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Istoriya the White movement in persons as an innovation of research process

p. I. Grishanin


At a turn of the XX —HH1 centuries in studying history of the White movement borders between "science" and "journalism" began to be washed away. Strengthening of emotions in science, a scientific character mimicry in journalism demonstrate the happened violation of genre borders. Professional historians begin to create works on a joint of literary and popular scientific genres. It is explained only by the need to understand objectively difficult peripetias of fratricidal war, and, above all to show that each general had weaknesses, the pain, the advantages, but all of them were united by one — love for the country. Therefore historians turn into writers, and the last present themselves as historians.


P. Grishanin


At the turn of the 21st century the borders between & #34; science" and & #34; publicism" in studying the White Movement history started diffusing. Emotion intensification in science and mimicry of a scientific character in publicism manifest the genre bounds violation. Professional historians begin to produce works at the turn of literary and popular science genres. This is explained purely by the need to study complex peripeteias of the fratricidal war objectively and, which is more important, to show that every general officer had his own weaknesses, troubles and merits, but they all were united by love for their country. Therefore historians turn into literati, and the latter present themselves as historians.

It is no secret that one of features of modern historical knowledge is weakening of its identification potential because it is in rather competed environment. Instrumentalization of history faces promoting of scientific criteria of knowledge that leads to situations in which personal or collective memoirs contradict the official version of history.

In development of historical knowledge two interdependent trends are observed: on the one hand, there is a process of dissolution of history in the present, and to another — excessive trust not to history, and to memory. As a result, as the Swiss researcher I. R-mann considers, "the modern history does not explain where the future — a role which she long since played conducts. It cannot be model of the future any more" 1.

To some extent it was a consequence of high politicization nearly of all plots of the Russian history in the late eighties of the 20th century when the so-called wellbeing in the future directly contacted that, the past will be how truthfully described. The domestic researcher A.B. Kamensky emphasizes that "today the Russian society in relation to history and historians has no overestimated expectations, so, attempts again to give stories and, in particular

to teaching history, ideological sounding which became more active recently, in effect, are doomed to a failure" 2.

At the same time it should be noted that at a turn of the XX —HH1 centuries in studying history of the White movement trends of development of historical knowledge of 1985 — 1991 began to dominate — borders between "science" and "journalism" began to be washed away. Strengthening of emotions in science, a scientific character mimicry in journalism demonstrate the happened violation of genre borders. Professional historians begin to create works on a joint of literary and popular scientific genres. It is explained by exclusively urgent need objectively to understand difficult peripetias of fratricidal war, and, above all as one of the running researchers of White business in the south of Russia A.V. Venkov considers, by means of "gallery of portraits" to show that each white general had "weaknesses, the pain, the advantages", but all of them were united by one — love for Rodine3. Therefore historians turn into writers, and the last present themselves as historians.

All this keeps within a framework of a postmodern which, according to the domestic researcher M.F. Rumyantseva, is characterized "by change of type of memory from historical, serving collective

identifications of society in historical space, to other type of memory which serves identification of an individual in all space of culture" 4.

The literary boom around heroes of Civil war strikes with unprecedented scope. Literature becomes the field of a peculiar coordination of numerous ideas of Civil war. The consolidated search of a complete view of tragic events of 1917 — 1920 begins to be shown in genre convergence as one of features of modern public consciousness. More often it is possible to face use literary and art (or cinema) proofs of justification of any given scientific-theoretical concepts. At the same time moral appeals begin to receive the status of the new theoretical truth. Intellectualization of modern literature in the form of a scientific mimicry demonstrates active transformation of the popular ideas into the leading and general sociocultural principles.

With the corresponding prefaces there are various documentary collections, for example, "Behind the back of Kolchak" and the White Soldiers series 5. There are popular scientific series which many books are devoted to the positive image of the White movement and its leaders, for example "Russia forgotten and the unknown" 6.

Biographies of the certain leaders of the White movement represented only in tonalities of national heroes of distressful Russia and even moreover are taken as a basis of new works, as a rule. By estimates, for example, of D.M. Volodikhin, "heroes of White business are secular martyrs, sufferers for Russia, for the sovereign, for belief. The last orthodox troops before long night" 7. By means of a personnel the authors try to open the functioning mechanism about -

the tivobolshevistsky movement during Civil war. The famous researcher of the Russian revolutions A.I. Kozlov who published many works about life and A.I. Denikin's activity in one of the early studies in the mode of a so-called convertible genre recognizes that it is extremely interesting to modern reader to learn "vital credo of one of the largest persons of the end of the second millennium". Kozlov is convinced of what thus is possible "directly and to specifically comprehend history lessons connected, in particular, with a global problem of violence and the ill-fated fate of our state" 8.

Especially brightly above designated is shown in the File without Retouch series which is published the Moscow publishing house VEChE within which there were several books devoted by one of the chief representatives of the White movement — to L.G. Kornilov, A.V. Kolchak, N.N. Yudenich and G.M. Seme-


At first it is worth addressing one of founders of White business general L.G. Kornilov. The military historian A.V. Shishov calls him "one of the main initiators of Civil war" 10 that in principle and is that. It should be noted that Shishov's works on White movements differ in emphasis of attention to military operations during Civil war. Leaning on a set of documents and certificates, the researcher designs Kornilov's image as the most white among all white generalov11. Shishov notes that the natural ingenuity, thirst for knowledge, erudition were inherent in Kornilov. It is especially noted that Kornilov was a person resolute, not losing self-control critical minutes, able not only to order thousands of people, but also to force subordinates to believe in himself; the emphasis is placed on firm concepts of Kornilov about honor and a military duty. Showing Kornilov on the Russo-Japanese war, the author

it gave hope to troops which saw in the vigorous young commander of the savior sent by destiny. V.G. Krasnov shows that Wrangel an iron hand began to put white army in order, saving it from all the nastiest that remained from Denikin: embezzlements of public funds, decomposition, theft which corroded army and the back. After Wrangel inhaled in army the new force as if by miracle from the decayed parts, the shabby and separate troops, literally fighting cases in the eyes grew. Wrangel as the soldier and the guardsman, built army of new type, built it in his own image — Guards. The author notes that Wrangel safely put forward gifted youth which put above honored denikinsky senior officers whom calls by "asthmatic denikinsky reptiles" 34. After Wrangel removed shoulder straps from "the degraded, impenitent colonels in the dullness", sending them to ordinary, thereby, allowing to pay for the past, brave young ensigns became at the head of regiments. Krasnov notes that it caused hot delight in army, and, despite Napoleonic ambition of Wrangel, it was much better than "an old wreck" of Denikin.

Narrating about Wrangel in the time of troubles of revolutions, the author writes that Wrangel was shaken by the fact of renunciation of Nicholas II's throne as the convinced monarchist Wrangel did not know, than it is possible to replace the power. And in the decision of the grand duke Nikolay Nikolaevich to obey to Provisional government and to transfer General headquarters to the general M.W. Alekseeva Wrangel sees an event, fatal for the country and army. Krasnov writes that Wrangel was deeply revolted by the general cowardice, cowardice and servility before the new power of soldiers, officers, officials and, the most important, the immediate environment tsarya35. It is noted that to Wrangel since childhood the look was imparted that the army has to stand out of

politicians. Though then it is visible that Wrangel not really adhered to him subsequently.

Narrating about a kornilovsky performance in August, 1917, V.G. Krasnov considers that it only led to rapid increase of disintegration of the state and army against which Kornilov fought. According to the author, differently also could not occur as masses saw real threat to revolutionary gains which were identified with democratic in a kornilovsky performance. They saw attempt of military reaction to return an old regime in a performance. In reply on it only rapid growth of revolutionary movement which was frequent spontaneous and anarchical began. The author characterizes the general Kornilov as the general, inclined to "zaryvchatost", who was able to combine assertiveness readily make a compromise and to be pliable when it was demanded by his personal interests.

Speaking about the White movement, V.G. Krasnov gives different characteristics of army and to its various figures. So, the group of a Cossack captain of A.G. Shkuro mostly dangled in the back and plundered, the Volunteer army in general lost red technically, in number of soldiers, but it was rescued only that at red there was an inept management and lack of discipline that reduced all superiority on net36. The general V.L. Pokrovsky and the colonel Shkuro did not manage or did not wish to put a necessary end of inevitable robbery of the population from parts and sharply did not draw a distinction legal and unlawful that has an adverse effect then on army. The youngest of the Crimean generals Slashchev is characterized by vigor, cruelty and adventurism. Savinkov is represented as the large master of political intrigues. The general Denikin at the beginning of the command is shown as the thoughtful, firm, purely Russian person having reputation of the honest soldier, brave, capable and

it novitsya by the obedient tool of the Rate. Denikin is shown the person of nothing understanding in policy. The slogan of "The United, Great and Indivisible Russia" proclaimed him is called foggy and uncertain. It with some fanaticism went for fight against all what was contrary to this truth proclaimed it.

When it is told about Denikin and Wrangel's conflict and the strategy of a campaign which is developed Denikin to Moscow, Wrangel's ambition is noted. Probably, he decided that with the shabby army of new glory you will not earn, and understood inaccuracy of the idea by the main forces to move on connection with Kolchak whose army receded and was already inaccessible. Therefore he decided to head the large mass of a cavalry on the central direction to Moscow where success was outlined. However in the "Moscow directive" Denikin channelized it another, and V.G. Krasnov calls this directive at the same time both the beginning of triumph of the general Denikin, and the beginning of its defeat.

Capture of Tsaritsyno by Wrangel promotes growth of his authority — he becomes the general, most popular in the officer environment. The author notes that in comparison with Denikin Wrangel won even appearance: "Its high figure tightened in the Circassian, and a characteristic "wolf" look really made an impression" 40. Krasnov concludes that therefore it was no wonder that the general Denikin saw the dangerous rival in Wrangel. As result — since August, 1919 Denikin's relations with Wrangel began to worsen quickly and it knew all out of the Rate. The author explains an essence of their disagreements with Denikin and Wrangel's aspiration to leadership in the south of Russia, preservation of an absolute power and mastering of the main force for fight against Bolsheviks — Armed Forces of the South of Russia.

Analyzing Wrangel's memoirs, V.G. Krasnov comes to a conclusion that it sometimes distorts the facts. He notes,

that in Wrangel's memoirs the constant aspiration of the general to focus attention of the reader on miscalculations and wrong moves general Denikin attracts attention and it is told about his personal correct actions. Krasnov notices that it is natural as memoirs of figures of the White movement, with rare exception, for this purpose and were written to show the role and the importance in various events. The author explains Wrangel's dislike for the general K.K. Mamontov with Wrangel's offense that Mamontov got success of brilliant 40-day raid, but not to it. V.G. Krasnov objectively estimates results of that raid and comes to a conclusion that the task assigned by the Main command to Mamontov was fully carried out. Raid was executed is exemplary, despite hobby for its participants for plunder of settlements, but V.G. Krasnov justifies it as plunder went generally on the way back when it was refused further approach to the North. V.G. Krasnov writes that if connections of Armed Forces of the South of Russia moved forward, then would reject the opponent to the North. But it did not happen as Denikin threw all forces to Moscow. It is noted that Moscow for Denikin was everything: both boundless power, and loud glory. And he did not want to share it with someone else. For this reason he pushed into the background Wrangel who could help as the brilliant cavalry chief, and Mamontov who successfully and resolutely began to move ahead on sever41. In general, the author notes that the ambition was inherent in both Denikin, and Wrangel, and Mamontov, and Kolchak, and many other white military leaders. Just all of them sought to big glory. This is V.G. Krasnov and calls one of the main reasons of crash of white matter in Russia as it was impossible to achieve the general success in fight against Bolsheviks. The situation developed so that to Mamontov without support was netse-

lesoobrazno to go north further. And the general Mamontov as the author considers, considered the further advance losing and returned back as support to it was not. And on some sectors of the front even retreat of white troops began that changed a situation in favor of the Red Army. After all these events the faith in the high command was considerably shaken.

Continuing to draw Wrangel's analogy to Denikin, V.G. Krasnov writes that Wrangel was resolute and very successful military leader what he was lost by spineless Denikin in. Besides Wrangel was careful, did not risk in vain and preferred to consult, receive at first exact instructions from above and already then to work for certain. But V.G. Krasnov notes what approach both Denikin, and Wrangel did not meet the requirements of day and therefore in the Russian situation of that time everything was predetermined and the question consisted only in defeat time as the army all the same would lose even if it to Moscow would be conducted by Wrangel. Aspiration of people to Wrangel, his grand welcomes only fed in Wrangel his vanity and aspiration to glory more and more. But the author notes that for Wrangel, as well as for any successful military leader, this quite natural quality. Wrangel's trip to Ekaterinodar during retreat of its army to Tsaritsyno are regarded by the author simply: "Wrangel actually left the army in a situation, critical for it" 42. And a situation when Wrangel refused to visit Legislative Rada as at first did not send him the official invitation, speaks about his baronial pride. V.G. Krasnov notices that at this moment the personal ambitions of Wrangel got the best of interests it armii43.

The author notices that Denikin and his headquarters did not realize about the amount of the suffered defeat in a campaign to Moscow and refused even to recognize that in its army there are no efficient horse parts, prodol-

zhy to lay hopes for the broken Mamontov's army. V.G. Krasnov writes that Wrangel understood that in the demoralized and receding army he does not have the place as with them you will not get new victories and glory. And Wrangel already did not believe in the general Denikin, hostile to it, and understood that it will suffer total collapse soon, and Wrangel did not want to take part in it. The same hostile relations at Wrangel developed also with Shkuro whom he did not let to the Volunteer army headed by it. These relations were mutual. Krasnov notices that defeat of army of Denikin and its catastrophic retreat happened suddenly for all, and what was considered a basis for the arising Russian statehood, failed in the first serious kampanii44.

When V.G. Krasnov describes Wrangel as the governor of the Crimea, fairly criticizes its board. It is noted that Wrangel saw the key to success in further war with Bolsheviks implicit submission of its absolute power, and strongly disturbed him that the prestige of the Main command fell. Dontsa wanted to come back home rather and did not think already of a new campaign to Moscow that threatened with split in a white camp. But V.G. Krasnov shows that Wrangel managed to change such position of donts. It is noted that though all supporters of the White movement also gathered in the Crimea under Wrangel's command, but only a small part was capable to be at war. Wrangel reformed army, carried out mobilization and strengthened technical parts. According to V.G. Krasnov, for this purpose Wrangel had time, the situation favored emu45.

But Krasnov accents negative sides of the regime of Wrangel, emphasizing that the counterintelligence actually became governing body of the Crimea, brought order, court-martials pronounced death sentences. By V.G. Krasnov's estimates, some drastic measures to Wrangel was

Mia, for what Wrangel punished without mercy. Also one more reason which ruined Denikin — "a stupid velikoderzhav-nichestvo, "Uniform and Indivisible", inability to find a common language with suburban nationalities" 50 is noted.

V.G. Krasnov analyzes also Wrangel's conflict with the general Slashchev (the unrecognized genius, the old rival of Wrangel) who after Denikin's falling also wanted to become a dictator — his name at that time sounded on an equal basis with a name of Wrangel. Krasnov notes that for determination and eagerness Wrangel stood Sla-shchev, forgave him alcoholism and scandals, however as a result decided to get rid of him as troops did not need two leaders. "What history entrusted him to Wrangel, he does not intend to share with anybody!" 51. It is noted that Wrangel was ready to do anything, for the sake of preservation of the power. Its union with Makhno, in fact, was purely makhnovsky and if it existed in fact, then it would give to Wrangel a great number of the true fighters and would lead to disappearance in all territory of "green" controlled by Wrangel.

Also V.G. Krasnov notes that Wrangel and could not exist month without military and technical and political support of allies. The author characterizes defeat of landings on Don and Kuban as the beginning of the end of the Russian army, and the zadnep-rovsky tragedy finally undermined in troops confidence to the commander, and then all understood that this strategic crash of Wrangel and the end of army. Krasnov notes that Wrangel obviously overestimated the opportunities. And, despite all defeats, Krasnov writes that in Wrangel's rate there was the same that once in Denikin's rate — all continued to amuse themselves with illusions and to wait for one more eminence and chance.

Speaking about the emigratory period of activity of Wrangel, V.G. Krasnov comes back to his positive estimation and writes that in the most difficult conditions of Gal-

lipol Wrangel and his environment tried to keep army in an efficient state and to prevent its decomposition as still trusted in a possibility of resumption of fight against Bolsheviks as left the Crimea not to be emigrants. And to return to Russia and to serve it. For what the efficient army was necessary. But dreams, plans and provisions of leaders of the White movement conflicted to real vital needs of most of the Russian emigrants who were in difficult psychological state that had an adverse effect on army. Wrangel's claims for a role of the leader of all military emigration and his attempt to keep the strict military organization were perceived in the environment of officers ambiguously. Many did not share his views on political apathy of army, subsequently there were even opponents among various military unions.

And nevertheless V.G. Krasnov shows new and new miscalculations of Wrangel. For example, the general liquidated any opportunity to connect himself with the Russian public abroad which could provide psychological and material support, possessing big funds and international relations. Wrangel's requirement of political apathy of the officer unions as V.G. Krasnov shows, resulted in the results opposite to that which the general wanted to achieve — his influence and prestige in emigre circles sharply fell. It is noted that the immediate environment of Wrangel did not promote growth of its popularity, and even on the contrary. First of all the general A.P. Kutepov whom the author calls the assistant and Wrangel's competitor for leadership in the Russian military emigration is accused of it.

At Wrangel sensible assistants because of what his leadership and popularity inevitably ran low were not valid. This results from the fact that Wrangel all -

lat one and did not hold about itself clever people. In such situation nothing remained to it as V.G. Krasnov except how to rely on the grand duke Nikolay Nikolaevich shows. The author concludes: "Probably, the general Wrangel was a bad politician" 52. The general Wrangel, according to V.G. Krasnov, was too ambitious and jealous to the popularity which he tried to preserve. But the author does not blame him for it as he considers that it is natural to the person, wholly understood what it is the power. In decomposition of the Russian army and all White movement abroad the author also notes the Soviet intelligence agencies — GPU and Razvedupr of PKKA53.

V.G. Krasnov proves that attempt at Wrangel in 1921 was initiated and carried out by the French who did not want to kill Wrangel but only wanted to intimidate to achieve his departure from Constantinople. The French, the author concludes, could quickly and without special efforts to organize such operation on controlled by them territorii54. The author does not call into question that GPU it was involved in Wrangel's death. He explains it with the fact that the "iron" general Kutepov with controlled fighters who was going to begin active fight against Bolsheviks about which Wrangel was skeptical was dangerous to Moscow. Kutepov, but not Wrangel inspired fear in Bolsheviks. But it was possible to move away him only by means of the Soviet agent Skoblin whom Wrangel dismissed, but to whom Kutepov was kind. The author writes that the unique plan for Kutepov's elimination consisted in primary elimination of Wrangel which successor could be only Kutepov. After that Kutepov would return Skoblin under the resolution of the grand duke Nikolay Nikolaevich for a post of the head of kornilovets. And then Brackets lean, according to V.G. Krasnov, could perform operation on elimination of the general of Kutepova55.

Thus, the book is constructed in general on positive assessment of the general Wrangel and negative characteristic of his opponents. Allocating negative sides of activity of Wrangel, V.G. Krasnov at the same time tries to acquit him. He explains Wrangel's misses with the fact that the military talent seldom is followed by political talent and writes that in the white movement this line was inherent in all. Wrangel's ambition comes true what honor for all leaders of the White movement more characteristic there was a glorification of own name, neglect to opinion of others, irrepressible thirst of the power, aspiration to personal wellbeing and continuous political-magogiya56.

Summing up the result and generalizing above and above told it is possible to note that for all researches of this sort the image of the anti-Bolshevist movement through a prism of a personal tragedy of any given his leader because of awareness of own powerlessness is obligatory to bridle revolutionary elements in Russia. And many authors try to bring in work intrigue elements consciously.

But anyway all these works represent standard model of communication in which there is a sender, the message and the addressee. The message is generated, and is interpreted later, proceeding from a certain code, the general both for the sender, and for the recipient. In the course of communication also the certain literary style excluding certain indexes of specialization is developed. It is characteristic that all these works are designed for rather wide audience therefore the sender and the addressee are present at them not as real poles of the message, and as a single whole. At the same time works are aimed at quite certain reactions of more or less certain readership therefore are open for various interpretation. Ideological addictions can bring to

28 V.V. Markovchin. Three atamans. — M, 2003.
29 In the same place. Page 9.
30 In the same place. Page 108.
31 In the same place. Page 160.
32 Sinyukov V.V. Alexander Vasilyevich Kolchak: from the researcher of the Arctic to the Supreme governor of Russia. - M, 2004. - Page 368.
33 Krasnov V.G. Wrangel. Tragic triumph of the baron: Documents. Opinions. Reflections. — M, 2006.
34 In the same place. Page 5.
35 In the same place. Page 84.
36 In the same place. Page 156.
37 In the same place. Page 157.
38 In the same place. Page 172.
39 In the same place. Page 187.
40 In the same place. Page 258.
41 In the same place. Page 293.
42 In the same place. Page 340.
43 In the same place.
44 In the same place. Page 417.
45 In the same place. Page 433.
46 In the same place. Page 436 — 437.
47 In the same place. Page 441.
48 In the same place. Page 466.
49 In the same place. Page 452.
50 In the same place. Page 464.
51 In the same place. Page 465.
52 In the same place. Page 583.
53 In the same place. Page 585.
54 In the same place. Page 641.
55 In the same place. Page 650 — 652.
56 In the same place. Page 631.
57 U. Eco Rol of the reader. Researches on text semiotics. — SPb., 2005. — Page 14, 19, 45, 53.
58 M. Eliade. Aspects of the myth. — M, 2005. — Page 23 — 24.
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