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Role of the 14th army in an active phase of the Dnestr conflict



 © 2007 A. Kolosov

The ROLE of the 14th ARMY IN the ACTIVE PHASE of the DNESTR CONFLICT

Now practically all people who are any interested in policy know about existence of the Dnestr Moldavian Republic (DMR) and about not settled Dnestr conflict. The subject of Transnistria is very relevant for Russia mainly now because the people of this unrecognized republic many times showing the desire to be together with Russia once again supported on September 17, 2006 "a course on independence of Dnestr Moldavian Republic and the subsequent free accessions of Transnistria to the Russian Federation". According to official figures Central Election Commission, 97.1% of the pridnestrovets participating in a referendum on September 17 voted for independence of the republic and the subsequent free accession it to Russia [1]. Undoubtedly, Russia and Russian government cannot ignore opinion of thousands of people considering themselves by a part of Russia, many of which have the Russian citizenship. The Russian Federation is one of participants of negotiation process on settlement of the conflict. Moreover, military presence of Russia ensures stability and the peace in the region and also is a guarantee of existence of PMR. Now in Transnistria there are Russian peacekeepers and the remains of the 14th general Guards army transformed to the Task Force of the Russian Troops (TFRT).

About the Dnestr conflict it is possible to write much. But within this article we would like to focus on the most important factor of the conflict which the 14th army was. In general, the army always influences all conflicts as it is weapon, ammunition, military equipment, professional staff.

The role of Russia during negotiation process on peaceful settlement of the Dnestr conflict is huge. The termination of bloodshed in the region - a merit of Russia. It is recognized even by the Moldavian politicians. "Russia in 1992 stopped armed conflict on coast of Dniester", - the prime minister of the Republic of Moldova told Dumitr Bragish, speaking at opening of joint Russian-Moldavian military exercises "A blue board-2000" [2].

But when speak about value of Russia in the region, about her peacekeeping merits, the stopped war, it is necessary to understand that all this became possible only thanks to existence in a zone of the conflict of the 14th

armies. The Russian military personnel in Transnistria was and remains the most important tool of the Russian policy in the region and also guarantors of the world, stability and existence of PMR as outpost of the Russian influence in Southeast Europe. Actually, it also is a subject of our research.

The Dnestr conflict originates from acceptance of the Moldavian SSR by the Supreme Council in August, 1989 of discrimination laws on language. The conflict in the development took place a number of phases. Most of scientists consider that its active phase, i.e. directly fighting, proceeded from March 1 to August 1, 1992. During this period the conflict reached the culmination and the importance of the 14th army was crucial.

It represented powerful, equipped, equipped, recognized as experts as the best connection of the Warsaw pact [3, page 27], after disintegration of the Soviet Union appeared in the territory of three states: Ukra - ny, Moldova and PMR. Actually under the name of the 14th army its divisions deployed in Transnistria and which passed under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation appear in this article. By the way, there were best and most efficient parts of the 14th army and huge warehouses of ammunition.

After disintegration of the Soviet Union the Republic of Moldova sought to get all attributes of the independent state, the main of which is the army. It filed the claims for property and arms of the divisions of the 14th army deployed in its territory. The president Mircha Snegur the decree of November 14, 1991 announced the property of the Republic of Moldova "arms, vehicles, the equipment, base and other property belonging to the parts of the Soviet army which are deployed in the territory of the republic" [3, page 23]. But to announce one business, and another is to turn the words into reality. Snegur had to wait slightly with nationalization of army.

After signing of the Belavezha Accords of the USSR ceased to exist. "We were to nobody necessary. There came the moment when the army was a draw... Officers did not know what to do to whom to serve" [4, page 165]. The military commandant of the city of Tiraspol M. Bergman characterized by such words a situation. The army turned into submission of Armed Forces of the CIS. On January 15, 1992 B. Gromov presented to army of the new commander,

Yu.M. Netkachev became him. On March 23, 1992 Glavno is the commander of the joint armed forces of the CIS, the marshal of aircraft E. Shaposhnikov signed order No. 314/1 "About transfer of connections, parts, institutions, military equipment, arms and property of the Armed Forces of the former USSR which are deployed in the territory of the Republic of Moldova under direct command of the relevant structures of the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Moldova". Thanks to this order the Moldova received huge to - a lichestvo of weapon and military equipment and could start real formation of national army and preparation for power targeting in Transnistria of "constitutional order". Transnistria did not receive anything. Among the parts transferred under jurisdiction of the Republic of Moldova there were no parts deployed in the territory of PMR. Did not pass under command of RM several parts deployed in right-bank Moldova, for example the 300th paraborne regiment in Chisinau.

Despite desire of Moldavians to tidy up to the hands all army entirely, an opportunity to carry out it at them was not as left-bank territories to them were uncontrollable, and the fact even if on paper, transfers of the divisions of the 14th army deployed in PMR, Moldova their transition under PMR jurisdiction causes most likely. Such scenario of succession of events was quite real. "Day by day in a division the fermentation of minds amplified - offers on transition under jurisdiction of Transnistria in increasing frequency sounded.... the majority of army parts was ready to swear for fidelity to the people of PMR", - so estimated a situation in the 59th motorized rifle division of G. Andreyev [5]. In it, in our opinion, the reason of transition of the 14th army under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation also is. The leadership of the Republic of Moldova had no opportunity to subordinate to itself divisions of the 14th army, being based in Transnistria, and very strongly was afraid of their transition to the party of pridnestrovets. The leadership of Moldova needed to solve several problems urgently. First, not to allow transition of the parts and connections of the 14th army deployed in PMR under its jurisdiction. Secondly, not to allow arms of security agencies of PMR from arsenals of the 14th army. At that time to the leadership of Moldova one way - to tell military units of the Russian Federation seemed. Most likely, that the Moldavian side itself contacted the leadership of the Russian Federation with the similar offer. And differently, how to explain after the oblivion period suddenly the appeared interest of the Russian Federation in the splinters of once mighty army which are in epitsen-

conflict Torah? It is possible to assume existence of secret arrangements that the transferred military connections will observe a neutrality and also will not interfere with the taking place events, and it is possible, at all will be removed to Russia. Soon after transition of the 14th army under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation the Moldavian leaders demanded from Russia of withdrawal of troops [6]. But it was impossible to carry out it even at all desire. First, there is no place and there is nothing. Secondly, difficulties were caused by transit of arms and military equipment through the territory of independent Ukraine. Thirdly, the army was involved in the conflict.

So, on April 1, 1992. The President of the Russian Federation B.N. Yeltsin signed the Decree "About Transition under Jurisdiction of the Russian Federation of Military Units of the Armed Forces of the Former USSR Which Are in the territory of the Republic of Moldova". According to the Decree, the 14th Guards army, connections, the military units and institutions of Armed Forces of the former USSR which are in the territory of the Republic of Moldova and did not be a part of its own armed forces were translated under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation with submission to their Commander-in-chief of the Joint armed forces of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The authorized representative of the Russian Federation was entrusted to take measures for prevention of involvement of the troops translated under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation in the international conflicts and their interventions in internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova and also on suppression of attempts of capture of arms, military equipment and military facilities of the military formations transferred under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation [7]. From this point Russia found not only military divisions in the region and became the owner by the largest, efficient and organized force in a conflict zone, but also it was directly involved in the conflict. On it responsibility for lives of people and for the future of this earth because the further direction of development of the conflict depended on a position of the Russian Federation and actions of the 14th army laid down.

Russia took a position of a neutrality and non-interference to the conflict. The commander of the 14th army general Yu.M. Netkachev steadily were given instructions: to observe a neutrality, not to allow capture of warehouses with arms. However if officially the 14th army observed a neutrality, then informally separate divisions and officers helped pridnestrovets, up to transition to the party of PMR. This fact was admitted by Yeltsin who told in the interview to Komsomolskaya Pravda: "As for situation in Moldova - it is unconditional, among officer

the structure of the 14th army there are supporters of Transnistria, and they begin to pass, sometimes and with the equipment, to the party of pridnestrovets... But it is not intervention of Russia, it is protection of the people living there on a personal initiative of the officers living there" [8]. But there were facts of open and organized transition to the party of PMR, for example, on May 18, 1992 the 66th detached engineer battalion (in / Part 48414) deployed in the village of Parkany passed under PMR jurisdiction.

The Moldavian side scrupulously fixed all facts of participation of the 14th army in the conflict on the party of PMR. The leadership of the Republic of Moldova repeatedly declared a fate of the 14th army in the armed opposition on the party of PMR, moreover, directly accusing the Russian Federation that ". the territory of Moldova on the left coast of Dniester is occupied by forces of the 14th army" [9]. The facts of participation of the 14th army in the conflict were published in the press and were repeatedly sounded by various officials. The Minister of Defence of the Republic of Moldova divisional general I. Kostash gives the following facts of participation of the 14th army in the conflict on the party of separatists: "During the dubesarsky events on November 26 - 31, 1991 the commander of the militarized group from of B. Rybnitsa Saburov received for the division weapon and ammunition from warehouses in / Part 72431 located in the village. Sausage Rybnitsky area. On the night of November 19, 1991 from 183 MSP 59 MSD were transferred to groups "National гвардии" 200 submachine guns and ammunition to them. From warehouses in / Part 74273 guardsmen received two 120-mm mortars and 20 min. So, in the middle of March from the 66th detached engineer battalion located in the village of Parkany, guardsmen took out more than one thousand automatic machines, 1.5 million cartridges, 20 grenade launchers, other arms without any resistance of military. From 183 MSP 59 MSD the KamAZ truck loaded by automatic machines, 3 cars "ЗИЛ" are given to separatists; with cartridges, signal flares, other ammunition. On April 24 from the 308th mobile rocket and technical base the weapon and ammunition was two helicopters directionally in Dubesar.

In March - April, 1992 guardsmen began to receive armored vehicles from military. All equipment 237 of engineer crew from Dubesar passed into their order. On April 26 on positions of guardsmen near the village of Kochiyer 8 armored personnel carriers and BAHT appeared. On May 4 in Dubesar from Odessa profits 6 "амфибий". In the evening on May 19 from 183 MSP 59 MSD were given to guardsmen of T64B-10 units armored personnel carrier 70 - 10 units, the armored personnel carrier of 60 PB - 1 unit, 120-mm mortars - 6 units, 100 mm of PTP - 3 units,

Automatic telephone exchange of 17 - 2 units, LNG of 9 - 9 units, RPG of 7 - 12 units, AKS - 63 units, PKT - 21 ud., GAZ cars - 66 - 6 units, the URAL cars - 3 units

The commander of the 2nd SME lieutenant colonel Vinik who together with 44 officers, 5 ensigns, 47 soldiers and about 100 guardsmen, including women, left in a conflict zone directed preparation and transfer to guardsmen of military equipment and other arms. There the military personnel of the 14th army was involved in fighting therefore they lost the killed of the senior lieutenant A. Zimanov, the lieutenant F. Chernavsky, privates D. Papreli, S. Digoran. Forces of police lined one tank and several armored personnel carriers of the 14th army.

On May 20 from arrangement 183 MSP 59 MSD servicemen reported to guardsmen of T 64B - 10 unit, armored personnel carrier 70 - 10 units, the armored personnel carrier of 60 PB - 1 unit, one mortar battery, one SG battery & #34; Гвоздика" anti-tank means, large number of ammunition... Guardsmen freely dispose for 1411 a warehouse of artillery ammunition in the village of Kolbasna where 2700 cars with the arms which arrived here from Hungary, Czechoslovakia, the former GDR are stored. On May 22 from these warehouses two cars "were sent to a conflict zone to KamAZ" "Grad" loaded by shells for rocket launchers;. Now surface-to-air missile systems "are preparing by Biryuza" for transfer to guardsmen; and "Strela-10".... On May 24 in Tiraspol there arrived the Deputy Commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the CIS Stolyarov. During the meeting with the leadership of Transnistria and command of the 14th army he said that so-called PMR and the 14th army represent the geopolitical interests of Russia in this region and proceeding from it the leadership of Russia always maintained close contact with leaders of so-called PMR. At a meeting solutions of the Dnestr crisis were considered. Preference was given to obtaining full independence by Transnistria. Also the possibility of its inclusion in structure of Moldova with the status of independent political unit on the federal beginnings was not excluded. As option the possibility of accession of Transnistria to Russia was studied. Similar thoughts sounded also during the meeting of the general Stolyarov with officers 59 MSD. The Deputy Commander-in-chief noted that recently Russia loses influence in this region and therefore the 14th army will not be brought out of Transnistria. Instructed to accelerate completion of parts by staff, to force construction of objects and housing, necessary for army, for officers" [10]. The above material, from the point of view of the general I.

Kostash, confirms live broadcast of parts of the Russian 14th army in armed conflict in Transnistria.

Foreign researchers take for granted the fact of participation of the Russian troops (14th army) in the conflict on side of Transnistria in battle for Bender. In addition, the 14th army delivered weapon and ammunition to the Dnestr militarized groups and conducted combat training of republican guard of PMR [11]. In 2004. Strasbourg Court on human rights rendered a verdict on business "to Ilashk and others against Moldova and Russia", complaint No. 48787/99. During consideration of the case the court came in a conclusion that during the conflict of 1991 - 1992 of force of the former 14th army were in Transnistria, a part of the territory of the Republic of Moldova, and battled on the party of the Dnestr separatists. Moreover, a large number of weapon from warehouses of the 14th army was voluntarily transferred to separatists who also had opportunities to take control of weapon and contrary to will of the Russian soldiers [12].

Even the Russian researchers admit the fact of participation of the 14th army in the conflict. For example, the colonel M.M. Bergman, the direct participant of events, writes: "on May 20 in the area one artillery battery of the 14th army was dead Do-rotsky, having fired several volleys, destroyed the OPON mortar battery. In the area was dead Golerkana at the time of a crossing other battery destroyed the ferry and the barge with arms and a landing" [3, page 65]. And slightly further he frankly writes, about the Bender events on June 19 - 23, 1992: "A result of the first four days of war was the fact that the Dnestr paramilitary groups thanks to intervention of the 14th army could avoid elimination, cheered up and stabilized the situation in Bender, Kopanke, Kitskanakh and Dubasari a little" [3, page 85].

Despite all charges of the Moldavian side to the Russian Federation, officially the 14th army adhered to a neutrality. But the management position in Moscow is one, and action of people on places is completely different. The position of Russian government was friendly in relation to the Republic of Moldova, tells about it even the signing fact in April, 1992 of the contract on establishment of diplomatic relations between the Russian Federation and Moldova. In our opinion, the only thing with what Moldova has full authority to reproach Russia, so it with lack of due control of the 14th army, its arsenals and staff.

The reasons of assistance of the 14th army for prid-nestrovets, and at times direct transition to the party of PMR are in the following.

First, the staff of the 14th army sympathized with the authorities of PMR as its about 80%, including officers and ensigns, were locals. They did not want to leave anywhere and did not wish distribution of all innovations of the last years on the Left bank.

Secondly, the Moldavian leaders regarded the military personnel of the 14th army as invaders, and more than once declared the unwillingness to keep privileges the serviceman, to provide them with housing and to pay pensions to military pensioners. The authorities of PMR, on the contrary, at the highest level confirmed: maintaining all privileges by the serviceman and to members of their families; their right for provision of housing, etc. Preservation of PMR became for the military personnel a guarantee of their social status and material welfare in the future.

Thirdly, paramilitary groups of the Republic of Moldova repeatedly arranged provocations against the military personnel of the 14th army and their families, fired and attacked its divisions. The incident which took place in in / Part No. 65161 2 March, 1992 is especially indicative. The military personnel felt in an unusual situation - the hostages of the erupting conflict left to the mercy of fate. Without wishing it is indifferent to watch death of civilians of Transnistria, military secretly helped pridnestrovets.

Despite all reproaches of the leadership of Moldova to the Russian Federation, cases the authorized transfer of weapon from the 14th army to representatives of Transnistria was practically not. By order of the chief of the General Staff of the general M.A. Moiseyev, the commander of the 14th army lieutenant general Mr. Yakovlev was ousted and fired for transfer of PMR of 482 automatic machines from armed forces. Yu.M. Netkachev, not to allow leakage of arms from arsenals to pridnestrovets, at the beginning of March, 1992, issued the order "razukomplektovyvat the equipment on the left coast of Dniester, remove from it optical devices and accumulators and to mine approaches to warehouses" [4, page 185]. But many officers and soldiers, feeling guilty because of the inaction, transferred weapon to pridne-strovets or created conditions in order that pridnestrovets freely took it. Many officers, having left or being fired for the help to pridnestrovets, came on service to armed forces of PMR.

Moldova had a real chance to use a neutrality of the 14th army for free submission of Transnistria. But provocations and wild statements, and sometimes and direct attacks on military units and obstre-

Lamy of vehicles and aircraft the Moldavian side incited against itself staff of divisions.

Throughout all conflict the 14th army had the huge stabilizing and peacekeeping potential which was not used owing to uncertainty of a position of Moscow and also indecision and spinelessness of the commander of army. Even the simple statement of the officer Council of War of the 14th Guards general army in which it was said that in a case ". if after the end of negotiations of 02.04.1992 fighting and provocations finally are not stopped and removal of paramilitary groups will not begin, the staff of army will alert connections and parts full according to combat crews. Reduction begins from 16 o'clock by 02.04. 1992" [4, page 200]. Of course, nobody alerted army except the general A. Lebed. But similar threats were quite effective till some time. So, soon after this statement the paramilitary groups of RM were brought from Bender. Officers on the Councils of War spoke about an opportunity for a long time, keeping a neutrality, to come to the line of contact of warring parties as "blue helmets", thus, having divided them. But instead of realizing the peacekeeping potential, having stopped the conflict, the 14th Guards army continued to be a source of weapon, ammunition and professional military staff, being the conflict catalyst.

The conflict reached apogee on June 19, 1992 when troops of the Republic of Moldova intruded in Bender and battle for the city began. The Moldavian side, despite the obvious and undoubted guilt, nevertheless accused the Russian Federation of all events. The Dnestr side accused the 14th army and Russia of criminal omission and indulgence of Moldova. And here, when it became clear that the conflict expands, the army gets out of hand, and the Moldavian blitzkrieg failed, the leadership of the Russian Federation decided to decide on the policy in Transnistria.

Yeltsin decided to take current situation under personal control. In the night of June 22 he heard by phone Yu.M. Netkachev's report on a situation in the city of Bender and in the region in general. It became clear that it is necessary to undertake something. Yeltsin made the strong statement which was heard as prevention: "Russia always acted and supports the solution of conflict questions in the political way, but when similar is undertaken, dozens of people perish we are obliged from -

to react. And let Snegur knows about it" [13]. Also reacted.

On June 23 in Transnistria there arrived "colonel Gusev". Under this pseudonym the major general A.I. Lebed who quickly analyzed a situation and undertook army command disappeared. It is undoubted that Lebed received carte blanche on actions for settlement of the conflict in the region from B.N. Yeltsin. "On behalf of the President of Russia to Lebed five tasks were set. The first - to stop any available means bloodshed. The second - if necessary to provide evacuation of families of the military personnel. The third - to take all bases and weapon and ammunition warehouses under strict control. The fourth - to provide the free admission of echelons with ammunition, weapon and the equipment through the territory of Ukraine or to create conditions and prerequisites for this purpose. The fifth - to create not preventing conditions for performance of the above-stated tasks from Moldova" [3, page 90].

The first was the most difficult task. During Yu.M. Netkachev's command the army lost the prestige. To restore it and to force to respect opinion of the army management, it was necessary to have force. Lebed gave the order to mobilize army parts on the state of wartime and to bring them to a state of full combat readiness. By the end of June all divisions were completely ready to fighting, their number was 17 thousand people on June 26 Lebed convened a press conference where he said: "The army will continue to keep a neutrality, but the quality of this neutrality will change. It will be another, qualitatively other neutrality - the armed neutrality. We are rather strong to fight back anyone" [3, page 93]. Since June 27 Lebed became the official commander of army.

From the most arrival to Transnistria Lebed developed active work of the termination of the conflict. He understood that to force the Moldavian side sit down at the negotiating table only force can and decided to show to the leadership of Moldova force of the Russian army. After the army of the Republic of Moldova on July 2 again fired at Dubasari and the Dubasari hydroelectric power station, was decided to strike a blow to its troops. And it was carried out at night from 2 for July 3, from 3 to 3 o'clock 45 minutes in the run-up to the meeting of the leadership of Moldova and Russia in Moscow and, undoubtedly, affected a position of Moldova at negotiations.

Finally to clear a situation, Lebed convened on July 4 a press conference where he made the statement which forever entered in

history. He qualified the conflict as "the genocide developed against own people" and characterized the Republic of Moldova as the fascist state. Lebed refused to recognize the president of Moldova Snegur and in completion of a performance said that "such time has come - to take a certain position. It is time to stop dangling in the swamp of obscure, unconvincing policy. Enough. It is time to get down to business, majestically to observe St" [14]. By then he already decided on the position and not only in words, but also in practice showed it. In many respects thanks to a hard line of Lebed and his active actions the settlement of the conflict became possible. The crucial role of the general A. Lebed and the 14th army is recognized the termination of bloodshed, perhaps, as all.

On the third of July in Moscow the meeting at the highest levels took place. Representatives from PMR did not participate in negotiations. At a meeting decisions were made: to stop fighting and to part warring forces; to define the political status of Transnistria; to remove parts of the 14th army according to two-way deals, but only after implementation of the first two points; to create and send to Transnistria to part of the structure of airborne forces of the Russian Federation for holding a peacekeeping mission. The Russian President B. Yeltsin expressed opinion that RM has to be uniform, PMR within the uniform state has to have the political status; The Russian Federation categorically against association RM and Romania [15].

So, the decision on completion of the conflict was made, it was necessary to reach the agreement on ceasefire conditions between warring parties. On the seventh of July in the village. Li-mansky there took place the meeting of the Dnestr and Moldavian sides with mediation of Russia on which conditions of a temporary truce were defined, the ceasefire agreement and a conclusion from Bender of heavy weapons is reached. On July 9 in Helsinki the Presidents of Russia, Romania and Moldova signed the ceasefire agreement in Transnistria. But the world in Transnistria was not yet. To keep fragile truce and not to allow a new spike in violence, Lebed exposed posts of the 14th army between the conflicting parties. The risk justified itself. On July 21, 1992 in Moscow the Presidents of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Moldova in the presence of the leader of PMR Smirnov signed an agreement "About the principles of peaceful settlement of armed conflict in the Dnestr region of the Republic of Moldova". The agreement created the peacekeeping mechanism which exists still, conditions

for peaceful co-existence and successful resolution of disputes between Moldova and PMR therefore more than 15 years the world reigns in the region. On July 23, 1992 in paramilitary groups of PMR the order on prohibition of fire from all types of weapon was given. But provocations from the Moldavian armed forces did not stop till August first when under observation of the Russian peacekeeping forces the removal of paramilitary groups of warring parties began with positions.

We will sum up the results. During an active phase of the Dnestr conflict the 14th army played a noticeable role. Up to the end of June it acted as the conflict catalyst because owing to the above-stated circumstances it was a source of weapon, ammunition, military equipment and professional military staff. Thanks to prompt and competent actions of the major general A.I. Lebed who undertook command of the 14th army and brought it to a state of full combat readiness, the army could realize the peacekeeping potential, having divided warring parties and having stopped bloodshed. Exactly thanks to transition of the 14th army under jurisdiction of the Russian Federation Russia got in the form of PMR a geopolitical outpost in Southeast Europe. Moreover, the 14th army for long time became the main political tool of Russia in the region and it was a trump in a geopolitical game with the West. Stay it in a zone of the conflict provided to Russia that noticeable role in negotiation process on peaceful settlement of the conflict which the Russian Federation played and continues to play. the 14th army helped to defend independence of Transnistria and still is a guarantor of existence of PMR and also the world and stability in the region. The fact of finding of the military personnel of the Russian Federation in the region makes impossible "peacekeeping" operation of NATO and any other power option of resolution of conflict.

Literature and notes

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4. M.M. Bergman. On an era ring: The extraordinary adventures of the colonel of the Russian Army told by him. M, 2001.
5. G.S. Andreyeva. Women of Transnistria. Tiraspol, 2000.
6. The statement of the government of the Republic of Moldova in connection with succession of events in Transnistria//Sfatul Tse-ry. 1992. On Apr. 8 Page 1.
7. Trupele ruse în Republica Moldova (culegere de documente §i materiale)/Mihai Grecu, Anatol Taranu. Chi^inâu, 2004. P. 103-104.
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9. Message of the President of the Republic of Moldova to his Excellency to mister Boutros Ghali, General-py secretary of the UN//Civil world. 1992. May 30. Page 1.
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Rostov state university

Koppiters, Michael Emerson, Michel Heyssen, Tamara Kovziridze, Gergana Nutcheva, Natali Tochchi, Marius Wal, with comments to Nick Popescu, Gia Nodia; transl. from English M., 2005. Page 163; International Crisis Group (ICG). Moldova: Regional Tensions Over Transdniestria. Brussels: ICG Europe Report No. 157. 17 June 2004; Jacson N.J. Russian foreign policy and the CIS: theories, debates and actions. London, 2003. P. 101-103; King C. The Moldovans: Romania, Russia, and the Politic of Culture. Stanford, 1999. R 179208; Kolsto P., Edemsky A., Kalashnikova N. The Dniestr Conflict: between Irredentism and Separatism//Europe - Asia Studies. 1993. Vol. 45. No. 6. P. 988.

12. The decision of the European Court of Human Rights on business to Ilashk and others against Moldova and Russia (the Complaint No. 48787/99), of 08.07.2004//http://www. suty ajnik.ru/rus/echr/judgments/ilascu_rus.htm
13. June 22, 1992: on fronts of the Commonwealth//Komsomolskaya Pravda. 1992. June 23. Page 1.
14. Statement of the commander of the 14th general Guards Russian army / A.I. Lebed. For the power offensively. Krasnoyarsk, 2004. Page 495-499.
15. Further development of the conflict of Moldova and Transnistria//http://www.olvia.idknet.com/conflic1990-92. htm

On October 10, 2006

Karlsen Per-Arne
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