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Social ideal: civilization aspects of development of the Soviet society



r. S. Istamgalin

SOCIAL IDEAL:

CIVILIZATION ASPECTS of DEVELOPMENT of the SOVIET SOCIETY

Work is presented by department of philosophy of the Ufa state academy of economy and service.

Unlike pre-Soviet, it is possible to call the Soviet civilization project vertical. It assumed not just finding of the special place of the country near other civilization formations and the eminence over them is even not simple. It assumed their full absorption in the course of the global revolutionary changes which began in Russia. It was the request for break in real axial time in which the mankind separated and got confused in the conflicts will manage to unite at last, but not thanks to development of abstraction of the one God or the universal principles of the global capitalist market and the legal norms serving it, and thanks to comprehension of abstractions of communistic ideology.

R. Istamgalin

SOCIAL IDEAL: CIVILISATIONAL ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET SOCIETY’S DEVELOPMENT

Unlike pre-Soviet ones, Soviet civilisational project can be called vertical. It meant not only ^ finding a special place of the country among other civilized societies and not only rising over them. It meant their total absorbing in the process of world revolutionary transformations that began in Russia. It was a claim for a breakthrough in the real axial time for the mankind entangled in conflicts to be able to unite at last: not due to assimilating the abstraction of single God or universal principles of the global capitalistic market and legal norms serving it, but due to perceiving the abstractions of the communist ideology.

In comparison with Soviet all previous Russian civilization projects also really were horizontal. At most, for what they applied, - the statement of Russia nearby and over other civilization enclaves, i.e. achievement of superiority over them, but not their assimilation. The projects of an orthodox civilization with the center in Moscow which were moving forward in pre-Pertine Russia did not extend out of borders of the orthodox world. "Greek project"

Catherine II assumed domination of Russia in Europe, but left in it the lawful place and for the Western European countries considering themselves successors of Ancient Rome.

And implementation of the project of Holy Alliance by Alexander I was followed even by readiness to renounce orthodox identity for the sake of achievement of civilization unity - at leadership of Russia - with Austria and Prussia on an all-Christian basis. Were not planetary, despite

all their ambition, and later Pan-Slavist strategy. In other words, pre-Soviet civilization projects could apply and, as a rule, applied for alternativeness first of all in relation to the West. The communistic project performed by Bolsheviks which was initially laying claim not on original, and on global alternativeness, was, unlike them, uncontested.

It is more difficult to speak about results of the Soviet era, than about results of other periods, because of specific features of its consciousness. The purposes which were set before the country her leaders were formulated by them in logic of transition from capitalism by socialism and communism. In the same logic achievements of the Soviet system were fixed, many of which in actual fact were not achievements, but their imitations or just backsliding movements in relation to reached by dobolshevistsky Russia.

1. The communistic system removed a problem which was unsolvable for Ryurik dynasty and Romanov which inflexibility became one of the main reasons of a collapse of autocratic and monarchic statehood, and at the same time predetermined not transformation of the last in statehood of the western type. The centuries-old split between pre-state and state culture aggravated with the westernisation of noble elite which began during a Petrovsky era was eliminated in the Soviet Russia with revolutionary and repressive methods by means of violent cutting off of both poles of the split society: national (communal and veche) and

elite, issued under the influence of the European culture.

Elimination of an elite noble and bourgeois pole was interpreted by Bolsheviks as elimination of a private property and "exploiter classes" and ideologically was based as a necessary step on the way to socialism at which cannot and there should not be neither this property, nor these classes. Elimination of a country communal and veche pole too Inter -

it pretirovatsya in logic of class fight, and was based on need of the transfer of the village to socialist rails by means of collectivization and transformation of agriculture into a source of cheap resources for socialist industrialization. But as a result former split between pre-state and state culture disappeared, having been replaced by total nationalization of all way of life which, in turn, had no own cultural quality and therefore could be only historically situational and passing.

2. This nationalization was followed by creation of universal standards of the Soviet legality with which approval the introduction of the country to the first axial time in unusual way came to the end and its partial transition to the second was carried out. The fact that in a communistic system this process was perceived in a special way too and was interpreted as break during essentially modern world times is important again only for understanding of consciousness of the Soviet era, deception and self-deceptions peculiar to it, but this fact should not mislead concerning a vector of the process. The Soviet Union moved in the same direction, as the western civilization which was ideologically rejected by it, but the parallel historical course in relation to it assuming not development, but imitation of its basic principles.

The Soviet legality, as well as western, was constitutional. It is similar western, it was general, forced out the remains of common law of the rural local worlds which (both the remains, and the peace) were preserved in Russia till 1917. At last, the Soviet legality was brought over time to legal equality of citizens in their duties and the rights including selective that is one of the most important signs of the second axial time. Yes, it was talked generally only of imitations of the principles of legality and the right, of a form, but not of contents. But this form was universal, it integrated the pre-state worlds into big, gosudar-

stvenno-organized society. It was, speaking differently, a form of removal of sociocultural split.

Besides, during the perestroika years it became clear that the form of "socialist legality" and "socialist democracy" to some extent could be filled also with actual democratic and legal content, and in process of filling to be transformed by it. At the same time also the fact that the Soviet imitatsionnost has strong inertia which still blocks formation of legal statehood in Russia, however, became clear. A communistic era made property of mass consciousness only universal abstractions of legality and the right. As the behavior imperatives defining a way of daily functioning of the state and society they in culture did not take roots. But during the pre-Soviet period the consciousness of most of people did not master also these abstractions.

3. Development of national education became the major prerequisite which made such development possible. In this relation the communistic system completed the long process which began at the time of Peter I. Bolsheviks solved this problem consciously and purposefully that was defined, on the one hand, by the need for the qualified specialists and workers conforming to requirements of an industrial era, and with another - desire to prove superiority of the Soviet system over pre-Soviet in democratization and compliance to the interests of the national majority. Universal abstractions of scientific knowledge which development began with school laid the cultural foundation and for mass development of other abstractions, including abstractions of the state, legality, the right.
4. Also the accelerated transformation of the rural country into city was quite consciously carried out by Bolsheviks. First, it was dictated by needs of the industrialization creating the increased labor demand which could be scooped only from the village. Secondly, urbanization sootvetst-

a vovala to doctrinal ideological installations according to which only industrial workers can be a reliable and long-term support of a socialist system and there cannot be peasants subject to "proprietary prejudices". Bolsheviks were fated to put historical end near old rural Russia and to begin the history of Russia city.

The Soviet urbanization which is carried out in unprecedentedly short terms and filled the cities with rural migrants provided short-term legitimacy of the new state and its systemically important institutes. It was promoted by wide circulation of special rural and city type of culture as which carrier the first generation of citizens acted. But in the next generations it was not reproduced, and therefore the urbanization was fated to play the USSR the same role, as to development of education: being one of the most noticeable results of the Soviet period, it, together with education, stimulated formation of values, with the communistic system and its ideology of incompatible. Namely - values of city culture, i.e. individual freedom and welfare.

The Soviet state could answer these calls only with purposeful social policy which was considered by it as one of the main features of socialism. It entirely undertook construction and the maintenance of housing, free education and health care, provision of pensions. In such broad set the social benefits were not provided even in the developed capitalist countries, not to mention pre-Communist Russia. This policy which was especially actively carried out to a poststalin era was directly connected with an urbanization and requirements generated by it though and lagged behind its rates.

But business was not only in lag which in itself threatened a system with nothing. And even not only that the quality of free services gradually ceased to correspond to quickly changing type

requirements, and it was necessary to pay extra for higher quality illegally. Business was also that this system of the social benefits causing today in many nostalgic feelings then was perceived as habitual manifestation of the Soviet equalization and the unification blocking realization of the individual and personal beginning and the statement of higher than in the USSR, the western vital standards. So, an urbanization and education, being the main achievements of the Soviet socialism, became also the main reasons of its historical defeat.

5. Progress of the USSR on the military and technological direction, including military space where he became a pioneer became the most noticeable and conventional result of the Soviet period in the world. The communistic system found the mobilization potential sufficient for carrying out industrial modernization, a victory in war with Hitlerite Germany and transformations of the country into one of two world superstates. Progress of the USSR on this direction showed that at concentration in hands of the state of all material and human resources the military power can be provided also at low efficiency of economy.
the old problem of military and technological competitiveness in relation to the West which was reproduced throughout government of Ryurik dynasty and Romanov in its former look a problem stopped being

With creation in the Soviet Union of nuclear weapon and means of its delivery. But with the advent of such weapon consigned to the past and former type of big wars between the leading powers: both defensive, and status, and that which were caused by fixations on increment of territories. Thereby also essentially new historical call before which there was a country was designated, - a call by the world, i.e. lack of real threat of big war from the main military opponent acting through the West at impossibility to seriously threaten it.

The Banner of Victory over the prostrate German Reichstag and establishment promoskov-

sky communist regime in Eastern Europe allowed the Soviet Union to restore the domestic imperial and majestic identity shaken by military failures of the last Romanov at the beginning of the 20th century. But at security such identity began to be washed away by "a nuclear umbrella" from external military threats, and the official Soviet and socialist identity could support her only if itself constantly becomes stronger progress of socialism within the country and noticeable expansion of "the socialist camp" beyond its limits. However in that and other relation of the USSR quickly moved to borders of the opportunities that became more and more obvious and for the Soviet people, and for heads of the state. Especially as these borders were designated also in military and technological area over time.

The Soviet Union stopped the existence, having achieved the status of the world superstate and remaining it up to the disintegration. He left a historical scene because, solving some problems, created others which were for it unsolvable. The burden of the found supergreat power statehood became for it so excessive, as well as the calls generated by an urbanization and development of education. Its disintegration - a direct consequence of its achievements.

But matter not only that the Soviet socialism could not assimilate these results and resist their consequences. The ideological purposes which were implemented in the USSR in combination with methods which in it problems of pre-Soviet Russia were removed, in many respects returned the country to lower point of evolution in comparison with reached at Romanov. Too it was in detail told about these historical losses above, and we needed only to summarize them.

1. Elimination of former split between the state and pre-state culture by means of compulsory nationalization of a way of life did not mean that in the USSR there was new state culture. Abolition of common law and distribution of the principle of legality in breadth,

i.e. on all population, and even finishing it to legally fixed equal rights in itself this problem was not solved. First, because this principle did not become universal as the management of the ruling Communist Party was brought out of limits of its action. Secondly, such removal demonstrated that out of legal control there was all system of law enforcement: the nadza-horse party power legitimating itself not the legal, and declared on behalf of science historical law acted as her exclusive controller. Or that the same, communistic ideology. In legal relations the Soviet era returned the country by Peter I and even Ivan the Terrible's times. The movement to legal statehood which was outlined at Romanov was interrupted. It is not only about that trend which was designated at Nicholas II and was expressed in legal restriction of autocracy. It is also about trends of earlier.

The autocracy of the dodumsky period, like the CPSU, had monopoly for lawmaking. But unlimited powers of autocrats were fixed legally, and after Paul I's murder, i.e. since 19th century, were actually limited in the sense that the emperor had to reckon with the current legislation. In the military and mandative state system issued in the USSR at Stalin, the real legislator acting through the party high priest was behind the legislator front - the Supreme Council and its presidium - and was not connected by any restrictions in lawmaking and law enforcement. Stalin's successors tried, unconsciously going on the way of the Russian autocrats, to legitimate the absolute power legal norm on "leading and directing" a role of the CPSU. Moreover, statement was even published in the Constitution of 1977 that all party organizations work within the law. Nevertheless in terms of actual legal content poststalin statehood all

still conceded to the last Romanov' statehood.

The power of the Russian emperors, along with legal, had a dynastic source of legitimacy. The power of the CPSU acquired in the revolutionary way and approved by force had no own source of legitimacy, and therefore also its claim for "leading and directing" a role had no reasons. Legislative fixing of this role in the Constitution did not remove a question of legal validity of the most such fixing. Besides, outside the right regulation there was also a power of the party device, and, above all - the secretary general which unlike the power of the Russian emperors legislatively did not make a reservation in general. Changed nothing in this relation and the constitutional restriction of activity of the party organizations because actually legal mechanisms of such restriction were absent.

If to consider the remaining accountability to Communist Party committees of the Soviet court, then there will be obvious also a fundamental difference of trends of the poststalin period from Romanov who were outlined in the last decades boards. In the second case it was talked of evolution in the direction of legal statehood that was shown in the movement to independence of the courts (with jurors and independent lawyers), establishment of zemstvoes and, finally, in legal restriction of autocracy in favor of the State Duma. In the first - about imitation of legal statehood that just also demonstrated inability of a communistic system to create new state culture. This system could build only the situational state with situational legitimacy.

From it Post-Soviet Russia inherited some important principles: the generality of the law and equality before it, including rights of equal which in Russia Romanov did not manage to be approved and mass consciousness were not mastered. But also in the USSR, having become property of consciousness, they were not

vital reality, and her ceremonial facade. Therefore the Soviet era left behind not the culture of legal statehood, but the pseudo-culture of legal imitation which inertia affects to this day.

2. At situational progress also industrial modernization was followed by considerable strategic losses in the USSR. From two of its main options: German and American, known at that time in the world, German was chosen as a reference point. Unlike American, with its rate on economic freedom, individualism and high compensation, he assumed the significant programming and stimulating role of the state in development of the industry and the strengthened control over workers. Such choice was caused as those that the German model was considered as rather effective, and that it more corresponded to doctrinal fixations of Bolsheviks on nationalization of economy. But thereby the Soviet heads were also successors of that tradition of domestic state modernizations "from above" which developed long before them. Their innovation was that they brought it to the fullest, extreme embodiment. In this regard they followed not so much the last Romanov who were guided, in turn, by the German emperors how many for Peter I, but went much further him too.

Like Peter, Stalin carried out technological modernization by means of militarization of all way of life of the country with only that difference that it did it not in military, and in peace time. However much more essential difference was that Stalin industrialization was carried out not just at restriction of the market relations and the property rights as was at the time of Peter, and at complete elimination of the market and its replacement with the state goal-setting. It also caused strategic vulnerability of the Soviet industrial system. Could create its state, but it was not able

to provide its self-development, to tell her impulses for new modernizations. The military industrial complex put especially privileged position was the only sphere in which this system bared competitiveness in relation to market economies.

In a sense the Soviet Union appeared in the same modernization trap to what Russia at the last Romanov got. In that and other case the modernization of separate priority segments of economy was carried out at conservation of all others, and together with them and most of the population in not dynamic, stagnating state. But if at the end of XIX - the beginning of the 20th century the city and the city industry developed due to preservation of archaic orders in the preindustrial village, then in the Soviet option the maintenance of technological competitiveness of military industrial complex was carried out due to insufficient funding of civil sectors at заблокированное™ further modernization not only in the village, but also in the city. The fact that Romanov before Stolypin reforms kept archaic rural way consciously, and the Soviet leaders were hostages of the non-market system insensitive to modernization calls created by them, has no basic value. Significantly only the fact that during the Soviet period the trend of state and market modernization which was outlined at Romanov was stopped and replaced with modernization state bezrynochnoy which turned back strategic losses difficult to replace.

The Soviet economy was so situational, as well as the Soviet statehood. Having liquidated the market and enterprise culture developing in pre-Soviet Russia, the communistic system did not create the new productive culture alternative market, but complicated return to the interrupted way. Much of what interrupted it during the Soviet era from national life disappeared. However inertia of nationalized economy affects in postsovet-

it is not less sky Russia, than inertia of fasadnoimitatsionny statehood.

3. The Soviet industrial modernization not only did not bring the country out of deadlocks of extensive managing, long since in it dominating, but also liquidated all sprouts of an intensification which slowly sprouted in pre-Soviet city business, in the best landowner and "kulak" farms. The communistic system possesses a priority in creation of the extensive economy of new type based not so much on the armed occupations of others lands and the world markets, how many on the permanent non-market industrialization extending in space without high-quality changes in time. Extensiveness as a product of the carried-out technological modernization deprived of own modernization impulses - such is there was an unplanned and not predicted historical result of full replacement of the market and market subjects by the state.

Replacement of a plow and a horse by the tractor brought primary economic effect, but in the absence of organizational, administrative and economic incentives for a further intensification it was doomed to remain single. Therefore implementation of industrial technologies in agriculture was not followed by the solution of a food problem, and the forced development of virgin lands and their subsequent inefficient use became the expressive evidence of uncontested extensiveness which prevailed over the communistic system of managing. The purchases of the latest import equipment happening throughout the Soviet period testified to the same: in itself it did not provide in the USSR performance level and qualities which provided in the countries from where it was imported. Both in agriculture, and in the industry such system, even borrowing innovations, could develop only in breadth due to increase in the area of plowing or construction of the new enterprises, thanking

to what some time economic growth was carried out.

As well as any extensive economy, its industrial Soviet version had the natural (natural) borders. Before others the border demographic - a rural source of the labor necessary for continuation of industrial new buildings was designated, by 1970th ran low, and the extensiveness turned back the stagnation which predetermined the subsequent disintegration of a communistic system. It was delayed thanks to the high world prices for oil: the extensive economy which reached the limit can prolong the existence if has the natural resource allowing it to be connected to intensive economies abroad.

The Soviet state applying for market replacement eventually capitulated to it. But inheritance which it left to adapt to the market it was difficult. It left behind the huge industrial sector making products which at directive and planned sale were consumed generally in the most this sector and with rare exception, treating first of all the raw industries and some segments of superexclusive military industrial complex, had no market value. It left behind the economic environment which was not knowing a concept of the competition and to it not predisposed. Wednesday in which the domestic tradition of extensive managing was completely cleaned from intensification trends, let and the weak, outlined in the last decades boards Romanov.

4. It was significantly weakened during the Soviet period and personal capacity of the country which is saved up in pre-Soviet centuries. Radical revolutionary change of ruling elite and its completing from representatives of the lowest classes could not but be followed by its provintsialization, sharp falling of cultural quality and devaluation in it the subject beginning. Those ways of mobilization of personal resources which were cultivated in a communistic system,

promoted advance on the top of people with performing psychology and the energy potential allowing them to realize the state plans orders arriving from the power center. Any other manifestation of an initiative was excluded.

Consolidation of new elite around supreme authority was carried out by means of return of ideology and practice of "selfless service" which was realized not as return, and as the historical innovation corresponding to pioneer pathos of communistic goal-setting. However the Soviet elite was as situational as the Soviet statehood and Soviet planned bezry - night economy, and during the evolution this elite lost also energy of political tselepo-laganiye originally inherent in it and tselevoploshcheniye.

The ideology of "selfless service" was emasculated as the Stalin militaristic model of a communistic system was replaced by the model demilitarized. As well as in postpetrovsky Russia, demilitarization of a way of life was followed by elite privatization of the state and transformation of "selfless service" into the front formula covering at many service to private interest. But such as during the late Soviet era, not demands of personal resources, their such demobilization and such suppression of subjectivity autocratic and noble Russia nevertheless did not know. She managed to master the European humanitarian culture and to create its original own branch. Slowly, not always surely, not without backsliding movements, but it after all opened to the Western world, borrowing it not only military technologies, but also the economic, political and organizational ideas that was followed by the legislative statement of a private property institution, development of a private economic initiative, mobilization of personal resources in territorial self-government, and during the last period of government of Romanov - even legalization,

let and the forced, party and political subjectivity. During the Soviet era all this was lost, and to Gorbachev who realized a crucial role of "a human factor" in development of the country, in this relation it was necessary to begin national history anew.

Demobilization of personal resources by the outcome of the Soviet period was observed not only in party, state and economic elite. It was everywhere observed also among ordinary workers. Instead of economic, "bourgeois" work incentives at the time of Stalin the motivation equating peaceful work to military by means of its glorification was invented. Its use was not followed by serious achievements also in a Stalin military and mandative system where it was complemented - in full accordance with the system nature - stimulation repressive. During the after and Stalin period such motivation gradually at all became an anachronism, but communistic leaders could not oppose anything else to it. The Soviet equalization in compensation transferred former communal country tradition in which limits the mobilization of personal resources not only was not assumed to industrial society, but also was considered as reprehensible. The communistic system did not manage to connect equalization to such mobilization by means of awards, medals, honor rolls and glorification of leaders of production in newspapers. But as a result of the policy pursued by Bolsheviks also the pre-Soviet trend of overcoming equalization designated in economic activity of the peasants allocated from community at Stolypin was stopped. And it was strategic loss too.

Nevertheless the Bolshevist mode stumbled eventually about the same problem which suspense led to a collapse of the autocratic and orthodox monarchy of Romanov. It is about a combination of the general (state) and private interests. Romanov could not cope with this problem because its decision blokirova-

elk sociocultural split. In the split society the concept about the general interest cannot take roots if to mean not opposition to external threats, but arrangement of internal life. From here and the special consolidating role of wars in the history of Russia. From here - difficulties of its consolidation in the conditions of lasting peace. But from here - and the Russian ideology of conciliarity: it fixed not so much cash reality, how many a dream of what in this reality was absent. Ideal cathedral due was designed to fasten spiritually split, i.e. not so cathedral, real. But if today the given ideology is demanded again, then from this it follows that the Soviet system, having eliminated split, did not manage to approve the conventional idea of the general interest and that in Post-Soviet Russia the old domestic problem still remains a problem.

The communistic concept of the general interest the unconscious vital analogs had, on the one hand, model of military consolidation, and with another - model archaic sinkretichnykh, not dismembered, internally not differentiated communities in which private interests did not find still the independent status and act as projections of interest of the general. To reproduce these models during an industrial era, Bolsheviks had to imitate presence of agents of external hostile forces within the country, carry out total ideological unification, deprive the private interests of legitimacy and assign monopoly for representation of the general interest to one power institute represented by the sacralized Communist Party. But such decision again could be only situational. Big and complex modern society cannot long function as simple, and heads of the USSR eventually had to learn in it by own experience. Especially as the Soviet society in process of the development became harder and harder and differentiated.

The last, without having inherited from the Soviet period of legal ways

solution to the conflicts and having inherited from it ways of legal imitations, the representative of the general interest appears not to become able, and she is able to imitate only such representation.

5. The collapse of "real socialism" and the collapse of the USSR showed that the communistic civilization (formational) project was same strategically unrealizable, as well as the domestic projects preceding it. However its implementation was followed also by significant falling of already reached earlier civilization quality of the country and its statehood. Partially these historical losses were compensated by some acquisitions, but they did not create new steady quality.

Having declared generality of the principle of legality and having brought it to legal equal rights, the communistic system from the formal point of view approved higher civilization standard in comparison with reached at Romanov. But from the substantial point of view it was the kickback in the past under the guise of break in the future. It's not just that the Soviet legality excluded the property right from the list of the rights. The fact is that such exception meant transformation into the exclusive owner of the state, and such transformation, in turn, meant removal of the state out of limits of action of the principle of legality. Thereby the development which began at Romanov in the direction of legal statehood was interrupted, and behind formally legal facade there was a return to that combination of two other civilization elements: forces and beliefs which took place in Moskovia of Ryurik dynasty. The essential difference was only that the belief was secular now and acted on behalf of scientific knowledge.

This symbiosis of force and new belief which received an institutional support in the Communist Party and its device was intended to provide break in the global civilization of the second axial time alternative to a civilization western. Really it was talked of resuscitation in new conditions

old imperial world projects, i.e. projects of the first axial time which globalist tendency managed to reveal the insolvency everywhere. Bolsheviks managed to restore almost completely broken-up Romanov' empire and even to broaden it at the expense of external satellites - the countries of "the socialist camp". But the secular belief in other and best world which is not confirmed by obvious civilization achievements has property to weaken and run low, as happened to its communistic version.

To compensate withering of this belief by return from front legality to re-

alno the system could not: similar return was incompatible with its nature what all attempts such, made during the poststalin period testify to. When Gorbachev, without realizing that, decided to ignore and connect its nature the idea of socialism to the idea of legal statehood, i.e. to refuse a rate on nadzakonny force, the Soviet civilization project almost at once found the exhaustion. Not only "the socialist camp" broke up. Also the Russian Empire which historical existence Bolsheviks managed to prolong almost for three quarters of the century broke up.

Kaufman Lucas
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