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Unemployment problems in Nazi Germany and methods of their decision

15. PRO. F0 371/21725. River 338.

16. PRO. F0 371/21726. River 293.
17. PRO. FO 371/21728.
18. PRO. FO 371/21663. P. 129.
19. PRO. FO 371/21729.
20. PRO. FO 371/21730. P. 74.
21. DBFP. Third Series. L "1949. Vol. II.
22. PRO. FO 371/21738. P. 92.
23. PRO. FO 371/21736. P. 67.
24. PRO. FO 371/21742.

Kuban State University

On May 7, 2002

2003 E.A. Palamarchuk


The subject of this article devoted to one of the major directions of the social policy pursued by the Nazi regime has huge value for understanding of this policy in general. In domestic science she was affected in the monograph by A.A. Galkin. However, in our opinion, in it unfairly modest attention is paid to "the program of creation of works" and its place in the course of militarization of the German economy [1, page 199-200, 202] deserving more detailed analysis as is one of the main objectives which the author sets for himself in this publication.

Having come to the power on a wave of "a great depression" of 1929 - 1933 with the problems created by it which solution appeared too hard to the last Weimar offices, understanding that durability and stability of the new mode in many respects depend on that how successful and quickly to them will be possible to cope with the unemployment which accepted mass character, national socialists hurried to carry out a number of large-scale measures. Extension of the program of public works which realization in life was begun already by their predecessors became one of the most significant among them.

As a matter of fact, the corresponding plans were developed and implemented at the local level at the beginning of the 20th (creation in 1920 of a social security system of the persons who lost work can be taken for a reference point). With formation in 1927 of imperial establishment on labor mediation and insurance of the unemployed their financing was carried out partially by means of the state subsidies, partly - due to contributions to fund of insurance for unemployment. This question gained special sharpness in crisis years.

If business did not go to chancellorship of Bryuninga further discussion of projects of creation of works, then von Papen's government allocated 302 million marks for road and meliorative works, construction of housing in suburbs. Special hopes at the same time were laid on the systems of special vouchers which not only guaranteed them to owners to businessmen tax benefits, but also served them as compensation for providing work to the unemployed [2, page 281-282].

General von Schleicher which headed the last "presidential" kabinet-Veymarsky & #34; the republics on December 2, 1932, tried to accelerate implementation of the program of public works. He appointed G. Tereke the member of the cabinet in the rank of the imperial commissioner on employment. To the last from every quarter of Germany the projects of providing the unemployed with jobs prepared by rural communities and local authorities concerning arrived • mainly "expansions of network of roads, especially in small communities which had no strong communications with the regional centers, carrying out meliorative works, constructions of dams, devices of the sewerage, expansion of an electrical network yet" [3, page 212, 216]. (It is characteristic that the current economic program of the National socialist German Labour Party adopted the same year - NSDAP developed by G. Strasser also allocated the special place of the organization of financing of construction, land management, meliorative and other works that substantially promoted success of national socialists on elections to the Reichstag in July

1932 ) [4, page 179].

The financial base of the program of creation of works which got in inheritance to Hitler in general was 1098 million marks from which only 500 million marks were transferred to fund "the emergency program Terek" (further - "the program of primary measures"), and of them in turn 400 million intended for implementation of the projects initiated at the local level [5, page 117-118]. Nazis took away on realization the last four months [2, page 283], and in June

1933 the decision of the imperial government for the purpose of the practical embodiment of the plans which had "national political value", the budget of "the program of primary measures" was replenished with 100 million more a reykhsmarok [5, page 118].

The new impulse was given to this policy on July 1, 1933 when "The first law on unemployment reduction" to which first section devoted to creation of works the name of "plan" or "Reinhardt's program", by name the secretary of state of the imperial Ministry of Finance which was officially considered by his author was assigned came into force (also bearing on itself the plagiarism press).

To number of fundamental differences of programs Terek and. Reinhardt not only the financing of "public works" which increased in the second case, but also the changed priority use of these means belonged. If from 600 million a reykhsmarok allocated Terek, two thirds came to certain lands and communities in the form of loans on road construction, melioration of agriculture, various municipal projects [2, page 283] (though administrative authorities of many lands half-heartedly treated the prospects which arose in this regard, including conditions of granting the credits excessively burdensome, and the head of economic department of Wurtemberg R. Maier at a meeting of ministers of lands called on February 7, 1933 this program "cheating" [5, page 118]), then the attention of Nazis was concentrated first of all on objects of nation-wide scale that was explained by the priority given to rearmament. On February 9, 1933 Hitler listened to council of the Reich Minister of finance of Shverina von Krosiga to increase an imperial share of funds of "the emergency program" to 140 million a reykhsmarok due to reduction of a share of local communities by 10% [5, page 118]. And though "Reinhardt's program" provided allocation of one billion imperial brands on repair and reorganization of office buildings, housing, reconstruction of country farms, earthwork, etc. [2, page 284], in practice the support to separate communities, areas, was considerably cut down to municipalities. So, Hamburg besides the money intended for payment of grants to the unemployed until the end of 1934 financial year received from imperial treasury 6.3 million a reykhsmarok on implementation of "the emergency program", till March 31

1935 there are in addition 1.37 million marks within implementation of "Reinhardt's program" and 5.4 million more a reykhsmarok which came to the Hamburg mortgage fund were made available to householders. The general cost of projects which were planned to be carried out in the future winter if "Reinhardt's program" - was executed, was 85.6 million a reykhsmarok [2, page 287].

In "menu" of the program, creations of works as one of most "refined dishes" creation of all-imperial network of freeways was. The signal to it was given by Hitler. Holding a meeting of the Government on February 8, 1933, he disposed to put in order and to expand all transport network of a Reich. The laying of highways which began in 1934 became the most large-scale draft of the construction program of the 30th [6, page 147].

■ First when determining priorities of road construction in the Nazi management and circles, close to it, the fight between supporters of expansion and modernization of the German railway system and those who gave a palm to superhighways was started. With the publication of the special law on autobahns and the creation of society of Reykhsavtobana which followed on June 27, 1933 and appointment on June 30 F. Todt (after headed

the ministry of arms и& ammunition) the general inspector of the German roads the second won. Not the last - a role here was played also by Hitler's opinion thrown on the same scale.

If the original version of "Reinhardt's program" did not provide allocation of funds for these purposes, then eventually Shverin von Krosig conceded to pressure from Todt and the Minister of Defence Verner von Blomberg demanding to include high-speed highways in the list of the projects financed from its funds. Finally agreed on the sum in 55 million imperial brands (according to other data, in November, 1933 Krozig authorized allocation of 106 million a reykhsmarok on construction of roads, and 65 million had to arrive from the funds actually "Reinhardt's programs" allocated under projects of earthwork, and 41 million should receive a reykhsmarok for the account of the increased receipts from taxes on cars; materials of the German integration of public works contain figure in 58.6 million a reykhsmarok, as if made a contribution of "Reinhardt's program" to transformation of a faterland into the country of autobahns) [5, page 121, 126

>- 127].

According to "The second law on unemployment reduction" of September 21, 1933 the allocation of additional 500 million a reykhsmarok for repair work and tax exemption of agriculture and housing construction was provided. Investment costs, on imperial highways were already 1 billion a reykhmarok here [4, page 186].

does not have

Among scientists unity of opinions on. to an occasion of in what degree the modernization German" a highway system was a response to requirements of civil economy and in what pursued the military aims. So, Miluard, recognizing existence - the last, sees nevertheless its main task in employment and acceleration of development of the German automobile industry [7]. Overi, one of the most famous researchers of this problem, asks a question whether Germany by 1939 had wide network of the strategic roads suitable for use by army and military economy, and answers on it in the negative. In our opinion, appropriate in brief to give a chain of his reasonings: by September, 1939 only 3077 km of highways from the planned more than 14 thousand km were offered, and on a part of sites the works were not completed that allowed to carry out on them only one-way traffic; the Supreme command of the German armed forces, estimating different types of thoroughfares in terms of their strategic importance, gave, preference to the railroads by which by the beginning of fighting the vast majority of all cargoes was transported; participants of the meeting of Council of defense which took place in June, 1939, complaining concerning unavailability of the state transport system to the approaching war, a special claim was made to autobahns that, according to Overi, is the main argument in advantage

civil use of the last; as second and third of war were marked by sharply increased demand for construction materials, the minister of arms and ammunition A. Speer who became Todt's successor on this post found it necessary to impose in 1942 a total ban on all works on a further construction of imperial highways [8, page 390 - 393].

Actually in wider plan all these reasonings bring us to a discussion (fruitless according to Silvermen [5, page 114-115]) about a role of rearmament and a share of civil projects in post-crisis economic revival of Germany and finally rest against a question of when preparation for war, and about degree of its intensity at different stages began.

Of course, in comparison with the subsequent period of 1933 - 1935 - economies, key for improvement, - were time of more modest military expenses. In the letter to the imperial Minister of Labour of July 8, 1933 the Reich Minister of defense Blomberg, complaining that at allocation since June 1, 1933

1 billion brands on creation of works within "Reinhardt's program" were not considered requirements of Wehrmacht, asked about allocation to the last 13, 5 million a reykhsmarok, suggesting to take them from "voluntary" contributions of Germans to funds of support of national work which were supposed to be used for railway construction in areas with poorly developed transport system. The head of imperial financial department in the personal message to the Reich Minister of work supported Blomberg [5, page 115-116]. From 1932/33 to 1934/35 the sum of confidential budgetary expenses on arms (3.4 billion brands) taking into account 2.1 billion more brands which were on special military accounts was 17% of the total costs of the imperial government (31 billion brands) and 1.3% of gross national product [9, page 47]. Besides, from 1934 to 1937 were let out by the president of Reykhsbank of Ya. Shakhtom Mefoveksel for the sum of 12 billion a reykhsmarok which completely went for rearmament financing, having made 33 - 38% of the total military costs of that time [10]. At this G.B. Gui-zevius, the German diplomat, the active participant of an anti-Hitlerite plot, pays attention that "in the first three years of the Nazi regime the military orders forcedly remained within... the defensive program" as "for bigger there were not enough production - capacities" & [11, page 344].

Preparation for war was sharply accelerated by adoption in 1936 of "the second four-year plan" and Goering's appointment responsible for his performance.

However already at the beginning of Hitler's chancellorship growth of military production is observed what the following data confirm. The production of tanks which began in July, 1933 in circumvention of requirements of the Versailles peace treaty was behind the harmless name "agricultural Kruppa program". By efforts of the Automobile union of producers

motors the trucks which were the military vehicle rolled off the production lines. The management of the powder factory in Reynsdorf producing explosives already in the first half of 1933 increased the number of the personnel occupied on it since 2000 to 5200 people. The sum of orders for construction of the new warships placed by command of navy was 70 million a reykhsmarok. By 1934 840 of 1968 made planes intended for Luftwaffe [6, page 147].

And at last if during 1932 - 1938 the sector of the heavy industry grew almost by 200%, then the industries making consumer goods - only for 38% [9, page 54].

Thus, the economies occurring in the country restoration" and модернизация^ cannot be considered out of ■ a context of militarization of the last. The program of public works was not an exception of this row that was not hidden also by Hitler. At already mentioned government meeting on February 8, 1933 he proclaimed return to the German people of ability to carry arms as the major national task for the next five years. "Each measure financed by the state has to be considered in terms of whether it promotes performance of this task, - he emphasized. - This reason has to dominate always and everywhere [12, page 380]... Within the next five years the principle has to be leading; all for Wehrmacht" [5, page 115, a comment 9. In view of incompleteness of the text of the speech placed in the collection of documents of Noex and Pridham, the last statement is provided according to the publication Silvermena]. (However, at the same meeting the Reich Minister of work F. Zeldte threw a phrase about existence "except purely military requirements... other projects significant for national economy which should not be neglected" [5 of page 115-116, a comment 9], but it did not affect the general tonality of a meeting).

At the same time leaders of the third Reich took into account an opportunity to disguise military orientation of plans, osushchestvlyavshikhsya1 under the auspices of the program of public works as, without appearing in the official budget of the Ministry of Defence, they would not come into the view directly of Entente powers. Though, according to some information, in 1933 the Defense Ministry was not able to spend more than 50 million imperial brands in addition to the budgetary appropriations allocated to it, till 1936 from the funds allocated for financing of public works, military projects absorbed 200 million a reykhsmarok [12, page 381]. For the specified masking the Wehrmacht began to place orders for military equipment in 2800 firms which received the status of the defense enterprises [6, page 147] (If to believe so informed memoirist as Gizevius, extent of similar masking and in the subsequent, in particular in 1937, was such is that even the general Thomas, the chief of Military-economic management of Beliefs -

a hovny glavnokomandovaniye armed forces of Germany, "did not know all volume of military orders" as "one type of armed forces hid the arms from another". However, it is necessary to agree with the author of memoirs that it is difficult to imagine it) [11, page 344].

Need of accounting of strategic interests at implementation of construction works in the specified sphere was unambiguously emphasized by Goering in a conversation with Terek. Having called the last in imperial office in February, 1933, reykhsmarshat declared to it: "As I was told, you still financed from the means provided to you for employment only the projects seeming to you important for the national economy. Of course, construction of roads, carrying out meliorative works, construction of dams, settlements - all this fine things. But now the third Reich is faced by more important tasks. You allotted the means for earthwork for the purpose of a highway construction from Hamburg through Frankfurt to Basel. I consider it correct. But construction of highways which I entirely support has to submit to strategic objectives.... It is necessary to finance first of all the enterprises building planes and also firms occupied with production of military materials. All this will help to liquidate unemployment rather!" [3, page 232-233]. That in the idea of motorization of the country which was so close to it that he even "preferred the general von Rejchenau to the colonel general Beck as the first with enthusiasm supported motorization and the second, according to the Fuhrer, braked it Hitler, "certainly" was guided by military reasons, also F. Wiedemann, the leader's aide-de-camp in 1933 - reports

1938 about [13]. In addition, unlike the road system which was already existing in Germany the superhighways had "4 seven-meter strips in each direction providing movement of the motorized parts with a speed not less than 50 km/h"

[14] -one more argument in favor of told.

Therefore if it is necessary to agree with opinion

Shenda about existence of a number of the reasons of not military character for construction of autobahns, that his statement about a prevalence of geographical, demographic and economic reasons when determining routes of their proleganiye as they corresponded to the schemes developed by independent experts during the donatsistsky period, and a conclusion to which he comes, - "any possible resulted military benefits though were not ignored, were accidental, let and desired, by-products" this construction

[15], -look extremely unconvincingly.

At the same time, in our opinion, would be excessive simplification to connect laying of highways (as well as the program of public works in general) only with militarization of all spheres of public and state life, underestimating its general economic, it is equal as socio-political and propaganda value.

Thanks to policy of tax benefits, subsidies and direct capital investments in automobile production and construction (if in 1932 it was supposed to spend for various construction projects

2 one billion a reykhsmarok, by 1934 the corresponding sum was 5.7 billion, and by 1936 - 9 billion a reykhsmarok, and, 28% of works were the share of housing and 21% - on road construction), growth advanced economic recovery in these economic sectors in general. As a result in 1934 the number of the cars rolling off the production line for 50% exceeded the peak reached in 1929, and expenses on laying of roads (both local, and national value) were 100% higher, than in peak 20th [9, page 48-49].

From 5.4 billion imperial brands allocated finally under the program of public works, about 2 billion were spent for new superhighways [16]. The specified measures led to sharp increase of demand for construction materials and the equipment of heavy mechanical engineering, and in automotive industry - on more specialized industrial raw materials, to change of a situation in labor market. By 1938 over 1.1 million jobs to a greater or lesser extent depended on cars or roads. Total number occupied in the construction industries grew from 666 thousand in 1933 to 2 million in

1936 [9, page 50]. As for direct "contribution" of highway highways to unemployment resorption process, here, on different sources, figures are strongly broken a set that in many respects it is necessary to charge to complexity of Nazi accounts department.

According to some data, already by the end of 1934 about 350 thousand people [17], on others - 210 thousand, apart from those who were engaged in providing with materials and equipment were directly or indirectly engaged at their construction [12, page 383]. Overi gives the same figure for a roadwork in general, noting that by 1936 124 thousand people worked only on laying of high-speed highways [8, page 399]. Todt's adviser concerning social policy doctor Birkenkholts in July, 1934 defined employment in road construction in 143 thousand people. The status report on affairs of the association "Imperial Highways" contains the following data reflecting dynamics of employment in construction of autobahns: from 5 thousand in January up to 83,863 people in November, 1934; with 35,421 in January up to 113,139 people in July, 1935; with 61,044 in February up to 121,668 people in June, 1936. If to assume as a basis Hitler and Hess's statements that at the end of 1934 - the beginning of 1935 about 400 thousand people in any given form were involved in road construction and 600 thousand more people are engaged in the German automotive industry, including suppliers of accessories and the enterprise for car repairs, motorization, perhaps, at the beginning of 1935 allowed to employ about 1 million Germans [5, page 119-120].

In the socio-political plan the creation of highways had important psychological effect, generating at a part of the German population illusion edine-

a niya, used by Nazis for promotion of the idea of classless, monolithic Community of the People which can do the solution of any political, economic, technical and other tasks however large-scale and difficult they were. The speeches of many high-ranking officials devoted to the matter are imbued with spirit of romanticism. The minister of arms and ammunition Todt elected in 1939 the chairman of Association of the German engineers urged to see the certificate that national socialists ceased to treat technology as a heartless object in construction of highways. In the third Reich, he said, the esthetic criterion forced out motive of generation of profit. Highways are evident demonstration of creative and technical capabilities of a creative thought. Road per se becomes the work of art pleasing with the beauty and harmony with the environment! - he exclaimed [18, page 204-205].

Besides the listed measures of fight against unemployment also others were used. Unloading of the labor market was promoted by the transformation of voluntary labor service to an imperial labor service obligatory which followed on June 26, 1935 for youth of both sexes and serving at the same time for implementation of meliorative works and carrying out initial military preparation [4, page 186]. In December, 1938 it was extended to women that was fixed published in February, 1939. "The decree about a general labor service" according to which the authorities acquired the right of mobilization of any folkegenossen for the uncertain period for work in any part of the state [1, page 198]. A role was played also by granting interest-free marriage loans to those women which agreed to renounce the professional ambitions and to leave work for the sake of the status of the housewife [19]. Also idea of resettlement of a part of workers to rural areas which "theoretical" was substantiated were nourished. The president of Chamber of Commerce and Industry of administration of Aachen in October, 1933, referring to economic experts of NSDAP, so expressed the point of view of party on a problem of mass unemployment: as in the national socialist state "it will be impossible to reintegrate all industrial workers because of extraordinary decrease in export", a considerable part them should be moved to rural areas. End of projects of restoration, "which in turn will return people for work", will lead to emergence of "extensive space for rural settlements in the southern part of the Western brand". Large-scale resettlement assumed that earlier - the used lands, unsuitable for processing, will be adapted for cultivation through projects of restoration of the soil (still according to "the program Terek" for agricultural works it was planned to spend 200 million a reykhsmarok) [5, page 121].

Reduction of unemployment happened differentially depending on the region and the industry of production.

In East Prussia, for example, by July 26, 1933, i.e. still before "Reinhardt's program" could make any impact on economy, unemployment was eliminated in 30 areas, and on August 16 the district party head E. Koch reported to the Fuhrer on achievement of full employment in the territory of all earth for what he received a special praise of the leader who noted it as "the exemplary gauleiter and the oberprezident" [5, page 128, 129, a comment 46].

In Hamburg, the largest seaport, the second largest city of Germany, 70% of all working citizens were engaged in navigation, trade, shipbuilding and the branches of the city industry depending on them existing due to the processing of foreign raw materials or domestic materials going for export. As these industries directly depended on the world economy which was still in a condition of a deep depression, rates of elimination of unemployment lagged behind the majority of other parts of a Reich here. So, at the end of January, 1933 when the peak of crisis in Germany generally passed, in Hamburg there were 145,509 unemployed, or 167,207 persons who were looking for work within the Hamburg territory which general population made 1.2 million people. Thus, if over the country in general the share of the unemployed without persons of liberal professions made 22%, then in Hamburg this indicator equaled 30% [2, page 285] (it must be kept in mind that here data on the hidden unemployment) [2, page 299, a comment 12], and are not reflected in the transport sector of Hamburg - 20% in comparison with all-imperial 6%.

For September 30, 1934 on unemployment rate Hamburg was in the lead in a Reich, having bypassed other large cities, including Berlin and Leipzig where it also was high. During the period from January, 1933 to December, 1934 decrease in number of the unemployed receiving benefits in the city centers with the population over 500 thousand people of I reached on average 60.4% whereas in Hamburg - only 42.4% [2, page 286, 289].

Most rapidly resorption of unemployment happened in the industries to a degree connected with production of arms. Direct employment in the aviation industry, for example, increased from 4 thousand people in January, 1933 up to 53,865 people in January, 1935 and up to 205 thousand people in October, 1938 [20]. At the general increase in employment during 1925

>- 1939 observed its decrease in agriculture [21].

It is characteristic that when providing work the age principle was also observed and merits before the National Socialist Movement were considered. It agrees to the "Instruction about distribution of human resources" of August 28, 1934 signed by the Reich Minister of work, to services on employment it was imputed a duty to influence on "correct in the economic and social relation

distribution of human resources on the enterprises and institutions". The priority in granting the place of work should have been given to "jobless elderly workers and employees, first of all fathers of large families" who had advantage "in relation to workers and employees 25 years are younger". Till October, 1935 more than 100 thousand young people who lost work [22, page 38-39 became the victims of this Instruction; 4, page 186]. According to still earlier published order of the Deputy Fuhrer of July 24, 1933, rights for priority employment the members of CA, CC, "A steel helmet" who entered them till January 30, 1933, members of NSDAP with numbers of party-membership cards to 300 thousand, the party functionaries, persons consisting in the organizations which adjoined Nazi party and also disabled veterans had [4, page 187].

All above-mentioned measures allowed the imperial government to do away in only a few years with unemployment. However attempts of researchers to coordinate among themselves official data and indirect evidence give quite motley picture of dynamics of growth of employment.

By some calculations according to which peak indicators of the 20th in industrial production were reached by 1936, and in employment - by 1937 it was following (in million people):

1928 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938
1.4 5.6 4.8 2.7 2.2 1.6 0.9 0.4

(the figures concerning 1933 and 1934 are given for March) [9, page 28-29]. On others, for only one 1933 the unemployment was reduced more than by a third, and within the first 18 months of existence of Hitler's regime - for 60%: from 34% (6,013,612 unemployed and

11 487,211 occupied in January, 1933) up to 13.5% (2,426,014 unemployed and 15,532,793 having work in July, 1934) [5, page 113].

Some scientists pay attention that so rapid recovery of the labor market during the specified period was not so much real, how many ostentatious. Mason sees in reclassification as the "employed" hundreds of thousands of temporary workers occupied at "public works", illegal "statistical manipulation", triumph of Nazi promotion [23] (about 619 thousand people) [5, were in this way reclassified by page 114]. Hachtman pays attention that if to exclude from statistics of employment of such "quasiemployed", will become obvious: significant reduction of unemployment began only with the middle of 1934 [22, page 37].

Despite existence of a certain falsification by Nazis of figures of statistics (however, it it is difficult to determine degree by obvious reasons; Silver-men, for example, claims that its work in eleven German archives did not allow it to reveal a deliberate juggling the authorities of the third Reich of the statistical material concerning situation

in labor market [5, page 114, the comment 7], according to modern data, to summer of 1937 in the country remained less than half a million unemployed [24]. And in this regard Germany overtook other developed European states. If in it in 1938 the share of the unemployed made 1.3%, then in the USA - 18.9%, in Canada - 11.4%, in the Netherlands - 9.9%, in Belgium-8.7% and in Great Britain - 8.1% [4, page 185].

However the accelerated militarization of economy (together with the general improvement of an economic environment which elements were shown still before the Nazi party became ruling), having written down a considerable share of responsibility for the achieved success into the account, created the new problem which became the medal back.

Already three years later after the beginning of implementation of the program of public works there was a serious shortage of the labor first of all qualified [25]. At the end of 1938 the Reich Minister of work officially reported about existence in the German economy over one million vacancies [26]. Thereof in the labor market the considerable fluidity was noted.

According to estimates of imperial establishment on labor mediation, during the period from 1936 to 1938 about 1.5 million people were monthly changed by the workplace [22, page 41-42]. Many workers "wandered" within the same industry in search of higher earnings. In 1938 - 1939 this phenomenon increased in such scales that all persons which had full-time employment changed a workplace on average at least once a year [27]. The greatest activity was shown here by certain groups of workers. In particular, Shleziya's metalworkers repeatedly went in search of "better lot" to Saxony and Brandenburg where businessmen, differed in bigger "generosity". This problem gained special sharpness in border areas. Separate communities "structurally weak" the regions which were located near border lost up to 10% of the able-bodied population. At the same time the following trend was noted: if the women and subsidiary male workers occupied on production quite often showed tendency to change of the place of work, then skilled workers, as a rule, were loyal to "plant" [22, page 42].

The authorities took certain steps for restriction of freedom of travel of workers, including widely applied direct coercion. The law on regulation of use of labor of May 15, 1934 allowed in areas with high unemployment rate hiring of persons from other areas only in the presence of the consent of the services subordinated to the head of Imperial establishment on labor mediation and insurance of the unemployed Sirup [22, page 42-43]. On February 26, 1935 the law according to which all categories of workers and employees received new service records was adopted. They were given by labor exchanges and contained information on vocational training, change of places of work, a feather -

promotions of its owner. By 1939 about 36 million workers received such books which became important means of regulation of labor (since September 1, 1936 the acceptance for work of the persons which did not have the service record was forbidden) [1, page 198].

A number of the subsequent instructions - of February 11

1937 , on May 30, 1938 [22, page 44], June 22, 1938, February 13, 1939, on September 1, 1939 [4, page 188] - workers finally lost the right to freedom of travel and the choice of the place of work even within the region.

However, the specified measures did not bring that effect on which counted the authorities. Though at the end of 1936 propaganda among metalworkers and the qualified builders and rendering intermediary services through announcements in the press were forbidden to them, in the middle of 1939 in one of the Yugoslavian newspapers the attention that Germany "now the country only around the world in which Sunday after Sunday in all large daily newspapers 6 or more of pages from taken away under announcements are filled with offers of jobs of all types" was paid [22, page 46].

Decline in production of work in most the industrial industries became result of the happened changes multiplied by the shortage of raw materials and spare parts, not always satisfactory planning of production, wear of the equipment in the 30th that was recorded by Hoffman's index. (In Saxony, for example, the head of administration stated the corresponding decline by 15-30%). The situation most difficult in this regard developed in mining industry and construction. In the last physical activity was such is that in 1938 the recession of labor productivity was nearly 20% (besides the reasons stated above it turned out to be consequence of replacement of a part of the qualified construction workers on * unqualified, intensifications of production and increase in duration of working hours that led to decrease in moral spirit of builders). In various civil engineering firms the decline in production of work in 1935 - 1938 fluctuated ranging from 9 up to 60%. In mining industry in 1935/36 - 1938 average performance for change dropped by 10 - 12%. The management of the coal company Gelsenkirchen losing in this regard 10 t of coal daily complained of a habit of miners to run from the mine to the mine in a pursuit of "the long brand" and also on the competition from automotive industry in which work was more profitable and demanded smaller efforts [27, page 126; 28, page 188].

There is a question whether achievement of full employment and emergence of deficiency of labor was followed by increase in the standard of living of the German workers.

As the mode had to limit needs of the civilian population for consumer goods, increase in earnings was put under control of party and government institutions. For change of the salary or working conditions

obtaining special permission of the authorities was required. According to the decree of June 25

1938 and the instruction of April 25, 1941 additional material encouragement of the worker had to be authorized by the trustee of work. Any payment of special awards is from now on qualified as offense. Practice of improvement of an operating financial position by its transfer to the enterprise with higher compensation or in better the paid industry?

Harry Martin
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