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Diplomacy of the USA during the first military campaign of Israel in Lebanon (1982)

a. S. Yevtushenko


In LEBANON (1982)

Work is presented by department of modern, contemporary history and the international relations of the Kuban State University.

The research supervisor - the candidate of historical sciences, associate professor A.V. Vashchenko

On the basis of declassified documents of State department in article the diplomatic party of a political policy of the USA concerning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the territory of Lebanon reveals. Alignment of forces in the American establishment in the course of adoption of foreign policy decisions of rather Lebanese events is shown. The main attention is paid to the analysis of the relation of US Department of State to the conflict in Lebanon, conclusions of rather diplomatic course of action of Washington at the most difficult stage of the First Lebanon war are drawn.

A. Yevtushenko


The article reveals a diplomatic side of the U.S. policy line towards the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in Lebanon on the basis of unclassified documents of the U.S. Department of State. It demonstrates the alignment of forces inside the American establishment during the decision-making process concerning the Lebanese events. The main part of the article is focused on the analysis of the attitude of the U.S. Department of State to the conflict in Lebanon. The conclusion sums up Washington&s course of actions during the most complex stage of the First Lebanon War.

The beginning of a military campaign of Israel in the territory of Lebanon was preceded by difficult development of an intraregional situation which by the beginning of the 1980th was characterized by a number of both positive, and negative trends. On the one hand, in 1979 the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations which were taking place with the participation of the USA within the Camp David summit were successfully completed

(on September 5-17, 1978). Signing of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel became on March 26, 1979 their result. In spite of the fact that the American diplomacy could write down success in Kemp-David to itself in an asset, success on the Egyptian direction of the Arab-Israeli conflict did not mean leveling of other burning issues of Middle Eastern opposition at all. Among them to described

time for the foreground there was a problem of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs. However on the Palestinian track of negotiation process no progress was observed. The right-nationalist management which was in power in the Jewish state headed by the prime minister M. Begin (block of Likud) took very hard line on the Palestinian question. Ideological commitment of Likud to preservation under the Israeli control of territories of the West Bank and the sector of Gaza and also the construction practiced for quite some time now in them the Jewish settlements entered cruel opposition with aspirations of the Palestinian people to national self-determination and creation of own independent state. By then positions of a leader of the Palestinian national liberation movement were taken by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headed by Ya. Arafat. By the beginning of the 1980th the main forces of OOP were located in the territory of the Southern Lebanon.

The important factor influencing the general level of intraregional tension was represented by also political situation in Lebanon. By then once prospering Arab state was covered about 10 years by civil war. Opposition of Muslim and Christian groups which were supported by Syria and Israel respectively was its core. Thus, the Jewish state had noticeable impact on political life of the northern neighbor.

After signing a peace treaty with Egypt the discredit and destruction of OOP which was fiercely counteracting its expansionist plans of rather West bank and sector of Gaza became the main regional foreign policy goal of Israel.

In 1981 Lebanon already got to an orbit of the international attention when tension between Israel and OOP and also between Israel and Syria were fueled. The cause of disputes was the re-deployment of armed forces of Syria which in January, 1980 were withdrawn from Beirut and also coastal areas of Lebanon and are concentrated in the east of the country in Beqaa Valley (a smaller part of the Syrian troops settled down also along the highway Beirut-Damascus). These changes caused negative reaction from Israel. Placement by Syria in Beqaa Valley of missile launchers became the main reason of discontent of the Jewish state. The parties began to exchange hostile attacks, and the conflict situation began to gain steam quickly. Events around Lebanon were imposed on the general negativism of the Palestinian-Israeli relations. The situation in the region threatened to escape from under control. Under the circumstances Washington could not stand aside. The president R. Reagan appointed the retired American diplomat of the Lebanese origin F. Habib the special representative in the Middle East. Implementation of intermediary activity and search of a compromise for mutually acceptable settlement of the conflict became its task.

At this stage the rigidity and inflexibility of a position of Israel was already fully shown. It only aggravated already difficult negotiation process. So, at the meeting with F. Habib which took place on June 21, 1981 in Jerusalem the leader of the Jewish state said: "The government of Israel under no circumstances will not conduct negotiations with the Arab terrorist organizations which are proclaiming the purpose destruction of the Jewish state and its population and turned against them the weapon received in large numbers from the Soviet Union and Libya. Moreover, the government of Israel does not give the consent to that someone another conducted negotiations with the mentioned organizations" [11, R. 1].

Thus, the Israeli leaders, as a matter of fact, dictated to the United States the terms concerning their intermediary services.

F. Habib responded to M. Begin's statement that he is not going to conduct negotiations with OOP then went to Beirut to negotiations with the president of Lebanon E. Sarkis. As a result

the American diplomat managed to agree about ceasefire between Israel and OOP and also to soften crisis around missile launchers. The relevant agreement came into force on July 24, 1981

However long-term truce did not suit the leadership of Israel which as it was noted, headed for destruction of OOP. In spite of the fact that by the beginning of June, 1982 of OOP about a year the ceasefire agreement with Israel observed, the war cause was found. So, attempt at life of the Israeli ambassador in Great Britain Sh. Argov was made on June 3. Though OOP had to it no relation (attempt at Argov was made not by representatives of OOP, but fighters from the competing Palestinian group of Abu Nidal), did not keep itself to wait for the answer from Israel long. During the next two days the Israeli aircraft it is almost unceasing bombed refugee camps and other regions of Lebanon in which Palestinians lived. At that time it was the most hard and long blow of the Israeli forces across the Lebanese territory. As a result Israelis achieved what was expected: in response to their actions the Palestinians began rocket attack of the northern regions of Israel. Though, according to the Israeli data as a result of these firings only one person died, bleach an incident necessary for the leaders of the Jewish state it was received. On June 6, 1982 the military operation "World Galilee" began.

As for the leadership of the USA, for half a year before Israel of military operations it perfectly understood all complexity of the situation created around Lebanon. The memorandum of January 26, 1982 made following the results of a conversation of the American Secretary of State A. Haig with the Soviet colleague A.A. Gromyko, in particular, demonstrates to it. So, the US Secretary of State reported that the situation around the Palestinian question remains dangerous. In spite of the fact that Washington keeps leaders of the Jewish state from a solution by force, there is no confidence that military operations will not begin again - [7, river 27].

At the time of the conversation with A.A. Gromyko A. Haig perfectly knew that Israelis prepare the military operation. So, in spite of the fact that at the beginning of January, 1982 the prime minister M. Begin assured the U.S. President R. Reagan of what is not going to interfere for the territory of Lebanon, the chief of military intelligence of Israel E. Sagas notified A. Haig and also representatives of the Defense Ministry of the USA that invasion after all is supposed. Also the Secretary of State received notices of intentions of Israel and from other sources. However no counteraction from the USA at that stage was undertaken. The statement that "The United States do not support such actions was A. Haig's reply to the obtained information... At the same time they cannot forbid Israel to protect themselves from terrorist attacks. Important only that any step which it will take was presented as the response to internationally recognized provocation" [19].

The Israeli researchers Z. Schiff and E. Yaari claim that shortly A. Haig in the arrangement to Israel went further. So, during one of meetings the Israeli defense minister A. Sharon said to it: "Any state has no right to dictate another how it is better to protect the citizens". In response to it A. Haig nodded. Then A. Sharon let know that war can go beyond narrowly the goal consisting at a distance fighters of OOP from the territory of the Southern Lebanon. "How far you will go?" - the Secretary of State inquired. "As far, as it will be necessary", - A. Sharon answered. Then A. Haig said that he expects that actions of Israel will be fast and effective. As Z. Schiff and E. Yaari, A. Sharon wrote it was very happy with results of negotiations with A. Haig. In spite of the fact that the state secretary only confirmed the right of Israel to respond to acts of terrorism from OOP, the Minister of Defence of the Jewish state considered that he got approval on the limited military operation and returned to the country with news that Washington will not interfere with offensive at Lebanon [19].

Thus, the United States Secretary of State actually gave green light to conducting the military operation by Israel. At least, quite so it was regarded in Jerusalem.

After in the White House realized that A. Haig arrived precipitately, obliged to send it to M. Begin the explaining letter, as it was made on May 28, 1982. In general it was sustained in soft tones. So, the Secretary of State wrote: "The president and I recognize and we admire that restraint which Israel showed within the last months contrary to violations by the opposite side of the agreement on suspension of hostile actions in spite of the fact that long pressure was put upon it to fight back. At the same time we want to let know the sincere hope that Israel will continue to draw this line and will refrain from any actions which can potentially destroy the understanding which is the cornerstone of the ceasefire agreement. Military operations of Israel, regardless of the size, can lead to consequences which we cannot foresee at the moment"

[17, river 1].

Besides appeals to maintaining restraint in the letter the readiness of the United States to send to a zone of the conflict of the representative was also noted to help to settle problems of Israel with fighters of OOP.

However, according to Z. Schiff and E. Yaari, Israelis apprehended the letter only as the formality made by Americans to decline all responsibility in case their actions get out of the control of Washington [19].


about development of the military operation of Israel, it should be noted its precipitancy. Contrary to appeals of the international community (on June 6 the UN Security Council issued the resolution demanding from the Jewish state to withdraw the troops from the territory of Lebanon) the Israel Defense Forces dynamically moved ahead on the South - to Beirut. Already then it was clear that, without looking

on statements, the leaders of the Jewish state will not be limited only to establishment of control over the site of 25 miles in depth (40 km). On June 11 the UN Security Council once again called for ceasefire. This time the Israeli leaders answered positively. The relevant agreement came into force at noon of the same day. By that moment under control of Israel there were already considerable territories. So, on the coast they were located in three kilometers to the south of the airport of Beirut, in the east - almost reached the highway Beirut-Damascus, in the valley of Beqaa - were less than in seven kilometers from border with Syria [6, river 505].

However forces of OOP continued to remain in Beirut. On June 13 in the afternoon the Israeli troops reached east entry into the city. The so-called "creeping stage" of war began. By the evening on June 14 Israelis surrounded Beirut and within the next two months of 400 Israeli tanks and 1000 tools regularly fired at the territory of the Western Beirut while the aircraft struck systematic blows to strengthenings of Palestinians in the Lebanese capital [6, river 505, 506].

Ruthless bombings of the city caused a considerable international resonance. The president R. Reagan even began to threaten Israel with revision of the bilateral relations. Already on June 9 the Secretary of State A. Haig in instructions to the subordinate F. Habib noted: "The president studied a situation and authorizes you from his name to take a hard line in today's conversation with M. Begin and to convince him to begin withdrawal of troops in limits of a 40-kilometer zone, having stopped the attack of the purposes which are beyond its limits. You should notify M. Begin that failure to follow these requirements will be reflected in our bilateral relations and also on our ability to continue to protect Israel from the international consequences of its actions"

[13, river 2].

Thus, the White House, at least, at the declarative level went against aspirations of the leaders of the Jewish state. However any real measures

influence at the initial stage of military operations by Washington was not undertaken. At the same time the American side was not going to stand aside. So, from the very beginning of the Lebanese campaign and before its end the USA, as well as earlier, remained the chief intermediary in permission of the developed conflict situation.

It should be noted that the American diplomacy was faced by a difficult task. So, Washington on the way to consensus needed to consider opposite requirements of each warring party. Initially its plan provided the following the moments:

• complete recovery of the power of the government of Lebanon;

• elimination of the Palestinian military connections;

• submission of the Palestinian residents of Lebanon authorities of the lawful government [18, p. 1].

It is important to note that the initial position of the White House concerning the fate of the Palestinian people differed a little from that which was occupied by the leadership of Israel. So, Washington objected to the Israeli requirement that all Palestinian fighters (about 10,000 people) have to leave the territory of Lebanon. Instead it was supposed that only leaders of OOP [18, p have to leave the country. 1].

From the very beginning the identity of the state secretary A. Haig had a great influence on process of formation of a course of Washington concerning the Lebanese events. In process of development of the conflict of its decision all more began to be equitable to the interests of Israel.

Opening the internal factors influencing adoption of decisions by Washington concerning Lebanon it should be noted that already at an initial stage of the conflict between A. Haig and his subordinate F. Habib there were serious disagreements. As it was noted, implementation of shuttle diplomacy belonged to duties of the last to help conflicting parties to reach compromise. However F. Habib's mission was complicated considerably by A. Haig's aspiration

along with the official line to carry out and own, based on personal vision of the situation.

The cardinal discrepancy of views of two diplomats of one problem was noted in one of reviews of a Middle Eastern situation prepared by State Department. So, in the document of June 18, 1982 it was said that friction between A. Haig and F. Habib "reached such point that F. Habib would wish to leave a post" [16, p. 1].

From the very beginning A. Haig inspired in F. Habib mistrust. So, going to the Middle East, that imagined that he goes there to help with reaching an agreement on ceasefire after the occupation by Israel of a 25-mile zone. Thus, he was strongly disappointed when, being on the place, he learned that Israel is not going to be satisfied with what has already been achieved, and considered that A. Haig intentionally misled him.

One of representatives of the White House claimed that after that F. Habib began to send "hysterical" telegrams to Washington, demanding that the administration made "all necessary" to create conditions for immediate conclusion of agreement about ceasefire and removal of the Israeli armed forces in limits of a 25-mile zone [16, p. 1].

In the White House there were persons who took a similar position. It is necessary to distinguish Assistants to the President from them E. Misa and J. Beyke-ra. However contrary to their objections A. Haig managed to convince R. Reagan that actions of Israel give to the USA "new opportunities" [16, p. 1]. Thus, it was headed if not for support, then, at least, for tacit consent to further advance of Israel.

It is represented that the American Secretary of State understood wider space for diplomatic maneuver arising owing to further offensive of Israel at Beirut as "new opportunities", i.e. the independent stop of the Israeli army within a 25-mile (40-kilometer) zone could level for Washington an opportunity to act in

roles of the main peacekeeper. As a matter of fact, at that time the situation developed for the USA very favorably. As it was already noted, they actually were the only third party involved in resolution of conflict. Thus, the Secretary of State was ready for optimization of such situation. However its position was strategically incorrect and in the greatest way favored not to improvement of the situation of the USA, and the interests of Israel.

Returning to A. Haig's conflict with F. Ha-bibom and in view of that circumstance that A. Haig had overweight in influence, it should be noted that because of the contradictions existing between them there was a situation when F. Habib's councils reached the president with delay, i.e. succession of events advanced its recommendations. Thus, efficiency from its mission decreased.

Finally F. Habib was disappointed in A. Haig after arrived in Beirut. "Any American of the Lebanese origin would not be happy to see Beirut covered with sleeves from shells" [16, river 1], - from what was seen one of observers so characterized a condition of the diplomat.

By this time F. Habib already so did not trust the state secretary that he demanded that all his messages "were delivered personally in the president's hands" [16, river 1]. It is necessary to tell that this inquiry of the ambassador was satisfied. The events in Lebanon also made the shocking impression on R. Reagan. The Russian researcher I.D. Zvyagelskaya about it writes in the work: "Reagan was shocked by frames of bombings of Beirut which reminded him the chronicle of times of World War II, shooting of war correspondents which he watched in Hollywood, being a young actor" [1, page 238].

It should be noted that A. Haig discharged also the Pentagon of decision-making across Lebanon. The position of the Defense Ministry in general began to be ignored. Disagreement of his representatives with the line drawn by the head of State Department became one of the reasons of it. So, as for actions of Israel,

The Pentagon supported a position of the former president J. Carter urging the congress to accept sanctions against the Jewish state completely to force it to withdraw the troops from Lebanon. In response to the Israeli attacks the Pentagon proposed to increase military deliveries of Jordan and also to begin direct negotiations with OOP. Discharge of the Defense Ministry from decision-making became result of this statement also. As one of representatives of the White House told about it: "To the Pentagon for 80% curtailed the right to take part in operation" [16, river 2]. The official explanation was ridiculous - "misunderstanding of an essence of the international relations" [16, river 2].

A. Haig's aspiration to work in a separation from other representatives of administration of the White House, as well as considerable adventurousness conducted by it a course as a result led it to resignation. On June 25, 1982 he was ousted the state secretary. J. Schultz became the new Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Without having entered officially a position yet, J. Schultz, acting in committee of the Senate on foreign affairs, said that "crisis in Lebanon it is painful, but accurately showed the central problem of the Middle East which is that legitimate aspirations and the problems of the Palestinian people have to be considered and resolved [4, river 6]. Thereby it was aware of the USA some new turn is designated.

For the end of June, 1982 the position of the White House concerning permission of the Lebanese crisis provided:

1) creation of the strong Lebanese government;
2) reduction of the Syrian presence in Lebanon (it became because Israel put forward one of conditions of withdrawal of the troops from the territory of Lebanon the stay termination of connections of Syria there);
3) the end of activity of OOP in the territory of Lebanon as exterritorial force;
4) the end of activity of a proizrailska of the focused militia led by Ha-dadom;
5) strengthening of peacekeeping operation.

At the same time in official documents the aspiration to work strictly taking into account internal alignment of forces "to reduce possible risks and to hold an initiative was emphasized" [14, river 2].

However to hold an initiative in settlement, Washington needed to control actions of the Israeli government. The deputy state secretary N. Veliot in the confidential letter of June 27, 1982 addressed to his colleague L. Bremer, in particular, said about it. "Israeli cabinet, - wrote Veliot, - gathers today presumably to discuss and make the decision concerning the following steps in Lebanon. At the moment the main political question are intentions of Israel of rather Western Beirut. The government of the country faces the choice: or to resume an attack on the remained OOP forces, or to refrain and begin political and diplomatic settlement of a situation.

In my opinion, from the United States is absolutely necessary to guarantee that further attacks on the Western Beirut and its densely populated outskirts will not repeat" [10, river 1]. Further in the text the American diplomat makes recommendations of how it is necessary to run business with Israel in case it does not follow a course of the White House. "If Israel insists on the and, contrary to our position, will continue attacks on the Western Beirut, we can warn him that the president, according to the law of the USA, will suspend to it all military deliveries. Also we have to be ready to address immediately to the UN Security Council for adoption of the resolution urging Israel to stop military operations and to withdraw troops from Lebanon. M. Begin should not doubt that our actions have direct and rigid character" [10, river 2], - it was said in the document.

Anyway, further succession of events showed that these recommendations and remained on paper.

Returning to a situation directly in a conflict zone, it is necessary to tell that for July, 1982 with the participation of the USA there were negotiations on evacuation of OOP. In their center there was a problem of search of the states wishing to accept Palestinians in the territory. During negotiations F. Habib met the Syrian foreign minister A. Haddam and his Saudi colleague S. Al-Faysal. Following the results of a meeting it was clear, as here the easy decision is not expected. The fact is that any Arab country did not want to receive anyone from OOP. The initial plan of the USA for accommodation of fighters of OOP in the territory of Syria or Algeria was rejected by the leaders of these states. So, in the memorandum of July 20, 1982 issued following the results of negotiations it was said: "We continue to work on this problem, however without special optimism to find a solution. Assad said that Syria will not accept fighters, reaction of Algeria also was negative. Saudis say that they will continue to work on the matter with Syrians and find possible dispersion of fighters of OOP over all countries which will issue them identity cards" [12, river 1].

Due to told, it is important to note the fact that the USA did not conduct any negotiations of rather future OOP with Ya. Arafat. Washington continued to look at the leader of the Palestinian resistance movement as the terrorist, and made to it a number of demands from which adoption of UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 was the main thing. "Our political line concerning OOP remains invariable. The USA does not recognize and will not begin negotiations with OOP until it does not adopt UN Security Council resolution 242 and 338 and does not recognize the right of Israel for existence" [15, river 1], - it was said to the state secretary in one of memorandums of July 25, 1982

However on the same day Ya. Arafat made the written statement in which he expressed recognition of "all resolutions of the UN concerning the Palestinian question" [2, river 1]. But neither USA, nor, especially, Israel such

the option did not arrange. "There is a large number of the resolutions of the UN concerning Palestine which completely go to a section with resolutions 242 and 338 and also a set of documents which we vetoed in the Security council or against which voted in the General Assembly" [2, river 1], - it was said in the official statement of State department. Thus, "Arafat's initiative" did not pass.

Meanwhile F. Habib during the trips across the Middle East managed to make a certain progress in a solution of the problem of dispersal of the Palestinian fighters. Syria, Jordan, Sudan agreed to accept them. Only Saudi Arabia refused flatly such step, having assured, however, that it will continue to render all necessary help in settlement of the matter.

A little negativist position was taken also by Egypt. The president H. Mubarak connected the consent of the country to accept a part of representatives of OOP with mediation of the USA in satisfaction of aspirations of Palestinians to formation of the state on the West Bank and in the sector of Gaza. However at that time Washington did not review these complaints as realistic. Here a role was played also by fears of the White House that Israelis can accept such succession of events as a political victory of Palestinians in war that, in turn, could provoke a new wave of violence [9, river 1].

Due to told it should be noted that the leader of OOP did not consider evacuation of the organization from the territory of Lebanon as the acceptable decision at all. All negotiations of the USA with leaders of the Arab states were conducted without its position.

At the same time Washington very accurately considered a position of Jerusalem. So, despite statements of the state secretary and president, the White House did not seek to counteract aspirations of the leaders of the Jewish state actively. As a matter of fact, both parties supported the same option of resolving the situation which main aspect was an evacuation of OOP from the Western Beirut and all Lebanon. The difference was only

that Israel staked on military force, and the USA - on diplomacy. As well as at A. Haig, the main mistake of Washington was the fact that it did not consider scales of true intentions of Israel.

So, despite negative estimates of official Washington, the prospect of creation of the Palestinian state on the West Bank, the option of granting autonomy to Palestinians (as a result of a new round of negotiations on Kemp-Devidsky' type) was not excluded. Jerusalem looked at this problem absolutely differently. In particular, the prime minister M. Begin and his immediate environment expected that defeat of OOP in Lebanon will demoralize the Palestinians living on the West Bank that will facilitate to Israel process of annexation of this territory. However this aspect did not consider the White House. Thus, as well as at an initial stage of war, the USA contrary to own beliefs continued to conduct the course favorable to the Jewish state.

In August, 1982 the bombings of the capital of Lebanon by armed forces of Israel reached the apogee. So, on August 1 the artillery of the Jewish state fired at the territory of the Western Beirut within 14 hours. At that time it was the most long attack of Israel. In response to it the U.S. President said that he considers absolutely obligatory that any of the parties at this stage of negotiations did not break ceasefire [3]. However Israel, having intended to force out by all means OOP from Beirut, it was unshakable. On August 4 he fired at the city 20 hours without interruption. Then the president R. Reagan expressed need "restoration and maintenance of complete ceasefire" [5, river 6]. Besides the president sent the personal message to the prime minister M. Begin in whom warned that the American-Israeli relations can be substantially damaged in case of bloodshed continuation. However and it did not stop the Israeli attacks. Since August 11 and within two next days, the Israeli Air Force bombed areas of concentration of bases

OOP from air. This blow of force of the Palestinian resistance was not born. On August 12, 1982 the new round of negotiations with the assistance of F. Habib following the results of whom OOP agreed to leave Beirut followed.

On August 18, 1982 the government of Lebanon and OOP confirmed officially commitment to provisions of the agreement on evacuation developed with the participation of the USA. Next day it was approved by the leadership of Israel.

The plan offered by the United States provided distribution of representatives of OOP between a number of the Middle Eastern countries (Jordan, Iraq, Tunisia, Northern and Southern Yemen, Syria, Sudan and Algeria). Before leaving the members of paramilitary groups of OOP had to give all the weapon and ammunition to the Lebanese armed forces. Evacuation of OOP was supposed to be carried out under control from multinational peacekeeping forces. The schedule of evacuation and the sequence of actions of the foreign peacekeeping contingent and also various international organizations was formed. The funding mechanism for withdrawal of fighters of OOP from the Western Beirut also registered in the agreement.

Already on August 21, 1982 multinational forces which part 1800 American marines were began the mission for safety of a conclusion of OOP. On August 30 the turn to leave Beirut and to the leader of the Palestinian resistance movement came. On the same day it safely left for Tunisia. From this point and before Ya. Arafat's return to Gaza within agreements of Oslo (1993) in Tunisia there was a headquarters of OOP. By September 4 the evacuation of the Palestinian fighters was fully completed.

Of course, together with evacuation of OOP the conflict around Lebanon did not end. The United States did not manage to realize the plan completely subsequently. Neither the Syrian, nor Israeli troops from the territory of Lebanon were withdrawn (connections of Israel were in the safety zone created in the south of the country the next 18 years), and the Palestinian problem did not get permission. However this circumstance was not reflected at all in the bilateral American-Israeli relations which condition at the time of evacuation was accurately expressed by J. Schultz. "We are completely committed to maintenance of safety of Israel, - the Secretary of State said, - of course, throughout this period we had some tension in the relations. So, the United States opposed introduction of the Israeli troops to Lebanon. There were cases when it seemed to us that Israel uses excessive force, and we sounded to it our concern. In spite of the fact that that time was very intense, the relations between the United States and Israel in the basis remain are strong" [8, river 2].

The carried-out reconstruction of events allows to say that throughout the entire period of Lebanon war of the USA incorrectly imagined intentions of the Jewish state. In this regard they did not manage to develop an effective course concerning resolution of conflict. However as a result of it Israel was the winner. There was a situation at which rules of the game were defined not by Washington, but Jerusalem. So, M. Begin's government managed to achieve all goals: OOP was removed from the territory of Lebanon, and the solution of the Palestinian problem is removed. The important point confirming told is the fact that Ya. Arafat agreed to adopt the agreement on evacuation not as result of influence of the American diplomacy (though its role in settlement should not be diminished), but as a result of rigid military influence from Israel. At the same time the leaders of the Jewish state during conducting military operations did not seek at least for the minimum coordination with the partner. He was not even frightened by prospect of severance of diplomatic relations.

During the first Lebanon war that model of the American-Israeli interaction which completely was fixed in the 1990th began to develop. Support White

became its main characteristics

the house of the Israeli government irrespectively whether Israel according to their aspirations works or is not present. Exactly from now on small by the sizes,

artificially created Jewish state began to manipulate in the interests the world superstate, ignoring at the same time its requirements.


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2. Arafat&s "Initiative". July 26, 1982. [Electronic copy of the archival document]//The U.S. Department of State Reading Room. URL: (date of the address: 14.04.2009).
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6. Gilbert M. Israel: History. London, 2008.
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10. Letter from Nicholas A. Veliotes to L. Paul Bremer, III. June 27, 1982. [Electronic copy of the archival document]//The U.S. Department of State Reading Room. URL: PDF (date of the address: 14.04.2009).
11. Meeting Between Prime Minister Begin and Foreign Minister Shamir with Philip Habib. The Prime Minister&s Residence, Jerusalem, On July 21, 1981, at 6 p.m. [Electronic copy of the archival document]//The U.S. Department of State Reading Room. URL: (date of the address: 14.04.2009).
12. Memorandum for the President from George P. Shultz. [Electronic copy of the archival document]//The U.S. Department of State Reading Room. URL: (date of the address: 14.04.2009).

13. Memorand

Kelley Sharon
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