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EUROPE AND SPAIN (SEPTEMBER, 1936. May, 1937): COURSE "NON-INTERFERENCE"



UDK 94(4601.088.2

EUROPE AND SPAIN (SEPTEMBER of 1936 G. - MAY, 1937 1: COURSE "NON-INTERFERENCE"

Belgorod state university e-mail: malay_v@bsu.edu.ru

V.V. MALAY

On the basis of the international Agreement on non-interference to affairs of Spain (August, 1936) in London the Committee on non-interference to affairs of Spain was created. On the basis of a big circle of archival sources in article it is traced in what degree the non-interference policy which is given rise with the purpose to constrain growth of Civil war in Spain prior to the all-European conflict carried out this task (the end of 1936 - the first half of 1937) and what new accents it brought in the international and bilateral relations.

In growth begun in July, 1936. The civil war in Spain to scales of the all-European conflict any of powers was not interested. But tactics of "repayment" of the conflict significantly differed. Nearly completely from the help fact from the outside induced 27 European countries to hurry to sign evidence of dependence of a result of war in August, 1936. Agreement on non-interference. In the national interests of England and France was to try most longer to observe a neutrality, the fascist countries - to have formal cover of the actions and to connect by the agreement the Soviet Union. The USSR, without creating special illusions concerning implementation of this agreement, fairly it considered it necessary to be connected to it, but by the time of signing meant several options of further tactics.

Problems which members of the created international Committee on non-interference to affairs of Spain faced (London) and which pushed off them among themselves took shape already during coordination and signing of the Agreement: indirect intervention, rights of belligerent parties, forms and methods of the organization of control over supplies of arms and ammunition to both belligerent parties, volunteering, etc.

All members of the Agreement hoped for short duration of the conflict on the Iberian Peninsula. To the formed Committee on non-interference (further: KPN) in affairs of Spain were initially set semi-passive functions - "summation of information on the measures taken by the certain countries in connection with the agreement on non-interference to the Spanish affairs and also practical permission able to arise questions" that makes think on expediency of its creation, and then and functioning. In this context statements of the French and Belgian representatives at the first meetings of KPN and subcommittee to the chairman (it is created on September 15, 1936) about need to avoid discussions of political character and to turn Committee into "modest body of reconciliation" 1 looked symptomatic. On a trope of the known ispanist of D. Puzzo, KPN seemed to his organizers as "a meeting of harmless idlers diplomats" 2.

The first month of implementation of policy of "non-interference" at relative equality of the parties in Spain confirmed the aspiration of members of the committee not to take drastic measures on repayment of the conflict (at objective interest in it). The main problem of that period - suppression of arms supplies to rebels - was considered in the subordinated context, was substituted for organizational issues, consideration of "indirect intervention" (loans, fund raisings and promotion in favor of republicans, re-export of weapon and military ammunition), the relations with the press, etc. 3

1 Documents on British Foreign Policy (DBFP). 2nd ser. Vol. 17. Doc.178. P. 236, 247. Transcript of 1 meeting of Committee on non-interference to affairs of Spain. September 9, 1936; May I.M. Spanish notebooks. M, 1962. Page 27.
2Puzzo D. The Nonintervention Committee and Italo-German Aid to the Nationalist/The Spanish Civil War. Domestic Crisis or the International Conspiracy? Ed. by G. Jackson. Boston, 1967. P.69.
3 Archive of foreign policy of the Russian Federation (AVP Russian Federation). F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 53. L.75-77.

The majority of military and technical deliveries to rebels at the initial stage went in transit through Portugal. People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR according to the instruction of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) did not force discussion in KPN of a question of violations by Portugal of the Agreement on non-interference to the fact of adoption by soviet leadership of the decision on the help to the Madrid government (on September 28, 1936). "I, consider that promotion of the similar offer us could connect too us on the future in relation to any other countries... I offer therefore this offer on our initiative not to put, but in case of its promotion by others, to vote for it" - emphasized with the deputy people's commissar on foreign affairs of the USSR N.N. of Krestinskiy4.

As it appears from record of a conversation the manager. the 3rd Western department of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR of A. Neumann from the chargê d'affaires of France in the USSR Zh. Payar (on October 4, 1936), the Soviet leadership considered that in order that the Committee was engaged in the direct function and as nobody else did not make such complaint, "we are ready to bring it in return and to give thereby to committee the chance to deal, at last, with an issue of the available data on violation of the agreement by some of participants" what French diplomat5 was warned about. In the Soviet message the Chairman of the Committee of October 6, 1936 was offered to discuss urgently this issue and as a measure for it, at least partial, permissions to send the commission to the Spanish-Portuguese border for investigation of a problem and establishment there of control for prevention by illegal deliveries. Next day, October 7, the Soviet representative S.B. Kagan made on behalf of the government of the USSR the statement to the Chairman of the Committee lord to Plymouth, in addition, the repeating requirement to concentrate attention of KPN on investigation of actions of Portugalii6.

Emergence of this note caused discontent in the European political circles. At KPN meeting on October 9, 1936 the lord Plymouth with active assistance of the Italian and German representatives tried to leave from a being of a question, resorting to the procedural party of business. The Soviet Union was accused by Plymouth that, despite numerous drawing attention to activity of Portugal, did it in general that did not allow Committee, according to the protocol, to accept offers to rassmotreniyu7.

The non-interference policy which was not taking any measures against escalation of the Spanish conflict endured the first serious crisis in October, 1936. It was catalyzed by the Soviet statements of October 7 and 23. By then the Soviet Union began to render direct military aid to the Spanish Republic, information on what was available at the disposal of Committee member countries.

The Soviet statement of October 7 (approved that day by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks)) 8 made a start from the real situation in Committee and advanced the expected stream of charges in the address: the thought was emphasized that current situation did the agreement on non-interference nonexistent and that in case of not the termination of violations about the agreement, the Soviet part will consider itself free from obligations about nevmeshatelstv9.

Reaction of the western politicians (regardless of political affiliation) on this Soviet statement was in general negative. The press called it overdue (British "People", French Evr), accused the USSR of failure of Lokarnsky agreements, actually non-interference to affairs of Spain ("Deutsche diplomatish-politisha of Korrespondens", Figaro, Observer, Daily Telegraph, Times, etc.) 10.

The Soviet Union did not plan to leave KPN: in case of failure of the agreement Germany and Italy would have a great opportunity to deliver weapon to rebels, than it - to the lawful government.

Pays attention that the Soviet part at that moment did not pay special attention to violation of the agreement by Italy and Germany. A thesis that it was dictated by the aspiration to force the help to Madrid at minimum possible to it vni-

4 In the same place. L.84. N.N. Krestinsky - to the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) L. Kaganovich. September 23, 1936.
5 In the same place. F.0136. Op.20. Item 167. 828. L.39-40.
6 In the same place. F.b9.Op.24. 5. Item 77. L.116; Fibreboard of the USSR. T.19. Page 463-464.
7 DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. P.378, 389-393. Verbatim record of the 6th meeting of Committee on non-interference, on October 9, 1936.
8 Politburos of the Central Committee of RCP(b) - the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks). Agendas of meetings. T.2. T.2. 1930-1939. M, 2001. Page 812.
9 Fibreboard of the USSR. T.19. Page 463-464.
10 AVP Russian Federation. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L.29, 31-32, 47-49, 54-55; DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. Doc. 277. River 377; Sunday Express. 1936. Oct. 12.

manias, finds confirmation in N. Krestinsky's letter to L. Kaganovich (beginning of October, 1936): "I consider that we should appeal against actions only of one Portugal and, respectively, to demand a parcel of the commission only on the Spanish-Portuguese border, but not to all Spanish ports. I think that concentration of a question only on one Portugal will facilitate the argument (there are more materials) and will exclude a parcel of the commission to those ports through which there can be a supply of the Madrid government" 11.

The speech of the Italian representative at a meeting of Committee with charges against the USSR created on October 9, 1936 a precedent for further mutual attacks about violation of the agreement on non-interference by the Soviet Union and the fascist states as for the purpose of giving to it of bigger publicity, and derivation of Committee from the solution of others problem12.

About deepening of crisis of non-interference policy also the negative reply of the lord of Plymouth to the Soviet statement of October 12 in which infused on the organization in the Portuguese ports of control by forces of the English and French fleet and urgent discussion made the offer testified. Plymouth motivated refusal with absence in the Soviet note of additional proofs of violation of the Agreement and the fact that the reply of the Portuguese government provided by a meeting on October 9 is not received: "it is inexpedient to convene in this stage a new meeting of Committee for a being of a question" 13.

tactics of the leading European powers to the well-known Soviet statement in KPN Is remarkable on October 23, 1936

>. The fascist states after each Soviet note through the representatives in London carried out a sounding of the English political circles. On the eve of the meeting of Committee on October 23 the Italian ambassador Grandi at a meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs Britaniia. Took an interest in Iden that that finds it necessary to undertake in response to the Soviet demarches. Grandi confidentially reported that on the available data, the German answer to the Soviet note of October 12 will contain anti-Soviet charges and that Italians intend to support this liniyu14. Great Britain took a waiting attitude. The French attorney in Moscow Payar, according to A.F. Neumann's diaries, came almost each day "to be informed on position in the London committee and on assessment of this situation us" 15. On Neumann's remark that would be quite good if Payar informed Paris that "we treat our demarches before Committee very seriously and cannot understand the evasion reasons from convocation of a meeting in this situation", the French diplomat referred to the fact that "the French government is in this question under the English pressure". At the same time the French attorney expressed concern whether Germany will receive freedom of hands in case of the announcement of the agreement nedeystvitelnym16.

New nuances of the Soviet tactics open on become available to archival documents. On October 14, 1936 the Soviet ambassador in London I. Maysky together with Kagan visited Plymouth and confirmed the Soviet requirement about immediate convocation of Committee. Plymouth reasoned refusal with the fact that before receiving replies to the requests of Committee from Portugal, to Germany and Italy or from one Portugal to do it is useless. Plymouth handed May already prepared letter containing such answer. N.N. Krestin-sky who obtained about it information in the report suggested to give to L. Kaganovich in case of refusal of convocation of Committee in the press Kagan's letter of October 12. The following note to Kaganovich of the same day provided an assignment to I. Maysky and the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Paris V. Potemkin to visit, respectively, A. Iden and I. Delbos, protesting "behavior of the Chairman of the Committee". According to Kre-stinsky, this demarche was necessary that "to have an opportunity then to tell that we exhausted all measures for convocation of Committee". The draft of the message in the press prilagalsya17. A day earlier,

13 October, the soviet leadership allowed an opportunity in case of convocation of a meeting of Committee, not to publish the letter, and at once to print the speech with which I. Maysky had to make a speech at a meeting in justification of the offer on control over Portuguese portami18.
11 AVP Russian Federation. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L.2.
12 In the same place. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. L.21-23.
13 In the same place. L.13; In the same place. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L.66; DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. River 477; Doc.328. Note 4. River 467.
14 DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. River 449.
15 AVP Russian Federation. F.069. Op. 20. Item 60. 9. L.73-74, 77.78-79, 91-93. In the same place. F.0136. Op.20. Item 167. 828. L.35, 41, 42.
16 In the same place. F.0136. Op.20. Item 167. 828. L.42; In the same place. F.069. Op.20. Item 60. 9. L.78-79.
17 In the same place. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L. 71, 72-74. The deputy of People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs N.N. Krestinsky - to the secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) L. Kaganovich. October 14. Copies: To Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Ordzhonikidze.
18 In the same place. L.67.

The refusal of Plymouth to convene an urgent meeting induced the Soviet part "in the close future to publish the third statement without preliminary expansion of a question at a meeting of Committee". Krestinsky fairly assumed that in that case "our enemies (our italics: Century of M.) and also representatives of the French and English governments" will accuse the USSR that he did not exhaust all opportunities for convocation of Committee, having satisfied with the negative answer of the Chairman of the Committee. And in the report of October 15 he offered L. Kaganovich that I. Maysky and V. Potemkin at visit of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the countries of the accreditation emphasized that the Soviet part regards the known refusal "as the proof of unwillingness of the English and French governments to take effective measures to the termination of illegal supply of rebels with weapon". Krestinsky offered that these statements were made orally: "We will immediately not report in the press about these demarches. But we will refer to them when we make our last statement" 19.

In the telegram May on October 19 Krestinsky emphasized that it will be necessary to make the statement, "when non-interference policy crash will finally become clear. the moment and a form of your performance with this statement to you will be in addition specified by phone". Amendments which May proposed on telegraph "were told the leading companions" 20. Payar who visited A.F. Neumann on October 20 asked at least "a hint on further intentions of the Soviet government" 21.

A day earlier A. Neumann in the memo to N.N. Krestinsky specified the Soviet tactics in London, fairly doubting that after the prepared Soviet statement for a potential exit from Committee that "will not be kept and will not turn into the body answering to aspirations of the German policy as all countries except for the USSR will participate in it. "The direct question about dissolution of Committee, - according to Neumann, - can not result in positive results". He believed that the Soviet representative had to add that "If you, mister Chairman, deem it appropriate to convene (one more) meeting of committee, I will dare to reserve for myself the right at this meeting in more detail to state the reasons given above". Thus, we would provide ourselves an opportunity to participate in a meeting of committee even after the declaration on the termination of existence of the agreement". Concerning France the Soviet diplomacy adhered to former tactics - the notice of that on the Soviet demarche several hours prior to it oglasheniya22.

On October 22 from the Soviet plenipotentiary representation in Paris to People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR the message about Delbos's statement concerning a position of France in case of an exit of the USSR came from Committee and war between the USSR and other states: the French-Soviet pact will automatically not work, the question has to be submitted to the League of Nations, the fact of attack on the territory of CCCP23 is necessary for input of the pact in action.

The Soviet statement announced at a meeting of Committee on October 23, 1936 [in view of systematic violations by other countries of the Agreement on non-interference the Soviet government cannot consider itself connected it more than any of other participants of this agreement: Century M.], was frostily regarded by official Paris though Payar in a conversation at a meeting with A.F. Neumann introduced the idea on the same day that personally Soviet position seems to it logichnoy24.

Three days later, trying to get on reception to M. Litvinov, Payar emphasized to Neumann: "I do not know whether you violate the agreement or not, and I do not wish it to know. I do not know whether the agreement and my government breaks. That it seems to me especially important at the moment, it to provide functioning of committee". At a conversation there were veiled mutual recriminations in divergence. On the question Payara whether plans the USSR to observe the agreement on non-interference, Neumann answered that "we are connected by the agreement in those limits in which this agreement is really implemented by others" 25.

19 In the same place. L.83.
20 In the same place. L.97.
21 In the same place. F.0136. Op.20. Item 167. 828. L.4 ZB.
22 In the same place. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. L.14-16.
23 In the same place. T. 010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L.127.
24 Documents Diplomatiques français. 2-e sér. (DDF). T.3. Doc.429. P.661-662; AVP Russian Federation. F.069. Op.20. 9. Item 60. L.95.
25 AVP Russian Federation. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. L.17-18; F.069. Op.20. Item 60. 9. L.91 - 93.

In a note of Portugal of October 26 it was emphasized that as the defendant the Soviet government has to act: "Communism fights on the Iberian Peninsula in big fight on which results the fate of Europe depends. Rosenberg [the Soviet Plenipotentiary Representative in Spain: Century of M.] participates in cabinet councils - the fact which is exclusive in diplomatic history" 26.

Maintaining visibility of non-interference was equitable at that moment to the interests of all members of the committee. Crash of this policy could entail even more serious complications in the international and bilateral relations, than the fact of the beginning of the Spanish war. On October 24, 1936 at Iden's meeting with the French ambassador Korben the agreement was reached that both governments will work in close contact on a conclusion of "non-interference" from crisis: "to continue everything that in our forces to keep Committee acting and the Agreement effective" 27.

Thus, the Soviet Union as a result of demarches of October, 1936 declared itself free from obligations non-interference, but remained in Committee on non-interference. The agreement on non-interference was not liquidated. The Soviet diplomacy fairly predicted that Germany and Italy will change the tactics and will transfer the center of gravity to a question of control, but control, first of all, over Catalan portami28.

At a meeting of Committee on October 28 Plymouth achieved the adoption of the resolution recognizing groundlessness of the Soviet charges against Italy and Portugal. At the same time, the Committee took into consideration of 15 of 20 points of the Italian note against CCCP29.

A little earlier Plymouth managed to defend the new "procedural moment" helping to avoid intense statement of questions at meetings of Committee by transfer them for consideration in subcommittee at the chairman whose circle of participants was narrowed in comparison with Committee from 27 on 8 members. Therefore the British project of a parcel of special agents of Committee was presented to the Spanish ports and boundary railway junctions on October 24 at a meeting of subcommittee. Collecting and transfer to Committee of information on all cases of violation of the Agreement were included into power of agents. The English offer only supplemented Soviet. But the lord insisted Plymouth on its discussion as independent, having emphasized once again impossibility of consideration of a question of control in Portugal. The Soviet part focused attention to need of establishment of effective control, demanding at the same time definition of bases it organizatsii30.

The first crisis of non-interference policy was overcome rather without serious consequences for the international relations, but complicated bilateral, deepened actually Spanish crisis. Nobody was ready and interested in the solution of its main objectives. Crisis revealed that one of the main problems of non-interference policy was control over supplies of arms and ammunition to Spain. Other basic problem - volunteering - will be designated a little later.

the Debate on problems of control went in Committee and subcommittee at the end of October - to the first half of November, 1936 Plymouth already then insisted to address "both parties" in Spain with its formula (it is accidental it became known from I.M. Maysky's conversation with Korbe-nom) in calculation that the Spanish government or rebels will reject the offer of Committee, and it will be already legally possible not to undertake almost any measures. Categorical objections of the Soviet representative against acceptance of any steps before development of the project of control with requirements of more exact definition of bases of the organization of control, functions of local agents of Committee, their question naznacheniya31 were the answer to it.

By the end of a meeting of subcommittee the project of basic provisions about control in the following formulation was developed on November 2: neutral agents of Committee will be sent to Spain and the Spanish possession with the consent of both parties, one group on the territory of the Spanish government, another - rebels. Agents had to be appointed by unanimously plenary session of Committee. Their function consisted in investigation of the non-interference violation cases which came to the notice of Committee. Soviet before -

26 In the same place. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. L.36-37.
27 DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. Doc. 327. River 465.
28 AVP Russian Federation. F.082. Op.19. Item 83. 4. L.117.
29 In the same place. F.69. Op. 27. Item 88. 29. L.103-104, 106-107; DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. Doc. 339. Note 2. River 444.
30 AVP Russian Federation. F.69. Op.27. 29. L.109; 31. L.51.
31 In the same place. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L. 237-239, 249-250; F.69. Op.27. 29. L.109-110.

the lozheniye about the rights of representatives for the initiative to report in Committee about arms supplies and also about control in the Portuguese ports of import of planes (otherwise control would be vague and inefficient) was not accepted in vnima-niye32. The approval by the Plenary session of KPN of the scheme of control had no on November 12 a consequence of urgent acceptance of practical measures. Details, coordinations of application of the plan of control were discussed at practice.

To be fair we will note that during the considered period similar tactics arranged to a certain degree and the Soviet part. The Minister of Finance of the Spanish government Negrin at a meeting with the chargê d'affaires of the USSR in Spain S. Marchenko

18 November emphasized that the Spanish leaders "still have not enough power. Therefore it would be favorable to us to finish war in the next 2-3 months because during this time we still will manage to bring order within the country. The victory is necessary to us not earlier than in half a year" 33.
4 November M.M. Litvinov transferred to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Spain M.I. Rosenberg: ". I process case in the London Committee on movement of the center of gravity of its activity of establishment of control of future time. It is necessary to distract Committee from questions that whether we still consider ourselves connected by the agreement on non-interference several. These questions put us in an uncomfortable position because formally fascist countries are not recognized by violators of the agreement, and we are threatened still by danger of unpleasant revelations... I do not think that Madrid had an opportunity to receive a little serious cargoes from other sources. Thus, Madrid will be interested in the maximum difficulty of deliveries to rebels if he a little (it is allocated: Century of M.) will suffer from control. If we managed to carry out in Committee our offers concerning control, then Italy and Germany would be forced or to refuse absolutely supply of rebels, or to openly denounce the agreement. To us favourably both. It is doubtful, however, that our offers would be accepted by Committee. Most likely, the control leaving backdoor ways for deliveries will be established, but also such outcome will facilitate our negligence to Committee and our further revelations" 34.

At the end of November, 1936 Marchenko reported to Litvinov about satisfactory reaction of the Spanish leaders in connection with coincidence of their opinion to Soviet: "it is necessary. again and again to return to this question and as much as possible to delay recognition and control" (it is allocated: B.M.)35.

I.M. Maysky's letter to the lord to Plymouth (on November 11, 1936) where the question of so-called "volunteers" was brought up (or volunteers), under the guise of which Franco received well equipped and trained regular foreign parts, was not delivered for discussion.

The Soviet offer of December 4, 1936 suggested to improve the plan of control, having distributed the agreement on non-interference to a problem of "volunteers". The absence at Committee of aspiration to raise this question in the agenda forced the Soviet part to emphasize relevance of a problem in M.M. Litvinov's notes (on December 9) to the English and French ambassadors in Moscow and the letter of the Soviet representative in KPN to the secretary of this organization Hamming (on December 18) 36 again.

19 December in letters Chilston and Kulondra M. Litvinova the mediation problem between the lawful Spanish government and frankist was lifted. M. Litvinov did not exclude such opportunity, having information on L. Blum's conversation with M. Rosenberg in which the French prime minister offered this idea together with purpose in Spain of a plebiscite under foreign control: "I personally consider such offer deserving attention, but the issue at us will not be discussed before its official statement" 37.

I.M. Maysky complemented this thought with the offer "to make every effort to implementation of the Anglo-French project of mediation between the fighting parties": "if by means of German and Italian "volunteers" of Franco begins to win again and, maybe, will capture Madrid, a heavy blow will be struck to our prestige". Soviet

32 In the same place. F.010. Op.11. Item 71. 55. L.249-250.
33 In the same place. F.097. Op.13. Item 103. 24. L.4.
34 In the same place. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. Ll.45-46.
35 In the same place. F.011. Op. 1. Item 4. 37. L.151.
36 In the same place. F.05. Op.16. Item 119. 64. L.69; Fibreboard of the USSR. T.19. Page 675-676.
37 AVP Russian Federation. F.010. Op.11. 53. L.165-166; F.0136. Op.20. Item 167. 828. L.28.

the diplomat realized all difficulties of this option and did not exclude that "Germany and Italy will want to stop at nothing". Along with mediation realization he fairly found it necessary to dig up all possible resources for parrying of danger which was constituted by appearance of the German and Italian troops on Spanish territorii38.

At the beginning of December, 1936 the Soviet, as well as Spanish side, rather pessimistically estimated the prospects of defense of Madrid. The possibility of its falling was allowed and contacted expansion of the italo-German presence at Ispanii39. And if the initiative of sharply necessary control over deliveries to rebels was assessed by official Paris positively, then it did not cause the enthusiasm which is required for its urgent realization in London. Times claimed that this measure is dictated by uzkopraktichesky motives and underlined that "the organization now effective control over ports and borders will keep the military advantage reached by Russia in Spain" 40.

Thus, in non-interference policy by the end of 1936 there was a dual situation: functioning of Committee which members - Germany, Italy, on the one hand, and the USSR - with another, helped belligerent parties. At the same time the fascist states almost did not hide the presence on the Iberian Peninsula, participation in KPN had for them the subordinated character, therefore, discussions on the main questions played not a paramount role since could not affect the Spanish component of their foreign policy essentially.

According to information obtained by the adviser of plenipotentiary representation of the USSR in Spain Gaykis from the Spanish envoy in Bern at the end of December, 1936 Hitler organized a meeting on policy issues in Spain at which some divergences of rather further German intervention in Spanish dela41 were designated.

The Soviet Union tried to provide the greatest possible information support to the policy, responding to each charge that it assists the lawful government, but not rebels. It took the initiative in KPN, actually representing as the, and the Spanish interests.

In the English position two trends closely intertwined: fear as "red Spain", and the prospects of the italo-German domination on the Iberian Peninsula. This tactics depended on a situation in Spain, and in Europe. Therefore in KPN Great Britain at the level of a debate represented active work of settlement of the Spanish question, but, without showing real aspiration to implementation of the necessary measures. France on the majority of positions in Committee supported England, causing fair complaints of the Soviet part. As M. Litvinov noticed in December, 1936, "there are all signs of strengthening of alarm in Paris and London in connection with development of the Spanish affairs, but it does not mean that Paris and London will significantly change the tactics" 42.

The soviet leadership considered that the negotiations on questions of control, volunteering and mediation going in December, 1936 created a reason for more resolute performances of England and France, namely, in case of a rejection of offers on these questions by Germany and Italy or a delay them the answer to say that London and Paris reserve freedom of action: "Only such statement could make an impression in Berlin and Rome" 43.

At a meeting of subcommittee on December 22 the lord Plymouth was limited to the statement that the British government is very anxious with the fact of the increasing inflow to Spain of volunteers and suggested all countries to assume liability about prohibition volonterstva44 in the nearest future (it was mentioned on January 4, 1937). The English French plan of December 24 offered to establish control on frankoispansky and Spanish-Portuguese borders, and to patrol coastal waters of Spain the military fleet of member countries of the Agreement. Preparation to with - was in parallel conducted

38 In the same place. F.069. Op.20. Item 60. 4. L.71.
39 In the same place. F.069. Op.20. Item 60. 4. L.71; F.05. Op.16. 64. L.89.
40 DBFP. 2nd ser. Vol. 17. Doc. 498. River 714-715; The Times. 1936. 14 Dec.
41 AVP Russian Federation. F.097. Op.12. Item 102. 17. L.67.
42 In the same place. F.0136. Op.167. 828. L. 34-a.
43 In the same place.
44 In the same place. T. 069. Op. 20. 5. L.51-52; The Politburo of the Central Committee of RCP(b) is the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks). Agendas of meetings. T.2. Page 835.

to a glasheniye between Great Britain and Italiyey45. "It is almost impossible to trust sincerity of the British in their position of a neutrality, proceeding from my private conversations with the British ambassador Chilton, - the ambassador of the USA in Spain wrote Bauers. - Each their action goes so far that obviously leads to falling of the government and serves rebels" 46.

9 January, 1937 the English government forbade the citizens departure to Spain. The Soviet Union adopted the similar resolution on February.47 20.

The plans for questions of volunteers agreed at a meeting of subcommittee on February 15, 1937 and about control had to come into force, respectively, on February 20 and on March 6. The scheme of control possessed a number of weak points: deliveries by air were not affected, the Portuguese coast was not patrolled. The plan did not provide sanctions against the countries violators Soglasheniya48.

The Soviet diplomacy, pursuing an active line of control establishment, periodically blackmailed participants of KPN with threat of an exit from this organization in response to delays in the decision problem49. The maneuver undertaken by the Soviet part is characteristic (December, 1936 - February, 1937), - after fight for the right of participation of the fleet of the USSR in sea control, after its receiving the refusal under the pretext of lack in Spain of own bases followed at unwillingness to use English or frantsuzskimi50.

In the Soviet tactics statements of type were combined: "situation in Spain can be settled only by an immediate response of all volunteers" with tactical installations: "... before control there have to pass many weeks during which it is necessary to try to import the maximum quantity of shells" 51.

The Soviet Union to the last delayed payment of the first contribution to the organization of control of deliveries to Spain. On January 31, 1937 the share of the Soviet expenses in this direction was increased by the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (bolsheviks) to 136 thousand pounds. At the same time made a reservation that the first payment at a rate of 20 thousand pounds will be translated when contributions from other states begin to arrive. At the beginning of March, 1937. I. Maysky reported to Moscow that the further delay of payments is impossible. On March 10 M. Litvinov in the letter to the Chairman of Council of People's Commissars of the USSR V. Molotov asked to instruct Narkomfin in immediate money transfer in London52.

The control possessing basic shortcomings promoted further progress of rebels. It did not suit any of the parties which were combating in Spain, or standing behind them. But the European countries were forced to play by rules, the impromptu developing during "game". Italy, Germany and the USSR had an opportunity though partially to take away from itself charges of violation of the Agreement on non-interference. For obvious reasons at that moment nobody planned to refuse support of belligerent parties. Great Britain and France had an opportunity to show commitment to policy of "non-interference". This "a good mine at a bad game" will become a common practice in further activity of Committee on non-interference.

Gives the grounds for such conclusion and the analysis of the course of realization of other topical issue of non-interference policy - withdrawal of foreign troops from Spain. On March 13, 1937 the Spanish ambassador in London Askarat gave to Plymouth a note with concrete examples of the Italian intervention and a request to consider this problem. In memoran-

45 On so-called "gentlemen's" Anglo-Italian to the agreement of January 2, 1937 the Mediterranean was recognized as a zone of vital interests of the British Empire and Italy. Italy actually received freedom of hands in Spain in exchange for the obligation not to infringe on the English interests in Spain and the Mediterranean. - AVP Russian Federation. F.069. Op.21. Item 62. 4. L.8.
46 AVP Russian Federation. F.69. Op.27. 25. L.54-56; FRUS. Diplomatic Papers. 1937. Vol. 1. P.224-225.
47 AVP Russian Federation. F.069. O.21. Item 62. 8. L.133-136.
48 Fibreboard of the USSR. of t.20. Page 86.
49 AVP Russian Federation. F.69. Op.27. 27. Ll.60-61; 28. Ll.122-123; F.05. Op.16. 64. L.66-67; F.097. Op.12. 15. L.39. At the beginning of February, 1937 an exit of the USSR from Committee was allowed not in a declarative form any more. "Perhaps, in case of dissatisfaction of our requirements, we will even leave Committee", - M. Litvinov wrote M. Rosenberg on February 4, 1937 - AVP Russian Federation. F.011. Op.1 Item 4. 37. L.14.
50 See: By small V.V. Sudba of the Republic it was decided not in Madrid. Belgorod, 1999. Page 35-36.
51 AVP Russian Federation. F.069. Op.21. Item 62. 8. L.97. V.P. Potemkin's diary. Conversation with the English ambassador Chilston on October 16, 1937; In the same place. F.097. Op.12. 15. L.39. M. Litvinov - to the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR in Spain M.I. M. Rosenberg, on February 7, 1937.
52 In the same place. F.069. Op.21. Item 62. 8. L.28.

a thought of the Spanish government to heads of England and France of March 21, 1937 the readiness of Madrid "was emphasized to go to some victims - the Spanish zone Morocco", to take into account in the economic, military, sea and air relations "the interests of both powers as they will be compatible to its own interests". As a reciprocal Anglo-French step it was offered to take "the measures depending on them from now on to stop finally intervention of Germany and Italy in the Spanish affairs", and the first step - "elimination from the Spanish fight of any foreign intervention" 53.

At the 43rd meeting of subcommittee (on March 23, 1937). I.M. Maysky brought up this question. Next day at a plenary session he demanded from Committee of investigation of the complaints which are contained in the Spanish note and suggested to send to Spain the commission for clarification of cases of a parcel by the Italian government after February 20 (entry into force of the agreement on volunteers) of "volunteers" and the continuing Franco's supply with materials, participation of regular parts of the Italian army in military operations. For giving of bigger publicity to this problem I. Maysky's speech at a meeting was transmitted through TASS. Plymouth reproached I.M. Maysky with non-compliance with diplomatic formalities - the note with the statement was not transferred to it personally, and read on zasedan

Williams William?
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