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Notes of the Don statesman (M.P. Bogayevsky. The answer before history. Grand-ducal. March, 1918) (termination)



 © 2004 N. Sergeyev

NOTES of the DON STATESMAN (M.P. BOGAYEVSKY. The ANSWER BEFORE HISTORY. GRAND-DUCAL, MARCH, 1918) *

Below the second part of article of the deputy of the Don ataman, chairman of the regional government Mitrofan Petrovich Bogayevsky devoted to the most hard time of the Cossack state since October, 1917 - till January, 1918 is published. As well as the first part, the material given below is the unique source written by the author in prison in a genre of memoirs without delay of events, which is a peculiar political autobiography. Acquaintance of scientific community and modern scientific assessment of work of Bogayevsky are necessary. It is specific, important on coverage of the historical events having the All-Russian character is considerable on awareness of the author on events of historical importance. Scientific assessment is possible by means of a comparative method for the purpose of determination of reliability of the data which are contained in "The answer before history". As comparative material we used the most various documents and materials: earlier speeches and including the last big speech of the prisoner in Novocherkassk in March, 1918, article Bogayevsky 1917 - the beginnings of 1918, periodicals, certificates of other memoirists and other documents. Also researches of scientists where the indisputable, established by science objective facts contain are used. The task of establishment of authorship of the document because it is indisputable that especially is evident after its first reading was not set: written, undoubtedly, belongs to Bogayevsky - it is visible on his awareness on events about which more just nobody could know.

The second part of work of Bogayevsky contains a number of objective observations, the exact facts, fair generalizations. So, political value of the Southeast union of the Cossack troops, mountaineers of the Caucasus and the free people of steppes created in July - October, 1917 with stay of the Joint government in Ekaterinodar, Bogayevsky estimated objectively. He emphasized that in this Union "saw serious attempt to support and strengthen the idea of statehood", "it was thought of us in the form of impact on Russia by means of weapon". Such conclusion is supported by modern researchers [1]. Also other conclusions are right, for example, the mentioned Southeast union "was the enterprise stillborn: in each area there was extremely difficult situation"; on elections to Uch-

* Termination. The beginning in No. 3, 2004

a reditelny meeting in November, 1917 the Cossack list got considerable support (45% of voices) [2]. Peculiar truly Bogayevsky and a condition of confrontation reflects in the Soviet belokazachyem the front in the fall

1917 - winter of 1918 which, according to it, contained "more aggressive enthusiasm, than military operations".

In the Soviet historiography the opinion was approved that the Cossack circles were expression of class aspirations of the Cossack top. This in general right definition was often transferred also to characteristic of social composition of the Cossack circle that was wrong. In a modern historiography paid attention to this circumstance [3] more than once. Bogayevsky specified right reference points and determination of social composition of the Big army circle of 1917 (in the majority farmers), however the author allowed other extreme: he refused to define ideological orientation of solutions of the Cossack circles.

It is possible to agree that terror from White Guards in the first weeks after October, 1917 was applied occasionally (on November 26, 1917 cadets killed deputies of the Growth and Nakhchivan Council of L. Kund, Kazberyuk, and later the head of Bolsheviks G.P. Fadeyev-Vasilyev, etc.). There were also other facts: by order of Kaledin were originally arrested, and then delegates of a historical II All-Russian congress of Councils V.S. Kovalyov, M.P. Zhakov and others and also deputies of the Makiivka Council are released. Bogayevsky sought to quash "rumors about A.M. Kaledin's bloodthirstiness", however is annoying that he had no opportunity documentary to prove who when and where dismissed such rumors. Being in prison, he did not know and could not know already that the hungry army turned weapon on the solution of social problems that mutual terror collected and expanded, developed into the civil war which covered enormous territories and taking place in the most severe and cruel form (13 million are killed, in 1914 - 1920 the country lost 60% of the national wealth).

Other group of the facts and generalizations is not exact, is sometimes simply wrong, many data demand check. So, Bogayevsky bypassed a question of creation in Novocherkassk at all (in November - December, 1917). The All-Russian anti-Bolshevist government of the Don civil council under the chairmanship of the former chief of staff Supreme Commander tsar Nicholas II general M.V. Alekseev. And meanwhile Bogayevsky was a member of this government. It did not open Alekseev's role in creation of volunteer bourgeois and landowner army at all, this role is consciously belittled by Bogayevsky, and the general is represented only as the organizer of the arrived volunteers to the hostel. Besides the memoirist consciously sought to disprove the reality arresting attention - on volunteer army (as A.I. Denikin emphasized more than once) the press of class selection (in it officers were soldiers) laid down. Instructions of the author "Otve-

that before history" on what in this army was "many people absolutely poor", hardly changes the developed estimates of its social composition.

Bogayevsky's conclusion that the youth of Russia was on the side of anti-Soviet forces ("rushed in a deadly fight with the Bolshevism"), needs to be estimated concrete historical on the example of formation with its assistance in Novocherkassk since November - December, 1917 of youth teams at protection of the capital (in the absence of support from the Cossacks). Bogayevsky saw inaccuracy of the estimates of anti-Bolshevist positions allegedly of all youth of Russia, in this respect there are his certificates in memoirs. The criticism of data of "The answer before history" can be continued, but the volume of article limits opportunities, besides it can become a problem of an independent research. Fruitful reception of the istochnikovy analysis is comparison of work of Bogayevsky to P.M. Ageev's memoirs - "the Don Kerensky", the moderate socialist, one of heads of the Cossack circle. "Occasionally obviously and always secretly, - Ageev wrote, - A.M. Kaledin and M.P. Bogayevsky were to supporters of the Cossack dictatorship to Dona" [4]. This situation explains a lot of things: and their refusal to allow export of bread from Don for starving, and failure of formation of zemstvoes and land committees to Dona, both the beginning of construction of the All-Russian anti-Soviet power, and approval of bloody actions of "the commandant of Donbass" of Chernetsov's Cossack captain, etc. Bogayevsky's work - the major historical source. The human thought of the intellectual, professional historian is fine, are valuable to science of his data. However he could not write comprehensively truthful memoirs in the conclusion: a feather of the prisoner drove fear...

The ANSWER BEFORE HISTORY (The Don wave. 1919 30.U_. No. 25)

A few weeks flashed, and events did not keep waiting for themselves: October days in Petrograd and Moscow burst: a booming echo they responded, of course, to Dona. The escaped officers, the cadet and so forth began to appear. In Novocherkassk they were sheltered some. The gen. Alekseev who arrived to Novocherkassk organized in the group living the hostel in one of the former infirmaries: among them the huge majority is the youth which was not sparing the life in fight for the belief and a mistake will claim that all this there were children of rich parents, no, among them there were many people absolutely poor. I had to meet and talk to them, but ("alekseevsky") I had not a direct bearing on this organization, and all orders were done about it by exclusively Kaledin. But, of course, I was in the know. Why we treated so tolerantly these fugitives? Those days we also did not think that Don should wage civil war, and our attitude towards fugitives from Moscow and Petrograd was defined only by the fact that they

were politically persecuted, and we did not refuse to none of them a shelter, without asking about political belief. Any intentions to make of them the political tool, certainly, was not. And it is easy to prove it, at least on the example of Rodzyanko. He was to Novocherkassk, escaping from arrest in Petrograd, and wanted to play a political role. But Kaledin and especially the deputy Kharlamov let it know that he can only live in Novocherkassk as the individual. Rodzyanko was offended and, having quietly lived in Novocherkassk several weeks, somewhere left.

Meanwhile events of the Russian life, fight of the new power against the opponents turned into big civil war, and in Novocherkassk there arrived new groups of fugitives of different places. They settled, neither the ataman, nor the Army government showed any special cares of them as had no time for them in addition they were grouped around Alekseev who found ways of their food, etc. No public and army money at the same time existed at present and they lived exclusively private support, apparently, mainly from Moscow. Whether the organization was set by some purposes? As far as I know, no special tasks were put and people had a rest after endured, but the main point of view of Alekseev and his closest employees was defined constantly very precisely: protection of the Constituent assembly from whose that was attempts. Whether there was in it a hidden aspiration after all to advocate the class interests? I cannot tell anything concerning Alekseev's employees (there were different people, it is not enough to me known, but in general mainly cadets), but Alekseev made an impression on me positive: his word could be trusted. During the narration I still did not concern one moment in life of the Cossack troops of the European Russia: Southeast union. The thought of it arose in the first days of the Cossack congresses, but then it was implemented in the form of the union of the Cossack troops with its Council in the head who was in Petrograd. The union was not fated to play a large political role. To us weak it seemed connection and in the form of the Southeast union. It was reasonable in the idea at a July conference where there were representatives of almost all parts which entered subsequently into the Union. Attached to the union significance mainly political: in it saw serious attempt to support and strengthen the idea of the statehood perishing under the pressure of anarchy internal and powerlessness external, but it was thought of us in the form of impact on Russia by means of weapon: we thought, arranging at ourselves a democratic system, to promote strengthening of an order, to obey to will of which considered the duty. All Cossacks of the European Russia those days definitely held the Cossack program. It is enough to look at counting of votes on the Cossack regiments to make sure that else in November even veterans voted for list No. 1 at the head of which there was Kaledin.

This list was guided only by the Cossack program. The southeast union setting to itself the purposes state and seeking for association for organization of local life was the enterprise stillborn: in each area there was extremely difficult a local situation (Don, Kuban, Terek). The peasantry reached for the Cossack lands. With Orenburg and the Urals from the first days of existence of the Union the communication almost broke and had accidental character. I have to specify categorically: had no leading beginning in relation to the Cossack troops of Don, and on it Kaledin in any form did not apply. Difficult communication turned out because that ways of messages from the first days became very difficult. There is nothing to say that nobody could play roles of the organizer on the nesorganizovannost. Political life hardly began to make the way after the beginning of fight against the Bolshevism, I claim: no organized help existed and could not be. Each army acted at own risk. What to explain such persistent resistance of the Cossack areas with? Only intrigues of generals and landowners? It is inclined to think that in this fight there are a lot of deep reasons which cannot be resolved only fighting programs. Historical existence of the Cossacks both its long identity, and heavy service, and some household individual traits of the Cossack (all this is applicable to big or smaller groups) - all these facts played not the last role in fight against the Bolshevism. I do not say that the question for the Cossack did not stand in such sharp form as for the soldier peasant any more. It is necessary to add one more small stroke to all this: during revolution the Cossacks did not hurry with the structure of committees because for it in a new system the removal of guardianship of the ataman over the Cossacks was the most essential, Cossacks found the rest. Seizure of power by Bolsheviks in large figures was reflected in the area, first of all in Rostov where the revolution happened to the help of the Black Sea sailors. The reasons thanks to which sailors in Rostov appeared, are explained mainly by those exaggerated rumors which persistently were spread across all Russia that Kaledin: 1) enemy of peasants; 2) pursues workers on mines, disperses the working organizations and 3) bread and coal does not release from area. These three charges, unfortunately, extend and hitherto. They played a sad role in "suppression" of Rostov by Kaledin. I already raised the question of the attitude towards the peasantry and categorically I claim that there is resolutely no basis to say that Kaledin prevented to live to the peasantry: in areas the Army government did not interfere with his life at all, but needed assistance. Cossacks in July - August commissioners-nurses rejected zemstvo, but nobody prevented the Don peasantry to hurry with the organization. It is impossible to say that Kaledin hung up peasants on all cable columns, etc. Charges concerning persecutions of workers and their organizations arose for other reasons. Coal paradise -

ona of the Donetsk and also Cherkassk and Taganrog districts from the first days of revolution were in the movement: it was organized and, certainly, arms of workers were made, but originally the relations of owners and workers were normal, but then they gradually became aggravated. Performance of mines fell, and, probably, was misses on both sides much, the issue of miner militia was especially sensitive. We lie. it is right., abolishing police of Russia, entered militia, except the Don Region. Within several months in the area the local militia was put, but in the absence of means it ran up or was not better than former police. Kaledin from the first days of an atamanstvo strongly tried to obtain introduction of the state militia, believing that only the militia, independent by the situation, is able to fulfill the requirements of the state, in particular on protection of safety of inhabitants. Absolutely differently workers treated it, and attempts to enter militia on mines led to misunderstanding. Meanwhile we lie. it is right., anxious with coal mining falling, took measures to protection of mines and settlement of the relations on them (commissioner Orlov). Kaledin, only standing on the state point of view of that time, just as considered withdrawal of regiments to Don inadmissible, it was not reconciled with the fact that mines did not carry out completely the appointment and from here those movements of the Cossack parts on mines of the Makiivka district where it was especially disturbing, thanks to activity of such irreconcilable demagogues as Pereverzev. The commandant of the Makiivka district appointed a Cossack captain Chernetsov who played a large role in the history of Don the last months. The courageous guerrilla in the war, very fairly clever in general and the person, resolute by the nature, he, however, was capable of big extremes in the fight heat. And nevertheless he in every possible way sought to establish the quiet relations with workers that it, probably, and managed to reach as Cossacks of its hundreds had free access in the working organizations. Kaledin constantly orally and in writing confirmed to Chernetsov that he did not stir normal life of working committees, etc. I far am not aware of this question as also his Kaledin saw off personally, but I know that at Chernetsov business did not reach bloody collisions until events from the outside accepted the nature of already real civil war. Also the third charge was not quite correct: never and prevented to take out to nobody Kaledin coal from area, otherwise its works about protection of mines would be strange, and here between Rotopa-mi, Osotopami and so forth some fuss which couldn't settle to us as there was a million public affair went the coal organizations really. Has to tell about bread that prohibition of export it from area - and for very simple reason - it a little in her was valid if to take into account that all North of the area starved already then that this measure became essential and necessary. We could not think of pro-feeding of others when at us there came hunger at

>. To same it is necessary to add that requisitions of bread in general became extremely difficult as peasants and Cossacks reluctantly brought bread even at the doubled prices, and from the requisition armed with force to make it was also impossible because the population was deeply negative to it, extremely reluctantly went, but also absolutely refused to go to military units. Escape to Novocherkassk officers and cadets, independent policy of Kaledin, rumors about oppression of workers and peasants by it - all this those main reasons which prepared the movement to Don among the sailors of the Black Sea Fleet and Bolsheviks acting in Ekaterinoslavskaya's limits of lips. Certainly, it was in every possible way warmed up from the area because it was difficult for local Bolsheviks to make by own efforts a revolution as the Cossacks at that time still held neutral position. Approach of the Soviet troops, as we know, was led in several directions: to Taganrog, Rostov, Millerovo, Dashing, etc. The Black Sea traller entered the Rostov port. All actions focused mainly on Rostov where the Soviet power was announced. Fight lasted about 1:/2 weeks and on December 4th Kaledin almost without fight with the small victims occupied Rostov.

In capture of the city officers, the cadet and volunteers were directly involved and also also some Cossack parts worked. What was the purpose of occupation of Rostov when the most part of Russia already was in hands of Bolsheviks? Those days confidence that the only competent owner after all the Constituent assembly which those days just had to gather in Petrograd. If we voluntarily could not recognize the power of Bolsheviks in October days, then, naturally, in area we considered ourselves to the Constituent assembly owning all completeness of the power belonging to us in the absence of BP. it is right. Goes the exaggerated cock-and-bull stories about Kaledin's cruelty in particular shown during the Rostov business much. Yes. Several fighting skirmishes were cruel: near Nakhchivan and during a siege of the Rostov station where Pototsky * sat, really Red Guards laid down much, and their fighting capacity low at that time increased these victims (they, e.g., speak, went to open against the station), losses at Kaledin were, but they were less losses of the Rostov Bolsheviks. Having entered the city, Kaledin of atrocities, executions, etc. did not organize, but I cannot deny that in the current war with Germans and civil war they make an everyday occurrence, i.e. executions of prisoners and arrested: any soldier and the Cossack can in this occasion tell the sad story of human sufferings and cruelty, times absolutely unclear and indescribable. The same was confirmed also in civil war: both parties, seem to me, worked cruelly and inevitably on the relation

* The general Pototsky was the chief of garrison of Rostov.

to each other, I only do not undertake to approve who to the first possesses this awful initiative. At occupation of Rostov there were many arrested, but the commission on extrajudicial arrests which began to release them the whole groups was immediately founded. And I claim: in the Novocherkassk prison of nasiliya and murders and furthermore atrocities were not. As for the democratic organizations, all know that in day of occupation of Rostov Kaledin ordered not to interfere with work all of them behind an exception the soldier. - a roar. committee leading fight. Civil most cruel war, and Russia, obviously, horror has to endure it. But that is more awful than everything, in this war there was a terrible gap between the people and the most democratic and honest intellectuals which was the Russian who very much brought the victims for the sake of the benefit of the people... Disturbing days of the Rostov revolt compelled the government in the first of December again to convoke the 3rd big army circle since both the ataman and the government considered that it is necessary to request army about further policy. Rostov was occupied by Kaledin in operating time of a circle. After the occupation of Rostov the ataman at one of the first meetings gave the account on a situation to Dona and very resolutely stopped on one situation which formulated so (I report almost literally): "To operate area, leaning only on one part of the population, it is impossible. It is necessary to involve all population of the area in local affairs". He raised a question so resolutely and firmly that it was not objected. But Ageev, the chairman Kruga, aggravated a question a little, is unexpected for all having carried out the offer on parity. It excited a part of the Circle and though the parity passed, but some discontent on the Circle was. It, obviously, had no essential value, but was indicative in the respect that a part of the Cossacks hardly could reconcile to need to divide even the present insignificant power with the "nonresident" population. But the voice of the ataman was crucial and accepted need of convocation of a regional congress or edges. Uchr. meetings. It was solved originally together with Don's remains. Region ispol. committee to call the Circle and a congress of non-residents for the end of December. But the Circle dragged on, parted only in the middle of December and at the last meeting was decided to call the Circle later together with a congress from another town. The difficulty of simultaneous convocation is explained mainly by huge inconveniences in movement and complication of fast arrival for northern deputies. Thus, and here, as we see, Kaledin possesses an initiative of creation of the regional power with the general participation of all groups of the population. The question of the relation to fight against the Bolshevism was raised to the Circle. At the Circle there were about 500 deputies from villages, in the same place there were also more than 200 people of members of the All-Russian Cossack front congress which postponed the meetings from Kiev to Novocherkassk owing to fight between glad and Bolsheviks. All Don deputies of a congress according to the solution of the Circle were prinya-

you in it with the right of a casting vote. Therefore, will claim by a cruel mistake again that on the Circle everything was solved only by fathers. And as treated front what was offered by the ataman and troops. governs.? They supported their offers and generally there were no serious reasons for disagreements yet and furthermore to fight of "fathers and children". The army government, perfectly understanding that it conducts very responsible policy, led by the ataman everything entirely retired. And again Kaledin was elected by the vast majority: from more than 200 front voices he did not receive in addition, it seems 40 - 50 from which there were probably also some stanitsa deputies. Therefore, we witnessed again that not only stanitsa, but also veterans amicably supported the ataman who became especially on the way of the joint work with non-residents. The dispute was near the place of the companion of the army ataman. Here, perhaps, discord between front and stanitsa deputies affected slightly more brightly, the first with a part northern in number 250 supported Ageev as the socialist enjoying confidence among front already because he had to preside over their congress, without speaking already, of course, about his political convictions. The majority of votes was for me: it were mainly stanitsa deputies, and several dozen voices were also from northern districts. I explain the reasons of this vote with the fact that the Cossack program on which I only stood was expensive to the Cossacks and from here it supported my nomination. Speaking about the old Cossacks I, by the way, find it necessary to protest resolutely against that prejudice against structure of circles which provocatively was dismissed in Russia and in regiments: the overwhelming mass of circular deputies was the true Cossacks, farmers whose common state sense I never doubted. However, many villages along with the old Cossack sent also intelligent representatives and therefore it is clear that the general level of circles was quite intelligent. The certain reactionary adjusted deputies in the Circle were, but the general mood of the Circle always was deeply democratic. This my deep belief.

December 1917. The circle came to an end, and fight against Bolshevist troops not only did not stop, but as though became brighter to inflame, at the same time, however, it should be noted that at both parties more aggressive enthusiasm, than the real actions was shown, i.e. neither the front Cossack masses, nor soldiers wished to be at war at all. And it also brought: at Bolsheviks to the organization of red guard, the Latvian shooters, etc. random elements, and to Dona - to performances of volunteer army and organization of the guerrilla groups also collected from random elements. I very much find it difficult to claim categorically that volunteers and guerrillas - sonnies of rich parents, the bourgeois, etc. I was a student and the teacher, I played not the last role in 1906 - 1908 in council of heads St. Petersburg uni -

the versitet also I think that I know the studying student's youth. And just this youth there was also most of all in volunteers and guerrillas, that youth which for the sake of the benefit and happiness of the Russian people laid down the life on gallows and perished in Siberia. Yes, the same youth, poor and proletarian, it as though became the enemy of the people!... In what here a riddle? Why it could not become in ranks of fighters for a new better life, followed Kornilov, Kalediny, Dutovy, etc.? To me, the contemporary and the loved one of all events, more than once it was necessary to think seriously of this question, and I am afraid that I will not manage to give the correct biased answer, but nevertheless I will try to make it in process of the forces. The huge mass of our studying youth - from all groups of the bourgeoisie from large to the smallest. But in it always the democratic spirit which defined also political sympathies of the Russian youth strong kept. She was selflessly betrayed to the people and the victims proved this fidelity. And now, obviously, the critical moment in her life if it rushed in deadly fight against Bolsheviks came. Besides elements of class fight there is something another here. Idealistic rushes of the Russian youth led it to self-sacrifice; the Bolshevism with its fighting tactics those days when waited Uchred. SOBR., could not but cause a protest from youth; rough handling with cadets in Petrograd and Moscow gave as a result that cruel animosity which gave already armed struggle. In conclusion I can tell that the Russian youth, "a barometer of the Russian society", and rather new movement, perhaps, and is mistaken, but I firmly believe what is mistaken sincerely - and it it is possible to forgive much. I will not stop on peripetias of the running high civil war: it is more or less known. The direct leadership in affairs of defense of area mainly Kaledin and operational office of the Army headquarters with several officers knew; the colonel of the Army headquarters Arakantsev and had at this time no relation to this business. Actions on both sides developed slowly.

It should be noted that regular Cossack and soldier's parts equally persistently evaded from participation in actions. Hardly the December Circle as at the end of December the congress of non-residents (working cities and the peasantry) began parted. At this congress mainly among workers and soldiers was the person of 40 Bolsheviks from total number 120 - 130 (at the beginning of, apparently, 150). The mood of a congress was serious, though indistinct, was speeches much; Kaledin and me was met frostily, but listened attentively. Heads of a congress persistently sought to enter it into business work and to achieve any result. I, especially Kaledin any not only pressure, but also could not influence a congress since he was rather independent in the work and, apparently, from our party only one speech of Ageev had propaganda character, and it was hotly

it is approved by a congress since he called to association of all population of Don. A main goal of a congress - the organization of the temporary power to Dona until convocation regional Uchr. meetings, joint Circle and congress of the nonresident population. Also other questions were raised, but I will concern them further. According to the will expressed by a December Circle it was offered to organize the Joint government by means of introduction to the structure of the Army government of representatives from non-residents. "Parity" underwent severe criticism, but nevertheless in view of temporariness of situation the offer to accept was solved, and on the basis of consideration of different questions at congresses the order of members Objedin was developed. governs. from the non Cossack population which they also began to carry out after the receipt in Objedin. governs. 8 members Objedin entered. governs., 8 emissaries: part of the intellectuals, part of people gray. It was originally hard to adjust work as political structure Objedin. governs. it turned out motley. Some time for strengthening the relations was necessary. First of all times. governs., according to the resolution of a congress, started release of arrested in Rostov, etc. places during fight against Bolsheviks. I have no exact figures at hand, but I know that the special commission let out in the very first days almost all political arrested. I know that none of them were exposed to any repressions. And I claim again: rumors about Kaledin's bloodthirstiness in relation to defeated are absolutely superficial. Then Objedin. the government already started consideration of the land question in the area and issued the resolution which entrusted to local committees to make the inventory of all privately owned property and not to allow its plunder. The resolution is new in effect represented nothing, but to accelerate prove-

North Caucasian academy of public service

its deniye in life was necessary. Objedin. governs. already started consideration of some questions of working life, but at this time other events already beat out Objedin. the government from the returning to normal work. Parcels of peace delegations to the Soviet troops of essential value had no since Bolsheviks set the certain task which was not allowing negotiations. In the middle of January in Kamensk the soldier was formed. - a roar. committee, to which from Objedin. governs. the delegation led by Ageev was sent. Arrival of representatives Voyen was result of its negotiations. - Roar. Committee led by Podtelko-vy to Novocherkassk.

M. Bogayevsky

The Donskaya Volna newspaper in No. 16 for September 30, 1918 so summed up the stay results in power of M.P. Bogayevsky: "The fairy tale by Mitrofan Bogayevsky died, the Cossacks bent from a saddle on the left - at a president's table saw Pavel Ageev".

Literature

1. Yu.K. Kiriyenko. Revolution and Don Cossacks. Rostov N / D, 1988. Page 172.
2. Yu.K. Kiriyenko. Kaledinshchina crash. M, 1976. Page 70.
3. The power to Dona. Historical essays. Rostov N / D, 1999. Page 47; N.V. Zvezdova the Renaissance of the Cossack circle to Dona (May - June, 1917)//North Caucasian legal vestn. 2001. No. 1. Page 107-119
4. P.M. Ageev. Memoirs. 1917. Are stored in library of the Rostov university.

On December 30, 2003

John Jordan
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