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The EMPIRE, PARTIES AND MASSES IN the RUSSIAN DISTEMPER (February-October, 1917)



 __________________________________ History _______________________________________

Pavel MARCHENYA

The EMPIRE, PARTIES AND MASSES IN the RUSSIAN DISTEMPER (February-October, 1917)

The concept "empire" is interpreted as expression of the mediated vpasta of the imperative setting basic parameters to the state form of intelligent life of the person and society. Mass consciousness is considered as a dominant of political history of the Russian distemper and a sociocultural basis of a victory of the Bolshevism.

The concept of "empire" is interpreted as demonstration of imperative&s indirect power, which sets the basic features of the state. Mass consciousness is regarded as a dominant in political history of the Russian revolt and as social and cultural foundation for Bolsheviks& victory.

power, empire, distemper, parties, masses, mass consciousness; power, empire, revolt, parties, masses, mass consciousness.

MARCHENYA Pavel Petrovich — to. and. N, associate professor; associate professor of philosophy of the Moscow University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation; associate professor of UNC "New Russia. History of Post-Soviet Russia" RGGU marchenyap@mail.ru

A clue of many if not all mysteries of the Russian history is in features of the Russian power which, according to the academician Yu.S. Pivovarov, and is "the main figure and the maker of our history; it is extreme value, goal-setting and the center of all Russian system" from it "vlastecentrichny culture" 1. But the secret of "the Russian power", in turn, is incomprehensible out of judgment of a phenomenon of the empire as generator of strategic objectives and historical fate of Russia. In uncountable attempts "to enter" Russia in a context of last, real and future mankind the concept "empire" is one of the most significant — both on use frequency, and on the saturation of scientific-theoretical and ideological and estimated sounding. Depending on "negativity" or "positivity" of interpretation of this term, in modern "imperovedeniye" (respectively, and in "Russian studies") two camps are obviously found out resisting each other.

On the one hand, the view of the empire as "the moment of negative universalism" in which the world unites not as a form or the idea, and as inertial "funnel" of decomposition of borders and "perimeter defense" of the occupied territories and resursov2 is widespread. Often the empire is considered as "the defective national state which or will become national if the main nation assimilates or will force out all others, or will break up to parts on ethnic sign" 3, or at all as a metaphor of "the unfair world" and "time of troubles" when "illegitimate violence", "the armed globalization" and "global apartheid" 4 dominate.

On the other hand, to imperial ideology as main instru-

1 The February revolution of 1917 in Russia: history and present: materials of a round table. — M.: RGGU, 2007, p. 53. See also: Yu.S. Pivovarov, A.I. Fursov. Russian System: genesis, structure, functioning//Russian historical magazine, t. 1, summer 1998, No. 3, p. 13 — 96; A.I. Fursov. Phenomenon of the Russian power: continuity and change: materials nauch. seminar. Issue No. 3 (12). — M.: The scientific expert, 2008, p. 10 — 59.
2 Magong A.V. Imperialization (Concept of the empire and modern world)//Policy, 2007, No. 2, page 63-80.
3 Mamot M. Imperiya: past of empires and empire of the future//Prognozis, 2006, No. 3, page 272.
4 See: Emil Pine. The review on: Michael Hardt, Antonio Negri. Set: War and democracy during the Empire era. — M.: Cultural revolution, 2006//Pro et contra, 2006, No. 4, page 112; Livny D. Imperiya. History and modern world order//Ab Imperio, 2005, No. 1, page 81.

to the cop of mobilization of masses and a basis of the state and national revival those scientists and politicians who see in "the imperial idea" a relevant trend of public consciousness, conceptual justification of policy of new Russia, a perspective vector of its socio-political development and geopolitical transformatsii1 address.

The author of the present article is solidary with those from researchers who do not consider the empire "bad past" mankind, and, on the contrary, proceed from recognition their not an exception, but "the rule of world history" 2. But, considering polysemy of the use of this term, we will make several specifications that is understood as "empire" dalee3.

As a rule, speaking about the empire, mean one or several of the following signs: presence of the emperor which power is recognized as sacral; polyethnicity and the ethnocultural heterogeneity caused by it; paternalism as a basis of "power vertical" and sociocultural interrelations in imperial "family of the people"; scale of the mastered spaces; expansionism of territorial and cultural policy (its "imperialistic", colonial and hegemonic character); an originality of the relations of the center and the periphery in the empire and communications with neighbors outside.

But the empire there is no large-scale multinational state with extensive state interests which has enough will, forces and means to conduct "imperialistic" policy only, involving in the orbit all new people. The empire is not and just the form of the state other than other forms only technical features of the device and board. The empire is the state which realized the role in world history and purposefully carrying out it as the mission which is above the Leningrad Region -

1 Cm: L. Pankova, O. Leonova. "Imperial idea" as relevant concept of political culture//Observer, 2007, No. 3, page 92-100.
2 V.P. Buldakov. Empire and distemper: To reconsideration of history of the Russian revolution//Russia and the modern world, 2007, No. 3, page 7.
3 See: P.P. Marchenya. The imperial idea and mass legal and political consciousness in Russia//Imperial presentiments of Russia. — M, Volgograd, 2005, page 298 — 300; it. The power and the right in the Russian consciousness//Philosophy of economy, 2006, No. 1, page 138 — 144.

kalny ("only state") interests.

The idea of service to the imperative uniting the people inhabiting it for realization of Good and opposition to the Evil is the cornerstone of historical existence of any empire. Within such understanding of the empire, it, perhaps — the only state synthesis of ontologic and axiological representations of the person really possible in the history. The empire is the state form of intelligent life of the person and society. It is a supranational superethnic form of association of the people in uniform sociocultural space ("the center of the world") in which their life is entered in a universal, providentsialno-eschatological context. It is a form of the mediated power of the imperative which is the valid moral instruction for the imperoobrazuyushchy nation and the people included in it, defining sense and the purpose of individual and super and personal existence of the person and mankind in the history.

Any state education applying for an empire role proceeds from monopoly for the original Idea offered masses as the truth capable to serve as the anti-entropy ideological base of society at this stage of history. Existence of the idea capable to unite and conduct masses is norm of existence of the empire. The idea gives to both the state, and the person the feeling of involvement in history, joy and a consolation from conscious service to something is considerable to greater, than only private interests. The empire — it is not simple "big family", it is family which knows (or believes that it knows) meaning of life and gives participation in it to all the members. An opportunity to find value completeness of social life in service of Great Integrity, to find the reliable support which is out of time (especially, out of any times of troubles), to join Eternity has each separate people (as well as the certain person) identifying itself with the empire. In this sense the empire is a utopia. But it is working and as history, effectively working utopia shows.

However in the being of the empire the initial antagonism between is put

utopian aspiration to the embodiment of ideal values and impossibility of their perfect realization in practice, in values concrete historical. In this explosive interpenetration of a utopia and history both the reasons of stability of empires, and the reasons of cyclically repeating imperial crises — distempers are. In such context the historical functionality of a distemper just also consists in recovery of balance between a utopia and history in life of the empire and consciousness of its inhabitants. Empire life, its historical cycles can be considered as superficial manifestation of the hidden processes which latently are growing ripe in the thickness of public consciousness. A keeper and the spokesman of a basic minimum of imperial values are the people which, on the one hand, are a builder of the empire, with another — itself become its base. Within such model of understanding of imperialness the people at large provides a statics of functioning of the empire, and elite — to loudspeaker. If actions of elite obviously enter the conflict with fundamental values of the people, threaten historical life of the empire — there comes the time of troubles.

Then on the stage of history the people at large in "normal" historical time relating to policy forcedly enter it is indifferent. The negativism which is an indicator of the immune status of an imperial organism acts as force moving them. The special role in this mechanism belongs to the mass consciousness which is becoming more active in a crisis situation. Actually, in it mainly there is also a fight for the empire, in it and its Spirit and Blood root. If as a semantic core of the empire to recognize its ideokratichesky component, then race for power in the empire is, first of all, fight for the Idea (just as fight of empires is fight of the ideas), which we weed is mass consciousness.

Thus, the times of troubles in imperial history are the periods of the peculiar "revaluation of values" connected with updating of a basic complex of ideologems (recovery of harmony of a ratio between sacral most important tasks and actual terrestrial values, between the metaphysical meaning of the empire and its official

expression) and reunion of live psychological communication between society and the power (revival of consciousness of imperial society as complete subject of history, return to the lost integrity of experience of life as services). In other words, the distemper begins with ideological bankruptcy of the state and psychological alienation of masses from the imperious elite which lost imperial and historical legitimacy in their consciousness and comes to an end with coming to power of political force, ideologically and psychologically adequate to masses, isomorphic imperial tradition. And the power applying for the historical future in Russia, which have the right to consider this objectively existing mechanism of the Russian history. Actually, couple "the power — the empire" also forms dialectic unity of the main conflict of the Russian history, defining an originality of the notorious "Russian system" and its recurrence.

Proceeding from the above, we will look at one of the distempers, greatest in national and world history — the Russian distemper of 1917, emergence which course and results convincingly showed that to be the power in the empire is a special responsibility. Judgment of the Distemper-1917 remains magistralno significant for modern Russia and understanding of a role of the imperial beginning in its stories (some authors even call the October revolution "BIG OCTOBER IMPERIALISTIC", emphasizing: "We have in Russia the transit. Already twice within hundred years we leave one empire and we come to another. Features of national transit" 1 are that).

So, to spring of 1917 Russia it was before the obvious fact — in the empire disappeared the emperor. The autocracy, long time performing backbone function in national history capitulated to calls of the Latest time. Revolution raised on the agenda a question of the possibility of preservation of "the power without autocrat" in its imperial format. Ofitsialnoimperskaya "the Russian idea" in its triune formula was devaluated: the agony of autocracy was followed by crisis

1 V. Bondarev. "Is not present at end revolution?" Russian transit: from the empire to the empire//the Homeland, 2007, No. 2, page 19.

Orthodoxy and loss of national "soil".

Eight months of February by October pressed an era: at once several "historical alternatives" got a unique chance to prove the right for inheritance to the tsarism which became a corpse still during lifetime. In the conditions of an unprecedented resonance of global cataclysms (world war, modernization, revolution) all participating in the historical competition "alternatives" it is possible to call to a degree utopian. It was a peculiar competition of utopias.

A fundamental question of the times of troubles — the question of legitimacy or "samozvannost" of forces applying for the power — was solved in mass consciousness, in the system of archaically fundamental coordinates "the — the stranger". Inadequate actions of the elite ignoring masses forced to work the protective mechanism of the empire on rejection of alien interventions. Having remained and ideologically, and psychologically "others", Russian "democracy" was not what other as the party and government myth, a doctrinal chimera and a legal fiction. Ignoring of the mechanism of imperial producing a distemper the political system which developed after February started work on self-destruction. While "democratic" functionaries choked in a rhetorical high water, the country choked with a national revolt. The initial mood of waiting from the masses which, having been unable to understand political changes, showed habitual readiness for humility before the power in process of awareness of powerlessness of this power changed on opposite. The political and legal fetish of the Constituent assembly quickly stopped playing the role constraining the rabble-rousing movement. Having started "illegal" actions for realization of the expectations by traditional methods, masses proved to be not a passive object of policy and the right, and the powerful force on which nobody could rely quite. Impact of masses on political life of the country was shown in all significant events, affected a position and actions of the power, parties and various organizations. By fall the movement of masses, on

to official estimates of analysts of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Provisional government, accepted "antistate character" 1.

The ideas which were proclaimed the parties fighting for masses and real fruits of their activity were in paradoxical "compliance". Not to explain a victory of Bolsheviks and defeat of the others, based on party programs — they in Russia were just not read and not chitayut2. Concrete results were defined by that how ideological and value, psychological and behavioural vectors of political forces resounded with prepotent installations of the mass consciousness situationally derivative of archetypic characteristics of the Russian people. The efficiency of party promotion was defined mainly not by quality of expression of group consciousness, but ability "to cling" collective unconscious.

Cadets, being considered formally as "imperialists" and officially being called as the People's Freedom Party, neither with the imperial idea, nor with the people, nor with his understanding freedoms in practice had nothing in common. Cadet room values were in "anti-resonance" with basic values of masses, forming the model system of binary oppositions according to the scheme "the — the stranger" 3. Being "democrats without democracy", cadets tried to transplant zapadnichesky values to the soil historically alien to them artificially. The elementary misunderstanding by the mass of meaning of cadet speeches aggravated by "anti-bourgeois" promotion of other parties promoted that the unconscious and trustful relation of the people was replaced by thirst of punishment over "enemies of the people". Playing for "constitutional state", liberals proved to be not able to govern (to apply the right). Including themselves creators of the Great Russian Revolution, cadets were in the opinion of its people soon "blind people povo-

1 GARF, t. 1791, op. 6, 401, l. 152 (about).
2 For more details see: P.P. Marchenya. Political parties and masses in Russia 1917: mass consciousness as a revolution factor//Russia and the modern world, 2008, No. 4, page 82 — 99.
3 See: P.P. Marchenya. Mass consciousness and world outlook imperatives of an original way of Russia (on the example of the historical choice of 1917)//Philosophy of economy, 2004, No. 3, page 180 — 187.

dyryam", the "favourites" samochinno usurping the place of the tsar-father and, at last, "guilty werewolves in a distemper" who were beaten often directly on polling precincts selective urnami1.

Mensheviks, positioning itself as the only true spokesman of interests of the proletariat, in practice hid for a back of his main antagonistic enemy — the bourgeoisie, and on all fundamental issues were inclined to capitulation before liberals, alien on strategic objectives. Without having own will, not capable to carrying out reforms, vital to the country, they called all "democratic forces" for unity, but among themselves agreed unless only that "the Menshevism is better than the Bolshevism". Including themselves "a brain of revolutionary democracy", vast majority of the Russian people — the peasantry — they publicly announced "an immoral class". Declaring unavailability of Russian "backwardness" to implementation of "the European ideals", dogmatically blinkered Russian social democrats made "a political hara-kiri" 2 and jumped out overboard Russia returning to an imperial course.

The Social Revolutionaries by inertia continuing to consider themselves spokesmen of interests of the labor peasantry conceded ideological and institutional leadership to Mensheviks — conductors of will of other class. Having finally lost internal unity of party and losing a social base, neopopulists continued to think themselves the most powerful party under which banners they mentally counted almost all Russian people. But, having refused practical support of country radicalism, having been frightened to take the responsibility for universal realization by the mass of a traditional eserovsky slogan: "The earth and Volya", "the main krestyanofila" the countries without fight handed over the main source of the political capital to Bolsheviks. Using the known biblical scene, one may say, that as a result Social Revolutionaries were cut by Bolsheviks as if Samson Delilah. And, like Samson, Social Revolutionaries realized

1 GARF, t. 1796, op. 6, 164, l. 75 — 76.
2 A. Ioffe. (V. Krymsky). Menshevism crash. — Pg., 1917, page 23.

illusoriness of the power, only when was already late.

Bolsheviks, promoting hatred to autocracy, actually took its historical place in mass consciousness. Declaring internationalism, they nevertheless caught a number of traditional and messianic, imperial and archetypic installations of the nation. Formally expressing the interests of working class, they acted in many respects in consonance community (and matter not only in a legimization of "black repartition" — Bolsheviks returned to the people feeling of "soil", established the firm power, carried out social model of all state on the communal principles: paternalism, "democratic centralism", authoritative collectivism, general regulation of public life, etc.).

The Bolshevism was in consonance to both negative, and positive installations of mass consciousness: to search of "social justice", traditional methods of dominion, healthy understanding of life as services, to aspiration to a vseedinstvo, brotherhood of people, tendency to bright future, the ideas of favor to sufferer toilers and expiatory torture for injust. In it also the Judeo-Christian doctrine about "two Kingdoms" both "Messiahs", and neoislamic idea of an opportunity to deserve paradise eradication incorrect by fire and sword were combined. The Bolshevism united the main forms of a national utopia (a legend "about far lands" and a legend "about the tsar-liberator"). The doctrine about class fight was agreed with usual (korporativnosolidarny, communal, moral) ideas of "" and "others", with anti-bourgeoisness and "wandering" internally inherent in the Russian culture (spiritual need not to have the hail and to look for "the future hail"). In a sense "the Russian Marxism" made substitution of Orthodoxy, united in itself the West and the East and became quasireligious base for unprecedented modernization.

Finally Bolsheviks replaced an ideokratichesky imperial complex ("Orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality") with similar ("communism-dictatorship-party membership"), having offered the idea in consonance to tradition and having returned to masses feeling of participation to an imperative.

So, at first in mass consciousness, and then and in political and institutional sense they crystallized in force capable to stop the state disintegration, to stop a distemper and to recreate the empire in its new historical quality.

Practically all ideologems and actions of the Bolshevism it is possible to present in the form the systems of resonant accords with the corresponding installations and expectations of mass consciousness according to the scheme "the — the". Even liberals were forced to estimate an unconditional psychological victory of Bolsheviks as a prepotent factor of political history of revolution from spring to fall of 1917, having summed up: "... psychology — the anarchical psychology of the Bolshevism — was still the brightest and most effective factor of this story" 1. But they did not understand that the psychology of the Bolshevism was not "anarchical" because "a revolt not the antagonist of the power, and a convulsive rush from the power which ceased to frighten, to the power which will inspire a fear shiver anew" 2.

Opponents of the Bolshevism were not capable to the power in the empire. V.M. Chernov confessed: "... if last revolutions were the arena of fierce race for power, present — refusing the power, to charge with a responsibility burden someone's shoulders" 3. And by I.G. Tsereteli's recognition, "all problem of revolutionary democracy came down. to the central problem of creation of the strong democratic power. And the crash of the February revolution came from the fact that revolutionary democracy did not manage to cope with this task" 4.

Thus, the Russian "democratic power" of a sample of 1917 appeared in

1 V. Nabokov. Six months of revolution//Bulletin of the People's Freedom Party. — Pg., 1917, No. 19.
2 Tsit. on: A.A. Kara-Murza, L.V. Polyakov. Russians about the Bolshevism: Experience of the analytical anthology. — SPb., 1999, page 16 — 17.
3 RGASPI, t. 274, op. 1, 40, l. 88.
4 I.G. Tsereteli. Crisis of the power: Memoirs

leader of Mensheviks, deputy of the II State Duma. 1917 — 1918. — M, 2007, page 236.

"antiphase" with mass consciousness and, being not supported with either the appeal to traditional imperial values, or force of the power, it was swept away by elements of a mass protest. The Bolshevism which basis of success was the resonance with historical pulse of the empire which is not wishing to perish became his spokesman for a while.

Lessons of "a red distemper" remain exclusively instructive for the power of Russia. Here only conclusions are drawn, as well as almost a century ago, polar on sense. In particular, on a question: "What had to be the power in 1917?" — fierce discussions between irreconcilable, as in civil war, the parties continue. But, perhaps, the lesson of the 1917th, major for the power of Russia, is what it is (power) — should not be. It is possible to discuss long whether to consider the myth existence of Russia as empires (in the sense of a terrestrial stronghold of an imperative) and powers (in the sense of force constraining the Evil). But history demonstrates: when our people are keen on the idea in consonance to its internal historical call, he is really capable of great fulfillments. And vice versa: positive lines of national mentality are turned out by the destructive wrong side when the power undermines self-confidence as the spokesman of the imperial idea.

From as far as these lessons will be learned, not only the possibility of life of Russia as empires, but also the global future of the modern world in many respects depends. It is necessary to realize: the imperial idea is not only recognizable trend of the Russian consciousness, the imperial idea is a demiurge of the Russian history. And search of the Idea in Russia — it is not simple "an ancient Russian entertainment" as V.V. of Putin5 joked, these are attempts to grope the lost imperial "soil", only leaning on which Russia can consciously and is effective continue the history in mankind.

5 Tsit. on: Novye Izvestia. — M, on April 2007, 26.
Michael Banks
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