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"Western plans" of the Macedonian tsar Philip V


N.Yu. Sivkina



The second half of the 3rd century brought to the Balkan Greece some peace years: one coalition war replaced another at once. All states except for Athens which managed to keep a neutrality were involved in collisions. Liberation movement against the Macedonian domination intertwined with receiving financial subsidies from the Egyptian governor, fight for social transformations accompanied political rivalry between the states.

This ball of contradictions created the fertile field for the ambitious politicians leaning for implementation of the drawn-up plans for some forces, for others using weaknesses of the friends and enemies convinced that success justifies everything. Though scales of wars in Greece were not especially big, but their continuity led to mutual weakening and inability of the Greek states to independently solve the all-Greek problems that provoked new intervention.

Each Hellenistic governor wished to have, besides the rights of the conqueror, some ideological base for the board. In Asia and Egypt this basis was found in the idea of divinity of the tsar. Macedonia in this regard differed: any Antigonid hesitated on establishment of a royal cult in own state, not to mention Greece.

Starting with Philip II and Alexander the Great two trends were outlined in the relations between the Macedonian monarchy and the Greek policies. Philip II created the Corinthian league. He, and then his son considered Greeks as free allies. And only at the very end of board Alexander changed this position. The second direction originates from Antipatr who operated Hellas by means of the Macedonian garrisons and supporting about the Macedonian regime. All subsequent governors chose the second way, except for the short union between Antigonus Odnoglazy, his son Demetry Poliorket and Greeks. As F.G. Mishchenko noted, the subsequent governors of Macedonia were ready

to take each opportunity to turn free Greeks into obedient poddannykh1.

The following attempt to prove the claims for control in Hellas was made legally by Antigonus Doson, and then Philip V Such basis there had to be a contract on the General world which conditions were stipulated at formation of the Hellenic league in 224 g which included Achaean federation, Macedonia and some other states. If in former times the idea of the General world was incompatible with the idea of the sovereign policy, then at the end of the 3rd century the league included not the certain cities, but federations which were more accustomed to some restrictions of the actions, on the one hand, but also are more ready to equal partnership - with another. Such union provided full internal autonomy of the states-uchastnikov2 though the foreign policy, as a rule, was defined by the mightiest of allies. The relations of friendship of the great power with weaker state always remained ambiguous. The similar system not necessarily brought in good hands to nasiliyu3. In effect, hegemony of Macedonia was not more burdensome for Greeks, than hegemony of Athens, Sparta or Thebes during earlier era. The Macedonian governors Alexander the Great, Demetry Poliorket, Antigonus Doson successfully used the union with Greeks in the purposes. But in a case with Philip V the situation is more difficult.

In the available narrative sources Philip V, the penultimate Macedonian governor to whose lot two wars with Rome fell appears at us very gloomy figure. Subject to low passions, having despotic bents, ambitious, captured by the idea about world supremacy, it started the conflict with Romans and opened for them the road for gaining the Hellenistic world. However all negative reviews about the tsar originate in earlier works: from the work Polibiya, from memoirs of the Achaean strategist Arat, from compositions Roman annalistov4.

Philip V's image and in modern literature is so unattractive. Perception stereotypes, in our opinion, prevent to see the Macedonian tsar in its true light: as person who in the policy was guided by the principles significantly differing from what is attributed to him by historians.

In 220-217 BC in Greece there was an Allied war between the Hellenic union and Egoliysky federation. The Macedonian tsar as predominant force of the Hellenic league was forced to interfere with this conflict according to the allied contract. Fighting began in 219 g. According to Polibiya (Ro1u. IV 61), the Macedonian tsar Philip V with the army and an epirsky militia in the summer of 219 g passed through Thessaly to the area of ambrakiot and besieged horo-

sho the strengthened Ambrak (Ro1u. IV 61. 5 and 8). The siege proceeded more than forty days (Ro1u. IV. 63.2). During this time etoliyets not only made attacks to Peloponnese, but even, having seized the moment, sent army under Scopas's command to Macedonia where it collected plentiful production (Ro1u. IV. 62. 1-2). However this attack did not distract macedonians from a siege, and Ambrak's taking and transfer to his epirota became its result (Ro1u. IV 63.3).

After that Philip was transported near the cape Action to Akarna-niya. Here he united to akarnansky army and began to expel these-liysky garrisons from fortresses. He occupied the Level, Metropol, Konopa, Iforiya, Peany, other fortresses and, at last, Eniada (Ro1u. IV. 64). Eniad the tsar strengthened an acropolis and the harbor, having estimated their strategic situation. After this news came from Macedonia about the preparing invasion of dardan that forced the Macedonian tsar to come back home in the same way (Ro1u. IV 66).

According to one of versions, Philip intentionally did not hurry with attack on Egoliya as he watched events in Illyria where Romans were at war against Demetriya Farskogo5.

However it were the first steps of Romans on the Balkan Peninsula, and they did not mention Macedonia. Besides, Romans concentrated the main attention on the internal problems, waging at that time war with Hannibal. Illyrian events could attract some interest of neighbors, but it is doubtful that they already at that time felt the menacing power of the Roman military vehicle. The turn in Philip's policy will be shown much later: as it is considered, under the influence of Demetriya Farsky who was some time at the Macedonian yard (Ro1u. V 101-102). At last, even the skilled commander was not able to afford to delay military operations, expecting the data which do not have relations to this war. The young Macedonian tsar for the first time acted as the commander, and he should have been extremely careful for the sake of maintenance of the authority among allies.

And chronology of the events stated by Poliby (Ro1u. III. 13; 17. 33), speaks against this version: 221 g - Hannibal's appointment the commander and a campaign against olkad, 220 g - war from a vaktseyama and karpetanam, 219 g - a siege and Sagunt's falling, then Hannibal takes away army on winter quarters to New Carthage, and, having wintered, in 218 g, goes on Italy. That is Philip's campaign 219 g coincided with Sagunt's siege. It is doubtful that between these events there was some communication.

At the end of Allied war Philip V arrived in Argos on Nemean festivals (Ro1u. V. 101. 4-5). According to Poliby, here he received news of a victory of of an annibal over Romans at Trasimeno Lake.

And this message, according to the Achaean historian, generated desire to quicker end Allied war at the tsar to address the western affairs (Ro1u. V 101.6-102.1). The tradition considers this message in the context of the subsequent events: new ambitions of Philip were shown in the conclusion of the sudden world with Egoliya in 217 g, disembarkation of the Macedonian forces in Illyria in 216 g and then in the contract of the Macedonian governor with Hannibal in 215 g. The Roman writers exaggerated later value of this contract, but Poliby is sharper than others showed that the tsar planned to take Illyria, and did not even exclude probability Macedonian invasion in Italiyu6.

However it is more correct to consider, in our opinion, conclusion of peace not in the context of the subsequent events, and in terms of economic and political opportunities of allies to continue fighting.

The Achaean historian says that Philip received the message about Hannibal's victory in Argos and under pressure of Demetriya Farsky was inclined to a thought of the world in Greece, about conquest of Illyria and about a crossing to Italy (Ro1u. V 101.6-102.1). But in other passage (Ro1u. At 100.9-10), mentions that else during a siege of Ftiotidsky Thebes there arrived to it ambassadors of Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium and even from the tsar Ptolemaeus with the offer again to become intermediaries between it and etoliyets. And then the tsar agreed and sent them to Egoliya. Thus, peace negotiations began even before receiving news of fight at Trasimeno Lake.

Also the situation and with a statement about the western plans of Macedonia voobshche7 is. The view of change of foreign policy of Philip which developed in a historiography during Allied war in many respects, in our opinion, is connected with Polibiya's concept about "coupling" sobytiy8. According to its theory, events of of annibalovy war in Italy "were linked" to events of Allied war in Greece. However during Allied war they could not arise because for this purpose there were no conditions. The turn in his politician happened later, than is considered to be.

Hannibal's victory at Trasimeno Lake in itself could mean nothing for the Macedonian policy. One loud victory made in the far-away country with which it was not necessary to deal directly the commander about whom the Macedonian tsar hardly knew something could not be the turning point which turned all course of history of the Hellenistic kingdoms. Such statement is equivalent to the assumption that East campaign of Alexander of Macedon was caused by the murder of his father Philip II organized by Persians. Philip V could not know plans of of an annibal, features of the Roman tactics of the warfare, their mentality so unlike for Greek (Macedonia did not wage wars of extermination unlike Rome not inclined to a compromise) 9. Such hasty conclusions were not in character of the tsar.

To you it is not necessary and to refer to his youth, fervor and ambition: for years of the first war he showed remarkable organizing and military abilities. All these years strengthening of a position of predominant force of the Hellenic league and gradual expansion of the sphere of the influence in Greece was its main objective. But both goals were far from over. During lifetime of the Achaean strategist Arata Philip was not held in that respect and authority which expected and which tried to obtain during fighting. Positions in Hellas also were quite weak, and he constantly had to look back at allies, to reckon with their desires and the threats proceeding from them. It is worth remembering at least a hint Arata for cancellation of the allied relations during the sacrifice on Ifom (R1Sh. Aha! 50; Ro1u. VII. 11). Understanding all this, the tsar had to be an adventurer, like Demetriya Farsky to think of a crossing to Italy and "world supremacy". Philip, of course, was not deprived of ambitious plans, but it is impossible to call him the dreamer on a throne: it was always guided by practical motives. And, to a kak of all his predecessors, the sphere of its interests covered safety of the borders and submission of Greece.

After Allied war Philip's looks addressed to Illyria, but his purpose in the relation of Illyria did not concern Romans. He did not plan to establish own protectorate over these lands. War with Skerdilaid who attacked lands of the western Macedonia became his next action.

Makedono-illiriysky relationship always was difficult. In the years of Allied war the Macedonian tsar bought the help of Skerdilai - yes for 20 talents, and at the end of war refused its services. Skerdilaid, having considered that Philip did not pay in addition to him, attacked 4 Macedonian ships which stuck nearby (Ro1u. V. 95.1-4). After that illiriyets were engaged in robbery of merchant ships in the Malian gulf. Philip had to equip the whole squadron for a pursuit of Skerdilaid.

Against it, but not against Italy as A.P. Belikov convincingly showed, the tsar constructed 100 lemb for transfer of the sil10. Against pirates, fighting for freedom of navigation, the tsar intended to create sea bases on the western coast of the Balkans.

About the war of data practically did not remain. There is an instruction Polibiya (Ro1u. V. 108. 3), that Philip decided to begin war with Skerdilaid. In the fall of 217 g he won the city of Dassaretida, taken earlier by illiriyets, took in the neighborhood of the Likhnidsky Lake Enkhelana, Kerak, Sation, Boi, in the earth of kaloykin - the Bow", in the field of so-called p-santin - Orgiss (Ro1u. V 108.8-9). Skerdilaid was stopped, but the victory over it generated new, much bigger, danger: Philip, having borrowed

Dassaretidu, became the neighbor of Rome. The possibility of approach of macedonians to the West for the first time found lines realnosti11.

In the winter Philip V was engaged in construction of the fleet that in the spring to go against Apollonia. Skerdilaid, having learned about it, notified Romans and called them to the aid. However Rome was occupied with war with Hannibal therefore sent only 10 ships (Ro1u. V 110.8-9). The easy lemba constructed by macedonians during the winter, of course, could not resist to heavy Roman kvinkvirema. Philip did not wish war with Rome therefore he wanted to avoid collision at the sea. Having gone from Macedonia around Peloponnese, it reached Corfu. Here it was overtaken by the message that the Roman fleet goes to Apollonia (Ro1u. V. 109-110). Probably, the message about a distemper in Messeniya at the same time has come. And it interrupted the sea campaign.

Poliby contemptuously speaks of it, attributing Philip's decision on retreat to the panic which captured it. The historian even assumes that if Philip continued swimming, then he would take control of Illyria and he took the Roman kvinkvirema (Ro1u. V 110.9-10). However such version is absurd: There were quite enough 10 powerful Roman ships together with the fleet of Skerdilaid who had to join Romans to destroy the easy lemba operated by inexperienced macedonians.

A consequence of unsuccessful attack on Apollonia N. Hammond considers the aspiration which arose at the Macedonian tsar to obtain guarantees from Roman vtorzheniya12. For this purpose after news of Hannibal's victory in the battle of Cannes Philip began with it negotiations on behalf of macedonians and allies (Ro1u. VII. 9. 1). And summer of 215 g concluded with it the alliance. Livy reports about conditions of the union (1lu. 23.33.1-12): "the tsar Philip will be transported to Italy with the fleet as it is possible big (believed that he will be able to equip two hundred ships) and will devastate the sea coast, land warfare and at the sea will fall to its lot; upon termination of war all Italy and Rome will belong to Carthage and Hannibal, and the annibal will get all production; having finally subdued Italy, they will sail to Greece and will lead war with whom the tsar will specify; the states on the continent and the islands belonging to Macedonia will belong to Philip and will enter his kingdom". Similar conditions are called by Poliby, citing the text of an oath of allies (Ro1u. VII. 9.1-17).

In these certificates - several doubtful moments. First, Livy specified that the Macedonian tsar will have to wage sea war. Moreover, at its order there will be a fleet from 200 ships. Such figure could not be true: Macedonia never had such fleet. Even in 217 g at Philip it was constructed only 100 lemb, experts macedonians mastered seafaring rather recently.

Hardly the similar squadron was dangerous to Romans. Even if to assume what Carthaginians of it did not know, then the Macedonian tsar had to realize about the opportunities. Secondly, in contrast Libya, anywhere to an oath vteksta (Ro1u. VII. 9.1-17) there is no mention of a promise of the Macedonian tsar to attack the Roman lands. There is only an indistinct mention that Philip will help Hannibal as the ally (Ro1u. VII. 9. 11). It can be interpreted as preparation by the tsar of a campaign not only to Illyria, but also in Italiyu13. As Philip's agreement with Hannibal became known to Romans when the Macedonian ambassador fell to them into hands, it is quite probable that Rome quite so and regarded further plans of the tsar. However all this did not mean that Philip V really intended to transfer war to the Apennine Peninsula.

Besides, according to Poliby, in an oath of allies it was proclaimed that Romans will not dominate over kerkiryana, apolloniata, Epi-damniytsami, and it is equal over Faros, Dismall, Parfinami and Atintaniya (Ro1u. VII. 9.13). But it is not specified anywhere that these lands will be attached to Macedonia. And Livy does not specify what "states of the continent" will belong to the tsar. Thus, a conclusion about Philip's desire to conquer Illyria arises only if to adhere to the version about presence of plans of gaining the West at it. But, in view of real opportunities of Macedonia, new war would become too expensive enterprise for gosudarstva14. Philip could not but realize it.

Other mention Libya is also doubtful: that 4 Ltd companies of the Macedonian soldiers were involved in battle at Zama in the fall of 202 g and were taken prisoner to Romans (Y\. 30.26.3). Neither Poliby, nor Appian report nothing to the aid of Carthage about sending the Macedonian troops. After the world in Fe-nike Philip's attention was concentrated on east direction, he hardly sought to excite hostility of Rome to himself and to help the Carthaginians who were on the verge of defeat. So the mention Libya based perhaps, on insignificant presence of Macedonians among Hannibal's mercenaries, should be carried to "promotion" 15.

According to M. Cary, the contract since annibaly brought to new turn in relationship of Rome and Greek mira16. If the Macedonian tsar kept a neutrality in the second Punic war, there would be extremely doubtful an intervention of Rome in the Greek affairs. However, in our opinion, it is necessary to estimate Philip's contract since annibaly very carefully. The fact is that researchers have a temptation to consider that Philip from 217 g had serious reasons to suspect Rome of the aspiration to attack Macedonia. N. definitely says Hemmond17 about it, for example. Perhaps, it is worth asking a question, than any Hellenistic tsar of that era in the policy was guided? "Political figures drevnos-

ti, - L.P. Marinovich fairly notes, - thought and worked, being guided by some kind of "social instinct", i.e. representations of the environment which were created spontaneously from long historical experience, feelings" 18 were cast in the ideas accepted in this circle. Philip could hardly expect the remote consequences of the agreement with Hannibal, his decisions were defined by the main core his politicians - the idea of the General world.

Here it is appropriate to remember Carthago Embassy to Alexander of Macedon on the eve of his death (Diod. XVII. 113.2; Arr. 7.15.4; Just. XII. 13. 1). Gaining Alexander and war of diadokh did not concern the Western Mediterranean. However military-political events in the east riveted on themselves attention of Carthage. This diplomatic contact if it took place in deystvitelnosti19, should be regarded as the aspiration of one of the leading states of the West to agree with the head of the grekomakedonsky power in the east about differentiation of spheres vliyaniya20. Possibly, the essence of the contract of Philip with Hannibal can be considered the same. According to A.P. Belikov, Philip hurried as he considered that war on the Appeninsky peninsula comes to an end: it wanted to be included in peace dogovor21. In the Greek world it was accepted that after defeat in decisive battle any Hellenistic state asked the world. The Macedonian tsar badly knew the Roman customs. However whether it is possible to consider that Philip intended to attack Italy? Hardly. Both Philip, and Ganni-bal signed the contract, but both behaved unfair: Philip did not think of the real help to karfagenets, Hannibal acted from himself personally, and his government did not undertake any obyazatelstv22.

Hannibal's interest was in ensuring naval bases near Italy through which he would receive reinforcements from Africa. Bases in Illyria were ideal it zamyslam23. And Philip expected that he annibat will distract Romans and will give the chance to macedonians again to attack Apolloniyu24. Livy reports about Apollonia's siege in 214 g (Liv. 24. 40). Apollonia's storm was not crowned with success because strengthenings of the policy were quite powerful. BIII of century usually occupied the similar cities by means of treason, cunning or hunger. Could bring to Utsach also suddenness. However in a case with Apollonia nothing from this worked. Then the tsar attacked Orik at night and occupied his harbor.

News about events on the Illyrian coast reached the Roman fleet. The ships under Valery Levin's command beat off Orik, then Romans approached Apollonia. Together with its inhabitants they attacked macedonians. According to Tit Libya, Philip was forced to burn the remains of the fleet and to go to Macedonia by land (Liv. 24. 40. 17). As in raspo-

the ryazheniya of the Roman commander of ground forces was not, that prosecution of macedonians was impossible.

Failures under Apollonia forced the Macedonian tsar to replace the purpose of the attacks. In 213 g he attacked Lys and Akroliss.

By Lys it was well strengthened so Philip also did not hope to occupy the Kremlin (Polyb. VIII. 15.2-3). He successfully used an ambush, enticed garrison from fortress and Akrolissom took control, and next day occupied also itself Lys (Polyb. VIII. 15.5-16.10). After that neighboring inhabitants and other fortresses were subdued (Polyb. VIII. 16.10-11).

So obvious aspiration of the Macedonian tsar to occupation of the Greek cities on the Illyrian coast should not be explained with Philip's intention to force out Romans from Illyria and to establish own protectorate over it. It is considered that similar plans were inspired in the young tsar by Demetry Farsky. Philip V really could listen to Demetry's councils, but not concerning a political policy of Macedonia at all, and in seafaring. The Illyrian adventurer was engaged in piracy not one year before escape to Macedonia, he knew the Illyrian and Greek coast, features of the ships, methods of conducting sea battle. Possibly, Philip welcomed Demetry so and ennobled because of his knowledge and experience in navigation. And when the Macedonian governor in 216 g was engaged in construction of the ships for transfer of forces to Apollonia, he constructed lemba (Polyb. V. 109. 3-4): the Illyrian type korabley25 was taken for a sample.

Control over the western coast was necessary first of all for protection of the Greek population against etoliysky and Illyrian pirates. Philip constructed 100 lemb which could transport 5,000 - 7,000 people. For comparison: on the eve of the battle of Cannes the Romans had 80,000 infantries and 6,000 cavalries, and Hannibal had about 40,000 infantries and 10,000 konnitsy26. One comparison of figures says that Philip would be a madman if decided to intrude in Italy with so weak forces. Actually, the Macedonian tsar intended to block piracy raids, staking not on quality of the fleet, and it is rather on its quantity. Interception of Illyrian vessels had to be carried out far from the Greek coast.

Apollonia or Epidamn could only be the only convenient location for basing of the Macedonian ships in the north. Apollonia's choice was probably caused by the fact that from this city to Macedonia Egnatiyev Road conducted. It passed through Likhnid and the Pole - border of Illyria and Macedonia, through Gerakleyu and area of linkestid and eord to Edes-su, and then to Pell and further to Thessaloniki (Strabo. VI. 7.4). And in case of success

Philip connected two seaports (Apollonia and Thessaloniki) by the overland road that had to interest dealers and make profit for treasury from transportation of goods. Besides, it gave the chance to react quickly both to distempers, and to hostile attacks of the opponent. Such security system if it took the finished form, could become the effective tool in Philip's hands for unity of Greeks under the auspices of Macedonia.

Philip in five years of the world after Allied war showed the interest in Illyrian territories and achieved some progress. Illyrian tribes and the cities appeared under the influence of Macedonia. Its purpose was in breaking Skerdilaida and to eliminate threat of piracy raids of illiriyets. He did not expect the Roman resistance to the plans. The fact that Macedonians managed to be taken unawares at Apollonia's siege demonstrates to it at least, then Philip had to burn the fleet and to recede by land to Macedonia.

Rome considered itself in a state of war with Macedonia, however opening of fighting was prevented by war with Hannibal. Therefore Romans when consolidation of their position in Italy allowed to be reached by Greece, signed the contract with Etoliysky federation.

Livy places registration of alliance in events of 211 g, but modern researchers date formation of this union of 212 g 27 there Is a question why the union was registered right now why not right after news of Hannibal and Philip's alliance. The reason probably is in the last success of the Macedonian tsar: in capture of Lissa28. On the Illyrian coast the Romans began to consider emergence of the Macedonian possession as threat of Italy. Neither Illyrian pirates, nor parfina, nor atintana constituted danger to the Roman interests. Otherwise the situation with Macedonia was: in recent years the Macedonian governor became famous for the campaigns and victories. Its exit to Adriatic Sea was interpreted unambiguously: as the aspiration to help Hannibal. The senate saw threat of the to "east policy" in active actions of macedonians.

Thus, neither the Illyrian factor, nor the agreement with Carthage played the defining role in Philip V's policy. Also you should not speak about its plans of gaining the West because the interests of the Macedonian governor were limited to Greece. Sources of the Roman-Macedonian conflict should be looked for in dissimilarity of the Roman and Hellenistic mentality.

1 F.G. Mishchenko. Federal Hellas and Poliby//Poliby. General history. T. 1. SPb., 1994. Page 45.
2 G.A. Koshelenko. Greece during the Hellenistic era//Hellenism: economy, policy, culture. M, 1990. Page 151.
3 V. Tarp. Hellenistic civilization. M, 1949. Page 77; Tomlinson R.A. Argos and the Argolid: from the end of the Bronge Age to the Roman occupation. Ithaca-N.Y., 1972. P. 161.
4 Plut. Arat. 49; 51; 52; Polyb. III. 2. 8; IV. 77. 4; V. 12. 5-7; VII. 12-14; IX. 23. 9; 30. 1-4; X. 26. 1-7; XIII. 3-5; XV. 20; 22-23; XVIII. 8. 8; 44; XXI. 1. 5; XXII. 9. 1; Paus. II. 9. 4; VII. 7. 5.
5 Tarn W.W. The Greek Leagues and Makedonia//CAH. Vol. 7. 1928. 765; Walbank F.W. Macedonia and the Greek Leagues//CAH2. Vol. 7. 1984. P. 477; Fine J. Macedon, Illyria and Rome, 220-219 B.C.//JRS. Vol. 26. 1936. P. 35, n. 75.
6 Eckstein A.M. Greek Mediation in the First Macedonian War, 209-205 B.C.//Historia. Bd. 50. Hft. 3. 2002. P. 270.
7 Walbank F.W. Macedonia and the Greek Leagues... P. 481; Briscoe J. The Antigonids and the Greek states, 276 - 196 B.C.//Imperialism in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1978. P. 153 ff.
8 Tyzhov A.Ya. Poliby and his "General history"//Poliby. General history. T. 1. SPb., 1994. Page 18-19.
9 Walbank F.W. Monarchies and monarchic ideas 11 CAH2. Vol. 7. 1984. P. 81.
10 A. Belikov. Item Rome and Hellenism: problems of political, economic and cultural contacts. Stavropol, 2003. Page 63-64.
11 Hammond N.G. Illyris, Rome and Macedon in 229-205 B.C.//JHS. Vol. 58. 1968.

P. 16.

12 Ibid. P. 17.
13 Briscoe J. The Antigonids and the Greek states, 276-196 B.C.//Imperialism in the Ancient World. Cambridge, 1978. P. 154.
14 According to Plutarch (Plut. Aem. Paul. 28), the income of the Macedonian tsars in comparison with income Ptolemeev and Selevkidov was small, they exceeded established by Romans to give to 100 talents in only two with something time, that is made about a little more than 200 talents a year. However, R. Errington believes that this figure only of a land tax, but not all state revenue of Macedonia: Errington R.M. Geschichte Macedoniens: Von den Anfangen bis zum Untergang des Konigreiches. Munchen, 1986. S. 200.
15 Dorey T.A. Macedonian Troops at the Battle of Zama 11 AJPh. 1957. Vol. 78. 2. P. 185-187.
16 Cary M. A History of Rome down to the Reign of Constantine. L., 1935. P. 197.
17 Hammond N.G. Op. cit. P. 21.
18 Marinovich L.P. Alexander of Macedon and formation of Hellenism//Hellenism: economy, policy, culture. Page 99.
19 Tarn W.W. Alexander the Great. Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1948. P. 374.
20 Seibert J. Alexander der Grosse (Ertr (ge der Forschung, Bd.X.). Darmstadt, 1972. S. 172, 296 f; M.Sh. Sadykov. The interstate relations and diplomacy in the Western Mediterranean in 323-264 BC Kazan, 2003. Page 30.
21 A.P. Belikov. Decree. soch. Page 64-65.
22 In the same place. Page 68-69.
23 Hammond N.G., Walbank F.W. A history of Macedonia. Vol. 3. Oxford, 1988. P. 394.
24 Gruen E.S. The Hellenistic World and the Coming of Rome. Vol. 1-2. Berkeley; Los Angeles; L., 1984. P. 376; Hammond N.G. Op. cit. P. 17.
25 For more details see: V.I. Kashcheev. Hellenistic world and Rome: war, the world and diplomacy in 220-146 BC of M., 1993. Page 170.
26 See: Hammond N.G. Op. dt. P. 16.
27 Note 119 to book by the XXVI Tit Libya. See also: Walbank F.W. Philip V of Macedon. Cambridge, 1967. Appendix III.1. P. 301ff.
28 Gruen E.S. Op. dt. P. 377.
Mark Robertson
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