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Development of computer technologies in the USSR. The second half of the 1970th beginning of the 1980th .



a. V. Kutyryov *

DEVELOPMENT of COMPUTER TECHNOLOGIES In the USSR. The SECOND HALF 1970-X - the BEGINNING of 1980-X

At a boundary of 1960 - the 1970th in a number of the states of the West the entry of society in a post-industrial stage of development began. It was shown in the form of full automation of production, mass use of the COMPUTER and high technologies. The new stage of nauchnotekhnichesky revolution called microelectronic revolution was characterized by work process individualization, its transformation for a noticeable part of society into a kind of creative activity and means of self-realization. The huge role was played by creation in 1976 of the personal computer which gave the chance not only to extremely individualize highly skilled work, but also brought it out of control corporate technobyurokratii1. The real revolution in production EVM took place at a boundary of 1960 - the 1970th on the basis of new element base, emergence of microprocessors and difficult integrated circuits - computer facilities of the third - the fourth generation for the first time united compactness, speed, relative low cost, became available to a considerable circle of institutions, enterprises, organizations. It was an event of exclusive value. In general microprocessor revolution created prerequisites for emergence of the new non-material industry of production including a programmostroyeniye, accumulation of "know-how", etc. 2. There was also one more important

* The information about the author - 1979, Moscow, in 2002 RGGU, the graduate student of department of national history of the latest time of IAI RGGU ended (the research supervisor - and. N, the prof. A.B. Bezborodov), the contact phone number - 394-34-55.

a circumstance - personal computers initiated explosive development of communications, emergence of desktop devices with a potential possibility of communications by means of modem connection gave a powerful spur to development of network technologies and modem svyazi3. Thus, in modern conditions the huge value was gained by information, technologies of its processing and the analysis, the economic situation of the country, its achievements in the scientific and technical sphere depended on these components. Development of computer technologies caused changes in many areas of scientific knowledge, resulted in need of revision of the principles of management of the leading industries of industrial production.

For understanding of specifics of development of computer technologies in the USSR in the second half of the 1970th - the beginning of the 1980th it will be required to find out a number of questions, namely - ensuring needs of the national economy for modern electronics, feature of production and introduction in the industry of the latest COMPUTERS, specifics of financing of works on development of electronic technologies, preparation of the corresponding shots. The detailed analysis of this subject will help to find the answer to a question why the Soviet scientific and technical complex not only did not liquidate the lag which was distinctly outlined to the middle of the 1970th in information technology development, but also allowed the leading capitalist powers, first of all the USA, to go to such separation which became more difficult to be reduced every year.

Sources of this work are generally unpublished documents (fund of the State Committee of the USSR for science and technology of the Russian State Archive of Economy) and also publications in the Soviet and Russian press. Archival documents help to track a number of the phenomena in development of the latest electronic

the technologies in the USSR allowing to be a certain regularity. It both official reports, and statistical materials, and remarks of the people responsible for development of the COMPUTER, concerning features of elaboration of public policy in this area of scientific knowledge. For achievement of bigger objectivity the unpublished sources are considered together with the analysis of materials in the periodic press. Characteristic of contents of editions of the Soviet period - existence of a large number of publications on problems of introduction of the new equipment, production difficulties, abuses of officials of a low rank. At last, now in the press quite often there are memoirs of the domestic scientists who were engaged in development of the COMPUTER. Their analysis, despite all shortcomings inherent in sources of personal origin, allows to look at a problem from a bit different point of view, to see all features of public policy more stoutly.

Preference was given in the Soviet Union first of all to production scope of new technologies: it was staked on creation of automated control systems for industrial production, machines with numerical program control; and also the organization of computer centers of collective use and measuring computer systems which purpose was a collecting and the analysis of various information for various needs. Use of the COMPUTER by individuals, outside official bodies did not practice not so much because of the serious, constantly increasing lag in this area, but first of all because of features of the Soviet legislation which did not allow to have to ordinary citizens the copy equipment and to use it in house conditions. The similar state of affairs proceeded up to the beginning of the 1990th

Introduction of ACS on production brought notable economic effect, allowed to do work which was performed before whole tsekha4. In the mid-seventies were not conducted disputes on what is electronic computer facilities of the latest generations - a bourgeois toy or a useful innovation in the national economy any more, it was talked of improvement of work with new technologies.

Important aspect in understanding of features of development of computer technologies in the USSR during the specified period is clarification of degree of satisfaction of needs of the national economy for modern electronics. Here it should be noted that to the middle of the 1970th the industry needed not only enough actually the COMPUTER, but also the additional devices necessary for the most effective work of this type of the equipment - the peripheral equipment, components, the software, and in this case not only the quantity, but also quality was required.

First of all it is necessary to find out degree of security of the national economy of the USSR with modern means of information processing in the second half of the 1970th - the beginning of the 1980th. As for world scientific and technical progress, it should be noted that already in the early seventies in the USA appeared computers of the fourth generation. It were inventions really revolutionary in essence - thanks to reduction in cost of process of their production the computers became available to ordinary users, that is became personal, and their mass production and consumption began. If to speak about a situation in the Soviet Union in respect of mass reproduction of the COMPUTER (we do not speak about separate perspective developments now), then here the needs of the national economy for the latest electronics were satisfied, to put it mildly, partially if to consider that specific weight

obsolete cars of the second generation made about 83%5. Of course, it is always less samples of the latest equipment, than the products widespread in the industry and scientific institutions, it is clear. However, if to look at the percentage of the latest COMPUTERS and COMPUTER of the previous generations, then and accurate lag of the Soviet Union from the USA appears here. Indeed, in 1976 in the USSR the share of the COMPUTER of big power in the EVM general park of the country made about 1% while in the USA such COMPUTERS was

10 %6. If to tell specifically, then, for example, the volume of release of the R-50 COMPUTER, it is most perspective developments of the Soviet scientists at this time, made only 34 pieces for 1974 - 1976 that obviously did not satisfy requirement of the national economy. Further the situation did not change, and more likely on the contrary, - lag increased. Also such detail is very characteristic - in 1985 in a total amount of release a ratio highly productive (16 and 32-bit) and other microprocessors made 1:508. Thus, to the middle of the 1970th of the USSR lagged behind the level of the leading capitalist power in respect of existence and mass reproduction of the modern electronic equipment that could not but affect development practically of all industries demanding broad automation of all production.

As for the needs of the national economy for the peripheral equipment, here the situation looked is pessimistic also by quantitative indices, and on qualitative. In 1977 it was noted that "creation of new PCSs (automated process control systems - A.K.) restrains because of a lack of actuation mechanisms and mechanisms (sensors and signal converters, actuation mechanisms, drives, etc.)" 9. Despite successful developments of certain scientists, in any way not

it was possible to organize production of such specific component as memory devices in industrial scale that could not but affect overall performance of the COMPUTER. And considerable lag in this area from the level of technologically developed states was noted - to the middle of the 1970th the development of filler on magnetic disks with a capacity of 100 million signs without which creation of effective ACS was impossible was not finished yet while abroad these fillers with a capacity of 100, 200 and 300 million signs were produced already

there is a lot of let10.

Difficulties when developing necessary devices, that is in purely scientific sphere, were thrown also on a production part that led to serious dissatisfaction of need of the information industry for these components: "Slowly production of devices of preparation of data on the magnetic carriers allowing to increase the speed of information input in the COMPUTER almost a hundred times and to increase compactness of storage of information in hundreds of times develops. In 1976... only 33 devices were released, at the general need for them more than 3 thousand pieces" 11. Indirectly extent of lag can be understood from phrases "a hundred times" and "in hundreds of times", even at the modern level of development of electronic technologies when rates of a scientific and technological revolution can be compared to a geometrical progression (Moore's law, for example, says that every two years the speed of processors increases twice), at a normal situation the technical novelty cannot improve a situation in so many time at once. Respectively, more or less high-quality devices of storage of information provided about 1% of all COMPUTERS that, naturally, did not satisfy the need of the industry for the high-precision equipment in any way. So, we see that the deficiency of the equipment also was added to the shortage of the latest means of information processing,

necessary for effective operation of the COMPUTER that, clear, multiplied difficulties by ways of automation of production.

Here we pass to one more important subject, namely - to features of development of scientific and technical policy in the field of development of the latest information technologies that will allow to answer narrower question - specifics of production and deliveries to the COMPUTER enterprises.

First of all it should be noted dissociation and passivity of the government scientific institutions responsible for development of the industry of modern means of information processing. It is possible to tell with confidence that in the USSR there was no uniform technical policy on a question of development and deployment of the latest electronics, scientific institutions worked, practically without communicating with each other, practices. So, Yu.F. Shirokov, one of members of GKNT, said that ". each of these organizations is forced "to peddle old stuff" independently since any integral and perspective ideology of creation of systems on the basis of microprocessors in the country does not exist" 12. Interfered with scientific process and especially bureaucratic features of the Soviet scientific system. Activity of the profile organizations was characterized by such words as ". extreme sluggishness, indecision, incompleteness and uncertainty of decisions" 13.

In many respects it was connected with the unhealthy competition between the ministries which led to slowing down of scientific and technical progress in the field - many developers of computer technologies in the USSR directly speak about it. So, one of the reasons of the increasing lag of the Soviet Union in the field of development of the COMPUTER E.G. Kneller calls ". disagreements between the ministries - our institute treated one ministry, the plants - another, responsibility

nobody wanted to undertake" 14. About same also B.A. Babayan, one of creators of the most perspective Elbrus computing system for the time speaks: ". in general in this area the terrible chaos was created. One ministry did chips, another - computers. Also were at enmity among themselves." 15.

Is not subject to doubt that such situation was connected with excessive centralization of the Soviet scientific system which consequence not comprehensive control as a result was, but aspiration of officials from science to promote in all possible ways. At the same time development of the latest technologies was called into question, their introduction almost always meant risk which heads of the ministries were not able to afford. In such situation the competition between various departments directly slowed down scientific and technical progress, attraction to business of the competing organization could mean incompetence of specific heads within the system of similar values that was absolutely inadmissible for officials. So, it was specified that "the inventions created in others are especially unsatisfactorily worked in developments (it is allocated - A.K.) industries, institutions of academies of Sciences and in higher educational institutions" 16. For this reason such low level of cooperation between various ministries, departments and the organizations subordinated to them is characteristic of the Soviet research and production system in general, and not just of the elektronnovychislitelny industry separately, the situation of isolation of each industry most in itself, its autonomy, isolation was created. V.S. Lelchuk also speaks about extreme inefficiency of such policy of the ministries and departments leading to formation of the negative phenomena within a command system: "Necessary coherence in relationship between them [the ministries - And.

To.] it was not possible to reach. Pretty often departmental interests got the best of nation-wide. Not only production, but also scientific and production associations, applied research institutes and design offices worked especially within the

17

ministries".

It is characteristic that the departmental dissociation and was one of the main reasons of lag in purely scientific areas where the question of providing the COMPUTER with quality software products most was particularly acute. The deficiency of the software was not less serious problem, than the low level of the peripheral equipment. Especially it was shown against the background of perspective developments of the EVM new models by domestic experts. The situation with MVK "Elbrus" which on the potential quite could become one of the most powerful computers of the time - the second half of the 1970th is very characteristic in this plan. However negative trends of the Soviet model of introduction were shown here - the similar miracle of the equipment existed in piece scale and could not influence essentially a situation in general. Besides, there were difficulties and when providing this system with means of the software that also

18

constrained effective use of this COMPUTER in the industry. The lack of necessary infrastructure, the shortage of qualified personnel, the peripheral equipment and the software were a serious brake in development and use of the latest equipment. A characteristic detail - in the early eighties in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR organizations from the being available 1500 pieces of the micro Electronics COMPUTER for the above-mentioned reasons only about 10%19 fully functioned. In general the problem was particularly acute very much, on completion,

operational development "to mind" "software" about 31% of all time

were spent by
20

uses of the COMPUTER.

Departmental separation which consequence the lack of accurate coordination of works was concentration on any one important direction, significantly slowed down development of nauchnotekhnichesky progress in the sphere of development of modern COMPUTERS. Funds for development of the software were spent considerable, the number of developments was impressive, however the problem of providing computer aids with appropriate programs remained. In many respects it was connected with the fact that the majority of these developments simply did not find application, they were a peculiar transcendental object. In such conditions effective work on the COMPUTER demanded from the user not to rely on the state system, and to work most as it describes, for example, Ya. Zoltners, the deputy chief of department of ACS of Latvglavenergo: "In the country a large number of idle programs extends. Therefore when you look for for yourself the program, it is impossible to trust in a card file. It is necessary to search for VC where any given program proved to be." 21.

Often the incompatibility of various products, insufficiently high level of unification of the developed and released equipment was a consequence of lack of coordination. In the USSR there was no concept of achievement of program compatibility of developments, experts worked actually one by one, requirements of standardization were not imposed to their products, as predetermined lag. And if to consider that ACS focused on performance of multidimensional tasks demands full compatibility of the most various components (both the peripheral equipment, and communication devices with other ACS forming as a result the whole complex and software), then it becomes clear why in the USSR by the beginning of the 1980th the industry was so poorly automated. Generality, separation of the automated complexes was nearly main

a deterrent in development in the country of uniform structure of ACS where each object would be a part of a system.

In general functioning of ACS in the Soviet Union was connected with a number of features which predetermined a bigger lag from the level of development reached in the West. So, for example, in the second half of the 1970th the design of ACS was carried out in such a way that only simple calculating opportunities of the COMPUTER, and processing were used

primary information, its collecting and transfer were not automated,

22

these functions remained for the person. It is clear, that it could not but affect efficiency and performance of work of all complex.

As a result security of users with the peripheral equipment for the COMPUTER of the third generation in the early eighties

23

made about 20%, the park of these COMPUTERS made 36, 8%. In general in the USSR about 2% of outdated types were annually replaced

24

The COMPUTER that insufficiently for successful development of the industry was obvious. Here it is possible to talk also not quite thought over scientific and technical politics in the field which were expressed in insufficient financing of projects on development of necessary components. Expenses on creation and introduction of computer aids in relation to the total amount of investments to the scientific and technical sphere in the USSR were significantly less, than in the developed capitalist countries. So, if in our country in 1975 this rate was 2, 2% of overall appropriations for science, then in Japan in the same time for development of this direction 6, 5%, and in the USA at all 14, 2 were allocated

25

% of the scientific budget of the state. In general, in a production automation funding plan the Soviet Union seriously lagged behind the level of the developed capitalist countries - so, by data for 1980, the share of capital investments in automation in power made in the USSR 4, 1% while this indicator was in the USA at the level of 14%, in

nonferrous metallurgy - respectively 4 and 15%, in chemical industry - 9, 1 and 15%, in the food industry - 2, 6 and 17%; similar situation was also in others otraslyakh26. The situation did not change also several years later. All this could not but affect production automation - by the beginning of the eleventh five-years period of ACS

27

covered only 6% of all industrial enterprises. M.S. Shkabardnya, the minister of instrument making, the automation equipment and control systems, directly pointed that ". scales of works on

automation of the enterprises even of key branches of the industry.

28

remain insufficient.". The shortage of funds was one of the main reasons for the situation - it was nearly the most current problem which rose practically before all industries (first of all - civil) the industries in the mid-eighties

Among other things, the shortcoming of the people who are professionally prepared for effective work in the field was felt. There were not enough first of all latest equipment specialists, the training problem for service was particularly acute

29

COMPUTER of the third generation. In general, for example, of the software by the beginning of the 1980th 128 thousand people, however were engaged in development and such considerable number of experts did not satisfy requirements of the industries national hozyaystva30. It is also possible to note both inefficiency and crudity of policy of distribution of university graduates - scientific institutions of the Ministry of instrument making, the main organization responsible for development and deployment of the COMPUTER did not receive young specialists from one institute of Moscow, and age of most of designers in scientific research institute given

31

reached the ministry to the middle of the 1980th of 50 years. The staff shortage arose, first of all, because of the absence of corresponding

specialties in higher education institutions of the Soviet Union. So, even in 1987 in higher educational institutions of the USSR the training in such subject as "scientific instrument making and automation of scientific research" was not conducted; only the issue concerning the organization of the educational MNTK "Scientific Devices" industrial complex where passed was handled

32

training students of physical and mathematical faculties.

the Main contribution to training of specialists on work with ACS was made by MVTU of Bauman, MIPT (specialty "machine mathematics") and

33

Leningrad institute of avionics (LIAP). The lack of scientific personnel led to inefficient use of the modern equipment, insufficient load of the COMPUTER because of what the national economy of the USSR bore considerable financial ubytki34. In general it is possible to speak as about the shortage of shots in general (though the Soviet educational system more or less coped with ensuring quantity), and about deficiency of skilled staff on concrete narrow specialties (vibrometriya, a chromatography) which, however, had significant effect on scientific and technical development of the country. It is undoubted that the problem of a lack of shots also constrained progress in the field of development and deployment in the national economy of the country of the latest electronics.

The actual absence of service of service was one more serious problem also that led to long outage of technology which could be repaired. And the more every year was issued ACS and other high-precision equipment, the problem became more notable - in process of growth of the COMPUTER CM park the share of the cars accepted on service decreased that led to growth of idle times

35

The COMPUTER, to failure of systems in which they were used. At this time there is a number of regulations which purpose was a correction of current situation. It first of all Resolution

Council of ministers of the USSR of January 8, 1976. "About the organization and complex service of computer aids" and also the order of GKNT "About the Organization of the Complex Centralized Service of Means of Electronic Computer Facilities" of February 27, 1976 which is actually duplicating the order of superior organization. The meaning of these documents came down to the fact that at each enterprise, in each scientific institution where there were computer aids, the relevant customer service was organized. However the situation remained on the same place and several years later. So, in 1982 "... because of the limited complex centralized maintenance of cars. idle times on large and middle COMPUTERS because of technical malfunction made about 5% by the general useful time" 36. In general over the country could count on high-quality service at this time less than 10% of EVM37.

It is necessary to tell also that the situation with guarantee maintenance was better for the little also in other fields of the Soviet industrial production, and, as well as in other industries, prospered a phenomenon of "shadow economy" here. In the Soviet press of that time the facts of abuse of official position of the persons responsible for repair of computer aids were mentioned more than once. So, non-execution of the direct duties by the relevant organization which the offer to render the same service followed was an everyday occurrence, having paid it at the same time directly, cash. As competitor companies, for obvious reasons, were not, becomes obvious that to shake a monopoly position of this organization and, respectively, to promote improvement of the services provided by it, it was represented very problematic. So, A. Butov, director of computer center

shipping companies of northwest basins in the city of Leningrad were told by very typical case: "In principle they (servicing the organizations) do not refuse to carry out adjustment of the COMPUTER to the terms established by the State Planning Committee, but appoint date to three-four months later (& #34; it is a lot of work", "there are no people"). And we already know that at the right time to us "boys" will come from the same organization and will tell: "We generally went not to you, but heard that you have difficulties. We can help. It will be

38

to cost so much". In cash!" It is easy to guess that the unsatisfactory situation with providing the new equipment with repair work could not but affect degree of prevalence and effective use of the COMPUTER.

The problem of high-quality service was connected also with a problem of assessment of success of work of the enterprise for specific planned targets what it was told above about. So, V.A. Myasnikov, the head of department of instrument making of GKNT, directly says that "at the operating indicators to the plants it is unprofitable to release expanded sets of the COMPUTER" that leads to the shortage of reserve details: "Now to the plants it is unprofitable to deliver spare parts complete with a product as in value terms it influences performance a little

39

plan". In many respects it was connected with features of providing the enterprises with the latest electronics. The fact is that "... COMPUTERS were delivered... to users in the so-called "basic set" absolutely insufficient for the solution of problems of ACS; at the same time the vast majority of users has no opportunity to understaff the operating COMPUTERS with additional devices over "a basic set"" 40.

Undoubtedly, here we observe the lack of accurate study of questions of infrastructure connected with not absolutely adequate understanding of a problem from responsible persons. Problem

ensuring high-quality service with a logical image rises in one row with such negative trends of development of the COMPUTER in the USSR as a lack of computer facilities in general, the shortage of the latest samples, deficiency of components and the software. It is obvious that it is not separate bad points, but set of the phenomena which are naturally fitting into a system which main sign was an inability of the Soviet scientific and technical complex to reconstruct, having provided the most comfortable development to the new industries of scientific knowledge. Presence of perspective developments at domestic scientists only confirms this trend as it demonstrates inefficient functioning of a system, but not about serious problems in purely scientific sphere.

Thus, excessive centralization of all Soviet scientific system therefore the bureaucratic intrigues inevitable in any society, in this case became the main obstacle in a way of scientific progress was the reasons of lag of the Soviet instrument-making industry. The departmental fragmentation conducted to the fact that the principles of uniform scientific and technical policy predominated only on paper, the scientific organizations of various ministries practically did not cooperate in real life with each other that led to duplication of developments, overlapping of scientific research, dispersion of design forces. It directly affected quality of both the peripheral equipment, and the software, and in the conditions of the lag which was obviously outlined to the middle of the 1970th from the USA this circumstance only worsened a situation.

So, in the mid-seventies it was already difficult to not to react to the rapid development of the electronic and computing industry happening in the West. The heads of the country, officials responsible for nauchnotekhnichesky progress in our country understood it that cannot be told about

many local chiefs who very formally treated technical novelties therefore the COMPUTERS costing much just were not used properly. Complicated situation and departmental disagreements because of which actually scientific component often suffered. Besides, the situation was influenced negatively by the general economic situation in the country, financial opportunities for a successful competition with capitalist powers in the scientific and technical sphere gradually began not to be enough that could not but affect development of new information technologies. The Soviet experts sometimes could design the perspective elektronnovychislitelny car (as, for example, the BESM-6 1967 computer of - the fastest at the time in Europe; or MVK "Elbrus-1" and "Elbrus-2"), but at the same time in general economy scale steadily existed problems of shortage of components or the necessary software, and the outdated element base did not allow to increase quickly production EVM - from 1968 to 1987 only 355 BESM-6 was let out. As a result to the second half of the 1980th before the Soviet scientific and technical sphere there was a difficult task - to reduce the gap accruing from the USA and other capitalist countries in the information industry that was more difficult to be made every year.

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7 In the same place. L. 9.
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10 In the same place. L. 93, 94.
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12 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 2302. L. 80.
13 In the same place. L. 80.
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18 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 821. L. 292.
19 In the same place. L. 128.
20 In the same place. L. 312.
21 L. Amerkhanyan. Reputation of "electronic service"//Literary newspaper. 1984. August 8.
22 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 12. D. 544a. L. 81.
23 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. D. 432. L. 39.
24 In the same place. L. 39.
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26 In the same place. L. 65.
27 V.S. Lelchuk. Decree. soch. Page 190.
28 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. D. 1615. L. 65.
29 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 12. D. 544a. L. 71; RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 2302. L. 149.
30 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. D. 821. L. 314.
31 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 2602. L. 105.
32 In the same place. L. 106.
33 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. D. 2557. L. 172.
34 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 12. D. 204. L. 211; RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 432. L. 30; RGAE. T.
9480. Op. 13. 1014. L. 40.
35 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. 821. L. 293.
36 In the same place. L. 314.
37 In the same place. L. 293.
38 L. Amerkhanyan. Decree. soch.//Literary newspaper. 1984. August 8.
39 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 13. D. 433. L. 112.
40 RGAE. T. 9480. Op. 12. D. 547. L. 9.
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