye and in twilight Tim entered from the West in. However there he was met by fire of the Soviet soldiers who took refuge in houses. The battalion receded and was dug round at heights to the southeast by the village Stanovoye16. Prospecting patrols of fighting group of the commander of the 17th software were also sent to the region of an anti-tank ditch in the morning on July 1, but they came under strong fire and receded on the taken positions. The commander of the 1st battalion of the 47th software observed all morning positions of an anti-tank ditch and reported that in a southwest part of an anti-tank ditch the brisk movement and a congestion of the Soviet soldiers and the equipment is noticeable. The Soviet parts responded to each movement of the Hungarian connections with strong fire.

the 7th lpd for July 1 reached the village of Kirovka. The division could not promote further because of strong fire of the defending Soviet parts. In the report of army group these events were so described: "Royal Hungarian army: the opponent departs under attacks of army on the southeast. The left flank of the 7th lpd, as a result of approach moved forward on Orlovki's East. the 9th lpd occupied Stanovoye and Tim is the main by own efforts on the southwest and western outskirts, having a task still today to occupy this settlement. Parts 6th lpd step on the southeast on height of 3 km to the east of the southern outskirts Tim. The main forces of a division step on Top Rogoztsa for the 387th pd. Head parts they reached Bystrets. The right-wing regimental group of the 387th pd passed Bezlepkino and moves ahead on the southeast. The advanced parts of a division want to reach the site Oskol to the north of Baranovo still tonight" 17.

Seeking to carry out objectives at dawn on July 2 the 3rd battalion

the 17th software undertook break in Tim from the West. However, again having come under strong fire, receded on east outskirts of the village of Stanovoye. In the same time in the area protivo-

16 IVI Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation archive. T. 190. Op. 232. 9. L. 25.
17 CAMO. T. 500. Op. 1. 245. L. 43.

a tank ditch on the Hungarian positions the Soviet troops carried out massive fire. However, battalions could not leave fire zone since the Soviet gunners covered with the amplifying fire each movement of the Hungarian parts. At 10:30 the commander of the 1st software battalion 17 reported that against the right flank of battalion, from the district of the village of Livinka, with assistance of strong mortar fire the Soviet parts counterattack is organized. At the same time against the left flank of the 1st battalion of the 47th software the approach of the Soviet troops began. In the Hungarian parts there was panic. the 2nd battalion departed on 500 meters for the purpose of an exit from a zone of strong mortar fire. Hungarians managed to prevent fire of the 9th artillery division to approach of the Soviet parts.

The commander of the 9th lpd in the telephone message to the commander of the case so characterized the provision of a division for the beginning on July 2: "Investigation showed that the fighting group of the commander of the 17th software is counteracted by the opponent by force to battalion. At an anti-tank ditch of a position of the opponent are equipped with blindages. They are well disguised, are not looked through with the naked eye and completely control the area. The anti-tank ditch is strengthened by different heavy weapons. Further in depth there is a hidden defensive position. In the night of June 2 the opponent bombed and fired at fighting group. Losses of group for the expired day were: 16 officers and 230 soldiers of wounded, the number of the killed are unknown. the 9th cavalry squadron could not be transported on July 1 through the Tim River and Tim of the 3rd battalion of the 17th subparagraph could not support approach for the 3rd battalion of the 17th software reached on July 1 the village of Stanovoye and without counteraction of the opponent Tim where came under strong artillery and infantry fire carried out approach about one. Having left the covering parts, the battalion receded on northwest heights and there was dug round on both sides of the road. Losses of the 3rd battalion were: wounded: officers - 3, the soldier - 85; killed: officers 1, soldiers - 4; missing persons: officers - 2, the soldier - 63. Now in battalion there is no commander of a company" 18. Further the commander of a division suggested to allocate for a part of fighting group of the 17th software on initial positions to the region of height 262.0 and to continue approach only in case of retreat of the opponent.

The commander of the 9th lpd in the afternoon on July 2 reported that the Soviet parts recede, having left an anti-tank ditch. At the same time from the East the 22nd software of the 6th lpd entered in Tim. The city as it became clear later, already was left at 6:00 the Soviet parts. The commander of the case Sh-go gave the order on prosecution of the opponent. the 9th lpd it directed on the timsky road through the village of Kushkino, and mobile group and the 7th lpd through the village of Manturovo to Stary Oskol. While Sh-y the Hungarian case Mr. Tim, At ІІ-y tried to occupy the German building which was under supervision of the commander of the Hungarian army, having bypassed Mr. Tim from the East, moved ahead in the direction for. Old Oskol19.

On the night of July 3, proceeding from the reached position of troops, the headquarters of group of Yug armies gave the following order: "... the opponent before the front of the 6th army turned into retreat through Oskol. the 6th army passes to prosecution of the opponent on all front. The army group of Veykhs has to together with the 2nd Hungarian army and the 4th tank army, without allowing delay, to continue approach near Voronezh. the 16th mpd will be brought up from the 4th tank army now after the obstacle for the opponent on crossings through Oskol in the area Stary Oskol is provided. Ensuring approach of the 4th tank army on the northern flank" 20 remains a problem of the left flank of army.

Proceeding from this order, the headquarters of army group gave the order which explained that tasks of army group are left without changes. But to capture and conclude the Soviet parts receding from the area to the west Oskol in a full environment it was necessary to seek for connection of mobile parts of the 6th

18 IVI Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation archive. T. 190. Op. 232. 9. L. 28-29.
19 In the same place. L. 32.
20 CAMO. T. 500. Op. 1. 245. L. 53.

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of army and army group not in the area Stary Oskol, and in the area Blue Lipyagi. In the area Stary Oskol connections of infantry of the internal flank had to meet. The royal Hungarian army had to concentrate the main forces on the left flank with a task to quickly direct these forces to Stary Oskol, there to connect to the parts of the 6th army approaching from the southwest. For this purpose it should not turn too strongly on the South, and on the contrary, to seek to reach in the shortest way Stary Oskol. At the same time the 4th tank army was according to this order: "with the tank corps quickly makes the way to Voronezh, it is unexpectedly transported through Don and occupies the city. During this approach in the area Blue Lipyagi connection with the 40th tank corps of the 6th army is established and in interaction with it destroys the opponent located to the west" 21.

On July 3 GGG-y the Hungarian army case, making a march on the East, encountered the strong resistance of the receding connections of the 40th army of the Bryansk front. By the evening, conducting heavy fighting, it could reach the village of Manturovo, the village of Ostanino, the village Puzachi and the village of Kuzkino. VP-y army building 387th pd from the North rushed into Stary Oskol and in east part of the city replaced the 16th mpd, having occupied intact railway and autoanimal-drawn bridges. Parts of both divisions took the offensive from predmostny strengthening near Neznakomovo against the South and created predmostny strengthening through river. It is daring to the north of Neznakomovo. the 6th Hungarian lpd, moving ahead for the 387th pd, head parts reached the northern outskirts of in the evening. Old Oskol22.

In the night of July 4 in the area Stary Oskol - Pottery the advanced parts of the 40th tank corps of the 6th army (the 389th pd) and the 4th tank army connected (the 16th mpd) Wehrmacht, having closed an environment. Right-flank divisions of the 21st army and a part of the 13th tank corps of the Southwest front and left-flank divisions of the 40th army of the Bryansk front got to an environment.

Being afraid of break of the Soviet parts from an environment, command of the army case demanded from the Hungarian army of the fastest achievement to Stary Oskol: "You should tighten all available forces to the 7th case. This case has to in the area Stary Oskol and to the northwest of it to block to the opponent of a way of retreat and to establish connection on east coast Oskol with the 6th army rather. The direction of prosecution by the 3rd army building has to pass in the shortest ways to Stary Oskol the left flank located a ledge forward. Backs of the opponent and its groups surrounded in the area Stary Oskol have to be quickly destroyed. It is not necessary to interfere with accumulation of forces of the opponent on the northern flank of army group, the opponent has to be destroyed in defense. At the same time our losses will be smaller. Across what line there passes the northern front of army group, for the high command does not matter" 23. The Hungarian parts within July 4 and 5 reached Stary Oskol.

Command of the army Veykhs group on achievement by the 2nd Hungarian army Stary Oskol brought the German connections out of submission of the commander of the Hungarian army and gave up them in the direction to Voronezh. For the 2nd Hungarian army the task was set - the forced march to follow the German mobile troops on the East, having left to Don, to occupy the line of defense on its west bank against Voronezh to Pavlovsk. Vanguard parts of the 2nd Hungarian army reached the Don River near to the south Voronezh on July 10, 1942. Within July the line of defense allocated to Hungarians was busy with them.

The courage and military valor noted the first defensive battles of parts of the Red Army in the summer of 1942 during the Voronezh and Voroshilovgrad defensive operation. On some sectors of the front, including in the area

21 CAMO. T. 500. Op. 1. 245. L. 54.
22 In the same place. L. 60.
23 In the same place. L. 64.

Mr. Tim, the impact of enemy troops was stopped by heroism of the Soviet soldiers and officers. For Hungarians the first days of approach showed that they entered counteraction with the firm and courageous opponent, easy victories should not be expected, "to march on the Russian positions" as it was promised the German command, it will not be possible. From here, frequent escape of the Hungarian soldiers from the taken positions, panic, unwillingness to be at war.

Table 1

Losses of the 2nd Hungarian army from 28.06. on 10. 07:42 g 24

Date Ofitserov Ordinary

28.06.42 30 504
29.06.42 16 394
30.06.42 11 341
01.07.42 13 365
02.07.42 23 327
03.07.42 - 70
04.07.42 2 13
05.07.42 18 316
06.07.42 2 18
07.07.42 3 42
08.07.42 - 10
09.07.42 - 20
10.07.42 - 10

Only 118 2430

Dedicated actions of troops of the Bryansk front led to failure to meet time constraints of approach and to serious losses in manpower and the technician of Hungarians. And if by order of the commander of army group Mr. Tim had to is captured by the Hungarian parts already on June 28, then in fact he was busy only on July 2 and only after the city was left the Soviet parts. The Hungarian parts could not overcome an anti-tank ditch to the west of of Tim. They did not manage to surround and destroy the Soviet parts about Tim also. And, despite successful end for fascists of the first stage of the operation "V1ai", failure to meet time constraints of the first days of offensive and near Voronezh led further to adverse effects for Germans and their allies on the Stalingrad direction.

PARTICIPATION OF THE 2ND HUNGARIAN ARMY IN THE WEHRMACHTS SUMMER ATTACK IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE SOVIET-GERMAN FRONT IN 1942

The paper considers the process of participation of Hungarian armed forces in aggression against the Soviet Union during the years of the Great Patriotic War. On the basis of the analysis of trophy documents of national archives, course of operations on the Soviet-German Front with participation of the 2nd Hungarian army in the summer of 1942 is demonstrated.

of Key words: Great Patriotic War, Soviet-German Front, operations.

N.V. FILONENKO

Voronezh State Agricultural University n.a. K.D. Glinka

e-mail: an@vsau.ru

24 Szabo P. Op. cit. S. 107.
Garry Michael
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